WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE
HEFT 59

RYUSEI KEIRA

MĀDHYAMIKA AND EPISTEMOLOGY

A STUDY OF KAMALAŚĪLA'S METHOD FOR PROVING THE VOIDNESS OF ALL DHARMAS

INTRODUCTION, ANNOTATED TRANSLATIONS AND TIBETAN TEXTS OF SELECTED SECTIONS OF THE SECOND CHAPTER OF THE *MADHYAMAKĀLOKA*

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Ryusei Keira
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Abbreviations

AAA	*Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* of Haribhadra.
AAKŚV	*Abhisamayālaṃkārakārikāśāstravivṛti* of Haribhadra.
AAVN	*Anekāntavādanirāsa* of Jitāri
AK	*Abhidharmakośakārikā* of Vasubandhu.
AKBh	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu.
AKPŚṬ	*Abhisamayālaṃkārakārikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkā* of Dharmamitra.
AKVy	*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (Sphuṭārthā)* of Yaśomitra.
APDṬ	*Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇīṭīkā* of Kamalaśīla.
BGZ	*dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* of Tsong kha pa.
BK I	First *Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla.
BK II	Second *Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla.
BK III	Third *Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla.
BKGGA	Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
BNJ	*dBu ma snang ba'i brjed tho* of bsTan dar.
BPP	*Bodhipathapradīpa* of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna.
BPPP	*Bodhipathapradīpapañjikā* of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna.
BSGT	*Blo gsal grub mtha'* of dBus pa blo gsal.
C	Co ne Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
CG	*lCang skya grub mtha'* (*Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*) of lCang skya rol pa'i rdo rje.
Chin	Chinese.
CWTSB	*The Collected Works (gSung 'bum) of rJe Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa, Reproduced from an example of the old bKra sis lhung po redaction from the library of Klu 'khyil Monastery of Ladakh.*
D	sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
DhP	*Dharmottarapradīpa* of Durveka Miśra.
ed	edition; edited; editor.
EA	*Etudes Asiatiques.*

fn	footnote.
G	Golden Manuscript.
HB	*Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti.
HBṬ	*Hetubinduṭīkā* of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa.
HBṬīkā	*Hetubinduṭīkā* of Vinītadeva.
ill.	illegible.
IBK	印度學佛教學研究 *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies).*
JA	*Journal Asiatique.*
JBORS	*Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.*
JIABS	*Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.*
JIP	*Journal of Indian Philosphy.*
JSS	*Jñānasārasamuccaya* of Āryadeva(?).
JSSN	*Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana* of Bodhibhadra.
k	kārikā(s).
KhG	*mKhas pa'i dga' ston* of dPa' bo gTsug lag phreng ba.
LAS	*Laṅkāvatārasūtra.*
LNY	*Legs bshad snying po* (*Drang pa dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po*) of Tsong kha pa.
MAK	*Madhyamakālaṃkārakārikā* of Śāntarakṣita.
MAP	*Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla.
MAV	*Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* of Śāntarakṣita.
MAU	*Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa* of Ratnākaraśānti.
MĀ	*Madhyamakāloka* of Kamalaśīla.
MCB	Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques.
MMA	*Munimatālaṃkāra* of Abhayākaragupta.
MMK	*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s of Nāgārjuna.
n	note.
N	sNar thang Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
NB	*Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti.
NBh	*Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana.
NBhūṣ	*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña.
NBṬ	*Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara.
NM	*Nyāyamukha* of Dignāga.
NP	*Nyāyapraveśa* of Śaṅkarasvāmin.
NS	*Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama.
NV	*Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara.
om.	omit; omitted.
P	Peking Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
PBh	*Praśastapādabhāṣya* (or *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*) of Praśastapāda
PP	*Prajñāpradīpa* of Bhāviveka.

PPU	*Prajñāpāramitōpadeśa* of Ratnākaraśānti.
PPVṬ	*Prajñāpāramitāvajracchedikāṭīkā* of Kamalaśīla.
PrasP	*Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti.
PS	*Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga.
PSṬ	*Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā Viśālāmalavatī* of Jinendrabuddhi.
PSV	*Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* of Dignāga.
PSVa	Tibetan translation of PSV by Vasudhararakṣita and Seng rgyal.
PSVb	Tibetan translation of PSV by Kanakavarman and Dad pa shes rab.
PV	*Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti.
PVA	*Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* of Prajñākaragupta.
PVin	*Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti.
PVinṬ	*Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* of Dharmottara.
PVP	*Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* of Devendrabuddhi.
PVSV	*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* of Dharmakīrti.
PVSVṬ	*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* of Karṇakagomin.
PVṬ	*Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* of Śākyabuddhi.
PVV	*Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin.
PVV-n	Vibhūticandra's notes to PVV [included in R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition of PVV].
SDNS	*Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* of Kamalaśīla.
SDVK	*Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā* of Jñānagarbha.
SDVP	*Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* of Śāntarakṣita.
SDVV	*Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* of Jñānagarbha.
SK	*Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.
Skt	Sanskrit.
SP	*Sambandhaparīkṣā* of Dharmakīrti.
ŚSṬ	*Śālistambasya ṭīkā* of Kamalaśīla.
ŚV	*Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila.
ŚVV	*Ślokavārttikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā* of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa.
Taisho	大正新脩大藏經 *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, Tripiṭaka in Chinese.
TBh	*Tarkabhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta.
TAAS	*Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* of Umāsvāti.
TĀ	*Tattvāloka* of Kamalaśīla.
Tib	Tibetan.
TJ	*Tarkajvālā* of Bhāviveka.
TS	*Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita. (Verse number follows TSa.)
TSa	Sanskrit edition of TS by E. Krishnamacharya.
TSb	Sanskrit edition of TS by D. Shastri.
TSP	*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla.
TSPa	Sanskrit edition of TSP by E. Krishnamacharya.
TSPb	Sanskrit edition of TSP by D. Shastri.

VimŚ	*Vimśatikā* of Vasubandhu.
VimŚV	*Vimśatikāvṛtti* of Vasubandhu.
VKSKS	Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
VN	*Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti.
VS	*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda.
VSV	*Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti* of Candrānanda.
VV	*Vigrahavyāvartanī* of Nāgārjuna.
VVV	*Vigrahavyāvartanīvṛtti* of Nāgārjuna.
WSTB	Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien.
WZKM	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.*
WZKS	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.*
WZKSO	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.*
ZHL	*gZhung lugs legs par bshad pa* of Sa skya paṇḍita.

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Chapter 1
Introductory Remarks

The *Madhyamakāloka* (hereafter MĀ) is one of the main works of Kamalaśīla (c. 740-795),[1] an Indian Buddhist scholar of the later Mādhyamika, i.e., the "Middle Way" school that took its origins in the philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras. The text, composed in the final period of Kamalaśīla's life, is his most extensive independent work on Mādhyamika, proving by means of scripture (*āgama*) and reasoning (*yukti*) that every element or thing there might be, i.e., all dharmas, must ultimately be without any intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) whatsoever. No manuscript of the original Sanskrit is extant as far as we know, the text being available to modern scholarship only in the Tibetan translation of Śīlendrabodhi and dPal brtsegs.

Little is known about Kamalaśīla's life in India. What knowledge we do have about him — essentially about his Tibetan period, the later years of his life — stems from accounts of his debate, at the Council of bSam yas,[2] with the Chinese Ch'annist, Hva shang Mahāyāna. Like his master Śāntarakṣita (c. 725-788), Kamalaśīla[3] too was invited to Tibet to estab-

[1]For the dates of Kamalaśīla, see FRAUWALLNER (1961) pp. 141-144.

[2]On this Council, see DEMIÉVILLE (1987).

[3]In Tibetan Buddhism, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are counted by later dGe lugs pa scholars such as 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa as Satyākāravādins, i.e., those who accept that the aspects of cognition are really existent, at least on the level of conventional truth. See MIMAKI (1982a) pp. 29-31, and SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) p. 89, fn. 286. However, in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (hereafter MAV) and the *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* (hereafter MAP), a commentary of the MAV, although Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla ultimately negate both the Satyākāravāda and the Alīkākāravāda, i.e., the theory that the aspects of cognition are deceptive and really not existent, the latter is regarded as a higher philosophical stage than the former. See SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) p. 92, fn. 296, and KAJIYAMA (1978)

lish Buddhism. He especially endeavored to exclude what he considered to be incorrect Chinese and Tibetan views on Buddhist philosophy and practice, promoting instead orthodox Indian views in several texts, such as the *Bhāvanākramas*, that he wrote during his stay in Tibet.

Kamalaśīla died in Tibet in about the year 795. According to Bu ston's *Chos 'byung* four Chinese "butchers" were sent by Hva shang Mahāyāna to kill him by "squeezing (*mnyes*) his kidneys."[4] However, the *sBa bzhed*, the history of the bSam yas monastery, and the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* (hereafter KhG) say that the assassins were sent by non-Buddhist heretics (*mu stegs*); according to these sources, Kamalaśīla was killed — again by "squeezing his kidneys" — one evening when he was sleeping in the house of a translator.[5]

Kamalaśīla was a prolific writer (just as was Śāntarakṣita), a polymath

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pp. 120-132, and p. 140. In the MĀ also Kamalaśīla accepts the Alīkākāravādin's idea that in proofs of the nonexistence of pseudo-entities like primordial matter (*pradhāna*), the property-possessors (*dharmin*) are mental existents which are non-entities; here he definitively rejects the Satyākāravādin's idea that the property-possessors are mental existents which are entities. See Chapter 2 pp. 38-46, fn. 224, fn. 237 and MĀ D173b2-174b6. Therefore, there could be some doubt whether the Tibetan account of the conventional position of Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita is really correct. See ICHIGO (1985) pp. LXXIX-LXXX. However, although Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita regard the Alīkākāravāda as a higher philosophical stage than the Satyākāravāda, nonetheless in the context of examining the nature of *ākāra*, they seem to accept the Satyākāravādin's position that *ākāra* and cognition, or mind, have the same nature, i.e., a dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*). See MATSUMOTO (1980b) pp. 166-168 and TILLEMANS (1990a) p. 51, fn. 113. The Satyākāravādins hold *ākāra* to have a dependent nature, while the Alīkākāravādins hold it to have a thoroughly imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*). See *Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana* (hereafter JSSN) p. 202, 2-25 and MIMAKI (1976) p. 203, 3-28. See also OKI (1982) pp. 194-199. Therefore, we cannot definitively rule out that Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's conventional position is the Satyākāravāda.

For the Mādhyamika classifications in other Tibetan scholars' texts and Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's position, see MIMAKI (1982a) pp. 27-38.

[4]See HOUSTON (1980) p. 90, 21-22 and p. 95, 33-34.

[5]See KhG Ja 122b 6-7: *ka ma la śī la mu stegs kyis gshed ma btang nas nub mo sgra bsgyur gyi khang par gzims mal du mkhal ma mnyes nas bkrongs so zhes byung go //*. For the description of the *sBa bzhed*, see HOUSTON ibid. p. 63, 18-20 and p. 76, 12-14. Note that there are various versions of *dBa'/sBa/rBa bzhed*, and a version of *dBa' bzhed* which was published in Vienna lacks the description on Kamalaśīla's death. See WANGDU AND DIEMBERGER (2000).

possessing an encyclopedic knowledge of Indian philosophy. In the Mādhyamika section (*dBu ma*) of the bsTan 'gyur division of the Tibetan canon (*Tripiṭaka*), we find the following texts attributed to him:

(1). *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* (hereafter MAP), D3886, P5286.
(2). *Madhyamakāloka*, D3887, P5287.
(3). *Tattvāloka* (hereafter TĀ), D3888, P5288.
(4). *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* (hereafter SDNS), D3889, P5289.
(5). *Bodhicittabhāvanā*, D3913.
(6). First *Bhāvanākrama* (hereafter BK I), D3915, P5310.
(7). Second *Bhāvanākrama* (hereafter BK II), D3916, P5311.
(8). Third *Bhāvanākrama* (hereafter BK III), D3917, P5312.
(9). *Yogabhāvanāvatāra*, D3918, P5313.[6]

Of the nine listed above, texts (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(7) and (9) are extant only in Tibetan translations. In the case of the BK I and III, however, Sanskrit manuscripts have been found, edited and published by G. Tucci.[7]

Turning to Kamalaśīla's works on logic and epistemology, we find the *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣesaṃkṣipta* [D4232, P5731] and *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (hereafter TSP) [D4267, P5765] in the Pramāṇa (*Tshad ma*) section of the bsTan 'gyur. Of the two, only the TSP is extant in Sanskrit and has been edited.[8]

Finally, we should mention Kamalaśīla's numerous commentaries on Buddhist sūtras. Notably, in the commentary (*mDo 'grel*) section of the bsTan 'gyur, we find the *Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇīṭīkā* (hereafter APDṬ) [D4000, P5501] and the *Śālistambasya ṭīkā* (hereafter ŚSṬ) [D4001, P5502], and in the Prajñāpāramitā (*Sher phyin*) section, there are the *Saptaśatikāprajñāpāramitāṭīkā* [D3815, P5215], *Prajñāpāramitāvajracchedikāṭīkā* (hereafter PPVṬ) [D3817, P5216] and *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya nāma ṭīkā* [P5221].[9]

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[6]Most of these texts can also be found in the lDan dkar ma catalog, established in A.D. 824. See Z. YAMAGUCHI (1978) pp. 18-20. The *Bodhicittabhāvanā* and the *Yogabhāvanāvatāra*, however, do not seem to be listed in that catalog.

[7]*Minor Buddhist Texts, part II. First Bhāvanākrama of Kamalaśīla, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts with Introduction and English Summary.* Serie Orientale Roma IX, 2. Rome, 1958. And *Minor Buddhist Texts, part III. Third Bhāvanākrama.* Serie Orientale Roma XLIII. Rome, 1971.

[8](1). *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita: With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla* by E. Krishnamacharya, in Baroda in 1926. (2). *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita: With the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalaśīla* by D. Shastri, in Varanasi in 1968.

[9]In addition to the texts mentioned above, we can also find many texts ascribed

In indigenous Tibetan Buddhism, Kamalaśīla, like Śāntarakṣita, came to be regarded as a member of the Svātantrika (*Rang rgyud pa*)[10] and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika (*rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa*)[11] schools. The founder of the Svātantrika school is considered to be Bhāviveka[12] (c. 490-570), who

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to Kamalaśīla in the Tantra (*rGyud*) section, the Vinaya (*'Dul ba*) section, the letters (*sPring yig*) section and the miscellany (*sNa tshog*) section of the bsTan 'gyur. However, about most of those texts there is still considerable doubt as to whether they can be authentically attributed to Kamalaśīla. On the *Duḥkhaviśeṣanirdeśa* of Kamalaśīla, see DIETZ (1980) Teil 1 pp. 106-111, Teil 2 pp. 168-183, Teil 3 pp. 93-97.

[10]Tibetan scholars use the term "Svātantrika" (*Rang rgyud pa*) to designate Bhāviveka's school since it adopts autonomous reasonings (*svatantrānumāna*) as the means of proving the Mādhyamika position that all dharmas do not ultimately have intrinsic natures; they use the term "Prāsaṅgika" (*Thal 'gyur ba*) to designate Buddhapālita's or Candrakīrti's school because it accepts only *prasaṅga*-type reasoning, i.e., drawing absurd consequences from the opponent's position to make the opponent understand the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas. It is not yet clear whether those two terms were used in Indian Buddhism or were simply Tibetan creations. In Tibetan Buddhism, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055-?), who translated many texts of Candrakīrti, can be regarded as the first person who used the terms. As for the term "Svātantrika," however, it is possible that this term was used in India. I. Ogawa argues in his (1984) article that the term *[dBu ma] Rang rgyud pa* appears in the *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* (P337a8, 337b6) of Jayānanda, a Kashmīrian Buddhist scholar. However, as Ogawa says, since that text of Jayānanda seems to have been written in Mi nyag in Tibet and since Jayānanda collaborated in translating texts into Tibetan with Nyi ma grags himself, it is indeed difficult to determine whether the term "Svātantrika" was used in India.

For Tibetan scholars' definitions of the Svātantrika school, see TILLEMANS (1990a) p. 43, fn. 95.

[11]The term *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma* first appears in Tibetan texts of the 9th century, such as the *lTa ba'i khyad par* of Ye shes sde. See HAKAMAYA (1976a), MATSUMOTO (1980b) and MIMAKI (1982a) pp. 39, 19-43, 17, and p. 43, fn. 99. Most of the Tibetan doctrinal texts (*siddhānta, grub mtha'*) refer to the description in the *lTa ba'i khyad par* as a source of the Mādhyamika classification of *mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa* and *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa*. However, in his (1981e) article, S. Matsumoto says that the term *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma* which appears in the *lTa ba'i khyad par* does not mean the so-called Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school, but means Śāntarakṣita's work, i.e., the MAV. According to Matsumoto, Ye shes sde holds that, since the MAV has been written in reliance upon Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi*, it is called *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma*. The term *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa* appears in an Indian Buddhist text of the 11th century, i.e., the *Pañcakramaṭīkā kramārthaprakāśikā* of Lakṣmī (P464a5-6).

[12]On his name, see EJIMA (1990).

was a scholar in the middle period of Indian Mādhyamika history and who used autonomous reasonings (*svatantrānumāna*) to prove the Mādhyamika thesis that all dharmas do not ultimately (*paramārthatas*) have intrinsic natures (*svabhāva*). However, Bhāviveka and later Mādhyamika philosophers such as Kamalaśīla differ significantly in their logical methods used to prove this thesis, the main difference being that while Bhāviveka undertook his proof in reliance upon Dignāga's theory of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), Kamalaśīla and other Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas relied upon that of Dharmakīrti. Although the Mādhyamika thesis that all dharmas do not ultimately have intrinsic natures is a negative proposition, Dignāga's system of logic and valid cognition, which Bhāviveka depended upon, does not seem to have elaborated a theoretical stance concerning negative propositions.[13] Dharmakīrti, however, established the nonperception of a perceptible object (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhi/dṛśyānupalabdhi*) as the reason (*hetu*) which proves negative propositions or establishes negative judgments.[14] Therefore, between Bhāviveka and later Mādhyamika philosophers there was a significant difference in the logical method for proving their theses.

Although the later Mādhyamikas' method for proving a thesis is logically more developed than that of Bhāviveka, Kamalaśīla does not completely reject Bhāviveka's methodology either. Rather, Kamalaśīla interprets Bhāviveka's logical method[15] from the standpoint of later Mādhyamika philosophy or Dharmakīrti's theory of valid cognition and tries to utilize it for his own proofs of the Mādhyamika thesis. In fact, in the MĀ Kamalaśīla reinterprets Bhāviveka's actual reasonings according to his own principles of logical method and incorporates them into his own proofs.[16] On the

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[13]See KATSURA (1992) p. 231.

[14]HB p. 21*, 18-19: *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhir abhāvahetur abhāvavyavahārahetur vā.* On Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception (*anupalabdhi*), see Chapter 3 pp. 52-64.

[15]For Bhāviveka's method for proving the Mādhyamika thesis, see EJIMA (1980) pp. 89-137.

[16]See MĀ D190b1-6 and D198a6-7. See also EJIMA ibid. pp. 237-238. Kamalaśīla interprets the following proof-statement (*prayoga*) of Bhāviveka as the proof of an absurd consequence (*prasaṅgasādhana*) and incorporates it into his own proof of the nonproduction of entities from themselves: [Pratijñā:] Ultimately, internal domains do not arise from themselves. [Hetu:] This is because they are existent. [Dṛṣṭānta:] It is just like, for example, the consciousness (*caitanya*) (*na paramārthata ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni svata utpannāni, vidyamānatvāt, caitanyavat*). It

other hand, Kamalaśīla in the MĀ also incorporates Jñānagarbha's[17] and Śāntarakṣita's proofs of the Mādhyamika thesis into his own proofs, and in so doing, undertakes a systematization of the reasons which prove the Mādhyamika position.[18] In short, Kamalaśīla composed the MĀ with complete understanding of the various important arguments in the Svātantrika texts prior to the MĀ. Finally, in the context of establishing the teaching of the one vehicle (*ekayāna*), the MĀ can be regarded as the first Mādhyamika text which shows the incorporation of the theory of the Buddha nature (*tathāgatagarbha*) into one of the main schools of Madhyamaka thought.[19]

In Tibetan Buddhism, the MĀ is regarded as one of the three most important works of later Mādhyamika philosophy (the so-called *rang rgyud shar gsum*),[20] together with Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*. Of the three, however, the MĀ provides the most extensive arguments and the most developed and systematic ideas about the method for proving the absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of all dharmas.[21] Indeed, in this respect, the MĀ can be said to be the most

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is one of our future projects to clarify Kamalaśīla's interpretation of Bhāviveka's reasonings and Mādhyamika philosophy.

[17]Jñānagarbha is the author of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and its autocommentary (*vṛtti*). It is said that he was a master of Śāntarakṣita. See SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) pp. 68-69. Since his Mādhyamika philosophy is influenced by Dharmakīrti's theory of valid cognition, Jñānagarbha should be regarded as a later Mādhyamika philosopher. Although he is a Svātantrika, Tibetan scholars' ideas on his philosophical position are not consistent. dGe lugs pa scholars like 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa counts him as the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika. Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge of the Sa skya pa regards him as a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. On the other hand, dBus pa blo gsal of the bKa' gdams pa holds that he was a 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa. See MIMAKI (1982a) pp. 27-54.

[18]For Kamalaśīla's five reasons systematically established in the MĀ, see EJIMA ibid. pp. 227-239, Chapter 1 pp. 10-10 and fn. 32.

[19]See SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) pp. 94-96 and fn. 308.

[20]See Lessing and Wayman (1968) p. 90.

[21]The MĀ can be regarded as the first Mādhyamika text to establish systematically the five reasons which prove the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas. See fn. 32 and EJIMA ibid. pp. 227-239. The Mādhyamika interpretation of Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception (*anupalabdhi*) also does not appear in the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*. Amongst the three texts, the MĀ provides the most developed solution for avoiding the fallacy that the locus is unestablished. In addition, in the MĀ Kamalaśīla devotes one chapter to the establishment of the teaching of one vehicle (*ekayāna*).

important text of the three.

In spite of its importance in Tibet, however, the MĀ does not seem to have had much philosophical impact upon the later Indian Buddhism. In fact, we cannot find any references to the MĀ in Indian Buddhist texts composed before the eleventh century, although we do find quotations from the MAP, BK I and TSP in such texts. The absence of any conspicuous references to the MĀ in the Indian literature can be understood when we take into consideration the following passage in the KhG of dPa' bo gTsug lag phreng ba (1504-1566):

> "Then, the king [i.e., Khri srong lde btsan] asked the master, Kamalaśīla, to write down the teaching by which one determines, through hearing, reflection and meditation, that all dharmas are selfless. [Kamalaśīla] therefore wrote the first *Bhāvanākrama* and gave it [to him]. The king read it and thought about [its] meaning, and then asked [Kamalaśīla] how he [should] meditate upon the meaning of that [doctrine] in a systematic manner. So [Kamalaśīla] wrote the middle *Bhāvanākrama* and gave it [to him]. [And] since [he] asked [Kamalaśīla] how the result [of meditation] would be in this case, [Kamalaśīla] wrote the last *Bhāvanākrama* which explains the result and gave it [to him]. In the course of explaining the result, [Kamalaśīla] refuted the mistaken views of Hva shang and then gave [that final section of BK III to the king]. [The king] was very pleased with the [BK]. So then, by way of a commentary to the meaning of that [text], and because he was concerned that the thought of the Bodhisattva [i.e., Śāntarakṣita] might be criticized, [Kamalaśīla] wrote the *Madhyamakāloka*, linking scripture and reason, and then gave it to the king."[22]

[22]KhG Ja 119b2-5: *de nas slob dpon ka ma la shī la la btsan pos chos thams cad thos bsam sgom gsum gyis bdag med par gtan la phab pa'i chos de ji ltar lags pa yi ger dgod par zhus pas sgom rim dang po brtsams nas gnang / rjes gzigs pas don dgongs te da de'i don stan thog gcig du sgom na ji ltar sgom zhus pas sgom rim bar pa brtsams nas gnang / de la 'bras bu ji ltar mchi zhus pas sgom rim tha ma 'bras bu bstan pa brtsams nas gnang / 'bras bu bstan pa'i zhar la hva shang gi lta ba nor ba de sun phyung nas gnang* / de la shin tu dgyes pas de'i don 'grel du bo dhi sa tva'i dgongs pa la rgol ba byung gis dogs pa'i don du lung dang rigs pa 'brel bar dbu ma snang ba brtsams nas brtsan po la gnang ngo [zhes rBa bzhed khungs thub las byung ba ji lta ba bkod pa'o] /.* (* sBa' bzhed: *gnang*, KhG: *snang*.

The MĀ thus seems to have been written in Tibet, rather than India, and this fact could well explain why most Indian Buddhist philosophers were unaware of its existence. According to the *rNam thar yongs grags*, when Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (c. 982-1054) visited bSam yas monastery, he found the Sanskrit manuscript (*rgya dpe*) of the MĀ, which was not extant in India, copied it and sent it to India.[23] If this is true, it seems likely that Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna sent a copy of the MĀ to Vikramaśīla, since he was the abbot of that monastery. Interestingly enough, in the *Munimatālaṃkāra* (hereafter MMA), composed in the beginning of the twelfth century[24] by Abhayākaragupta, a scholar of Vikramaśīla, we can find sentences parallel

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See HOUSTON (1980) p. 62, 35.) As dPa' bo gTsug lag phreng ba says here, this description of KhG is the quotation from the *rBa bzhed*, the history of the bSam yas monastery. See HOUSTON ibid. p. 22, pp. 40-41, pp. 62-63 and p. 75, OKIMOTO (1982) p. 49, and MIMAKI (1982b) p. 219. Note that there are various versions of *dBa'/sBa/rBa bzhed*, and a version of *dBa' bzhed* which was published in Vienna lacks the description of the king's request to Kamalaśīla to write the BK I, BK II, BK III and MĀ. See WANGDU AND DIEMBERGER (2000).

The KhG [and the *sBa/rBa bzhed*] here says that the BK I was also written in Tibet. However, according to TANIGUCHI (1992), the BK I seems to have been written in India, not in Tibet. He has this idea due to the fact that the *Pha rol tu phyin pa'i theg pa'i sgom pa'i rim pa'i man ngag* of Jñānakīrti and the *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* (hereafter AAA) of Haribhadra borrow many passages from the BK I. Note that Haribhadra was almost contemporary with Kamalaśīla. Although in the AAA we can find many quotations from the TSP, MAP and BK I of Kamalaśīla, the BK II, BK III and MĀ do not seem to be quoted in Haribhadra's work.

[23]See EIMER (1979) Teil I p. 258, [§.] 319 and Teil II pp. 266-267, [§.] 319. Eimer's translation (of *rNam thar yongs grags*) in Teil I p. 258, 20-23: "er sagte, diese Texte seien in Indien nicht mehr vorhanden, kopierte sie zum grossen Teil <den Madhyamakāloka, das Avataṃsaka und andere Texte> und liess sie nach Indien bringen." Eimer seems to hold that the Sanskrit manuscript of the MĀ was at one time extant in India. However, since the *sBa/rBa bzhed* and the KhG say that the MĀ was composed in Tibet, it is doubtful whether its Sanskrit manuscript was actually to be found in India. The text of *rNam thar yongs grags* simply says: *rgya gar na med pa'i dpe mang po 'di na snang gsungs nas /* .... In any case, since most Indian Buddhist philosophers could not obtain the manuscript of the MĀ, it is clear that they could not have read the MĀ.

[24]Abhayākaragupta composed the MMA in the thirtieth year of the reign of King Rāmapāla (rg. c. 1077-1130 or 1072-1126). See the author colophon in the Tibetan translation (D292b5): *dpal ldan dga' skyong rgyal srid kyi // sum cu'i lo la byas pa yin*. See also SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) p. 114 and fn. 368.

to those of the MĀ.[25] Therefore, given that no references to the MĀ are findable in Indian texts prior to the MMA, it seems possible to infer that Abhayākaragupta read the manuscript of the MĀ sent by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna from bSam yas.

Although the MĀ does not appear to have had any philosophical impact upon later Indian Buddhism, it was very often quoted by Tibetan Buddhist scholars in their works on doctrinal systems (*siddhānta, grub mtha'*) and in other texts. Tibetan scholars show a significant interest in the Mādhyamika philosophy of Kamalaśīla, especially with regard to subjects like the theory of the two truths (*satyadvaya*) and the way of avoiding the fallacy that the subject of the proposition is unestablished (*āśrayāsiddha*).[26] However, they do not seem to have analyzed all aspects of Kamalaśīla's Mādhyamika philosophy. In fact, as far as I know, there does not seem to be a Tibetan treatment of Kamalaśīla's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception (*anupalabdhi*), which is one of the main subjects of this thesis. A future project would be to examine in more detail how Tibetan scholars understood the MĀ and Kamalaśīla's Mādhyamika philosophy.

1.1 Past Research on the Second Chapter of *Madhyamakāloka*; the Scope of Our Project

The MĀ consists of two parts: objections (*pūrvapakṣa*)[27] and replies (*uttarapakṣa*) — in the *uttarapakṣa* Kamalaśīla replies to each objection made in the *pūrvapakṣa*. The objections in the *pūrvapakṣa* can for the most part be regarded as those of the Yogācāra, Dharmakīrti and his commentators.[28] The *uttarapakṣa* consists of the following four chapters: (1) the proof of voidness (*śūnyatā*), i.e., the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas, by

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[25]See ISODA (1993). See also fn. 64, fn. 147, fn. 156, fn. 161, fn. 163 and fn. 181.

[26]For Tibetan arguments about Kamalaśīla's way of avoiding the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*, see TILLEMANS (1984b) and TILLEMANS AND LOPEZ (1998).

[27]The *pūrvapakṣa* of the MĀ has been translated by Ichigō into Japanese in his (1991).

[28]On the opponents' philosophical positions, see MATSUMOTO (1982a) and ICHIGO (1992) pp. 199-202. According to MATSUSHITA (1987a), Vaibhāṣika views also appear in the *pūrvapakṣa*.

means of scripture (*āgama*),[29] (2) its proof by means of reasoning (*yukti*), (3) the establishment of the theory of the two truths (*satyadvaya*)[30] and (4) the establishment of the teaching of one vehicle (*ekayāna*).[31]

In the second chapter of the MĀ's *uttarapakṣa*, Kamalaśīla focuses upon the position that all dharmas are ultimately void of intrinsic nature, establishing this proposition through inference (*anumāna*) and showing that people can understand the voidness at stake through direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). He devotes a great number of folios to the problem of how valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) can be established for the Mādhyamikas, given that they hold all things to be without intrinsic nature. As well, he sets out an important series of five reasons for the nonexistence of any permanent or impermanent real intrinsic natures of entities, the five being as follows: the "diamond-splinters" reason (*rdo rje gzegs ma'i gtan tshigs; vajrakaṇahetu*), the reason refuting the production of existent things and nonexistent things (*yod med skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs; *sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu*), the reason refuting production according to the tetralemma (*mu bzhi skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs; catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedhahetu*), the reason consisting in dependent origination (*rten 'brel gyi gtan tshigs; pratītyasamutpādahetu*), and the reason of being neither one nor many (*gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs; ekānekaviyogahetu*).[32]

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[29]Ichigō in a series of articles, viz., (1993), (1994), (1995) and (1996), translated the first chapter of the MĀ into Japanese. There is also Moriyama's partial translation into Japanese in his (1991a) article.

[30]As recent work on the third chapter, there are MATSUMOTO (1980d) and (1981b).

[31]Matsumoto in his (1982a) article translated the fourth chapter into Japanese. As for recent work on the fourth chapter, noteworthy are SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) pp. 94-96 and NAMAI (1996).

[32](1) Kamalaśīla's proof-statement (*prayogavākya*) by means of the *vajrakaṇahetu* is as follows: (MĀ D190a3-4:) *gang dag don dam par rang dang / gzhan dang / gnyi ga las skye ba dang / rgyu med pa las skye ba dang (CD dang: GNP dang /) bral ba de dag ni yang dag par na ngo bo nyid (CDP nyid: GN nyid du) med pa yin te / dper na nam mkha'i padma la sogs pa lta bu'o // rang dang gzhan gyis yang dag par yod par smras pa'i dngos po thams cad kyang de dang 'dra ba kho na yin no //* "[Vyāpti:] What is ultimately void of being produced by itself, by others and by both and of being produced without any cause, is really without intrinsic nature. It is just like, for example, sky-lotuses and so forth. [Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, all entities postulated by our coreligionists and by those in heterodox schools as being really existent are just like that [i.e., ultimately void of being produced by itself, by others and by both and of being produced without any

cause]. [Implicit conclusion: Therefore, all entities postulated by our coreligionists and by those in heterodox schools as being really existent are really without intrinsic nature.]" The *vajrakaṇahetu* is a reason consisting in the nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). For the concepts of pervaded (*vyāpya*) and pervader (*vyāpaka*), see fn. 291. On "proof-statements," see fn. 182.

(2) The **sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu* is as follows: (MĀ D137b5-6:) *'bras bu yod pa yang mi skye ste / skye pa don med pa'i phyir ro // med pa yang ma yin te / ri bong gi rwa la sogs pa yang skye bar thal bar 'gyur ro.* "Existent results do not arise, because [their] arising is pointless. Nonexistent [result] do not arise either, because it would follow absurdly that rabbits' horns and so forth would also arise." In the second chapter of MĀ, Kamalaśīla presents the following proof-statement at the beginning of the argument about this reason: (MĀ D202b5-6:) *gang zhig gzhan dag gis sngon med pa'i khyad par byar med pa de ni nam yang gang gis kyang mi skyed de / dper na nam mkha'i padma la sogs pa lta bu'o // yod par mngon par 'dod pa de yang de dang 'dra ba'i phyir ...* . "[Vyāpti:] What is not given new additional factors by others can never be produced by any [conditions]. It is just like, for example, sky-lotuses and so forth. [Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, that which is held to be existent is like that [i.e., not given new additional factors by others]. [Implicit conclusion: Therefore, that which is held to be existent can never be produced by any conditions.]" This is the statement of a reason consisting in the nonperception of the pervader.

(3) The proof-statement by means of the *catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedhahetu* is as follows: (MĀ D210b3:) *gang yang don dam par mu bzhi pa'i skye ba dang bral ba de ni de kho na nyid du ngo bo nyid med pa kho na yin te dper na nam mkha'i padma la sogs pa lta bu'o // rtsod pa'i gzhi gyur pa'i dngos po thams cad kyang yang dag par na de dang 'dra ba nyid do.* "[Vyāpti:] What ultimately lacks production according to the tetralemma is really just without intrinsic nature. It is just like, for example, sky-lotuses and so forth. [Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, all entities which are the subject of the argument are really just like that [i.e., ultimately lack production according to the tetralemma]. [Implicit conclusion: Therefore, all entities are really without intrinsic nature.]" This is the statement of a reason consisting in the nonperception of the pervader. Here, the tetralemma means that one cause does not produce many effects, many do not produce one, many do not produce many, and one does not produce one.

(4) The *pratītyasamutpādahetu* is as follows: (MĀ D205a7:) *gang zhig rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba de ni don dam par rang bzhin gyis stong pa yin te / dper na sgyu ma la sogs pa lta bu'o //.* "[Vyāpti:] What is produced depending [upon its conditions] is ultimately void of intrinsic nature. It is just like, for example, illusions and so forth." In his MĀ Kamalaśīla does not explain which type of reason the *pratītyasamutpādahetu* is. In the BSGT dBus pa blo gsal says that this is a reason consisting in the perception of that which is incompatible with the pervader (*khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa, vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*). See BSGT 108b1. Sa skya paṇḍita also seems to have the same view. See ZHL tha 148a4-5:

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lnga pa khyab byed kyi 'gal zla la rtag (brtag?) pa byas nas 'gegs pa rten cing 'brel 'byung gi gtan tshigs ni /. Note that in his LNY Tsong kha pa says that the *pratītyasamutpādahetu* is a reason consisting in the perception of something incompatible (*'gal zla dmigs pa, viruddhopalabdhi?*). See LNY 63b1: *rten 'brel gyi gtan tshigs kyang gsungs te de ni 'gal zla dmigs pa'i rtags so //.*

(5) Kamalaśīla's proof-statement by means of the *ekānekaviyogahetu* is as follows: (MAP D87b2-3:) *gang dag (P dag: D zag) gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin ma yin pa de dag ni don dam par na (D na: P om.) rang bzhin med de / dper na gzugs brnyan bzhin no // bdag dang gzhan gyis smras pa'i dngos po rnams kyang gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin ma yin pas ... /.* "[Vyāpti:] What is neither one nor many in nature is ultimately without intrinsic nature. It is just like, for example, reflections. [Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, entities which are postulated by our coreligionists and by those in heterodox schools are neither one nor many in nature. [Implicit conclusion: Therefore, entities which are postulated by our coreligionists and by those in heterodox schools are ultimately without intrinsic nature.]" The *ekānekaviyogahetu* is a reason consisting in the nonperception of the pervader. Cf. AAA p. 624, 5-6: *ye ekānekasvabhāvā na bhavanti na teṣāṃ paramārthataḥ svabhāvo 'sti. yathā māyādirūpasya. na bhavanti caikānekasvabhāvāḥ svaparoditā bhāvā.*

Although Kamalaśīla talks about the five reasons, he does not name them. In the MĀ D202a6, however, the first reason, i.e., the *vajrakaṇahetu*, is already referred to by Kamalaśīla when he speaks about "the four which are unobstructed just like diamond-splinters" (*rdo rje gzegs ma thogs pa med pa'i bzhi po*). Kamalaśīla also says in the TĀ D267b1: *bdag dang gzhan smras dngos po yi // brag ni ma lus gzhom pa'i phyir // bzhi char phyir ni mi ldog pa'ang // rdo rje phra mo de 'di yin //.* "Due to their entirely breaking the rock of the real entities postulated by our coreligionists and by those in heterodox schools, these four cannot be deflected and are [just like] fine diamonds." Cf. MIMAKI (1982a) p. 220. In addition, the third reason is stated as being the lack of "production according to the tetralemma" (*mu bzhi pa'i skye ba*).

In later Indian Buddhism, those reasons, with the exception of the second one [i.e., the **sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu*], are explained by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna as the "four great reasons" (*gtan tshigs chen po bzhi*). See the *Bodhipathapradīpa* (hereafter BPP) D240a5-7 and the *Bodhipathapradīpapañjikā* (hereafter BPPP) D279a3-280a4. See also EJIMA (1980) pp. 240-241 and MIMAKI (1982a) p. 212, fn. 547. Note that although Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna explains the *catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedhahetu* as one of the four reasons, the contents of the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) are different from those of the tetralemma in the reason given by Kamalaśīla. In the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, which is prior to the BPP, we also find the four reasons. However, the contents and order of the four reasons are different from what figures in the BPP. See *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* D264b4-5. See also EJIMA ibid. p. 244. Moreover, in the *Mādhyamakārthasaṃgraha* k. 6, the term "the four reasons" (*gtan tshigs bzhi*) appears. This text can be regarded as the first Indian text in which that term appears, although the contents of the four reasons are not clear. K. 6 says:

Several modern scholars have remarked that later Mādhyamika philosophers, like Kamalaśīla, argue for *niḥsvabhāvatā* (lack of intrinsic nature) in reliance upon Dharmakīrti's and his commentators' theory of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).[33] The second chapter of the MĀ gives us new information about the Mādhyamika application of Dharmakīrtian epistemology and the resultant method for proving the Mādhyamika thesis. Although we also find arguments about Mādhyamika method of proof in other later Mādhyamika

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mu bzhi skye 'gog la sogs pa'i // gtan tshigs bzhi ... //. "the four reasons such as the refutation of production according to the tetralemma." See EJIMA ibid. pp. 18-23, pp. 30-32, pp. 240-246.

In indigenous Tibetan Buddhism, many scholars also refer to the four or five reasons which prove the absence of intrinsic nature. In Tibetan explanations of those reasons, however, we find inconsistency with regard to the contents and order. See TILLEMANS (1984b) p. 361 and p. 371, n. 16, MIMAKI (1982a) pp. 212-227, and MIMAKI, MORIYAMA AND TOMABECHI (1996) pp. 64-65.

As was explained above, the Indian Mādhyamika texts posterior to the MĀ always mention four reasons rather than Kamalaśīla's five reasons. Since the MĀ seems to have been composed in Tibet, it seems likely that the later Mādhyamika philosophers after Kamalaśīla were unfamiliar with the fivefold series explained in the MĀ. Probably, after the end of 8th century, there was a move to systematically establish reasons which prove the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas. This can also be confirmed in Dharmamitra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārakārikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkā* (hereafter AKPŚṬ), a commentary on Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārakārikāśāstravivṛti* (hereafter AAKŚV). Note that according to Tāranātha, Dharmamitra was a contemporary of Dharmottara, Vimalamitra and Dharmākāra, and therefore Dharmamitra can be regarded as a immediate successor of Haribhadra who was himself almost contemporary with Kamalaśīla. See SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) pp. 102-103. In the AKPŚṬ, we can find Dharmamitra's explanation of the four reasons; Kamalaśīla's second reason [i.e., the **sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu*] is not included. Therefore, Dharmamitra does not seem to have been unfamiliar with the fivefold series explained in the MĀ, although in the AKPŚṬ he refers to the MAP of Kamalaśīla. See AKPŚṬ P9b1. Although the term *rdo rje gzegs ma* (*vajrakaṇa*) appears in Dharmamitra's explanation of the four reasons, however, since the contents of Dharmamitra's four reasons are different from those of the four reasons explained in the *Madhyamakaratrapradīpa* and from those of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's four reasons, Dharmamitra does not seem to have been the source for the reasons given by the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna. See AKPŚṬ P15a4-15b1.

[33]See EJIMA (1980) pp. 211-215 and pp. 231-231. Cf. SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) pp. 87-88, and ECKEL (1987) pp. 51-58. See also Chapter 2 pp. 38-46, MĀ D171b3-172a2, Chapter 3 pp. 50-51, Translation 1 pp. 112-116 and MĀ D170a5-170b7.

texts like the *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (hereafter MAV) and the MAP, the second chapter of the MĀ provides the most extensive and most developed treatment.[34]

1.1.1 The Scope of Our Project

In spite of its obvious importance, the second chapter of the MĀ has not yet been adequately studied and especially not in a way which does justice to its clear debt to Dharmakīrtian epistemology. Since the study of Dharmakīrti's and his commentators' theory of valid cognition has recently made remarkable progress, the second chapter can and should now be examined in light of recent scholarship in this area. It is, however, beyond the scope of the present study to translate all the sixty folios that comprise the second chapter. Rather than attempting to discuss all the numerous ways in which Kamalaśīla relied upon Dharmakīrtian epistemology and logic, we will in this thesis focus on certain specific problems, notably those aspects of Kamalaśīla's Mādhyamika philosophy where a potential contradiction might be alleged to occur between the realist epistemological underpinnings and the critique of realism that we find in all Mādhyamika schools.[35] In fact, as we shall see, when Kamalaśīla establishes the Mādhyamika position by means of ideas and arguments based on Buddhist epistemology, he certainly does not criticize or reject the Dharmakīrtian theories themselves, but rather adapts and expands them in a variety of ways. We will examine these ways of rendering Mādhyamika and epistemology compatible by looking in detail at Kamalaśīla's use of certain key facets of Dharmakīrtian epistemology, viz., aspects of the theories of inference and perception and the establishment of negative conclusions by using nonperception (*anupa-*

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[34]It is already known that the MĀ provides a more developed solution for thus avoiding the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha* than the solution explained in the MAP. See KOBAYASHI (1987) and (1989a). The Mādhyamika interpretation of Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception (*anupalabdhi*) also does not appear in the texts prior to the MĀ. And the MĀ can be regarded as the first Mādhyamika text to systematically establish the five reasons which prove the Mādhyamika thesis of *niḥsvabhāvatā* (lack of intrinsic nature). See EJIMA (1980) pp. 227-239.

[35]In what follows, we shall take the term "realist" to mean those who acknowledge that there are *real entities*, i.e., *vastu*. Whether those entities exist independently of the mind or are themselves mental entities, they are held to be real in the sense that they can withstand logical analysis and do not show themselves to have contradictory properties when analysed.

labdhi). This third facet of Dharmakīrtian epistemology is particularly important to Kamalaśīla's Mādhyamika project in that when he seeks to establish the *absence* of real intrinsic nature of dharmas, he does this by means of Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception. We will, therefore, consecrate a whole introductory chapter, viz., chapter III, to this adaptation of the theory of nonperception.

Our examination of these topics will be based upon translations of the following four sections of the second chapter and in reliance upon the textual editions which we have prepared:

(1) The section on the establishment by means of direct perception
(2) The section on the proof by means of inference
(3) The section on the proof by means of nonperception
(4) The section on the proof by means of the "neither one nor many" reason.

1.1.2 Past Research

As for recent work on the above-mentioned four sections, no translation into a western language has yet been made — there are only the Japanese translations of S. Moriyama, M. Ichigō and M. Kobayashi. Moriyama has translated sections (1) and (3) in his (1990a) and (1990b) respectively. Ichigō has also translated section (1) in his (1997) and section (3) in his (2000a). Kobayashi has translated section (4) in his (1986) and (1989b). Although Moriyama has also touched upon Kamalaśīla's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception in his (1990a), his interpretation of Kamalaśīla's ideas is different from that of the present writer.[36] Ichigō, in his translation of section (1), does not analyze Kamalaśīla's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception at all. We will see that, in many respects, our translations of sections (1) and (3) are different from those of Moriyama and Ichigō.

In section (2), Kamalaśīla discusses, *inter alia*, the problem of what one can reasonably say about nonexistence and nonexistent items. In Buddhist philosophy, this problem is normally treated as the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*, the fallacy that the subject of the proposition is unestablished. This is a conundrum which arises in proofs of nonexistence, and leads to several counter-arguments being leveled against the Mādhyamika's logical strategy. First, it could be objected that the Mādhyamikas could not prove the absence

[36]See fn. 131.

of intrinsic nature of God (*Īśvara*), the primordial matter (*pradhāna*) and so forth, because Buddhists do not accept the existence of these entities even conventionally and hence cannot establish them as subjects. It could also be argued that when a reason, such as being neither one nor many, proves a property (*sādhya*) like being without intrinsic nature, that reason thereby proves the nonexistence of the subject, or the property-possessor (*dharmin*) which is the locus (*āśraya*), and therefore, since the *sādhya* is negated when the locus does not exist, this reason would incur the fallacy that the locus is unestablished.[37] Thus, Kamalaśīla has to explain how the Mādhyamikas can reasonably prove the negation of intrinsic nature of all dharmas and avoid the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*. In the MĀ, the argument about this fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha* is connected to the argument about the establishment of negative judgment when, in section (4) mentioned above, Kamalaśīla explains how one can understand the fact that the reason of being neither one nor many qualifies its subject (*pakṣadharmatva*).[38]

Kamalaśīla's solution for avoiding the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha* has already been analyzed by several modern scholars — we should mention T. Tillemans (1982), (1983), (1984b) and (1998), T. Tillemans and D. Lopez (1998), M. Kobayashi (1987), T. Funayama (1991) and T. Iwata (1999b). We will not repeat those results here. A complete translation of section (2) into any Occidental language has yet to be made, although a Japanese translation of this section has been made by M. Ichigō in his (1999) and (2000b). S. Moriyama has also translated almost all parts of this section, i.e., D171a2-175a3, into Japanese in his (2000). However, in their interpretation of sentence structure and their understanding of Kamalaśīla's ideas on the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*, Ichigō's and Moriyama's translations are again significantly different from our own.

All other sections, aside from the above-mentioned four, remain untranslated into a western language, although several passages quoted in other texts have been translated.[39] There are only Japanese translations of three short sections by M. Ichigō in his (2000a): (1) The section on the proof by means of the reason acknowledged by both parties to the debate (*ubhayasiddha*), i.e., D175b7-176a1, (2) The section on the establishment of the relationship between the Mādhyamikas' logical reasons (*hetu*) and the prop-

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[37]See MĀ D172b3-5. For our translation, see pp. 131-132.

[38]See Translation 4 pp. 196-202.

[39]For example, LOPEZ (1987) and MIMAKI (1982a) contain translations of several sentences of the second chapter of the MĀ.

erty to be proved (*sādhyadharma*), i.e., D176a1-5, (3) The section on the proofs by means of the reason which is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*) and the reason which is an effect (*kāryahetu*), i.e., D176a5-177a2. As for other sections, complete translations into any modern Oriental language have yet to be made, although there are many partial Japanese translations.[40]

Finally, there is no commentary on the MĀ in Indian Buddhism; only two indigenous Tibetan commentaries are known to us. One is the commentary supposedly written by Phya pa chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169), but unfortunately not yet available.[41] The other is the commentary of bsTan dar (1835-1915), a Mongolian scholar, which is entitled *dBu ma snang ba'i brjed tho* (hereafter BNJ). Although this commentary is available, it is an incomplete work. The BNJ ends without having commented upon the second chapter of the MĀ nor upon the subsequent chapters, and is therefore of limited utility with regard to the study of the second chapter. It is nonetheless useful for the identification of the opponents appearing in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the MĀ, since bsTan dar analyzes the objections and divides them into 83 articles.[42]

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[40]In his (1981a) article, S. Matsumoto has translated several parts in the section of the proof by means of the "diamond-splinters" reason (*vajrakaṇahetu*), i.e., D195b7-196a3, D196a5-6, D196a6-7, D197a1-2, D197a2-4 and D197b4-198a5. And in his (1980d) and (1981b) also, he has translated several parts in the section of the proof by means of the reason refuting the productions of existent things and nonexistent things (**sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu*), i.e., D202b4-6, D203a2-3, D203b6-7, D204a1-3, D208b1-4, D208b4-6, D208b6-7 and D208b7-209a4. In his (1988a), S. Moriyama has translated D181a6-184b7, which contains the epistemological refutation of the existence of permanent and impermanent real intrinsic natures of entities. As for the section on the "diamond-splinters" reason, Moriyama translated D190a3-192a6, D192a6-193b2, D196b2-198b7 and D200a1-202b3 in (1997a), (1995) and (1998). Finally in Moriyama (1989b), we find a translation of D205a7-206b2, a section in which Kamalaśīla discusses the *pratītyasamutpādahetu*.

[41]See ROERICH (1949) pp. 332, 32-333, 3. See also VAN DER KUIJP (1978) p. 367, n. 24.

Prior to Phya pa, rNgog lo tsā ba Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109) seems to have written a summary of MĀ, which is entitled *dBu ma snang ba'i don bsdus*. See JACKSON (1994) and SEYFORT RUEGG (2000) pp. 27-36. This summary does not seem to be extant.

[42]Relying upon bsTan dar's divisions, M. Ichigō has made a synopsis of the *pūrvapakṣa* in (1991) and (1992) and has translated the *pūrvapakṣa* into Japanese in (1991).

1.2 The Edition of the Text of the *Madhyamakāloka*

The present study of the MĀ contains an edition of the Tibetan texts of the four sections of the second chapter mentioned earlier. The edition is mainly based upon the sDe dge edition (D) of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka preserved at Tokyo University. The sDe dge edition of the MĀ was compared with four other Tibetan editions: the Co ne edition (C), sNar thang edition (N), Peking edition (P) and the Golden manuscript (G).

Although five editions were used in order to establish a critical edition of the text, there are several cases where none of these five gives a plausible or even comprehensible reading of a particular passage. In those cases, if we find the Sanskrit passage which corresponds to the Tibetan in extant Sanskrit texts like the BK I, BK III, TSP, and *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* (hereafter AAA), we must interpret and sometimes even modify the Tibetan of the MĀ in reliance upon the Sanskrit. The reliable Sanskrit texts and canonical Tibetan texts are given in the notes. Since all these five editions share the problem of having incorrect and hopelessly obscure Tibetan renderings of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV), we are often forced to understand the MĀ's Tibetan verses of the PV by referring to the Sanskrit and to its canonical Tibetan translation. Finally, when none of these five editions gives a plausibly correct reading of a passage and when we do not have the Sanskrit which corresponds to the Tibetan, the passage must often be edited in reliance upon the other works of Kamalaśīla, such as the TĀ, which have arguments parallel to those of the second chapter of the MĀ, or in reliance upon indigenous Tibetan works, such as the BSGT, which have quotations from the MĀ and TĀ.

In translating the Tibetan of MĀ, we give priority to Sanskrit parallel passages in the BK I, TSP, etc. whenever possible. Also, in the case of the other texts quoted in the MĀ, we have tried to find Sanskrit fragments constituting parallel passages and, when possible, have translated on the basis of these fragments. Finally, in order to understand the arguments in the MĀ and their philosophical or historical background, we refer in footnotes to parallel arguments found in other texts like *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* (SDVV), TSP, MAV, MAP, AAA, and PV.

Chapter 2

The Mādhyamika Philosophical Project and Dharmakīrtian Epistemology

In this chapter, we examine how the Dharmakīrtian theory of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) can be established for certain important Mādhyamika thinkers when they seek to prove their thesis of *niḥsvabhāvatā* (lack of intrinsic nature), and what in fact they intend to, or can, prove by means of valid cognition. Our investigations will be centered mainly upon Kamalaśīla, but can be extended to varying degrees to other later Mādhyamika thinkers.

The problem situation is as follows. Without accounting for the fact that there are valid and invalid cognitions, the Mādhyamikas cannot prove the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas. However, how can valid cognitions be established for the Mādhyamikas who hold all things to be without intrinsic nature? Without the existence of valid cognitions, the Mādhyamikas could not prove their thesis, since they cannot prove it by simple dogmatic assertion. (If mere assertion were proof, it would follow absurdly that any and all theses could be established simply by asserting them.) Furthermore, the Mādhyamikas' assertions would also end up being contradictory, because when they state that nothing is existent ultimately, the very statement itself would also have to be nonexistent.[43] Thus the

[43]MĀ D136b5: *de ni tshig tsam gyis kyang mi 'grub ste / thams cad kyis thams cad 'grub par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // tshig kyang 'gal te ngo bo nyid med pa yin na ni ji ltar de grub par 'gyur ro /.* "The [absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas] cannot be established simply due to [your] statement either. This is

Mādhyamikas have to explain why the means of establishing their position, i.e., valid cognitions, are not also refuted and eliminated. In sum, the Mādhyamikas, in using Dharmakīrtian epistemology to refute entities' intrinsic nature, are constantly in danger of some form of self-refutation, and thus need to nuance and restrict their negative arguments so that the Dharmakīrtian foundations of these arguments remain sufficiently intact. Let us take up the details of how Kamalaśīla uses Dharmakīrtian epistemology and avoids the potential charges of self-refutation.

2.1 The Establishment of Valid Cognition for the Mādhyamikas

In the second chapter of the MĀ, Kamalaśīla clearly states that the Mādhyamikas prove the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas by means of valid cognition, and not by absurd consequences (*prasaṅga*), nor by simple dogmatic assertion. He says:

> "When it is objected that the [absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas] cannot be established simply due to [one's] statement ... and so forth, we [i.e., the Mādhyamikas] do not accept this [type of establishment] either, and therefore this is not a refutation [of us] at all. We too do not prove all dharmas as being without intrinsic nature simply by stating [this proposition]; and [we] do not [establish it] simply by proving an absurd consequence either. If you say: 'How [do you prove it]?' [we reply that] we prove [it] just by means of genuinely valid cognition (*yang dag pa'i tshad ma*)."[44]

In the history of the Mādhyamika philosophy, Kamalaśīla is regarded as a Svātantrika Mādhyamika. He thus does not subscribe to the Prāsaṅgika position of Candrakīrti and also seems to differ from Nāgārjuna in that the

because it would follow absurdly that anything is established by anything. The statement [itself] is also contradictory. For if [all dharmas] were to be without intrinsic nature, how would that [statement] be established?"

[44]MĀ D181a5-6: *gang yang de ni tshig tsam gyis 'grub par yang mi 'gyur te zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa de yang khas mi len pa'i phyir sun 'byin pa ma yin pa nyid de / kho bo cag kyang tshig tsam gyis chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par sgrub pa yang ma yin la / thal bar sgrub pa tsam gyis kyang ma yin no // 'o na ci zhe na / yang dag pa'i tshad ma nyid kyis sgrub bo //.*

latter philosopher, in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (VV) and *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, does not seem to have relied upon a theory of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) at all when he proved the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas.[45] On the other hand, although Bhāviveka, the founder of the Svātantrika school, proved the absence of intrinsic nature by means of valid cognition, nonetheless his proof was significantly different in logical method from that of Kamalaśīla, the main difference being that Bhāviveka relied upon Dignāga's theory of valid cognition, while Kamalaśīla relied upon that of Dharmakīrti. As we shall see below, it is precisely for this reason that new types of Mādhyamika arguments concerning the establishment of valid cognition are to be found in the MĀ.

Since Kamalaśīla relies on Dharmakīrti's and his commentators' epistemology, the valid cognition by means of which Kamalaśīla establishes or proves the absence of real intrinsic nature must be one of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) or inference (*anumāna*). In fact, the actual proof of that absence is effectuated just by means of inference. The direct perception of that absence is discussed to show that only buddhas' and bodhisattvas' yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) can directly understand the selflessness (*nairātmya*) of all dharmas, and that their perception is established as a valid cognition.[46]

The inference in question is one which "functions by the force of entities" (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*). That is to say, in Dharmakīrtian epistemology an inference which proves rationally demonstrable properties of entities, such as impermanence, must function by the force of entities, or

[45]Note that in their articles F. Tola and C. Dragonetti doubt the attribution of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (VV) and the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* to Nāgārjuna. See TOLA AND DRAGONETTI (1995) pp. 7-15 and (1998). O. Pind also says in his (2001) article that the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* would not be an authentic work of Nāgārjuna. See also STCHERBATSKY (1932) p. 28 fn. 3.

[46]Without the establishment of the proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature by means of inference, the yogic perception of that absence cannot be established as a valid cognition. This is because yogic perception is valid, i.e., "non-belying" (*avisaṃvāda*), only if it has an object already established by valid cognition. See Chapter 3 p. 51. In terms of Buddhist practice, (a) yogins first understand the absence of real intrinsic nature by means of inference; (b) they then meditate upon all dharmas as being without real intrinsic nature just like illusions; (c) next, they reach the first Bodhisattva stage (*bhūmi*) where they obtain the wisdom which directly perceives the absence of real intrinsic nature. Therefore, persons who want to obtain that wisdom should first understand the absence of real intrinsic nature by means of inference.

objectively, in that it derives its truth from the existence of certain facts, or states of affairs in reality, and not because someone states or believes that it is so. Since Kamalaśīla holds the absence of real intrinsic nature to be a rationally demonstrable property of entities, he proves it by means of inferences which function by the force of entities, rather than by means of scripture (*āgama*) or inference based upon scripture (*āgamāśritānumāna*).[47] Although ordinary beings cannot directly perceive the absence of real intrinsic nature, this does not mean that such an absence is like the heavens (*svarga*), hells, the details of the law of karman and so forth, which are said to be "radically inaccessible" (*atyantaparokṣa*) and thus beyond the limits of ordinary rationality. Although radically inaccessible objects, which are beyond the limits of ordinary rationality, cannot be proved by the inference functioning by the force of entities, the absence of real intrinsic nature is not radically inaccessible at all, but is just the reality or thusness (*tattva*)[48] of entities or the final limit of entities (*vastuparyanta*),[49] and is objectively inferable

[47]On the two kinds of inferences, i.e., *vastubalapravṛttānumāna* and *āgamāśritānumāna*, and the three kinds of objects, i.e., perceptible objects (*aparokṣa*), imperceptible objects (*parokṣa*) and radically inaccessible objects (*atyantaparokṣa*), see TILLEMANS (1990a) pp. 24-29, (1999a) and (2000) p. 12 and fn. 36. Of the three kinds of objects, while perceptible objects and imperceptible objects are objects of inference which functions by the force of entities, radically inaccessible objects, such as the heavens (*svarga*), are not objects of such a type of inference. Scripture must be relied upon to understand these objects.

[48]In this thesis, we translate "*tattva / tathatā / de kho na nyid*" by "thusness" instead of "reality" or "truth" in order to avoid a risk of philosophical confusion. That is, in Mādhyamika philosophy, although the word *tattva* is used normally in a positive context since the *tattva* of entities means voidness (*śūnyatā*) or the absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), the words "reality" and "truth" come back in other (usually negative) contexts, like "truly established" (*bden par grub pa*), "attached to reality" (*bden par mngon par zhen pa*) and so forth. Therefore, there is a real risk of philosophical confusion. Although "thusness" is literal, it seems difficult to find another solution. In any case, it seems better that we avoid being committed to a type of "reality" which nonetheless is not "truly established" and has no real nature.

[49]BK III p. 30, 1-6: *tasyaivaṃ prajñām upāyaṃ ca satataṃ satkṛtyābhyasyataḥ krameṇa saṃtatiparipākād uttarottaraviśuddhataratamakṣaṇodayād bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantagamane sakalakalpanājālarahitaṃ sphuṭataraṃ dharmadhātvadhigamaṃ vimalaṃ niścalanivātadīpaval lokottarajñānam utpadyate / tadā ca vastuparyantatālambanaṃ pratilabdhaṃ bhavati / darśanamārgaṃ ca praviṣṭo bhavati / prathamā ca bhūmiḥ prāptā bhavati /.* "In this manner, those who practice wisdom and method constantly with devotion give rise to ever greater

independently of scripture. Therefore, Kamalaśīla, following Dharmakīrti, holds that when the Mādhyamikas prove the absence of real intrinsic nature by means of inference, it should be proved by inferences functioning by the force of entities.[50]

Here, however, the fundamental problem of self-refutation will arise clearly. How is it possible to rely upon an inference which functions by the force of entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*) in order to negate the intrinsic nature of entities? Would it not be contradictory to rely upon the valid cognition whose existence implies the existence of the very entities (*vastu*) which are to be negated? Although Kamalaśīla states that the Mādhyamikas prove the absence of intrinsic nature by means of valid cognition, how can a valid cognition implying the existence of entities be established when the Mādhyamikas prove the absence of intrinsic nature of entities? An opponent says in the MĀ:

> "Valid cognitions are impossible with regard to anything other than what has the intrinsic nature of being an entity. If it were so [i.e., if valid cognitions were also possible with regard to other things], then these [valid cognitions] would even apply to nonentities, and therefore their validity (*prāmāṇya*) would be completely lost. Therefore, all valid cognitions do in fact imply the existence of entities; and when one applies a convention produced by the force of a valid cognition implying these [entities], one applies [the convention] only to the entities understood by means of a valid cognition, and hence ... ."[51]

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purity moment by moment because of the gradual maturation of their continuum, and due to that, when [they] attain the ultimate limit of meditation upon the true state of affairs, [they] produce pure and absolutely clear transcendental wisdom which is free of the net of all conceptualizations, understands the nature of dharmas and is like an unwavering lamp sheltered from the wind. Then, [they] obtain the object which is the final limit of entities, enter the Path of Vision (*darśanamārga*) and arrive at the first stage." See BK III p. 2, 8-11: *yadā vastuparyantatālakṣaṇāṃ tathatāṃ pratividhyati, tadā vastuparyantatāvagamāt prathamāyāṃ bhūmau vastuparyantatālambanam ucyate /.* "When [yogins] penetrate thusness marked by the final limit of entities, then because the final limit of entities is understood, it is explained that in the first stage, [they] have the object which is the final limit of entities." See SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) p. 98.

[50]See MAV D79b7-80a1. See also MAV D56b6-7 and MAP D87a6-b2.

[51]MĀ D189a7-189b1: *tshad ma ni dngos po'i ngo bo 'das nas gzhan gang la yang mi srid do // de lta na ni de dngos po med pa la yang 'jug pa'i phyir tshad*

This opponent says that if the Mādhyamikas proved the absence of intrinsic nature of entities by means of valid cognition, it would follow that they accepted the establishment of entities, because valid cognition implies the existence of entities. And if the Mādhyamikas accepted that conventions of being existent or nonexistent[52] (*sadasadvyavahāra*) implied the existence of valid cognitions, it would follow that entities (*vastu*) would indeed be established, because those conventions would imply valid cognitions which in turn would imply entities.[53] Therefore, when one applies those conventions proven by valid cognitions, one would apply them only to entities. The conclusion to the objection is that it would be impossible for the Mādhyamikas to prove the absence of intrinsic nature of entities by any valid cognitions.

To this objection, Kamalaśīla makes the following reply:

> "It has been already explained earlier that there are also valid cognitions which have conventional entities (*artha*) as their objects.[54] Otherwise, [that is,] if all valid cognitions were to have ultimate entities as their objects, [then] everyone would in fact see thusness (*tattva*). Therefore, it would be meaningless that those who want to see thusness make efforts at practicing the path of the Noble Ones (*ārya*). Philosophers would not debate about thusness either. This is because, since everyone understands the ultimate, there would not be any doubt [about

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ma nyid nyams pa kho nar 'gyur ro // de lta bas na tshad ma thams cad ni dngos pos mngon par khyab pa kho na yin la / des khyab pa'i tshad ma'i stobs kyis byung ba'i tha snyad 'jug na yang tshad mas (CD tshad mas: GNP tshad ma) rtogs pa'i dngos po kho na la 'jug pas de'i phyir ... /.

[52]For the meaning of convention (*vyavahāra*) here, see fn. 92.

[53]See MĀ D189a2-5: *ji (CD ji: GNP ci) ste gal te yod pa dang med pa'i tha snyad la tshad mas khyab po zhes bya bar khas len par gyur na de'i tshe dngos po grub pa kho nar 'gyur te / 'di ltar khyab par bya ba (CDG ba: NP om.) dang / khyab par byed pa'i dngos po ni gang du yang rjes su 'gro ba nges pa med par ldog pa tsam gyi sgo nas 'grub par mi srid do // ldog pa nges pa yang rjes su 'gro ba nges pa med par mi srid de / gang zhig gang yod na yod pa ma yin pa de ni ji ltar de log pa na ldog par 'gyur te / 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro // de lta bas na gdon mi za bar tshad mas khyab pa'i rjes su 'gro bar 'dod pa dang dngos po yod pa'i tha snyad khas blang bar bya'o // de khas blangs na ni 'ga' zhig tu gang la 'di yod pa kho na yin no zhes yod pa'i tha snyad tshad ma yod pa'i rjes su byed pa can rab tu grub pa de nyid kho bo cag gi (CDP gi: G gis; N ill.) dngos po rab tu grub pa yin no zhe na /.* For our translation, see fn. 366.

[54]See MĀ D168a7-168b2, D169a1-3 and D171b3-172a2.

thusness]. It would follow absurdly that it would also be pointless to write treatises on epistemology. This is because the effect of [writing epistemological treatises] is the exclusion of ignorance; and in order for thusness to be [universally] understood, everyone would have already had to definitively rule out ignorance. Moreover, theoreticians would not give mutually contradictory versions of that [thusness]; nor would doctrinal systems be different. This is because the nature of thusness is single. Therefore, although conventional valid cognitions do not have ultimate entities as their objects, conventional valid cognitions are possible, and hence it is not so that all valid cognitions in fact imply ultimate entities. Although [conventional valid cognitions] do not have ultimate entities as their objects, [they] are established as conventionally characterized simply because they do in fact obtain the objects as desired as do dreams and so forth."[55]

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[55]MĀ D189b2-6: *tshad ma 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob kyi don gyi yul can yang yod do zhes sngar bstan zin to // de lta ma yin na (CD na: GNP te) gal te tshad ma thams cad don dam pa pa'i dngos po'i yul can zhig tu (CD tu: GNP du) gyur na ni thams cad de kho na nyid mthong ba kho nar 'gyur te / de'i phyir de kho na nyid mthong bar 'dod pa rnams 'phags pa'i lam bsgom (CD bsgom: GNP sgom) pa sgrim pa don med pa nyid du 'gyur ro // smra ba po rnams de kho na nyid la rtsod (CD rtsod: GNP dpyod) par yang mi 'gyur te / thams cad don dam pa rtogs pa nyid kyis yid gnyis med pa'i phyir ro // tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos byed pa yang don med par thal bar 'gyur te / de'i 'bras bu ni rnam par rmongs pa zlog (CDNP zlog: G bzlog) pa yin pa'i phyir la / de kho na nyid rtogs par bya ba la yang thams cad kyis rnam par rmongs pa'i go skabs thag bsrings pa'i phyir ro // mtshan nyid byed pa rnams kyis de'i mtshan nyid phan tshun 'gal bar byed par yang mi 'gyur la / grub pa'i mtha' tha dad par yang mi 'gyur te / de kho na nyid kyi ngo bo gcig yin pa'i phyir ro // de lta bas na tha snyad pa'i tshad ma (CD tha snyad pa'i tshad ma: GNP om.) don dam pa pa'i dngos po'i yul can ma yin yang (GNP ma yin yang: CD ma yin pa yang) tha snyad kyi tshad ma srid pa'i phyir tshad ma thams cad don dam pa pa'i dngos pos khyab pa nyid ni ma yin no // don dam pa pa'i dngos po'i yul can nyid ma yin yang rmi lam la sogs pa bzhin du ji ltar 'dod pa'i don yang dag par 'thob pa tsam gyi sgo nas tha snyad pa'i mtshan ma rnam par gzhag (CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag) go //.*

de'i 'bras bu ni rnam par rmongs pa zlog pa yin pa'i phyir. In his PV II Dharmakīrti says that in order to remove ignorance, one writes treatises on epistemology and gives the definition of valid cognition (*pramāṇalakṣaṇa*). See PV II k. 7b: *śāstraṃ mohanivartanam /.* See also PVV ad PV II k. 7b p. 7, 19-20: *yadi vyavahārataḥ pramāṇasvarūpasiddhiḥ parasparavirodhīni lakṣaṇa-*

Kamalaśīla, in effect, invokes the schema of the two truths (*satyadvaya*) in order to enable him to reply to his adversary that although valid cognition implies that there are entities, it does not thereby imply *ultimate* (*pāramārthika*) entities — only conventional (*sāṃvṛta*) entities. In other words, the Mādhyamika would be vulnerable to a charge of self-refutation if his use of Dharmakīrtian epistemology necessitated the very thing that he himself was negating. But it does not: valid cognition is possible without ultimately existing entities.

Kamalaśīla's argument is that if valid cognition were to imply ultimate entities, then since valid cognition would always have ultimate entities as its object, it would follow absurdly that everyone would see thusness without effort. Therefore, valid cognition implies no more than conventional entities and always has only them as its objects. The conclusion is that valid cognitions of entities being without any real intrinsic nature remain possible and do not incur the contradiction that they would themselves have to have an entity with a real intrinsic nature as object.

Not only inference but also perception does not have ultimate or real entities as its object. In the section on the establishment by means of direct perception of the second chapter of the MĀ, an opponent says that one cannot understand the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas by means of direct perception, because the objects of direct perception are real entities.[56] Kamalaśīla rejects this objection by saying:

> "Nor is it established that: 'This is because the objects of perception are real entities.' That is to say, it is not correct that the perception of people of limited vision (*arvāgdṛś*) has as its objects real intrinsic natures of entities, since [it always] has as its objects deceptive visible matter (*rūpa*) and so forth, as does the perception of people suffering from eye disease

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śāstrāṇi na syuḥ / tasmāc chāstreṇa lakṣaṇopadarśanāt tadviṣayaḥ saṃmoho nivartanīyaḥ /. See INAMI (1992) pp. 26-27.

[56]See MĀ D134a7-134b1: *rigs pa'i sgo nas kyang ma yin te / 'di ltar re zhig mngon sum gyis ni dngos po ma lus pa dben par rtogs par mi 'gyur te / de'i yul ni dngos po yin pa'i phyir ro //.* "You [i.e., the Mādhyamika] cannot [prove the voidness of all dharmas] by means of reasoning (*yukti*) either. That is to say, first of all, one would not understand that all entities are empty by means of direct perception. This is because the objects of that [i.e., perception] are real entities." See Translation 1 paragraphs 1.1-1.1.1. Cf. NB I 12: *tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam //*, and NB I 14: *tad eva paramārthasat //.*

(*taimirika*). Otherwise, it would follow absurdly that everybody would perceive thusness."[57]

The essential point is that the objects of direct perception (i.e., ordinary beings' perception) are not real entities, but conventional things. His main argument is the same as that used to show that inference has only conventional objects: If it were not so, it would follow absurdly that everybody would always perceive thusness of entities without effort.[58] Kamalaśīla says that the objects of direct perception are deceptive things just like illusions, which appear conventionally although they are not really existent, but are not things like rabbits' horns, which are completely nonexistent even conventionally and have no capacity to produce the perceptions of themselves.[59]

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[57]MĀ D168a7-168b2: *gang yang mngon sum gyi yul ni dngos po yin pa'i phyir ro zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang ma grub pa yin te / 'di ltar tshu rol mthong ba rnams kyi mngon sum gang yin pa de ni rab rib can gyi mngon sum bzhin du gzugs (CDGN gzugs: P gthugs) la sogs pa brdzun pa'i yul can yin pa nyid kyis dngos po'i ngo bo nyid yang dag pa pa'i yul can nyid du rigs pa ma yin no // de lta ma yin na thams cad de kho na nyid mthong bar thal bar 'gyur ro //.* See Translation 1 paragraph 1.2.1.2.

On the term *tshu rol mthong ba*, see fn. 142. People of limited vision have three kinds of perception, i.e., *indriyapratyakṣa*, *mānasam* and *ātmasaṃvedana*, but seem to have no yogic perception.

[58]See MĀ D175a1-2: *snang ba ni gang gis na de log na ldog par (CD log na ldog par: GNP log par) 'gyur ba bden pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis khyab pa yang ma yin te (CD te: GNP ste) / brdzun pa yang snang ba'i phyir ro // de lta ma yin na skye bo thams cad de kho na nyid mthong bar 'gyur te / de kho na 'ba' zhig snang ba'i phyir ro //.* "An appearance does not entail the intrinsic nature of being true — otherwise, the former would be excluded if the latter [i.e., the intrinsic nature of being true,] were absent, for falsities do also appear. If that were not so, then [it would follow absurdly that] everyone would perceive thusness, for only thusness would appear." See Translation 2 paragraph 2.2.1.4.5, **§21** and fn. 240.

[59]MĀ D218b3: *gang yang de ni de'i yul (GNP yul: CD yul can) ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang rigs pa ma yin pa nyid de / dngos po rnams rta'i rva lta bur khas blangs pa ni ma yin no // 'o na ci zhe na / sgyu ma la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid lta bur yin te /.* "It is wrong to say: 'This is because it [i.e., absence of perception] is not an object of a [perception].' We do not accept that entities are thoroughly like horns of horses. Now if you say: 'How [do you accept them]?' [then we reply that] they are like illusions and so forth." See Translation 4 paragraph 4.2.1.4.2.3.

Another potential accusation of self-refutation is that the Mādhyamika in negating real entities would also deny that valid cognition itself is a real entity. Kamalaśīla's reply is again a recourse to the two truths: valid cognitions themselves are also, like all other things, ultimately without intrinsic nature and do not exist ultimately. Nonetheless, the Mādhyamikas do not conventionally deny valid cognitions like yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) and others. Kamalaśīla says:

> "When it is said: 'If that perception [itself] were also to have an intrinsic nature ... and so forth,' then here too [it should be replied that] all dharmas being ultimately unproduced, the perception [of them] as being of the same flavor (*ekarasa*) would also be ultimately without intrinsic nature. Nonetheless, all the presentations of perception and so forth, which rely upon conventional truth, would remain completely undisturbed. Although all dharmas are ultimately without intrinsic nature, the Mādhyamikas do not conventionally deny the causes which establish yogins' cognitions, other ordinary beings' cognitions or [that of] Noble Ones and so forth; otherwise all conventions would be eliminated."[60]

Thus, it should also be understood that valid cognitions, as well as their objects, are conventionally established. By means of conventionally established valid cognition, the Mādhyamikas prove the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas and obtain the cognition conducive to the ultimate. Although valid cognitions themselves are conventional, when the wisdom arisen from a valid cognition is conducive to the access to the ultimate, that wisdom is *regarded as being ultimate*, but is not itself ultimately existent.[61]

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[60]MĀ D169a1-3: *gang yang mngon sum de yang gal te ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa yin na ni zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa de la yang chos thams cad don dam par ma skyes par ro gcig pa nyid kyi mngon sum yang don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa yin mod kyi / 'on kyang mngon sum la sogs pa rnam par gzhag (CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag) pa kun rdzob kyi bden pa la brten pa thams cad rnam par mi 'khrugs pa kho na'o // dbu ma pa rnams ni chos thams cad don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang / gang gis na tha snyad thams cad chad (CD chad: GNP om.) par 'gyur ba / tha snyad kyi sgo nas rnal 'byor ba'i shes ba dang / so so'i skye bo gzhan gyi (CD gyi: GNP gyis) shes pa dang / 'phags pa'i gang zag la sogs pa rnam par gzhag (CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag) pa'i rgyu mi 'dod pa ni ma yin no //.* See Translation 1 paragraph 1.2.2, §7.

[61]This interpretation is made possible by taking the word *paramārtha* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound. In other words, wisdom itself is not an ultimate object but

has the ultimate as its object. The interpretation of *paramārtha* is threefold: the first interpretation is as a *karmadhāraya* compound; the second is as a *tatpuruṣa* compound; and the third is as *bahuvrīhi* compound. Kamalaśīla says in the MĀ D233b2-4: *chos dang gang zag la bdag med pa'i mtshan nyid kyi ngo bo de kho na nyid ni rigs pa dang ldan pas dam pa yin zhing don kyang de yin te / don du gnyer ba rnams kyi sgrib pa spang bar bya ba'i ched du don du gnyer bar bya ba yin pa'i phyir dang / ye shes dam pa phyin ci ma log pa'i don te yul yin pa'i phyir don dam pa zhes bya'o // 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes de'i yul can gang yin pa de yang tshig gi don gzhan du sbyor pa'i sgo nas der tha snyad gdags so // thos pa dang / bsams pa dang / bsgoms pa las byung ba'i shes rab de'i rjes su mthun pa gang yin pa de yang gdags pas de skad du brjod do //.* "The thusness characterized as the selflessness of persons and that of dharmas is rationally justified and therefore ultimate (*parama*); it is also the the object (*artha*).* Because [thusness] should be sought for the elimination of the obstacles in persons who seek it and because it is the *artha*, i.e., the object (*viṣaya*), of the supreme nonerroneous wisdom, it is called 'object of the ultimate' (*paramārtha*).** The transcendental wisdom which has the [ultimate] as its object is also designated as the [*paramārtha*] due to the application [of the meaning of the word '*paramārtha*'] to another thing. The wisdom arising from hearing, reflection and meditation, which is conducive to [the access to] the [ultimate], is also designated [as *paramārtha*], and therefore [that wisdom] is explained [as the ultimate] in that way.***" (* the interpretation as a *karmadhāraya* compound. ** the interpretation of a *tatpuruṣa* compound. *** the interpretation as a *bahuvrīhi* compound.) In this manner, *paramārtha* taken as wisdom, although itself following the *bahuvrīhi* interpretation, presupposes the *karmadhāraya* rendering, for *paramārtha* is the object of that wisdom. Since the transcendental wisdom produced by yogic perception has the ultimate status of things as its object, that wisdom itself is regarded as ultimate (*paramārtha*). This is how the wisdom arisen from the inference which proves the absence of real intrinsic nature can be regarded as ultimate, even though it is itself nothing more than a conventionally existent thing. The same idea can be found in AAA p. 636, 15-26 (= MAP D119b7-120a4). See also SDVV D6a1-3.

In the history of Mādhyamika philosophy, Bhāviveka is regarded as the first philosopher to present the three interpretations of the term *paramārtha*, viz., as a *karmadhāraya* compound, a *tatpuruṣa* compound and a *bahuvrīhi* compound. See EJIMA (1980) p. 102-105. Note that Bhāviveka seems to have undertaken his interpretation of that term under the influence of the *Madhyāntavibhāga*'s and *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*'s three interpretations of *paramārtha*, i.e., the *karmadhāraya*, *tatpuruṣa* and *bahuvrīhi*) interpretations. See *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* III pp. 41, 6-42, 1, and see SAITO (1998). The triple interpretation of that compound as was given by Bhāviveka is also adopted by later Indian Mādhyamika philosophers like Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

2.2 The Logico-grammatical Structure of the Thesis of *Niḥsvabhāvatā*

Next, we examine what in fact the Mādhyamikas intend to, or can, prove by means of the inference which functions by the force of entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*). In brief, the problem concerns the logical scope of the qualifier "ultimately" (*don dam par; paramārthatas*) or "really" (*yang dag par*) in the Mādhyamika thesis, for on at least one interpretation of the qualifier the inference would undercut the possibility of any conventional entities and would thus be self-refuting.

As we have seen earlier in this chapter, the inference which functions by the force of entities has conventional things as its object, and is thus actually an inference which functions by the force of *conventional entities*, not by the force of assumed ultimate or real entities. The consequence of this position is that when a Mādhyamika concerns himself with the ultimate states of things, he can never positively prove an ultimately existing nature of entities by means of such an inference, but must restrict himself to negative proofs of absences.[62] Thus they prove the negation of the intrinsic nature of entities by means of reasons such as the "diamond-splinters" reason (*vajrakaṇahetu*) and the "neither one nor many" reason (*ekānekaviyogahetu*), which are regarded as the nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). However, what should or could the Mādhyamikas logically be proving when they seek to show that all entities are ultimately without intrinsic nature? How do they analyze the logical and grammatical structure of the thesis they are seeking to prove? Where do we have to place the qualifier "ultimately" (*paramārthatas*)? The question of the scope of the qualifier "ultimately" is not explicitly developed in the MĀ, but various passages and arguments permit us to discern what was probably Kamalaśīla's position.

In the history of Mādhyamika philosophy, Bhāviveka is regarded as the first scholar who adopted the qualifier "ultimately" in the Mādhyamika proof-statements. However, he did not explicitly mention which words in the proof-statement should be qualified by this term. The problem of the scope of the qualifier "ultimately" can be schematically formulated as follows: Does the Mādhyamika mean that ultimately, or from an ultimate point of view, things are without intrinsic nature? Or does he mean that things are without an ultimately existing intrinsic nature? In the first case the qualifier

[62]Cf., however, fn. 399.

bears upon the negation, i.e., "being without ...", "not having." In the second case the qualifier pertains to what is negated, i.e., intrinsic nature, and thus ensures that it is not all intrinsic natures which are being negated but rather ultimately existing intrinsic natures.

Kamalaśīla's position seems to be the second one. The problem with the first position is that when the intrinsic nature of all entities is ultimately negated, it would follow absurdly that the conventional could not exist and that therefore the Mādhyamika's inferences would either invalidate the non-erroneous perceptions of conventional entities or would themselves be invalidated by the perceptual experiences of such conventional things. In short, "being ultimately without intrinsic nature" would hypostasize the negation and thus lead to the nihilist extreme, where the negation becomes an absolute reality — the subtle point of Mādhyamika philosophy is always that neither the affirmation nor negation of things is ultimate.[63]

Kamalaśīla's position seems to be that the Mādhyamikas do not prove the ultimate negation of intrinsic nature of all entities. Rather, they prove the negation of the property or the nature *superimposed* by others as being *ultimately* existent upon conventional things. They thus opt for a formulation like: It is not so that X has an ultimately existing intrinsic nature. We can see this from the following passage in the MĀ:

> "In this case we [i.e., the Mādhyamikas] invalidate by inference that which has been in fact superimposed by the infantile as ultimate nature and the like upon the conventional objects of direct perception, which appear deceptively just like dreams and so on; but we do not invalidate conventional objects like perceptible things. Therefore, since the [object] with regard to which [direct perception] is not erroneous is perceptible, there is no invalidation of that [perceptible object] by means of inference. Since the superimposition of real nature and the like [upon the conventional objects], which [superimposition] we invalidate, is not nonerroneous with regard to those [conventional objects], it does not follow that direct perception is denied. Although inference ends up having the [requisite] connection [i.e., a necessary relation between the reason and the property to be proved] due to the perception of the persons of limited vision, it does not end up having it as something

[63]See MAY (1959) pp. 21-22.

with an ultimate intrinsic nature, but just as something conventional. This is because persons of limited vision cannot perceive the real intrinsic nature of entities directly. Therefore, we do not invalidate the conventional nature of entities, but just prove [the absence of real intrinsic nature] in order to negate that which has been superimposed as real nature upon the [conventional nature of entities]."[64]

Kamalaśīla says here that the Mādhyamikas invalidate that which has been superimposed by the infantile as *ultimate nature and the like* (*don dam pa pa'i ngo go la sogs pa*) upon conventional things. This seems to clearly indicate that the qualifier applies to nature (*ngo bo*), i.e., *svabhāva* and the like, rather than the negation.

The point of the important methodological passage quoted above is as follows. Valid cognitions, which imply the existence of conventional entities, cannot have ultimate entities as their objects. Nonetheless, the opponents wrongly hold that one can prove an ultimate nature of entities by means of valid cognition, but in fact they simply superimpose an ultimate nature upon the conventional objects of valid cognition. Therefore, in this case the Mādhyamikas can refute the opponents' superimpositions, and it is just this refutation or invalidation of the opponents' superimpositions that the Mādhyamikas effectuate in proving absence of intrinsic nature of entities. Because the Mādhyamikas invalidate the production, the nature and so forth *superimposed* by the opponents as being *ultimately* existent upon conventional things, the Mādhyamikas do not invalidate the nonerroneous

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[64]MĀ D179b5-180a2: *de la mngon sum gyi spyod yul gyi don tha snyad pa rmi lam la sogs pa bzhin du brdzun par snang ba la yang byis pa rnams kyis dngos su don dam pa pa'i ngo bo la sogs par sgro btags pa gang yin pa de la rjes su dpags pas gnod par byed kyi / mthong ba la sogs pa'i don tha snyad la yang gnod par byed pa ni ma yin no // de'i phyir gang la ma 'khrul pa de ni mngon sum yin pas / de la rjes su dpag pas gnod pa med do // bden pa'i ngo bo la sogs par sgro btags pa gang la gnod pa de ni de la ma 'khrul pa ma yin pas mngon sum la skur pa 'debs par thal ba ma yin no // rjes su dpag pas tshu rol mthong ba'i mngon sum las 'brel pa thob kyang don dam pa pa'i ngo bo nyid du thob pa ni ma yin no // 'on kyang kun rdzob pa kho nar yin te / pha rol ma yin pa mthong pa rnams kyis dngos po'i ngo bo nyid yang dag pa pa mngon sum du so sor mi myong ba'i phyir ro // des na dnos po rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kun rdzob pa la yang gnod pa ni mi byed kyi / 'on kyang de la bden pa'i rnam pa nyid du sgro btags pa sel ba'i phyir rab tu sgrub par byed pa kho na yin no //.* We can find a passage parallel to MĀ D179b5-6 in Abhayākaragupta's MMA D145a6-7.

perception of conventional entities by means of the inference which proves the absence of real intrinsic nature of such entities. They do not deny the perception of conventional entities, only the superimpositions of ultimate properties upon these conventional objects of perception. In short, they do not commit the fault of inferentially invalidating nonerroneous perception.

Here, the negation or invalidation of the superimposed ultimate intrinsic nature means the mere exclusion (*vyavacchedamātra*) of such intrinsic nature and should best be taken as a nonimplicative negation, or *prasajyapratiṣedha*.[65] We can see that it is *vyavacchedamātra/prasajyapratiṣedha* that is most likely at stake here in the Mādhyamika proof by looking at a related context where Kamalaśīla discusses the problem of *āśrayāsiddhahetu* (a logical reason whose locus is not established). Kamalaśīla says:

> "When one does not wish to prove that a property of entities is an existent nature but instead, wishes to state a proof of the mere exclusion (*vyavacchedamātra*) of a superimposed property, then the [reason] with regard to which the faults such as being unestablished would be pointed out does not require even conventionally any property-possessor which is an entity."[66]

Kamalaśīla holds that when the property to be proved (*sādhya*) and the means of proof (*sādhana*) are mere exclusions, that is, when these two have the form of a nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), rather than the form of an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*),[67] the proponent can avoid the

[65] See fn. 67.

[66] MĀ D172a6-7: *gang la dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi (CD kyi: GNP kyi /) 'on kyang sgro btags pa'i chos rnam par gcad (CD rnam par gcad: GNP rnam par bcad) pa sgrub pa tsam zhig brjod par (DGNP par: C pa) 'dod pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i (CD pa'i: GNP pa'i /) nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te /.* See Translation 2 paragraph 2.2.1.4.1, **§8** and fn. 207.

[67] See fn. 212.

On the two kinds of negations in Buddhist epistemology, i.e., implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) and nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), see KAJIYAMA (1973). *paryudāsa* is the negation which positively implies or affirms another thing. For example, the negation in the term *abrāhmaṇa* ("non-Brahman") implies positively a member of another caste, such as *kṣatriya* and *vaiśya*. According to Kajiyama, *paryudāsa* has the following characteristics: (1) affirmation is primarily intended; (2) negation is understood by implication; (3) the object to

fault that the subject of the proposition is unestablished (*āśrayāsiddha*). Therefore, when the Mādhyamikas intend to prove the mere exclusion of superimposed ultimate intrinsic natures by means of the "neither one nor many" reason and other such arguments, which consist in nonperception of the pervader, it seems proper to regard the *sādhya* as having the form of a nonimplicative negation. That said, it is worthwhile noting that there is however a certain controversy surrounding this question. In particular, in Tibetan Buddhism — probably in the philosophy of Phya pa chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) — there seems to have been interpretations of the "neither one nor many" argument according to which the *sādhya* can have either the form of a nonimplicative negation or the form of an implicative negation.[68]

Finally, we should note the logico-grammatical structure of Kamalaśīla's thesis is in many respects already prefigured in other writers. There are two currents of thought to be discerned here: (1) the idea that the Mādhyamika does not negate conventional entities, but rather superimpositions upon such

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be affirmed is not mentioned by its own name, as in the case of *abrāhmaṇa* (non-Brahman); (4) a positive idea is yielded by the negative expression, and both ideas are conveyed in a single sentence (*ekavākyatā*) because both refer to the same object (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*). On the other hand, *prasajyapratiṣedha* is the negation which does not positively imply another thing. For example, the negation in the sentence "It is not so that they see the sun" (*sūryaṃ na paśyanti*) is regarded as simply negating the sentence "They see the sun" (*sūryaṃ paśyanti*). Although some contexts may imply that they see something other than the sun, such an implication is secondary to the negation of the sentence "They see the sun." KAJIYAMA ibid. p. 171, 1-16, says that *prasajyapratiṣedha* has the following four characteristics: "(1) the primary aim is negation; (2) affirmation may be understood, but it is only secondary to negation; (3) the negation, e.g., *sūryaṃ na paśyanti*, forms a separate sentence from that which it tentatively supposed, i.e., *sūryaṃ paśyanti*; the two sentences must be understood in two steps; (4) the object of negation is explicitly mentioned by its own word, as in the case of *sūrya* in *sūryaṃ na paśyanti* = *asūryaṃpaśyāni (mukhāni)* ('sun-not-seeing (faces)')." For the Vaiyākaraṇas' explanations on the two kinds of negations, see CARDONA (1967) and ABHYANKAR (1961) p. 227 and p. 253. See also MARUI (1991) for the Mīmāṃsaka use of those negations.

[68] See fn. 399. According to Phya pa chos kyi seng ge, when the *sādhya* has the form of a nonimplicative negation, the "neither one nor many" reason is a reason consisting in nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhihetu*). On the other hand, when the *sādhya* has the form of an implicative negation, the "neither one nor many" reason is regarded as a reason which is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*).

entities; (2) the use of the qualifier "ultimately/really" to ensure that the negation bears upon ultimately existing intrinsic natures. The first idea is present in several authors, and is not restricted to a Svātantrika approach, as it is present in Nāgārjuna's *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*[69] and is also to be found in philosophy of Prāsaṅgika, Candrakīrti.[70] The second idea is however typically Svātantrika and is rejected by Candrakīrti, for whom the use of the qualifier is incomprehensible.[71] It looks like it was Jñānagarbha who clearly put both these ideas together and who thus serves as the antecedent for Kamalaśīla. In his SDVV and its *kārikās* (SDVK) Jñānagarbha states the same type of proof as Kamalaśīla, negating superimposition, but conserving conventional truth, or "appearances", and construing the scope of the qualifier so that it is ultimate, or real, intrinsic natures which are negated. He states:

> We [i.e., Mādhyamikas] do not at all negate the natures which appear. No negation of what is experienced is correct. (SDVK 28)

> This means that [that negation is not correct,] because [it] would be in contradiction with perception.

> We negate the things imagined by others, such as the aspects of production and so forth (*ādi*) that do

[69]See *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* pp. 138, 31-139, 1: *dgag par byed pa (bya ba?) med na 'gag pa zhes bya ba de med do zhes na / de ni ma yin no // ma grub pa'i rtog pa spong pa yin no //.* "[Objection:] When there is no object to be negated, there is not the [action] called 'negation' [either]. [Reply:] This is not correct. We exclude [others'] conceptualization of a [thing] which is not established." Note that some modern scholars hold that the attribution of the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* to Nāgārjuna is doubtful. See fn. 45.

[70]See also TANJI (2000) and TILLEMANS (2001).

[71]Although it is not clear whether Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla knew of Candrakīrti, it is well known that when Candrakīrti attacked Bhāviveka, he regarded the qualifier in Bhāviveka's reasonings as qualifying the negation. See PrasP p. 27, 9-11: *saṃvṛtyā cakṣurādisadbhāvād adoṣa iti cet / paramārthata ity etat tarhi kasya viśeṣaṇam // sāṃvṛtānāṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ paramārthata utpattipratiṣedhād / utpattipratiṣedhaviśeṣaṇe paramārthagrahaṇam iti cet /.* "If [Bhāviveka] says: 'Because conventionally eyes, etc. exist, there is no fault', what then does this qualifier: 'ultimately' (*paramārthatas*) qualify? If [Bhāviveka] says: 'Because [we] ultimately negate the production of conventional eyes, etc., the qualifier: 'ultimately' qualifies the negation of production', [then] ... ."

> not appear [to perception] but that are [conceived] as being real. (SDVK 29)

We negate only those things imagined on the basis of philosophical texts and the like, that is, [we negate] aspects that do not appear to cognitions to which things like visible matter appear, [aspects] such as real production and mental appearances, primordial matter (*pradhāna*) and the transformations (*pariṇāma*) [of the elements]. When we negate those [imagined things], we do not incur any invalidation by direct perception and the like at all. The word "and so forth" (*ādi*) [in the k. 29] includes existence.

> Therefore, in this case it is rational to negate just such imagined things. (SDVK 30ab)

This is because there is no fault [such as] the one explained earlier [i.e., invalidation by means of perception].

> A negation of that which is not imagined would just refute [the proponent] himself [who puts forward such a negation]. (SDVK 30cd)

We cannot negate physical things such as visible matter and the like, which are untainted by conceptualization's corruptions, are of a dependent nature (*paratantra*) [and] which are appearances to simple [non-conceptual] cognition. Not only is this impossible, but if we did [negate such things] then the person who performed [this negation] would in fact be subsequently refuted by direct perception and other [valid cognitions].

> We negate the primordial matter and so forth which appear to conceptualization and have been imagined by others as being really the cause of entities. (*Antaraśloka* 30-1)
> When we negate the things imagined [by others], [the qualifier:] "really" does not qualify the negation. Therefore, how would the conventional be

nonexistent? (*Antaraśloka* 30-2)[72]

Note that in regard to the structure of the proof, Jñānagarbha explicitly specifies the scope of the qualifier, "really" (*yang dag par*) or "ultimately" (*don dam par*), in the Mādhyamika proof-statements. According to Jñānagarbha, that qualifier qualifies "having production" (*skye ba*) or "having intrinsic nature" (*rang bzhin*), but does not qualify the negation of production/nature. For Jñānagarbha, just as for Kamalaśīla, the Mādhyamikas

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[72]SDVV D12a6-b4: *snang ba'i ngo bo gang yin pa // de ni 'gog pa ma yin nyid // nyams su myong ba gang yang ni // dgag par rigs pa ma yin no // mngon sum dang 'gal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro snyam du bsams pa yin no // skye la sogs pa'i rnam pa gang // snang ba min pa de yang ni // yang dag par zhes bya sogs par // gzhan gyis yongs su brtags pa 'gog // gang yang gzugs la sogs pa snang ba dang ldan pa'i shes pa la mi snang ba'i rnam pa yang dag par skye ba dang rnams par shes pa snang ba dang / gtso bo dang yongs su 'gyur ba la sogs pa bstan bcos la sogs pa la brten nas yongs su brtags pa 'di 'ba' zhig 'gog par byed de / de bkag pa la mngon sum la sogs pa'i gnod pa mi 'jug pa kho na'o / sogs pa smos pa ni yod pa nyid la sogs pa yongs su bsdu ba'o // de bas 'dir ni de lta bu'i // brtags pa kho na dgag par rigs // ji skad smos pa'i nyed pa med pa'i phyir ro // brtags pa ma yin 'gog pa 'di // bdag la gnod 'gyur 'ba' zhig go // gzugs la sogs pa'i lus rtog pa'i nyes pas ma sbags pa gzhan gyi dbang gi bdag nyid rnam par shes pa tsam snang ba dgag par mi nus pa 'ba' zhig tu ma zad kyi / byed na byed pa po la mngon sum la sogs pas phyir gnod pa kho na byed do // rnam par rtog pa snang ba yi // gtso bo la sogs yang dag par // dngos po rnams kyi rgyur gyur par // gzhan gyis brtags gang de 'gog go // brtags pa 'gog par byed pa la // yang dag ches bya bkag pa yi // bye brag min te de yi phyir // kun rdzob ji ltar med par 'gyur //.* Cf. ECKEL (1987) pp. 95, 14-96, 13.

The Sanskrit of SDVK 28 is found in AAA p. 93, 9-10: *nirbhāsate hi yad rūpaṃ naiva tat pratiṣidhyate / vedyamānasya no yuktaṃ kaścit pratiṣedhanam //.*

The SDVV to SDVK 30cd has been translated on the basis of Śāntarakṣita's SDVP D45a6-b4: *brtags pa ma yin 'gog pa 'di // zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni / gzugs la sogs pa'i lus rtog pa'i nyes pas ma spangs (sbags?) pa zhes bya ba la sogs pas 'grel te / rtog pa nyid nyes pa yin no // gzugs la sogs pa'i lus 'di la des ma sbags pa kho na yod pas zhes tshig rnam par sbyar ro // ci lta bu zhig ce na / rgyu dang rkyen la rag las te skye pas gzhan gyi dbang gi bdag nyid do // ci'i phyir lus rtog pa'i nyes pas ma sbags pa can yin snyam pa la / bshad pa / rnam par shes pa tsam snang ba yin te rtog pas dben pa'i shes pa snang ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go // tsam smos pa ni rtog pa dang lhan cig pa rnam par gcod par byed pa'o // gzugs la sogs pa de lta bu de ni rang rig pa'i phyir / dgag par bya mi nus pa 'ba' zhig du ma zad kyi / 'gog par byed na byed pa po la phyir gnod pa kho na byed do zhes bya bar sbyar ro // gang gis she na / bshad pa / mngon sum la sogs pas so // sogs pa smos pas ni / rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa nang du bsdu par bya'o //.*

prove the negation of the superimposed real production or real intrinsic nature of entities, but do not prove the ultimate negation of production or intrinsic nature, for otherwise, it would follow absurdly that the conventional would not exist and that valid cognition would be invalidated by perception, as it would negate things that are actually experienced. Granted in his MĀ Kamalaśīla is not as clear on these matters as Jñānagarbha, but as he also holds that the Mādhyamikas should negate the *real* production or *real* nature superimposed upon conventional things, it is likely that Kamalaśīla had the same basic position here as Jñānagarbha.[73]

2.3 PV I kk. 85-86 and III kk. 357-358

In the section on the proof by means of inference, Kamalaśīla quotes several verses from Dharmakīrti's PV in order to explain why and how the Mādhyamikas prove the absence of real intrinsic nature of all entities by means of inference in reliance upon Dharmakīrti's theory of valid cognition. Let us, in the final section of this chapter, look at some key Dharmakīrtian positions concerning inference as they are adapted by Kamalaśīla to his Mādhyamika purposes. We will do this by examining in some detail Kamalaśīla's treatment of PV I kk. 85-86 and the PV III kk. 357-358.

First, PV I kk. 85-86:

> "The determination of properties and property-possessors, and such things as difference and nondifference, is just as acknowledged in the world, without any analysis of their real nature. The establishment of something to be proved (*sādhya*) and the means of proof (*sādhana*) in reliance upon this [distinction between property and property-possessor] in this way is considered by scholars to enable one to have access to the ultimate."[74]

In the MĀ, the PV I kk. 85-86 are quoted to explain that the Mādhyamikas rely upon properties, property-possessors and so forth as they are generally

[73]Note that Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla may be in the same lineage, as Jñānagarbha is said to be the master of Śāntarakṣita, who was in turn the master of Kamalaśīla. See fn. 17.

[74]PV I kk. 85-86: *dharmadharmivyavasthānaṃ bhedo 'bhedaś ca yādṛśaḥ / asamīkṣitatattvārtho yathā loke pratīyate // taṃ tathaiva samāśritya sādhyasādhanasaṃsthitiḥ / paramārthāvatārāya vidvadbhir avakalpyate //.*

acknowledged in the world and that the Mādhyamikas apply the conventions of *sādhya*, *sādhana* and so forth for the sake of having access to thusness. Therefore, kk. 85-86 quoted in the MĀ indicate the starting point and the goal of the Mādhyamika proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature by explaining that the Mādhyamikas rely upon conventionally acknowledged things and in this way aim at obtaining the wisdom of thusness.

Second, PV III kk. 357-358:

> "The establishment of what is to be cognized (*[pra]meya*), the means of valid cognition (*[pra]māṇa*) and the result of the means of valid cognition (*[pramāṇa]phala*) is effectuated with regard to the grasped [aspect], the grasping [aspect] and the reflexive cognition [respectively] in accordance with appearances, although [this division] does not [ultimately] exist. Otherwise, how would it be possible for a single entity [i.e., a cognition,] to have in reality the aspects which appear to be of various natures? Its oneness would be undermined."[75]

[75]PV III kk. 357-358 (= PVin I kk. 48-49): *yathānudarśanaṃ ceyaṃ meyamānaphalasthitiḥ / kriyate 'vidyamānā 'pi grāhyagrāhakasaṃvidām // anyathaikasya bhāvasya nānārūpāvabhāsinaḥ / satyaṃ kathaṃ syur ākārās tadekatvasya hānitaḥ //.*

Reflexive cognition (*sva-saṃvitti, °-saṃvid, °-saṃvedana, ātma-°*) means that cognition is cognized by itself and does not rely upon another cognition to cognize itself. In the Buddhist theory of reflexive cognition, all cognitions have a reflexive nature, or reflexivity, in that cognition cognizes itself. When one has the cognition of something blue, the awareness of the cognition of something blue is produced at the same time. This awareness is caused by the cognition itself due to its own reflexive nature, and not by another cognition. Śāntarakṣita explains reflexive cognition in his TSa k. 2012: *svarūpavedanāyānyad vedakaṃ na vyapekṣate // na cāviditam astīdam ity artho 'yaṃ svasaṃvidaḥ //.* "In order to cognize its own nature, [cognition] does not rely upon another cognition. It is not the case that this [i.e., cognition] is not cognized. This is the meaning of reflexive cognition."

Buddhist philosophers like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti hold that cognition's reflexive awareness is a necessary condition for its perception of objects. As Dharmakīrti says in his PVin I k. 55: *dmigs pa mngon sum ma yin na // don mthong rab tu 'grub mi 'gyur //.* "If cognition were [itself] not perceived, the perception of [its] object would not be established." Cf. TSPa p. 401, 4: *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati.* See VETTER (1966) p. 96, fn. 2. Why could not there be perceptions of objects if cognition were not also aware of itself? The Buddhist philosopher's reason is that a cognition which does not understand the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) cannot understand the qualified things (*viśeṣya*). That is to say, when an

object is cognized (*jñāto 'rthaḥ*), the object (*artha*) is the qualified thing, and the state of being cognized (*jñāta*) is the qualifier. If the state of being cognized, i.e., the qualifier, were not understood by such and such a cognition, then the object, i.e., the qualified thing, could not be understood by that cognition either. See TBh p. 17, 8-11: *yadi jñānaṃ svasaṃvedanaṃ na syāt, tadā jñāto 'rtha iti durghaṭaḥ syāt, 'nāgṛhītaviśeṣaṇā buddhir viśeṣye varttate' iti nyāyāt / tathā hi artho viśeṣyaḥ, jñāta iti viśeṣaṇam, jñāto jñānena viśeṣita iti /.* See KAJIYAMA (1966a) p. 49, 7-12.

The theory of *svasaṃvedana* is considered to be established for the Sākāravādins, those who accept that cognition is endowed with an image. The Sākāravādins hold that cognition does not cognize the external objects themselves — what is cognized by cognition does not exist outside the sphere of cognition. When one cognizes something blue, one cognizes the blue thing which is an aspect (*ākāra*) of cognition. See PVin I k. 38ab: *nānyo 'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo paraḥ /.* "What is experienced by cognition does not exist as being different [from the cognition]. There is no other awareness of it [i.e., cognition]." External objects and cognition would be completely different in nature: while the former has a material nature, the latter is immaterial or spiritual. Thus, because it is impossible that cognition would have a material nature, cognition could not cognize external objects themselves but cognizes its own aspects, which are regarded as the objects; cognition therefore cognizes itself. According to Śāntarakṣita, cognition's immateriality or spirituality (*ajaḍarūpa*) shows that cognition cognizes itself, i.e., it shows cognition's reflexive nature. See TSa k. 2000 (= MAK 16): *vijñānaṃ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate / iyam evātmasaṃvittir asya yā 'jaḍarūpatā //.* "Cognition arises as something excluded from [all] material natures. This reflexive awareness of that [cognition] is nothing but [its] immateriality." See ICHIGO (1985) p. 70, fn. 1.

Reflexive cognition is always considered to be a direct perception. When a perception perceives its object, the perception and the object must be in the relation of knower and known (*vedyavedakatva*). However, when cognition is perceived by itself, how can the relation between knower and known be established? For, normally, the agent of an action (*kartṛ*) and its object (*karman*) should be two different or separate things. The Sākāravādins' solution of this problem is that with regard to the reflexive awareness of cognition, the relation between knower and known is established not as a relation between agent and object, but as the relation between establisher and established (*vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāva*). That is, the relation between knower and known is simply *logically or conceptually* established with regard to single indivisible cognition, but is not really established. It is contradictory that single partless cognition would really have a threefold nature, i.e., the knower (*vedaka*), the known (*vedya*) and the knowing (*vitti*). See TSa k. 2001 (= MAK 17): *kriyākārakabhāvena na svasaṃvittir asya tu / ekasyānaṃśarūpasya trairūpyānupapattitaḥ //.* "The reflexive awareness of that [cognition] is not in terms of the relation of the action and *kāraka* [i.e., the

agent and the object]. It is impossible for a single partless [entity] to have a threefold nature [i.e., the knower, the known and the knowing]." And see TBh p. 16, 10-11: *na karmakartṛbhāvena vedyavedakatvaṃ jñāne varṇyate / kiṃ tarhi vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvena /.* Cf. NBṬ p. 82, 7-8: *na cātra janya-janakabhāvanibandhanaḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvaḥ yenaikasmin vastuni virodhaḥ syāt / api tu vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvena /.*

When Dharmakīrti explains his theory of perception from the Yogācāra point of view, then as PV III k. 357 says, cognition's grasping aspect (= the knower), its grasped aspect (= the known) and the reflexive awareness (= the knowing) are regarded as *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *pramāṇaphala* respectively. Dignāga also says in his PS I k. 10: *yadābhāsaṃ prameyaṃ tat pramāṇaphala te punaḥ / grāhakākārasaṃvittī trayaṃ nātaḥ pṛthakkṛtam //.* English translation in HATTORI (1968) p. 29, 23-29: "Whatever the form in which it [viz., a cognition] appears, that [form] is [recognized as] the object of cognition (*prameya*). The means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and [the cognition which is] its result (*phala*) are respectively the form of subject [in the cognition] and the cognition cognizing itself. Therefore, these three [factors of cognition] are not separate from one another." See also HATTORI ibid. p. 107, n. 1.67. Since it is contradictory that a single partless entity would have a threefold nature, cognition does not *ultimately* have the division of the grasping aspect, the grasped aspect and the reflexive awareness. See PV III k. 354: *avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaiḥ / grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate //.* "Although the nature of cognition is [ultimately] without division, it is apprehended by those who have erroneous insight as if it had the division of the grasped [aspect], the grasping [aspect] and the reflexive awareness."

When Dignāga and Dharmakīrti explain that the grasped aspect, the grasping aspect and the reflexive cognition are respectively *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *pramāṇaphala*, then the reflexive cognition means the awareness of the cognition that possesses both an objective aspect (*grāhyākāra*) and a subjective aspect (*grāhakākāra*). Dignāga says in his PSVb on PS I k. 9a: p. 183, 18-20; *yang na rang rig 'dir 'bras bu. shes pa ni gnyis su snang bar skyes te, rang gi snang ba dang yul gyi snang ba'o. snang ba de gnyis la gang rang rig pa de ni 'bras bur 'gyur ro. (svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra. dvyābhāsaṃ hi jñānam utpadyate, svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāsaṃ ca. tasyobhayābhāsasya yat svasaṃvedanaṃ tat phalam.)* English translation in HATTORI ibid. p. 28, 29-35: "Or [it can be maintained that] the self-cognition or the cognition cognizing itself (*svasaṃvitti*) is here the result [of the act of cognizing]. Every cognition is produced with a twofold appearance, namely, that of itself [as subject] (*svābhāsa*) and that of the object (*viṣayābhāsa*). The cognizing of itself as [possessing] these two appearances or the self-cognition (*svasaṃvitti*) is the result [of the cognitive act]." As for the Sanskrit of k. 9a and its commentary, see HATTORI ibid. p. 100, n. 1.60 and p. 101, n. 1.61. Dharmakīrti also says that the reflexive awareness of the cognition that possesses both an objective aspect and a subjective aspect is the "result of the means of valid cognition." See PV III k. 337: *tasmād dvirūpam asty ekaṃ yad evam anubhūyate / smaryate cobhayākārasyāsya*

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saṃvedanaṃ phalam //. "Therefore, single [cognition] is double in form [i.e., has objective and subjective aspects] [due to its being disturbed by ignorance], which (*yad*)* [cognition] is experienced in such a manner [i.e., as having the two aspects] [by means of reflexive awareness] and is recollected [later in accordance with the experience]. The awareness of the [cognition] that possesses both aspects is the result [of the means of valid cognition]." (* Note that Manorathanandin seems to interpret *yad* as "because." See PVV pp. 220, 25-221,1: *yat yasmāj jñānam evaṃ dvyākāratayā 'nubhūyate svavedanena yathānubhavaṃ kālāntare smaryate ca /.*) See TOSAKI (1985a) pp. 20-21.

It is not only the reflexive awareness of nonconceptual cognition that is a direct perception; Dignāga and Dharmakīrti hold that the reflexive awareness of conceptual cognition is also a direct perception. See PS I k. 7ab: *kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt.* English translation in HATTORI ibid. p. 27, 32-36: "Even conceptual construction, when it is brought to internal awareness, is admitted [as a type of perception]. However, with regard to the [external] object, [the conceptual construction is] not [admissible as perception], because it conceptualizes [the object]." As for the Sanskrit of k. 7ab, see HATTORI ibid. p. 95, n. 1.51. And see PV III k. 287: *śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānaṃ tatra kalpanā / svarūpaṃ ca na śabdārthas tatrādhyakṣam ato 'khilam //.* "The cognition which understands the meaning of a word with regard to some [object] conceptualizes that [object]. However, [conceptual cognition's] own nature [which consists of being a particular] is not the object of word. Therefore, all cognitions of [their own natures] are direct perceptions."

Finally, it is not only all cognitions or minds which have reflexivity. All mental factors (*caitta*), such as pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and indifference (*upekṣā*), also have this reflexivity. See NB I 10: *sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanam.* "All minds and mental factors are aware of themselves." And see TBh p. 15, 18: *sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanaṃ svasaṃvedanaṃ.* Dharmakīrti says that without the sense organ (*indriya*) having its object and mental concentration (*manaskāra*), the awareness of mental factor is not established. See PV III k. 252abc: *sārthe satīndriye yogye yathāsvam api cetasi / dṛṣṭaṃ janma sukhādīnāṃ.* See also PVin I p. 64, 16-24. Dignāga says that when one has the cognition of something blue, this blue thing is also cognized as something desirable or undesirable in accordance with the reflexive awareness of the cognition of it. See PS I. k. 9a: *svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra* and k. 9b: *tadrūpo hy arthaniścayaḥ.* "Or the reflexive awareness is here the result, because the determination of the object has the nature of it [i.e., reflexive awareness]." And see PSVb on k. 9b p. 183, 23-25: *gang gi tshe shes pa yul dang bcas pa don yin pa de'i tshe rang rig pa dang rjes su mthun par don 'dod pa'am mi 'dod pa rtogs par byed do.* (As for the text, see HATTORI ibid. p. 103, n. 1.63.) "When a cognition possessing [the aspect of] an object is the object [to be cognized by reflexive awareness], then in accordance with the reflexive awareness [of the cognition], the [perceived] object is understood as something desirable or undesirable." Cf. HATTORI ibid. p. 29, 1-4. However, it is not clear

K. 357 is quoted in the MĀ in order to show that in the proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature, as in other such proofs, the object of valid cognition (*prameya*), the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and the result of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇaphala*) are established on the basis of Dharmakīrti's theory of valid cognition. It is clear that by quoting k. 357, Kamalaśīla also regards the grasped aspect (*grāhyākāra*), the grasping aspect (*grāhakākāra*) and reflexive cognition as the object of valid cognition, the means of valid cognition and the result of the means of valid cognition respectively. In the proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature by means of inference, the object of valid cognition is conventional entities which are to be qualified by the absence of real intrinsic nature, and inference is the means of valid cognition. Kamalaśīla here, however, does not explicitly say what the result of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇaphala*) is, but we can probably surmise what it is by a systemic argument: In the proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature, it seems that the *pramāṇaphala* is the reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) of the [conceptual] cognition which understands all entities as being without real intrinsic nature by means of inference.[76]

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whether the awareness of a mental factor (*caitta*) is established separately from the establishment of the awareness of mind (*citta*) or the establishment of the awareness of *caitta* is also the establishment of the awareness of *citta*.

[76]On reflexive awareness, see also fn. 75.

In the Buddhist epistemological tradition, the result of inference is reflexive awareness. Cf. NB II 4: *pramāṇaphalavyavasthā 'trāpi pratyakṣavat //.* "In the case [of inference] too, the establishment of the result of the means of valid cognition is the same as [in the case of] direct perception." In NB II 4, Dharmakīrti does not take the Yogācāra position, but rather takes the Sautrāntika position, since he regards cognition's similarity to its object (*arthasārūpya*) as the means of valid cognition. See NB I 20-21: *arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam / tadvaśād arthapratītisiddher iti /.* "This [cognition's] similarity to the object is the means of valid cognition. This is because by the force of this [similarity], the understanding of the object is established." On the Sautrāntika view, as depicted in NB, the result of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇaphala*) is the knowledge of the external object (*arthapratīti*). In his PV, however, Dharmakīrti comes to the conclusion that even for those who accept the existence of external objects, the reflexive cognition should be the result of the means of valid cognition. See PV III k. 345: *tasmāt prameye bāhye 'pi yuktaṃ svānubhāvaḥ phalam / yataḥ svabhāvo 'sya yathā tathaivārthaviniścayaḥ //.* "Therefore, even with regard to [the view] that the external things are the objects of valid cognition, it is correct that the reflexive cognition is the result [of the means of valid cognition]. This is because an [external]

Kamalaśīla thus once again assimilates much of Dharmakīrti's logical theory by relegating it, in fact, to the level of "appearances," i.e., conventional truth. PV III k. 357 says that the object of valid cognition, the means of valid cognition and the result of the means of valid cognition are established just as they appear with regard to the grasped aspect, the grasping as-

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object is determined just in accordance with the [cognition's] nature." Therefore, whether Dharmakīrti takes the Sautrāntika position or the Yogācāra position, the reflexive cognition is the result of the means of valid cognition, and therefore, just like the result of direct perception, the result of inference should also be regarded as the reflexive cognition.

For Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, *svasaṃvid* means the reflexive awareness that possesses both an objective aspect (*grāhyākāra*) and a subjective aspect (*grāhakākāra*). The understanding or determination (*pariccheda*) of the object — i.e., the *pramāṇaphala* — is the reflexive awareness that is conditioned by the grasping aspect (*grāhakākāra*), or in other words, the *pramāṇa*. See PV III k. 363: *tatra buddheḥ paricchedo grāhakākārasammataḥ / tādātmyād ātmavit tasya sa tasyāḥ sādhanaṃ tataḥ //.* "In the [Yogācāra view], cognition's [function of] determination is acknowledged as being the grasping aspect. Due to [this aspect's] having that nature [viz., determination], the reflexive awareness is [the result] of the [grasping aspect]. Therefore, the [grasping aspect] establishes the [reflexive awareness]." Additions follow PVV. Cf. PVin I p. 98, 13-15: *de'i phyir 'dzin pa'i rnam pa rang rig pa'i sgrub par byed pa 'dod de /.* See also PV III k. 339: *yadā saviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ jñānāṃśe 'rthavyavasthiteḥ / tadā ya ātmānubhavaḥ sa evārthaviniścayaḥ //.* "When [in the Yogācāra view of consciousness-only too, it is acknowledged that] cognition has an object since the object is established [due to confusion] with regard to a part of cognition, then it is precisely the reflexive awareness that is the determination of the object." See also PV III k. 349cd which takes the Sautrāntika point of view: *arthasthites tadātmatvāt svavid apy arthavin matā //.* "Because the establishment of an [external] object has the nature of the [reflexive awareness], the reflexive awareness is also acknowledged as being the cognition of the [external] object." Cf. PVin I pp. 88, 31-90, 2: *don gnas pa ni rang rig pa'i rang bzhin yin pa nyid kyi phyir rang rig pa yin yang 'bras bu las 'di ni don rig pa yin par blta'o //.* "The establishment of the [external] object is of the nature of reflexive awareness. Therefore although it is reflexive awareness, nonetheless, from the point of view of the effect it should be considered to be knowledge of the object." Cf. VETTER (1966) pp. 89, 39-91, 4.

The same positions on *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *pramāṇaphala* are most likely attributable to Kamalaśīla. Thus, when the absence of real intrinsic nature of all entities is proved by means of inference, then, due to the reflexive awareness established by the grasping aspect which is the inference, the understanding of the object of valid cognition will be established. This is, then, the *pramāṇaphala*: the understanding of all entities qualified by the absence of real intrinsic nature.

pect and the reflexive cognition. In the second chapter of MĀ, relying upon this same k. 357, Kamalaśīla holds that all logical notions, such as properties, property-possessors, incompatible things, pervaded things (*vyāpya*), pervaders (*vyāpaka*),[77] essential properties and results, are also established just as they appear with regard to conventional things. He says:

> "That way, according to the masters, incompatible properties like permanence and impermanence are also established just as they appear with reference to things such as lamps in order to have access to the ultimate."[78]

He also says at the end of the analysis of the establishment of the valid cognition for proving the absence of real intrinsic nature:

> "Thus, in the [proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature], properties, property-possessors, incompatible things, pervaded things, pervaders, essential properties, results and so forth, all of which are established just as they appear, are not contradictory."[79]

Finally, it also seems that Kamalaśīla (at least provisionally) adopted the theory of Alīkākāravāda, i.e., the position that the aspects of cognition are false and do not ultimately exist.[80] Kamalaśīla seems to quote PV III k. 358 in order to explain that as a method for proving the absence of real intrinsic nature, the Mādhyamikas adopt the Alīkākāravādin's idea of the ultimate nonexistence of the aspects of cognition, since PV III k. 358 says that it is impossible for a sigle entity, i.e., cognition, to have in reality the aspects which appear to be of various natures. In fact, Kamalaśīla accepts the Alīkākāravādin's ideas as the solution for avoiding the fallacy that

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[77]For the concepts of pervaded things (*vyāpya*), pervaders (*vyāpaka*), see fn. 291.

[78]MĀ D177b4-5: *slob dpon rnams kyis ni don dam pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir de bzhin du mar me la sogs pa dag la yang rtag pa dang mi rtag pa la sogs pa chos rnams kyi 'gal ba ji ltar snang ba bzhin du rnam par gzhag go //.* See Translation 3 paragraph 3.2.2.1.1.1, **§5**.

[79]MĀ D181a4: *de lta bas na 'di la chos dang / chos can dang 'gal ba dang / khyab par bya ba dang / khyab par byed pa dang / rang bzhin dang 'bras bu la sogs pa ji ltar snang ba bzhin rnam par gzhag pa thams cad mi 'gal ba nyid do //.* See fn. 275.

[80]On Alīkākāravāda, see fn. 234.

the locus is unestablished (*āśrayāsiddha*).[81] However, Kamalaśīla's adopting the Alīkākāravāda does not mean that the Mādhyamikas would accept something like nondual cognition (*advayajñāna*) as being really existent, as would a bona fide Yogācāra of the Alīkākāra school. For Kamalaśīla all mental states would remain conventional entities.

Thus, PV I kk. 85-86 and PV III kk. 357-358 are quoted to indicate the starting point and the goal of Kamalaśīla's proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature of all entities and to explain how his proof can be established on the basis of Dharmakīrti's theory of valid cognition. These quotations and philosophy behind them, play an essential role in the establishment of Kamalaśīla's proofs by means of inference. Again the key tactic in reinterpreting Dharmakīrti so as to render him compatible with the Mādhyamika philosophical project is to relegate his epistemology to the domain of conventional truth. In this way the Mādhyamika can use Dharmakīrtian epistemology to attack realism and yet also avoid the danger of self-refutation.

[81] See MĀ D174a4-174b6.

Chapter 3

Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of Nonperception[82]

As was explained in Chapter 2, Kamalaśīla avoids self-refutation of his Mādhyamika arguments by maintaining that valid cognitions do not have as their object ultimately existing intrinsic natures of entities, but simply take conventional entities as their objects. Now, since ordinary beings cannot perceive the ultimate nature of entities, it is also impossible that they would perceive the voidness (*śūnyatā*) of entities, since that is what entities ultimately are.[83] Here, however, the following problem arises: if nobody

[82]In 1999 the present writer published an article entitled: "Kamalaśīla's interpretation of *anupalabdhi* in the *Madhyamakāloka*" (in *Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy*, Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference Hiroshima, November 4-6, 1997, ed. by Sh. Katsura, BKGGA 32, Vienna: pp. 185-192). In that article, we have tried to show how Kamalaśīla does not accept the establishment of another thing (*anyabhāva*), but only accepts the establishment of another perception (*anyopalabdhi*) by comparing his interpretation of *anupalabdhi* with that of Dharmakīrti. The analysis of what the object of another perception consists in remained somewhat insufficient in that article, and we hope to remedy this problem in the present chapter.

[83]An opponent says in MAP D121b5-6: *dngos po'i rang bzhin de yang mngon sum yin pa'i phyir de'i rang bzhin du gyur ba stong pa nyid kyang mngon sum kho nar khas blangs pa la / stong pa nyid ni byis pa rnams kyis mngon sum du mi rtogs pas mngon sum gyis gnod pa yin no // dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa mi dmigs pas med par thal bar tha snyad gdags su rung ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pas gnod pa yang yin no //.* "Because, on the one hand, the intrinsic nature of entities is perceptible, the voidness which is their intrinsic nature would also have to be accepted as being actually perceptible. However, voidness is not understood perceptually by the infantile [i.e., ordinary beings] and thus would be invalidated by [their] direct perception. Also, [voidness] would be invalidated by inference because we

could understand the Mādhyamika thesis of the absence of real intrinsic nature by means of direct perception, the Mādhyamikas would not have a method for obtaining the *nonconceptual wisdom* of thusness. In that case the religious project of Mādhyamika philosophy would not be fulfilled: bodhisattvas would not be able to progress spiritually on the path to buddhahood by *directly realizing* the ultimate thusness, i.e., the absence of real intrinsic nature. The Mādhyamika theory of meditation upon all dharmas as being without real intrinsic nature thus could not be established. Furthermore,

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could justifiably apply the convention that it would not exist on account of [the principle] that it would be something perceptible which was not in fact perceived." (Cf. AAA p. 637, 6-8.) The opponent argues that the Mādhyamika thesis would be invalidated by ordinary beings' direct perception (*pratyakṣabādhā*) and by inference (*anumānabādhā*), i.e., nonperception (*anupalabdhi*) of what is perceptible (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*). Kamalaśīla, however, replies that the absence of real intrinsic nature cannot be understood by the perception of ordinary beings whose minds are affected by the superimposition of real entities and that absence cannot be a perceptible object (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*) for them. See MAP D122a3-5: *dngos po rnams kyi sgro btags pa'i rnam pas dben pa nyid stong pa nyid ces bya na / stong pa nyid sgro btags pa'i rnam pas bsgribs pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir dngos po'i rang bzhin bzung bzhin du yang byis pa rnams kyis nges par mi 'gyur te / de'i phyir bzung mod kyi / tha snyad gdags su mi rung ba'i phyir ma bzung ba dang 'dra ba nyid pas 'di ni dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa ma yin no // de lta bas na mngon sum la sogs pas gnod pa ma yin no zhes bya ba 'di ston to //.* "If it is said that voidness is the lack of the superimposed aspects of real entities, [then] due to [the fact that] voidness is of the nature of being covered by the superimposed aspects [of real entities], the infantile cannot determine [voidness], differently from [the case of their] grasping the intrinsic nature of entities. Therefore, although they would grasp [voidness], [nonetheless] since they cannot apply the convention [that entities have voidness], it is in fact similar to [the state of] not grasping [voidness]. Therefore, this [i.e., voidness] is not a perceptible [object]. Thus, [the Mādhyamika thesis] is not invalidated by direct perception and [by inference]. This has been explained." Cf. AAA p. 637, 10-15: *samāropitākāraviviktatābhāvān niḥsvabhāvatocyate. sā ca bhāvasvabhāvagrahaṇena gṛhītā 'pi kṣaṇikatvavad bhrāntyā samāropitatattvotpattyākāratiraskṛtarūpatvān na bālair niścīyate. ato niścayānupapatteḥ pratyakṣatāyā abhāvān na pratyakṣabādhā. tathā gṛhītā 'pi vyavahārāyogyatvād agṛhītakalpaiveti nopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvam asyāḥ. tato nānumānabādhā.* Note that Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's idea that yogins' perception can directly understand the absence of real intrinsic nature does not serve as the reason for avoiding the fault of *pratyakṣabādhā*. That is to say, it is not correct to say, as does Moriyama, that Kamalaśīla's interpretation of nonperception would have been undertaken in order to avoid that fault. See fn. 169.

if the Mādhyamikas could not prove the possibility of a direct perception which understands the absence of real intrinsic nature, they also could not prove the existence of the Buddha's wisdom directly understanding selflessness (*nairātmya*). Therefore, since the Buddha would not be established to be someone who can *directly realize* thusness, his authority would accordingly be lost, as it is an essential facet of the Buddha's wisdom that it be nonconceptual and direct. Conceptual thought, while certainly not to be discounted, is always taken by Buddhists to be an inferior and partly erroneous source of knowledge, and thus if the Buddha's authority rests on his possessing the highest wisdom, that wisdom must be nonconceptual and direct.

In fact, Kamalaśīla maintains that there *are* people who can understand the absence of intrinsic nature by direct perception, but it is only yogins like buddhas and bodhisattvas, and not ordinary people. Kamalaśīla says:

> "We too do not accept that people of limited vision directly understand such a profound thusness of dharmas. Nonetheless, even if we grant that someone like you does not understand such thusness, why is it not still possible to say [the following]: The selflessness of all dharmas is understood by means of the direct perception of supreme yogins, who, by accumulating an immeasurable assemblage of both merit and wisdom (*puṇyajñānasaṃbhāra*) over many aeons, have acquired the power which enables them to realize everything and have dispelled all the darkness of the obscurations by the light of perfect wisdom, arisen from meditation upon the real state of affairs (*bhūtārtha*)."[84]

Supreme yogins, like buddhas and bodhisattvas, who have assiduously devoted themselves for a long time and who have meditated upon all dharmas

[84]MĀ D168a5-7: *kho bo cag kyang tshu rol mthong ba rnams kyis chos kyi de kho na nyid zab mo de lta bu mngon sum du mthong bar ni khas mi len to // 'on kyang gal te khyed lta bu de kho na nyid de lta bu rtogs pa med du chug kyang rnal 'byor pa dam pa bskal pa mi nyung bar bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs dpag tu med pa bsags pas mtha' dag 'byor par byed pa'i thabs thob pa / yang dag pa'i don bsgoms pa las byung ba'i yang dag pa'i ye shes kyi snang bas sgrib pa'i mun pa mtha' dag bsal (GNP bsal: CD bstsal) ba rnams kyi mngon sum gyis chos thams cad bdag med par rtogs so (CD so: GNP so //) zhes bya bar go ci ste mi srid de /.* See Translation 1 paragraph 1.2.1.1.2, §4. See MAK 74-75. For our translation of MAK 74-75 and for Kamalaśīla's classification of direct perceptions, see fn. 147.

as being selfless, are said to obtain a "clear" (*spaṣṭa*) perception of the selflessness of all dharmas. This is indeed theoretically possible within the system of Buddhist epistemology, since a clear perception of an object can arise from the meditation upon it, whether the object is existent or not. Such a clear nonconceptual perception is said by Kamalaśīla to be like the case where men, intoxicated by sexual desire, hallucinate that there are beautiful women in front of them — the hallucination comes from repeated conceptual thought, in this case longstanding obsession. The difference between true yogic perception and simple hallucination, however, is that the object of the first has been previously proved to exist.

According to Dharmakīrti (and hence Kamalaśīla), yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) is the effect arising from the "ultimate limit of meditation" (*bhāvanāprakarṣaparyanta*).[85] Although meditation is generally conceptual, a clear perception, i.e., concentration (*samādhi*) which is nonconceptual, can arise from the "ultimate limit of [conceptual] meditation." Meditation's ultimate limit is the state where the object of meditation is said to appear slightly unclearly "as though it were veiled by a thin cloud."[86] After yogins have arrived at that ultimate conceptual state through repeated meditation, they then pass to a state of clear perception which nonconceptually understands its object. Dharmakīrti says in PV III k. 281:

> "Yogins' cognition has been explained earlier. For them the [cognition] which arises from meditation is free of the net of conceptualizations and appears clearly indeed."[87]

He also says in PV III k. 286:

> "Of the [clear nonconceptual cognitions which arise from meditation], the non-belying one, like for instance [the cognition of] previously ascertained facts [such as the Four Noble Truths], is accepted as a valid cognition, i.e., as a perception arising from meditation. The rest is confusion."[88]

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[85]Dharmakīrti's definition of yogic perception: (NB I 11:) *bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānaṃ ceti* /.

[86]NBṬ pp. 68, 4-69, 1: *abhrakavyavahitam iva yadā bhāvyamānaṃ vastu paśyati sā prakarṣaparyantāvasthā* /. See STCHERBATSKY (1930-32) II, p. 31, 20-21.

[87]PV III k. 281: *prāguktaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ teṣāṃ tad bhāvanāmayam / vidhūtakalpanājālaṃ spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate* //.

[88]PV III k. 286: *tatra pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi yat prāṅnirṇītavastuvat / tad*

In the MĀ Kamalaśīla proves that the yogic perception which directly understands the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas is established as a valid cognition. He explains that any cognition which appears clearly (*spaṣṭam*) and is non-belying (*avisaṃvāda*) is a valid direct perception. This is because "clear" means being free of conceptualization (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and because a cognition which has an object already established by valid cognition is to be regarded as non-belying (*avisaṃvāda*). The absence of real intrinsic nature is also the object determined by Kamalaśīla's five valid reasons, like the "diamond-splinters" (*vajrakaṇa*) and "being neither one nor many" (*ekānekaviyoga*).

In short, Kamalaśīla relies integrally upon the theory of Dharmakīrti to develop his account of yogic perception. He explains that yogic perception of the selflessness of dharmas presupposes an earlier conceptual ascertainment that becomes progressively more subtle until it finally, just after an "ultimate limit of meditation," becomes a clear, nonconceptual, valid perceptual cognition. Like Dharmakīrti, he differentiates valid clear cognition from nonconceptual vivid hallucination by the fact that the former is backed by a previous inferential validation, whereas the latter is not.[89]

Now, the yogic perception of the selflessness, or the lack of real intrinsic nature of dharmas, is generally regarded by Mahāyāna Buddhists to be a negative perception, i.e., one which *fails* to find any self or real intrinsic nature. In that sense, this yogic perception of the lack of intrinsic nature is actually a nonperception (*anupalabdhi*) of such natures, and this nonperception is the ground for the judgment that such natures do not exist. Once again, Kamalaśīla heavily relies upon Dharmakīrti, in particular upon Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception (*anupalabdhi*). The central idea of this theory is that when someone is competent and is in the appropriate situation to perceive a certain object at a certain place and time, but does not in fact perceive it, he is then justified in concluding that that object does not exist then and there. Kamalaśīla explains yogic perception in the light of this *anupalabdhi* theory of Dharmakīrti: if real intrinsic natures existed, yogins would perceive them; but they do not perceive such natures in their yogic

bhāvanājaṃ pratyakṣam iṣṭam śeṣā upaplavāḥ //. See PVV p. 204, 9-13: *tatra bhāvanābalabhāviṣu spaṣṭānirvikalpeṣu yat saṃvādi upadarśitārthaprāpakaṃ tad bhāvanājaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam iṣṭam / kim ivety āha — prāk prathamaparicchede nirṇītaṃ vastu satyacatuṣṭayaṃ tasminn iva / yathā āryasatyaviṣayaṃ bhāvanābalajaṃ saṃvāditvāt pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam, evam anyad apīdṛśam /.*

[89] See MĀ D170a5-170b7. For our translation, see pp. 112-116.

perception, and therefore are justified in judging that such natures do not exist.

One of the most interesting aspects of Kamalaśīla's interpretation of nonperception is that it connects his proof of the Mādhyamika position to his theory of meditation. According to Kamalaśīla, the Mādhyamika yogins practice meditation upon all dharmas as being without real intrinsic nature, obtain the realization of the selflessness (*nairātmya*) of all dharmas and repeat that meditation in order to obtain the omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) of a buddha. If Kamalaśīla could not rationally explain how one could directly understand an absence by means of yogic perception, his account of meditation could not thus be established.

In this chapter, we first survey Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception, and then examine the differences and similarities between Kamalaśīla's interpretation of nonperception and that of Dharmakīrti. Finally, we analyze the object of the "other perception" (*anyopalabdhi*) that is implicit in nonperception of ultimate intrinsic natures. Analyzing this object, we clarify how yogins' wisdom understanding the absence of real intrinsic nature is established and how yogins negatively judge all dharmas to be without real intrinsic nature.

3.1 Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi*

In Dharmakīrti's logic there are three types of valid reasons: reasons consisting in effects (*kāryahetu*), reasons consisting in essential properties (*svabhāvahetu*) and reasons consisting in nonperception (*anupalabdhi*). While the first two are reasons which establish things positively (*vastusādhana*), nonperception is a reason which establishes a negation (*pratiṣedhahetu*).[90] Dharmakīrti says that all correct conventions of negation

[90]See NB II 10-11: *trirūpāṇi ca trīṇy eva liṅgāni // anupalabdhiḥ svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ ceti //.* "Triply characterized reasons are only three. [Those reasons consist in] nonperception, essential properties and effects." See also NB II 18: *atra dvau vastusādhanau / ekaḥ pratiṣedhahetuḥ //.* And see NBṬ p. 108, 4-5: *triṣu hetuṣu madhye dvau hetū vastusādhanau — vidheḥ sādhanau gamakau / ekaḥ pratiṣedhasya hetur gamakaḥ /.*

When Dharmakīrti interprets Dignāga's valid reasons in the *hetucakra*, he develops the idea that reasons consisting in nonperception can actually be assimilated to reasons which are essential properties (*svabhāvahetu*). This is because a nonperception of what is perceptible allows us to infer the fitness or possibility for produc-

(*pratiṣedhavyavahāra*) or negative judgments are established only by means of nonperception.[91] Here are some of the salient points in Dharmakīrti's theory that will be relevant in the comparison with Kamalaśīla.

First of all, not all nonperceptions can establish correct negative judgments. Dharmakīrti puts a restriction on the type of nonperception that can prove correct negative conventions:

> "Nonperception of what is perceptible is the reason for nonexistence or the reason for the convention of being nonexistent."[92]

Dharmakīrti says that only nonperception of what is itself perceptible (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta/dṛśya*) can establish the negation of something — here, "being perceptible" means that an entity meets the conditions for producing a perception of itself.[93] The nonperception of what is not perceptible

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ing cognition of, speech about and action directed towards that which is nonexistent (*asajjñānaśabdavyavahārakāryayogyatā*), and because the fitness to produce this effect is held to be the essential property of the complete set of causes, viz., the nonperception. See IWATA (1991b). Therefore, Dharmakīrti holds that nonperception of what is perceptible and the fitness for producing negative judgment, etc. are in a relation of same nature (*tādātmya*).

[91]See NB II 25: *pratiṣedhasiddhir api yathoktāyā evānupalabdheḥ //.* See also NBṬ p. 116, 8-9: *pratiṣedhavyavahārasya siddhir yathoktā yā dṛśyānupalabdhis tata eva bhavati yatas tasmād anyato noktā //.* And see PVSV p. 5, 9: *yāvān kaścit pratiṣedhaḥ sa sarvo 'nupalabdheḥ /.*

[92]HB p. 21*, 18-19: *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhir abhāvahetur abhāvavyavahārahetur vā.*

Here, the convention of being nonexistent (*abhāvavyavahāra/asadvyavahāra*) means cognition of, speech about and action directed towards that which is not present. Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa says in his *Hetubinduṭīkā* (HBṬ) p. 174, 28-30: *abhāvavyavahāraś ca jñānābhidhānapravṛttilakṣaṇaḥ / tatra 'nāsty atra ghaṭaḥ' ity evamākāraṃ jñānam, evaṃvidhavastvabhidhāyakaṃ cābhidhānaṃ, niḥśaṅkasya ca tatra pradeśe gamanāgamanalakṣaṇā pravṛttir iti /.* "The convention of being nonexistent has the characteristic of cognition, speech and action. Of these, cognition is the one [which understands] that here there is no vase. Speech is the [words] which state such a fact. And action is the one which is characterized by [activities] of a person having no doubt, such as [his] leaving from or approaching that place [where the vase is nonexistent]." Cf. NBṬ p. 122, 1-3 and TBh p. 30, 7-9. See STEINKELLNER (1967) p. 156, Anm. 3.

[93]Dharmakīrti explains those conditions in his *Nyāyabindu* (NB) II 13: *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptir upalambhapratyayāntarasākalyaṃ svabhāvaviśeṣaś ca //.* "Being perceptible consists in the additional conditions of perception being com-

(*anupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta/ adṛśya*), however, cannot serve as a reason establishing nonexistence.[94]

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plete and in there being a distinct entity itself." See also PVSV p. 101, 18-19: *na hy asti saṃbhavo yad upalabdhiyogyaḥ sakaleṣv anyeṣu kāraneśu san nopalabhyeta /.* See also KELLNER (1997) pp. 105, 17-106, 11 and fn. 163 and (1999) pp. 196-197.

When the additional conditions of perception, such as one's having no defects in one's sense organs and so forth, are satisfied, then if an entity which is the object of perception is present, that entity will necessarily be perceived. See NB II 14: *yaḥ svabhāvaḥ satsv anyeṣūpalambhapratyayeṣu san pratyakṣa eva bhavati sa svabhāvaviśeṣaḥ //.*

[94]See NB II 27: *anyathā cānupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpteṣu deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭeṣv ātmapratyakṣanivṛtter abhāvaniścayābhāvāt //.* "[The convention of negation (*pratiṣedhavyavahāra*) is established only by means of the nonperception of what is perceptible,] because by means of another [nonperception, i.e., *adṛśyānupalabdhi*], there is no determination of nonexistence, since [a perceiver's] own perception does not function with regard to the imperceptible objects which are inaccessible in space, time or nature." See also NBṬ p. 117, 4-5: *sati vastuni tasyā adṛśyānupalabdheḥ sambhavād ity anyathāśabdārthaḥ / etasmāt kāraṇāt nānyasyā anupalabdheḥ pratiṣedhasiddhiḥ /.* And see NBṬ p. 117, 12-15: *teṣu pratipattur ātmano yat pratyakṣaṃ tasya nivṛtteḥ kāraṇāt niścayābhāvaḥ / yasmād anupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpteṣv ātmapratyakṣanivṛtter abhāvaniścayābhāvaḥ, tasmāt saty api vastuni ātmapratyakṣanivṛttilakṣaṇāyā adṛśyānupalabdheḥ sambhavaḥ / tato yathoktāyā eva pratiṣedhasiddhiḥ //.*

On *deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭeṣv*, see TBh p. 30, 17-20: *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvaviśiṣṭena deśaviprakṛṣṭe sumervādau kālaviprakṛṣṭe bhaviṣyacchaṅkhacakravartyādau svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭe piśācādāv anupalambhamātrasambhave 'pi nābhāvavyavahāra ity uktaṃ bhavati /.* "The restriction 'being what is perceptible' explains that the convention of being nonexistent is not [established] with regard to inaccessible objects in space, such as the Sumeru mountain, inaccessible objects in time, such as the future emperor Śaṅkha, and inaccessible objects in nature, such as a spirit, although there can be mere nonperceptions [of such inaccessible objects]."

Although *adṛśyānupalabdhi* is not a reason which can establish the convention of nonexistence, it can nonetheless be a reason which "negates the convention of being existent" (*sadvyavahārapratiṣedhahetu*). See HBṬ p. 169, 15-18: *yā tv anupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhiḥ pratyakṣā-numānanivṛttilakṣaṇā sā saṃśayahetuḥ pramāṇanivṛttav apy arthābhāvāsiddheḥ, nimittābhāvāt tu sadvyavahārapratiṣedhahetur ity avagantavyam /.* "On the other hand, the nonperception of what is not perceptible, which is characterized as the non-activation of direct perception and inference, is a doubtful reason, because although valid cognitions may not function, the nonexistence of the object is not thereby established. However, it should be understood that [the nonperception of what is not perceptible] is the reason which negates the convention of being existent, because the cause

Second, according to Dharmakīrti, when nonperception is given as a logical reason, or *sādhana*, it must not be interpreted as having the form of a nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), i.e., as the absence of perception.[95] This is because absence or nonexistence lacks any capacity (*sāmarthya*) to perform any function whatsoever and therefore cannot be a *sādhana*.[96]

[for that convention, i.e, the apprehension (*upalabdhi*) which precedes cognition of, speech about and action directed towards something present] is lacking." According to TILLEMANS (1995b), Dharmakīrti accepts *adṛśyānupalabdhi* as a valid cognition: he uses it to negate cognition, speech and action directed towards something imperceptible (*adṛśya*), but not to prove exclusion or nonexistence of the imperceptible objects themselves. Cf. STEINKELLNER (1967) pp. 157-158. As for a critical edition of PVṬ on PV I k. 3, see STEINKELLNER (1994).

[95]Dharmakīrti does not accept his master Īśvarasena's idea on nonperception. According to HBṬ and DhP, Īśvarasena regarded nonperception as the mere absence of perception (*upalabdhyabhāvamātra*) and accepted such nonperception as a third valid cognition (*pramāṇāntara*). See STEINKELLNER (1967) p. 159, Anm. 4) and p. 169, Anm. 17), KELLNER (1997) p. 107 and fn. 166. See also KATSURA (1992).

[96]See HB p. 22*, 11-16: *katham anyabhāvas tadabhāvaḥ, yenābhāvarūpānupalabdhir abhāvavyavahāraṃ sādhayed iti ced, uktam atra yathā paryudāsavṛttyāpekṣāto 'bhāvo 'nupalabdhiś cānupalabdhiḥ. na pratiṣedhamātram, tasya sādhanāsiddher abhāvavyavahārāsiddhiprasaṅgāt. tasyāsaṃsṛṣṭarūpasya bhāvasiddhir evāparasyābhāvasiddhir ity anyabhāvo 'pi tadabhāva iti vyapadiśyate.* "[Objection:] How would another object [than X] be the absence of X, so that the nonperception which has the nature of nonexistence would establish the convention of being nonexistent? [Reply:] We have [already] replied to this [objection] by saying that due to relying upon the function of implicative negation, nonperception is nonexistence and nonperception. [Nonperception] is not a simple negation, because, since such [a nonperception] is not established as a *sādhana*, it would follow absurdly that the convention of being nonexistent is not established. Just the establishment of the existence of that [i.e., an entity] which is of the nature of not being fused [with another entity] is the establishment of the nonexistence of another [entity]. Therefore, it is explained that another object [than X] is also the absence of X."

On Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa's interpretations of the words *tasya sādhanāsiddher*, see STEINKELLNER ibid. p. 170, Anm. 18. Arcaṭa first interprets those words as meaning that the absence of perception cannot be established as a *sādhana*, because simple absence lacks any capacity (*sāmarthya*) to perform any function whatsoever. See HBṬ p. 176, 3-7: *yat tu anapekṣitārthāntarasaṃsargaṃ pratiṣedhamātram anupalabdhiḥ itīśvaraseno manyate tan nirākurvann āha — na pratiṣedhamātram ityādi / kasmāt ity āha — tasya sādhanāsiddheḥ ityādi /*

Dharmakīrti regards the negative participle (*an-*) of the word "nonperception" (*an-upalabdhi*) as an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*)[97] and maintains that the nonperception of X can be both a *perception which is other* than that of X (*anyopalabdhi*) and *something other* than X (*anyabhāva*). He says in the *Hetubindu* (HB):

"In this [definition of nonperception], when perception is a

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na hy abhāvasya sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇasya sādhanatvaṃ siddhihetutvaṃ sidhyati, sarvasāmarthyaviraharūpasya tadayogāt /. Second, Arcaṭa interprets *tasya sādhanāsiddher* as meaning that no *sādhana* of the absence of perception is established. He says that if the absence of perception were to be established by another absence of perception, then this absence of perception should also be established by the third absence of perception, and therefore there would be an infinite regress (*anavasthāna*). See HBṬ p. 176, 11-14: *athavā tasya prasajyapratiṣedhātmana upalabdhyabhāvasya sādhanam eva kiñcin na sidhyatīti / sa hy abhāvatvād apareṇopalabdhyabhāvena sādhyaḥ syāt, so 'py apareṇety anavasthānam /.* The above two interpretations of the words *tasya sādhanāsiddher* are already found in Vinītadeva's HBṬīkā P190b2-8.

Although Dharmakīrti says here that nonperception is not a simple negation, i.e., a nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), Arcaṭa interprets the words *na pratiṣedhamātram* as meaning that nonperception has not only the form of a nonimplicative negation but also the form of an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*). He says that another object (*anyabhāva*) than X has the form of a nonimplicative negation, because it has the nature of the absence of X (*abhāvarūpatā*). See HBṬ p. 165, 23-25: *na hi prasajyapratiṣedha evaiko nañarthaḥ kintu paryudāso 'pi / tato 'nyabhāvasyābhāvarūpatā na virudhyate, prasajyapratiṣedharūpatā 'py anyabhāvasya yathā tathottaratra vakṣyate /.* See also HBṬ pp. 179, 9-180, 16. Vinītadeva seems to have had the same idea as Arcaṭa. See HBṬīkā P190a6-8: *dgag pa tsam ni ma yin no zhes bya ba 'di ni sngar bshad zin pa nyid do // 'di skad du / gang gi tshe ma yin pa'i ngo bor dngos po med pa dang / mi dmigs pa dag rnam par 'jog pa de'i tshe / bum pas dben pa'i phyogs kyi ngo bo nyid kho na bum pa med pa yin no // de'i phyir bum pa med pa'i ngo bo'i mi dmigs pa de lta bus dngos po med par tha snyad gdags pa sgrub pa la nyes pa 'ga' yang med do //.* "The statement that [nonperception] is not a simple negation has been just already explained earlier. Thus, when [nonperception] has the form of an implicative negation and is established as nonexistence and nonperception, just the intrinsic nature of a place lacking a vase is the absence of the vase. Therefore, there is no fault at all in establishing the convention of being nonexistent by means of this type of nonperception which has the nature of the absence of a vase [i.e., a nonimplicative negation]."

[97] On the two kinds of negations, implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) and nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), see fn. 67. See also KAJIYAMA (1973).

property of a perceiving [agent], perception is the cognition of this [perceiving agent]. Nonperception is a perception other than that [perception], because, due to the function of the implicative negation [in the word 'non-perception'], [nonperception] is something other than the intended perception, just as [in the case of the words] 'not to be eaten' or 'not to be touched.' When [perception] is a property of [the object] which is perceived, perception is the object itself that is characterized as the fitness for producing the cognition that has it as object (*svaviṣayavijñāna*), because [such] fitness is the nature of entities. A nonperception [*qua* object] is just a fitness for [producing] a perception, which [fitness] is other than that [object], just as [in the case explained] above."[98]

[98]HB pp. 21*, 20-22*, 2: *atropalabdher upalabhamānadharmatve tajjñānam upalabdhiḥ. tasmād anyopalabdhir anupalabdhiḥ, vivakṣitopalabdher anyatvād abhakṣyāsparśanīyavat paryudāsavṛttyā. upalabhyamānadharmatve svaviṣaya-vijñānajananayogyatālakṣaṇo viṣayasvabhāva upalabdhiḥ, yogyatāyā bhāvarūpatvāt. tasmād anyopalabdhiyogyataivānupalabdhiḥ pūrvavat.*

See HBṬ p. 169, 23-26: *atra anupalabdhivākye yopalabdhiḥ śrūyate kriyārūpā sā yadā kartṛsthatayā 'pekṣyate tadā tasyā upalabhamānasya kartuḥ dharmatve apekṣyamāne tajjñānam upalabhamānasya yajjñānaṃ tad upalabdhir ucyate /.*

See HBṬ p. 170, 22-24: *tasmād upalabdhijñānād anyā vastvantaraviṣayā upalabdhiḥ jñānātmakā anupalabdhiḥ /.*

For the two examples, i.e., "not to be eaten" (*abhakṣya*) and "not to be touched" (*asparśanīya*), see STEINKELLNER (1967) p. 167, Anm.7. See also HBṬ p. 170, 25-28: *yathā bhakṣyābhakṣyaprakaraṇe vivakṣitād bhakṣyād anyatvād abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭaḥ — bhakṣyo 'pi san tadanyasya — ucyate / yathā ca sparśanīyāsparśanīyādhikāre vivakṣitāt sparśanīyād anyatvād asparśanīyaś cāṇḍālādiḥ — tadanyasya sparśanīyo 'pi san ucyate /.* "For example, with regard to 'to be eaten' and 'not to be eaten' it is said: due to being other than the intended things to be eaten, domestic cocks should not be eaten; although it can be eaten, [something] other than it [should be eaten]. And for example, with regard to 'to be touched' and 'not to be touched' it is said: due to being other than the intended [persons] to be touched, Cāṇḍāla and other [impure persons] should not be touched; although they can be touched, [someone] other than them [should be touched]."

On the function of implicative negation (*paryudāsavṛtti*), see HBṬ p. 170, 6-8: *vidheś ca prādhānyaṃ vivakṣitopalabdher anyopalabdhir bhavati ity evaṃvākyenānyopalabdher vidhānāt anyopalabdhisāmarthyād eva vivakṣitopalabdheḥ pratiṣedhaḥ pratīyate /.* "Positively establishing [something] is the primary [function of implicative negation]. [So] when we take sentences like one that there is another perception than the intended perception, another perception is positively

We see in this quotation from the HB that the term *anupalabdhi* can be interpreted in two fashions depending upon whether we take perception (*upalabdhi*) as being a property of the agent (*kartṛ*), i.e., the perceiver, or of the object (*karman*), i.e., the thing perceived. As the commentators make clear, the argument in HB turns on the dual semantic range of the term "perception," which can either designate the action found in the agent (*kartṛsthakriyā*) or the action found in the object (*karmasthakriyā*).[99] In the former case "perception" means a quality of the person perceiving (*upalabhamānadharma*), i.e., his action of perception. In the latter case "perception" means a quality of what is being perceived (*upalabhyamānadharma*), i.e., "perception" means that which has undergone the action of perception.[100] The ambiguity in the term "perception" thus turns on what certain

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established [due to the function of implicative negation]. Therefore, just because of implying another perception, the negation [i.e., nonexistence] of the intended perception is understood." See STEINKELLNER ibid. p. 60, 17-30, Anm. 6. Vinītadeva also says in his HBṬīkā P187b7-8: *brjod par 'dod pa'i dmigs pa las gzhan pa'i dmigs pa yin pas sgrub pa ni gtso bo nyid yin te / de ltar na dmigs pa gzhan yod par sgrub pa'i shugs kho nas brjod par 'dod pa'i dmigs pa dgag par shes par 'grur ro //.*

Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa's commentary on the word *upalabhyamānadharmatve*: (HBṬ p. 171, 16-19:) *tad evaṃ jñātṛdharmalakṣaṇām anupalabdhiṃ vyākhyāya jñeyadharmalakṣaṇāṃ pratipādayann āha — upalabhyamānadharmatve ityādi / yadā karmasthakriyāpekṣayopalabhyamānasya vastuno dharma upalabdhi vivakṣyate tadā viṣayasvabhāva upalabdhir mantavyā /.*

[99]On the terms *kartṛsthakriyā* and *karmasthakriyā*, see ABHYANKAR (1961) p. 101 and 104 and RENOU (1942) vol. I p. 122 and 126. The Sanskrit terms are found in e.g., Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini 3.1.87. *kartṛsthakriyā* refers to roots such as $\sqrt{gam}$ ("to go") whose action is found in the agent. On the other hand, *karmasthakriyā* refers to roots such as $\sqrt{pac}$ ("to cook") whose action functions in the object in the sense that it produces a change there. See TILLEMANS AND HERFORTH (1989) p. vii. When an action is found in the object (*karmasthakriyā*), the agent can function as though it were the object (*kartā karmavad bhavati*). E.g., *pacyata odanaḥ svayam* "the rice cooks by itself." However, when an action is found in the agent (*kartṛsthakriyā*), such a construction is grammatically impossible. So sentences such as *gamyate grāmaḥ svayam* are ungrammatical, since the action of going is found only in the agent (e.g., Devadatta), but not in the object (e.g., *grāma* "village").

[100]Dharmakīrti seems to have undertaken this grammatical interpretation of the term *upalabdhi* in order to explain his idea of the equation of the presence of a perceptible object with its perception. See PVSV p. 4, 9-11: *tathā hi sattvam upalabdhir eva vastuyogyatālakṣaṇā tadāśrayā vā jñānapravṛttiḥ / tataḥ sajjñāna-*

modern linguists term "agent and patient prominent" perspectives,[101] i.e., perception taken from the point of view of the agent who does this action and from the point of view of the patient that undergoes the action.

Taking the *kartṛsthakriyā* perspective, Dharmakīrti maintains that the agent's not perceiving X implies his having another perception (*anyopalabdhi*). On the *karmasthakriyā* perspective, the object not being perceived implies that something else (*anyabhāva*) is perceived. Although Dharmakīrti uses the jargon of "fitness for producing perception," it is clear that by this he means object, as the object itself is taken to be a power, or capacity for producing a perception. Thus when Dharmakīrti says "A nonperception [*qua* object] is just a fitness for [producing] a perception, which [fitness] is other than that [object]," the point is that "nonperception" designates another object, or an *anyabhāva*, which is fit to produce a perception of itself.

The HB's distinction between the two renderings of *anupalabdhi* (implying *anyopalabdhi* and *anyabhāva*) is thus a clear example of substantive Indian philosophy being rooted in Sanskrit grammatical analysis, or *Vyākaraṇa*. This *Vyākaraṇa* oriented distinction will prove to be very im-

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śabdavyavahāravṛtteḥ /. "That is, presence is just the perception that is characterized as an entity's fitness [for producing the perception of itself] or [the perception that] consists in the action of a cognition depending upon that [fitness]. This is because, from that [perception], there arise cognition of, speech about and action directed towards something present." Cf. PVin II p. 12*, 7-22. According to PVṬ, when the action of perception is found in the object (*karmasthakriyā*), perception is characterized as the fitness of an entity (*vastuyogyatālakṣaṇā*), i.e., object itself. So in this case, the arising of a perception directly means the presence of an object. On the other hand, when the action of perception is found in the agent (*kartṛsthakriyā*), perception is regarded as the action of a cognition depending upon the fitness of an entity (*tadāśrayā ... jñānapravṛttiḥ*). In this case the arising of a perception is metaphorically understood as the presence of an object, because perception is a cause for the determination of the presence of an object. See PVṬ D13b2-4: *dmigs pa nyid yod pa yin la de yang gnyis te / re zhig gang gi tshe las la yod pa'i bya ba yin par brjod pa de'i tshe ni dmigs pa dngos po rung ba'i mtshan nyid yin te / ... gang gi tshe byed pa po la yod pa'i bya ba yin pa'i phyogs de la ni de'i rten can gyi shes pa 'jug pa yin te / ... de ni nye bar btags pa'i phyir yod pa zhes bya'o // ci'i phyir zhe na / de las yod pa'i shes pa dang sgra dang tha snyad dag 'jug pa'i phyir te / de las zhes bya ba ni dmigs pa las so //.* On Dharmakīrti's equation of the presence of a perceptible object with its perception, see KELLNER (1998) pp. 33-39.

[101]On the linguistic term "agent and patient prominent," see TILLEMANS AND HERFORTH ibid. pp. 105-106.

portant in Kamalaśīla's adaptation of theory of *anupalabdhi* to his own Mādhyamika purposes.

We should note that besides *Vyākaraṇa* notions, Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi* has a heavy debt to his semantic theory of *anyāpoha* ("the exclusion of what is other"), especially in the interpretation of the concept of otherness (*anyatva*) that plays such a key role in *anupalabdhi*. When X and Y have been previously associated in one and the same cognition and only Y appears, Y is understood as an entity which is *other* than X. Thus, the establishment or determination of Y as being *other* than X establishes the absence of X.[102] It is said in the HB:

> "Just the establishment of Y other [than X] establishes the absence of X. This is because the exclusion of X is established by means of one and the same valid cognition (*pramāṇenaiva*) that determines the individuality of Y, which is other than X and is of the nature of not being associated [with X]."[103]

From this explanation of Dharmakīrti, it is clear that the theory of non-perception thus relies upon the theory of *apoha*, which says that the determination of X is not established without the exclusion of what is other than

[102]If X and Y do not both have the fitness for producing the perception of themselves, because X is an imperceptible (*adṛśya*) entity, then since the determination of Y equally excludes what is other than Y, that determination will not establish the negation of X. However, when both are perceptible, then the difference (*anyatva*) between X and Y is established due to the "mutual relationship" (*parasparāpekṣā*) of those two things associated in one and the same cognition, and therefore when Y is determined, what is other than Y is established as X. See HBṬīkā P203b7-204a3: *de lta bas na de skad bshad pa'i rnam pas sngon po la sogs pa gcig dmigs pas don 'di sngon po yin gyi / ser po la sogs pa'i ngo bo ni ma yin no zhes bya ba ni de lta bu sngon po de'i ser po la sogs pa'i bdag nyid rnam par gcod pa yin gyi / de'i yul lam de'i dus su sngon po la (las?) ma gtogs pa gzhan tham cad 'gog par byed pa ni ma yin no // 'di ni shes pa gcig dang 'brel ba dag phan tshun bltos pa kho nas gzhan nyid yin par 'dod pas na / 'dir dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa rung ba nyid kyis ngo bor mtshun pa'i phyir / phyogs gzhan yin par 'gyur ba 'di tsam zhig tu zad kyi / phyogs der dmigs pa'i rig byar ma gyur pa yang 'gog pa ni ma yin no //.* See also KELLNER ibid. pp. 112, 7-113, 11.

[103]HB p. 23*, 6-8: *anyabhāvasiddhyaiva tadabhāvaḥ prasidhyati, tasya tadanyasyāsaṃsṛṭarūpasya tattvavyavasthāpakena pramāṇenaivānyavyavacchedasiddheḥ.* See also HB p. 25*, 2-4: *tasyānyāsaṃsṛṣṭarūpasya kevalasyaikātmavyavasthitasya tadātmanā paricchedasyaivānyavyavacchedatvāt tasya kaivalyam aparasya vaikalyam ... .*

X (*anyāpoha/anyavyavaccheda*). In the case of a positive judgment, the determination of X is established due to the exclusion of what is other than X, while in the case of a negative judgment, the exclusion or absence of X is established due to the determination of something other than X. *anupalabdhi*, of course, leads to a negative judgment, and thus the absence in question is established by the determination of something else.

Finally, when nonperception of X implies another perception than that of X (*anyopalabdhi*), is this *anyopalabdhi* a sense perception (*indriyapratyakṣa*) or reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedana*)? Following Dharmakīrti, it seems to be a sense perception. As we shall see later, for Kamalaśīla it is reflexive awareness. We begin with Dharmakīrti's position.

In the NB II 12, Dharmakīrti shows an example of reason consisting in nonperception, which is very often cited in the arguments about this reason.

> Of the [three reasons], nonperception is as follows: On some particular place, there is no vase, because though perceptible it is not [in fact] perceived.[104]

Here, nonperception means the "nonperception of an entity itself" (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*) and establishes the "convention of being nonexistent" (*abhāvavyavahāra/ asadvyavahāra*) with regard to a perceptible object that is not thus perceived.[105] In the example cited above, *anyabhāva* is a place which is other than (*anya*) a vase. *Anyopalabdhi* is the perception of the place,

[104]NB II 12: *tatrānupalabdhir yathā — na pradeśaviśeṣe kvacid ghaṭaḥ, upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher iti //.* See also PVSV p. 2, 16-17 and PVin II p. 10*, 7-9.

[105]See NB II 31: *svabhāvānupalabdhir yathā nātra dhūma upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher iti //.* "Nonperception of an entity itself is as follows: here there is no smoke, because though perceptible it is not [in fact] perceived."

According to Dharmakīrti, when one proves an absence by means of reasons such as nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*), the fact that the reason qualifies its subject (*pakṣadharmatva*) should be understood by means of the nonperception of an entity itself. See HB p. 28*, 4-9: *seyaṃ tridhānupalabdhiḥ. siddhe kāryakāraṇabhāve siddhābhāvasya kāraṇasyānupalabdhir vyāpyavyāpakabhāvasiddhau siddhābhāvasya vyāpakasyānupalabdhiḥ svabhāvānupalabdhiś ca. tatra kāraṇavyāpakayor api svabhāvasyāsadvyavahārasiddhir anyabhāvasiddher eva. sa tathāsiddhaḥ kāryavyāpyayor abhāvam abhāvavyavahāraṃ vā sādhayati.* "This nonperception is threefold: (1) the nonperception of the cause which is established as nonexistent in the case where the relation between cause and effect is established; (2) the nonperception of the pervader which is established as nonexis-

which is other than (*anya*) the perception of a vase. Therefore, the object of *anyopalabdhi* is the place, i.e., *anyabhāva*. Dharmottara says in his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (NBṬ):

> "Therefore, since just this place being free of a vase and the cognition having this [place] as [its] object (*ālambana*) are the cause of the determination of the nonperception of what

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tent in the case where the relation between pervaded and pervader is established; (3) the nonperception of an entity itself. Here, with regard to the essential properties of the cause and the pervader, the convention of being nonexistent is established due to just the establishment of another object. Those [two nonperceptions] established in such manner establish absence or the convention of being nonexistent with regard to the effect and the pervaded." In the proof of the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas, Kamalaśīla does not necessarily follow this idea of Dharmakīrti, because Kamalaśīla holds that one cannot understand by means of the nonperception of a perceptible object that the reason would be established with regard to imperceptible subjects like *ātman* and *Īśvara*.

In the HB Dharmakīrti says that there are three sorts of nonperceptions, i.e., nonperception of an entity itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*), nonperception of a cause (*kāraṇānupalabdhi*) and nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*), while in the NB he enumerates eleven sorts of nonperceptions. In his TBh Mokṣakaragupta enumerates sixteen sorts of nonperceptions. On the classification of nonperception, see KAJIYAMA (1966a) pp. 151-154 Appendix I. Although there are various nonperceptions, Dharmakīrti says that of the eleven sorts of nonperceptions explained in the NB, all those ten sorts of nonperceptions beginning with the second *kāryānupalabdhi* essentially belong to the first *svabhāvānupalabdhi*. That is, when *svabhāvānupalabdhi* establishes the convention that X is absent because of the nonperception of X, those ten sorts of nonperceptions establish that convention by positively establishing something other than X [e.g., a thing incompatible (*viruddha*) with X] or by establishing the negation of something other than X [e.g., the effect of X or the pervader of X]. Thus, those ten sorts of nonperceptions are regarded as belonging to *svabhāvānupalabdhi* indirectly, but not directly. See NB II 42-43: *ime sarve kāryānupalabdhyādayo daśānupalabdhiprayogāḥ svabhāvānupalabdhau saṅgraham upayānti // pāramparyeṇārthāntaravidhipratiṣedhābhyāṃ prayogabhede 'pi //*. See also TBh p. 33, 16-18: *ete ca kāryānupalabdhyādayaḥ pañcadaśa prayogāḥ svabhāvānupalabdhisvabhāvā eva pratipattavyāḥ / prayuktibhedena paraṃ bhedaḥ /*. English translation in KAJIYAMA ibid. p. 85, 19-23: "It is to be understood that these fifteen formulae beginning with the [second] *kāryānupalabdhi* are essentially identical with the [first] *svabhāvānupalabdhi* [and are derived from the latter]. Further subordinate forms may be enumerated according to the various circumstances of application (*prayuktibheda*)."

> is perceptible, [these two] are explained as the nonperception of what is perceptible."[106]

Since *anyopalabdhi* has *anyabhāva* (i.e., the place) as its object, it seems to be sense perception. However, while sense perception understands its objects according to their identities *(tattva)*, it does not understand a place *as being other* than a vase. According to Dharmakīrti, although the *anyopalabdhi*, or the perception of the place, is a sense perception, it is the reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) of this sense perception that understands the place *as being other* than a vase. He says in PV IV k. 270:

> "Due to the awareness [i.e., reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedana*)] of the perception of something [i.e., a place], there arise the [subsequent] conceptual cognitions 'I do not perceive [a vase]' or 'I perceive this [place].'"[107]

He also says in PV IV kk. 273-274ab:

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[106]NBṬ p. 102, 3-4: *tasmāt sa eva ghaṭaviviktapradeśas tadālambanaṃ ca jñānaṃ dṛśyānupalambhaniścayahetutvāt dṛśyānupalambha ucyate /.* See TBh p. 29, 12-13: *ekendriyajñānagrāhye pradeśādāv upalabhyamāne yadi ghaṭaḥ syāt dṛśya eva bhaved iti /.* "[The word *dṛśya* means that] when a place and other [objects] which are to be directly apprehended by one and the same sense perception are perceived, [then] if there were a vase, it would necessarily be perceptible." See also TBh p. 29, 20-21: *tasmān niṣedhyād anyad viśiṣṭam eva vastudvayaṃ pradeśaḥ pradeśajñānaṃ vā 'nupalabdhir iti sthitam /.* "Therefore, it is established that the two entities, i.e., a place and the cognition of the place, which are other than the object to be negated and are just limited [as the entity fused in one and the same cognition and as its cognition] are [regarded as] nonperception."

[107]PV IV k. 270 (= PVin III k. 45): *ekopalambhānubhavād idaṃ nopalabhe iti / buddher upalabhe veti kalpikāyāḥ samudbhavaḥ //.* We follow Manorathanandin's interpretation of this verse. See PVV pp. 507, 29-508, 6: *bhavatu tāvad dṛśyānupalabdher asadvyavahārayogyatāsiddhiḥ / saiva tu kathaṃ sidhyatītyāha / ... ekajñānasaṃsargiṇa ekasya pradeśasyopalambhānubhavāt svasamvedanād anantaraṃ ghaṭādi nopalabhyate / idaṃ pradeśābhyupalabhyata iti kalpikāyāḥ buddheḥ sva[sam?]vedanaviṣayīkṛtavidhipratiṣedhānukāriṇyāḥ samudbhavo bhavatīti svasamvedanād evānupalambhasiddhiḥ /.* Cf. PVin III D206a7, P304a2: *de'i phyir 'ga' zhig mngon sum du gyur na de'i tshad ma'i stobs kyis 'di ni dmigs so zhe 'am / gzhan ma* dmigs so zhes bya ba'i rnam par rtog pa (D pa: P om.) gnyis 'byung bar 'gyur ro //.* (* DP om. *ma*. However, judging from the context, we should add *ma*.) In his PVA Prajñākaragupta presents two different interpretations of this verse. On Prajñākaragupta's interpretation and that of Dharmottara, see KELLNER (1988) pp. 55-56, pp. 47-48, Appendix II pp. 87-89 and pp. 136-137.

"The exclusion of another [thing] is not separate from the awareness of the distinct nature [of an entity]. Therefore, the perception of [a thing] different from the [object to be negated] is also the nonperception of that [object to be negated].

Therefore, this nonperception [which has the nature of cognition] is reflexively understood by means of perception [i.e., reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedana*)]."[108]

Without the awareness of the perception of a place, the exclusion of a vase which is other than the place is not established. It is only due to reflexive awareness that nonperception is established. Therefore, the convention that a vase is nonexistent is established due to the awareness of the perception of a place, i.e., the reflexive awareness of *anyopalabdhi*.

3.2 *Anyabhāva*

Now, Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception, as it was explained in the preceding section, does not make it possible for Kamalaśīla to prove the

[108]PV IV kk. 273-274ab (= PVin III kk. 46-47ab): *viśiṣṭarūpānubhavād anyā nānyanirākriyā* / tadviśiṣṭopalambho 'taḥ tasyāpy anupalambhanam // tasmād anupalambho 'yaṃ svayaṃ pratyakṣato gataḥ /.* (* PVV: *anyathānyanirākriyā.* Tib: *gzhan bsal ba ni gzhan ma yin //.* Due to Tib, it seems possible to emend this stanza in PVV to *anyā nānyanirākriyā.* Cf. Miyasaka and PVA: *nāto 'nyānyanirākriyā.*) For the interpretation of this verse, see PVV p. 508, 24-509, 4: *ato viśiṣṭasya niyatasya rūpasyānubhavād anyathānyasya nirākriyā na bhavati / atas tasmāt pratiṣedhyād viśiṣṭasya bhinnasya pradeśāder upalambhas tasya pratiṣedhyasyāpy anupalambhanam / ... tasmād ayaṃ jñānātmakānupalambhaḥ svayam ātmanā pratyakṣataḥ svasamvedanād gataḥ pratītaḥ ... /.* See also PVP D324a2-4: *don de dben pa'i ngo bo can gyi don dmigs pa gang yin pa de nyid dgag par bya ba nyid du brjod par 'dod pa'i don de yang mi dmigs pa yin no // gang gi phyir gzhan dmigs pa nyid ma yin par dgag pa mi dmigs pa brjod pa / des na mi dmigs 'di ni / mngon sum bdag nyid kho nas rtogs / rang rig pa'i mngon sum gyis grub pa yin te / gcig dmigs pa nyid gzhan mi dmigs pa yin pa'i phyir ro //.* "Just the perception of [another] object whose nature is to be free of the object also does not perceive the object which is intended to be what is negated. Because it is explained that just the perception of another [object] is the nonperception [which takes the form of] an implicative negation, this nonperception is understood by means of just the perception of itself, [that is, this nonperception] is established by means of reflexive cognition. This is because the perception of something is the nonperception of another thing."

absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas. This is because, although according to Dharmakīrti the absence of a thing X is never understood without the establishment of something other than X, the Mādhyamikas cannot accept that there *are* such "other things" (*anyabhāva*). In the MĀ an opponent makes the following objection in reliance upon Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception:

> "Moreover, if one grasps a certain place as being free of another object, then the fact of [the place's] being void of that which is other than it is to be apprehended by means of direct perception. However, for those who accept the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas, there cannot be any [such] entity which is lacking the intrinsic nature of all dharmas; otherwise, by the direct perception of something, one would understand that all dharmas are empty. This is because that [entity] is also included amongst all dharmas. But if it were not to be included, your own thesis would be undermined."[109]

This opponent says that if the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas were understood through the perception of some other entity, then since no such entity can be established for the Mādhyamikas who hold the totality of things to be without intrinsic nature, they could not prove the absence of intrinsic nature. This is because such an other entity should be included in the totality. On the other hand, if such an entity existed outside the totality of things, it would follow that the Mādhyamikas could not prove the totality as being without intrinsic nature, but instead they could only prove this fact of a finite or limited number of things.[110]

To this opponent's objection, Kamalaśīla replies that the Mādhyamikas do not accept the establishment of any other entity like a place being free of a pot. He does so in reliance upon the interpretations of voidness explained

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[109]MĀ D134b3-4: *gzhan yang don gzhan gyis dben pa'i phyogs la sogs pa 'ga' zhig 'dzin na ni de las gzhan pas stong pa nyid mngon sum gyis rtogs par bya ba yin par 'gyur na / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du smra ba rnams la ni gang 'ga' zhig mngon sum du dmigs pas chos thams cad dben par (CD par: GNP pa) rtogs par 'gyur ba chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid kyis dben pa'i dngos po ni cung zad kyang med de / de yang chos thams cad kyi nang du 'dus pa'i phyir ro // 'on te nang du ma 'dus na ni rang gi (CGNP gi: D gis) dam bcas pa nyams par 'gyur ro // (DGNP //: C om.).* See Translation 1 paragraphs 1.1.3-1.1.3.1.

[110]See fn. 139.

in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (hereafter LAS).[111] He says:

> "Nor is it correct to say: 'Once one has perceptually apprehended a certain place as being free of another object, then something [i.e., the place] void of that which is other than it will be understood by direct perception ... and so forth.' This interpretation [of voidness] is the voidness of one thing by another (*itaretaraśūnyatā*), and not the voidness concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*). It is due to the voidness concerning characters that we accept that all dharmas are ultimately without intrinsic nature, because ultimately their particular and universal characters (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*), as they are established, are void. In the case of entities, the voidness of one thing by another is not ultimate, but rather depends on conventional truth. That is, although all entities are not different [from each other] on account of [their] being of the same flavor (*ekarasa*) in being ultimately unproduced, [they] appear mutually different to the infantile, just as [they appear] in dream states and so on. Therefore, in this case, this voidness of one thing by another is established for them [i.e., the infantile] as a commonly acknowledged nature in that they grasp one entity as being free of another, but it is not ultimately established. In actual fact dreamt and illusory entities do not admit among themselves any distinct natures. Therefore, the Illustrious One (*bhagavat*) has said that this [voidness of one thing by another] should definitely be abandoned since it is the worst of all, not being founded on ultimate reality."[112]

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[111]See fn. 173.

[112]MĀ D169b6-170a3: *gang yang don gzhan gyis dben pa'i phyogs la sogs pa 'ga' zhig mngon sum gyis bzung nas (CD nas: GNP nas /) de las gzhan pas (GNP pas: CD pa) stong pa mngon sum gyis rtogs par bya bar 'gyur zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te / tshul 'di ni gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid yin gyi / mtshan nyid stong pa nyid ni (CD ni: GNP om.) ma yin no // mtshan nyid stong pa nyid kyis ni don dam par (CDNP don dam par: G don par) chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par 'dod de / don dam par de dag gi rang dang spyi'i mtshan nyid ji ltar rnam par gzhag (CD rnam par gzhag: G bzhag; NP rnam par bzhag) pa stong pa'i phyir ro // dngos po rnams kyi gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid gang yin pa de ni don dam pa ma yin gyi / (CDGN /: P om.) 'on kyang tha snyad kyi bden ba la brten pa yin no // 'di ltar dngos po thams cad don dam par skye ba med par ro gcig*

Kamalaśīla criticizes the interpretation of *anupalabdhi* which accepts the establishment of an *anyabhāva*, like a place, which would be one thing void of another. This is at most conventionally established for the infantile — as a theory of voidness it would be unacceptably simplistic. The Mādhyamikas accept all dharmas as ultimately lacking intrinsic nature due to the *voidness concerning characters*.[113] This does not imply that they

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*pa'i phyir tha dad pa med pa * yin mod kyi / 'on kyang byis pa rnams la rmi lam la sogs pa'i gnas skabs bzhin du phan tshun tha dad par snang ngo // de'i phyir de la grags pa'i ngo bor (CD ngo bor: GP ngor; N ill.) de dag la don gzhan gyis dben pa'i dngos po 'dzin pa'i sgo nas gcig gis gcig (CDNP gcig gis gcig: G gcig) stong pa nyid 'di rnam par gzhag (CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag) gi // don dam par ni (GNP ni: CD om.) ma yin te / yang dag par na (CD na: GNP ni) rmi lam dang / sgyu ma lta bu'i dngos po rnams la ngo bo nyid phan tshun tha dad pa med do // de nyid kyi phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis 'di ni don dam pa la brten pa ma yin pa nyid kyis (CD kyis: GNP kyis /) thams cad kyi tha chad yin pa'i phyir (CDNP phyir: G phyin) spang bar bya ba kho nar gsungs te /.* (* CDGNP add *ma.* Judging by the context, however, we should delete this word.) See Translation 1 paragraph 1.2.3, **§11**.

[113]Voidness concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*) is one of seven kinds of *śūnyatā*s explained in the LAS p. 74, 5-8: *tatra mahāmate saṃkṣepeṇa saptavidhā śūnyatā yad uta lakṣaṇaśūnyatā bhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatāpracaritaśūnyatā pracaritaśūnyatā sarvadharmanirabhilāpyaśūnyatā paramārthāryajñānamahāśūnyatetaretaraśūnyatā ca saptamī //.* All dharmas are void of their characters in that their particular and universal characters (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*) are void. See LAS p. 74, 9-10: *tatra mahāmate lakṣaṇaśūnyatā katamā yad uta svasāmānyalakṣaṇaśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ ... /.* The LAS's explanation of *lakṣaṇaśūnyatā* is not so helpful to the understanding of the meaning of this voidness. However, the point seems to be that all things are void of their *svalakṣaṇa*, since the LAS concludes the explanation of *lakṣaṇaśūnyatā* by saying: (p. 74, 12-13:) *atas tad ucyate svalakṣaṇaśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti //.* For *[sva]lakṣaṇaśūnyatā* and *svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*, see 大智度論 (*Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra?*), Taisho vol. 25, p. 293a, 25-29: 自相空者，一切法有二種相總相別相。是二相空，故名爲相空。問曰。何等是總相何等是別相。答曰。總相者如無常等。別相者諸法雖皆無常，而各有別相。如地爲堅相火爲熱相。French translation in LAMOTTE (1976) pp. 2121, 27-2122, 6: "Vacuité des caractères spécifiques (*svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā*). — Tous les dharma ont deux sortes de caractères (*lakṣaṇa*) : des caractères communs (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) et des caractères spécifiques (*svalakṣaṇa*). Ces deux sortes de caractères étant vides, le Prajñāpāramitāsūtra parle ici de « Vacuité des caractères » (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*). Question. — Qu'est-ce que les caractères communs, et qu'est-ce que les caractères spécifiques ? Réponse. — Les caractères communs, c'est par exemple l'impermanence (*anityatā*), etc. Les caractères spécifiques, en ce sens que les dharma, bien qu'ils soient impermanents, possèdent chacun son caractère

accept the establishment of another thing (*anyabhāva*).

Kamalaśīla also has another argument against *anyabhāva*, one which turns on the meaning of *anya* "other", or "different." Since all dharmas are of the same flavor (*ekarasa*) because of being ultimately unproduced, they are really not *different* from each other and do not have any mutually *distinct* nature. Therefore, nothing *else* is ultimately established, and the absence of one thing from another (*itaretaraśūnyatā*) cannot be established with regard to what are like illusions.

3.3 *Anyopalabdhi*

Although Kamalaśīla does not accept the establishment of any *anyabhāva*, he does accept the establishment of *another perception* (*anyopalabdhi*) as being implied by the fact that the negation (*an-*) in the term "non-perception" (*an-upalabdhi*) is an implicative negation. This acceptance of *anyopalabdhi* is brought out in Kamalaśīla's interpretation of a key passage from the *Ārya Dharmasaṅgīti*. The context in the MĀ is that an opponent objects that one cannot understand the absence of intrinsic nature by means of direct perception, because the objects of direct perception are real entities and because unreal things without intrinsic nature cannot produce the perception of themselves. To this objection, Kamalaśīla makes the following reply:

"Nor is it established that: 'This is because the objects of per-

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spécifique. Ainsi, pour la terre (*pṛthivī*), c'est la solidité (*khakkhaṭatva*); pour le feu (*tejas*), c'est la chaleur (*uṣṇatva*)." See also ibid. p. 293c, 8-13: 如是等諸法各有別相。當知是諸相皆空，是名自相空。餘義如性空中說，性相義同故。問曰。何以不但說相空而說自相空。答曰。若說相空，不說法體空。說自相空，即法體空。French translation in LAMOTTE ibid. pp. 2125, 23-2126, 7: "De tels dharma ont chacun leur caractère spécifique et il faut savoir que ces caractères sont vides : c'est ce qui s'appelle la «Vacuité des caractères spécifiques» (*svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā*). Pour d'autres significations, reportez-vous à ce que j'ai dit à propos de la Vacuité des essences (*prakṛtiśūnyatā*, n° 12), puisqu'aussi bien essence (*prakṛti*) et caractère (*lakṣaṇa*) sont synonymes. Question. — Pourquoi [le Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra] ne dit-il pas simplement Vacuité des caractères (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*), mais parle-t-il de la Vacuité des caractères spécifiques (*svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā*) ? Réponse. — Parler seulement de Vacuité des caractères, serait passer sous silence la Vacuité fondamentale des dharma ; parler de la Vacuité des caractères *spécifiques*, c'est traiter de la Vacuité fondamentale des dharma."

ception are real entities.' That is to say, it is not correct that the perception of people of limited vision (*arvāgdṛś*) has as its objects the real intrinsic natures of entities, since [it always] has as its objects deceptive visible matter (*rūpa*) and so forth, as does the perception of people suffering from eye disease (*taimirika*). Otherwise, it would follow absurdly that everybody would perceive thusness. The cognition of great yogins who are buddhas or bodhisattvas is also not established as having real entities as its objects. This is because they never see any real intrinsic natures of entities. In the *Ārya Bodhisattvapiṭaka* it is said:

> 'Therefore, all dharmas are seen to be naturally nonexistent, unceased, naturally tranquil, completely unproduced, unborn, absolutely unborn and completely extinguished. Therefore, he who sees [correctly] does not see and does not observe. This is the correct vision and the vision [of dharmas] as they are. And if it is asked what is the perception of all dharmas as they are, [we answer that] it is not seeing anything.'

In the *Ārya Dharmasaṅgīti* it is also said:

> 'Not seeing any dharmas, this is the supreme seeing.'

Therefore, it is not established that the objects of perception are real entities.

It is also not correct to say: 'This is because it is impossible that unreal things somehow produce cognition.' We too do not accept that unreal things like rabbits' horns and so forth will produce a perceptual cognition. However, great yogins who correctly meditate on all dharmas as being like mirages and echoes obtain the concentration (*samādhi*) which arises from the ultimate limit of meditation upon the true state of affairs (*bhūtārtha*), and therefore they have inconceivable supreme powers. Thus this type of wisdom (*ye shes de lta bu*), which clearly realizes (*mngon sum du byed pa*) the thusness of all

dharmas being selfless, arises in these yogins, so that (*yena*) the yogins understand completely directly (*mngon sum kho nar*) that all dharmas are selfless. It is precisely this that is termed 'nonseeing' (*adarśana*) [in the sūtra], but [the negation in 'nonseeing'] does not have the form of a nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)."[114]

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[114]MĀ D168a7-169a1: *gang yang mngon sum gyi yul ni dngos po yin pa'i phyir ro zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang ma grub pa yin te / 'di ltar tshu rol mthong ba rnams kyi mngon sum gang yin pa de ni rab rib can gyi mngon sum bzhin du gzugs (CDGN gzugs: P gthugs) la sogs pa brdzun pa'i yul can yin pa nyid kyis dngos po'i ngo bo nyid yang dag pa pa'i yul can nyid du rigs pa ma yin no // de lta ma yin na thams cad de kho na nyid mthong bar thal bar 'gyur ro // sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa' rnal 'byor pa chen po rnams kyi ye shes gang yin pa de yang dngos po'i yul can du rab tu ma grub ste / de dag gis dngos po'i ngo bo nyid yang dag pa pa (CDP yang dag pa pa: GN yang dag pa) 'ga' yang ma gzigs pa'i phyir te / 'phags pa byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod las / ji skad du / des chos thams cad ngo bo nyid kyis med pa dang / 'gag pa med pa dang / rang bzhin gyis nye bar zhi ba dang / shin tu ma skyes pa dang / ma byung ba dang / kun tu (CGNP tu: D du) ma byung ba dang / shin tu yongs su mya ngan las 'das par yang mthong la / des gang gis mthong ba de yang mi mthong rnam par mi mthong ste / 'di ni yang dag pa'i (CD pa'i: GNP pa) mthong ba dang ji lta ba bzhin gyi mthong ba yin no // yang chos thams cad ji lta ba bzhin du mthong ba gang zhe na / gang 'di mthong ba med pa yin no zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o // 'phags pa chos yang dag par sdud pa las kyang / (CD /: GNP om.) chos thams cad mthong ba med pa ni mthong ba dam pa yin no zhes gsungs so // de'i phyir mngon sum gyi yul ni yang dag pa pa'i dngos po yin par ma grub po // gang yang dngos po med pa ni ji ltar yang rnam par shes pa skyed par byed pa (CD skyed par byed pa: GNP bskyed par byed pa) nyid du mi rung ba'i phyir ro zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te / kho bo cag kyang dngos po med pa (CD pa: GNP pa'i) ri bong gi rwa la sogs pa lta bu ni gang yang mngon sum gyi shes pa skyed par byed pa nyid du khas mi len to // 'on kyang rnal 'byor pa chen po chos thams cad smig rgyu dang sgra brnyan lta bur ji lta ba bzhin du sgom par byed pa rnams kyis / yang dag pa'i don bsgoms pa'i rab kyi mtha' las byung ba'i ting nge 'dzin thob pa'i phyir mthu phul du (CD du: GNP tu) byung ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa dang ldan pas rnal 'byor pa de dag la gang gis na rnal 'byor pa rnams kyis mngon sum kho nar chos ma lus pa bdag med pa rtogs par 'gyur pa chos ma lus pa bdag med pa'i de kho na nyid gsal rab tu mngon sum du byed pa'i ye shes de lta bu nye bar skye ste / de nyid mthong ba med ces bya'i / med par dgag pa'i ngo bo ni ma yin no //.* See Translation 1 paragraphs 1.2.1.2-1.2.1.3.

Quotation from the *Ārya Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. In the *Byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod*, we cannot find the sentences which literally correspond to the MĀ's quotation from this sūtra. Cf. *Byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod* P183b5-184a4: *gang gi tshe*

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na byang chub sems dpa' chos thams cad rang bzhin gyis 'gags par mthong ba de'i tshe tshul bzhin mthong ngo // gang gi tshe chos thams cad rang bzhin gyis zhi bar mthong ba de'i tshe tshul bzhin mthong ngo // gang gi tshe chos thams cad rnam par zhi bar mthong ba de'i tshe / tshul bzhin mthong ngo // gang gi tshe chos thams cad rang bzhin gyis snyoms par ma zhugs pa mthong ba de'i tshe / tshul bzhin mthong ngo // gang gi tshe chos thams cad ma skyes par mthong ba de'i tshe / tshul bzhin mthong ngo // gang gi tshe chos thams cad ma byung bar mthong ba de'i tshe tshul bzhin mthong ngo // gang gi tshe chos thams cad shin tu yang dag par ma byung bar mthong ba de'i tshe / tshul bzhin mthong ngo // gang gi tshe chos thams cad mya ngan las 'das par mthong ba de'i tshe tshul bzhin mthong ste // de gang gis mthong ba de la yang rtog ste / ci nas kyang mi mthong ba dang mi rtog pa de ltar mthong ste/ de ltar mthong na tshul bzhin mthong ba zhes bya'o // ... gang chos thams cad yang dag par mthong ba dang / ji lta ba bzhin du mthong ba de ni yang dag par lta ba'o // chos thams cad ji ltar ba bzhin du mthong ba gang zhe na // 'di lta ste ma mthong ba'o //. (These sentences of the *Byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod* are also quoted in the *Sūtrasamuccaya* D194a7-195a1.) Cf. *Byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod* P185b3-7. 『聖寶積經』「菩薩藏會」Taisho 11 pp. 297c, 21-298a, 11: 觀一切法自性息滅。若如是觀。名如理觀。若觀諸法自性寂静。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法畢竟空寂。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法入平等性。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法畢竟無生。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法畢竟不生。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法畢竟不起。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法畢竟寂滅。是則名爲如理正觀。舍利子。是菩薩摩訶薩作是觀時。亦不見有能觀之者。應如是觀。... 舍利子。菩薩摩訶薩應以如是如理正見。如其所見正觀諸法。舍利子。云何名爲如其所見正觀諸法。舍利子。謂無所見名觀諸法。

Quotation from the *Ārya Dharmasaṅgīti*. *Chos yang dag par sdud pa* P74b2-3: *bcom ldan 'das chos thams cad mi mthong ba ni yang dag par mthong ba'o //.* 『仏説法集經』Taisho 17 p. 637b, 21: ... 名爲不見。世尊。是名正見諸法。Sanskrit is found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* p. 264, 1-2: *adarśanaṃ bhagavan sarvadharmāṇām, darśanaṃ samyagdarśanam iti.* This sentence of the sūtra is quoted in the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* D24b3, the PP D187b6 and D247b3, the TJ D56a5 and D116b5, the SDVV D4b1, the MAV D78a7, the BK I p. 212, 2-3, the ŚSṬ P183a4, the AAA p. 640, 23-25, the AKPŚṬ D7b6-7, the BPPP D281a6, the MMA D144a1-2, the *Marmakaumudī* P231b4, etc. Cf. TJ D159a1 and D195b3, PPVṬ P275b3-4, APDṬ P165b5-166a3 and AAA pp. 565, 14-567, 10. Cf. Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's *Satyadvayāvatāra* k. 7ab: *ma mthong ba nyid de mthong bar // shin tu zab pa'i mdo las gsungs //.* "It was said in the very profound sūtras that just nonseeing is the seeing of the [ultimate]." See LINDTNER (1981) p. 194.

yang dag pa'i don bsgoms pa'i rab kyi mtha' las byung ba'i ting nge 'dzin. This is Dharmakīrti's definition of yogic perception. See NB I 11: *bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānaṃ ceti /.*

gang gis na rnal 'byor pa rnams kyis mngon sum kho nar chos ma lus pa bdag med pa rtogs par 'gyur pa. In the MĀ we often meet with this type of sentence which has a *gang gis na* (*yena*) clause. For this clause, see fn. 154.

Kamalaśīla explains that yogins' nonseeing of real intrinsic nature does not mean that they hold things to actually be like rabbits' horns, which do not appear even conventionally. They regard things as being like illusions, mirages and so forth, which appear conventionally but not really existent. Therefore, when they meditate upon all dharmas as being like illusions and reach the ultimate limit of this meditation, they obtain a *clear perception where nothing appears*. And when nothing appears to yogins' minds, they do not see any real intrinsic nature of dharmas, and just this *nonseeing* is considered the supreme *seeing*, the correct vision, or the vision of dharmas as they are. According to Kamalaśīla, when the yogic perception where nothing appears arises from the ultimate limit of meditation upon the true state of affairs, yogins obtain the wisdom which clearly realizes the thusness of all dharmas being selfless, with the result that they directly understand that all dharmas are selfless. What is important for our purposes is that Kamalaśīla says that the negation in the term "nonseeing" does not have the form of a nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*). Since he regards the nonseeing of real intrinsic nature or self (*ātman*) of all dharmas as the supreme seeing, it is evident from his statement that he takes the negation as having the form of an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*).

As was mentioned earlier, Dharmakīrti regarded the nonperception of an X as a perception other (*anyopalabdhi*) than that of X. Due to the fact that Kamalaśīla takes the nonseeing of all dharmas as the supreme seeing, and since this supreme seeing is surely different from the seeing a real intrinsic nature or self of dharmas, it is clear that he also holds the implicative negation in *anupalabdhi* to imply another perception (*anyopalabdhi*). In sum, while Kamalaśīla does not accept the establishment of any *anyabhāva*, he does accept that of an *anyopalabdhi*.

3.4 The Object of the Other Perception

In the case of Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception, the nonperception of an X implies both a perception other than that of X and the existence of something other than X. Therefore, this thing that is other than X, i.e., *anyabhāva*, must be the object of the other perception, i.e., *anyopalabdhi*. In the case of Kamalaśīla's interpretation of nonperception, however, no *anyabhāva* is established. So, what then is the object of *anyopalabdhi*? Without the establishment of an *anyabhāva*, can *anyopalabdhi* be estab-

lished as a perception? After all, a perception must have an object.

Kamalaśīla does not give an unambiguous answer in the MĀ. In fact, the MĀ gives us the following two explanations which are key to solving this problem:

> (1). "Great yogins who correctly meditate on all dharmas as being like mirages and echoes obtain the concentration which arises from the ultimate limit of meditation upon the true state of affairs, and therefore they have inconceivable supreme powers. Thus this type of wisdom, which clearly realizes the thusness of all dharmas being selfless, arises in these yogins, so that the yogins understand completely directly that all dharmas are selfless."[115]

and

> (2). "The voidness concerning characters of all dharmas is established as [that which is] understood through the arising of the wisdom to which no dharma appears. [This is so] because [dharmas'] particular and universal characters, as they are established, would be perceptible (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*) [if they truly existed], but yogins do not perceive any [such] ultimate aspects."[116]

The first explanation (1) shows that the wisdom obtained from concentration, i.e., the yogic perception, which arises from the ultimate limit of meditation upon the true state of affairs, clearly realizes the thusness of the

[115]MĀ D168b6-169a1: *rnal 'byor pa chen po chos thams cad smig rgyu dang sgra brnyan lta bur ji lta ba bzhin du sgom par byed pa rnams kyis / yang dag pa'i don bsgoms pa'i rab kyi mtha' las byung ba'i ting nge 'dzin thob pa'i phyir mthu phul du (CD du: GNP tu) byung ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa dang ldan pas rnal 'byor pa de dag la gang gis na rnal 'byor pa rnams kyis mngon sum kho nar chos ma lus pa bdag med pa rtogs par 'gyur pa chos ma lus pa bdag med pa'i de kho na nyid gsal rab tu mngon sum du byed pa'i ye shes de lta bu nye bar skye ste /.*

[116]MĀ D170a4-5: *chos thams cad kyi mtshan nyid stong pa nyid (CD stong pa nyid: GNP stong pa nyid stong pa nyid) gang yin pa de ni de dag gi rang dang spyi'i mtshan nyid ji ltar rnam par gzhag (CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag) pa dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa las rnal 'byor pa rnams kyis don dam pa'i rnam par mi dmigs pa'i phyir chos thams cad snang ba med pa'i ye shes skye ba'i sgo nas rtogs par rnam par gzhag (CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag) go //.* See Translation 1 paragraph 1.2.3, **§12**.

selflessness of all dharmas. Therefore, it is possible to say that that wisdom has thusness as its object. Since the Mādhyamikas hold that selflessness, nonproduction and the absence of real intrinsic nature are thusness, the object of that wisdom can be regarded as thusness characterized as selflessness and so forth.[117]

The second explanation (2) shows that the voidness concerning characters of all dharmas is understood through the arising of the wisdom where nothing appears. Kamalaśīla holds that by means of nonperception the Mādhyamikas prove the voidness concerning characters, but do not prove the voidness of one thing by another, since he says:

> "When it is said: 'Nonperception of an entity itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*) is impossible', then we have in fact replied earlier to this [objection]. If this interpretation [of voidness] is the voidness of one thing by another, we also do not intend to prove this. Now if you say: 'Well, what [do you intend to prove]?' [we reply that we prove] the voidness concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*)."[118]

Kamalaśīla accepts all dharmas as being without real intrinsic nature due to their voidness concerning characters, and therefore that voidness can be regarded as the same as the absence of real intrinsic nature, the selflessness of all dharmas and so forth. Thus, in this case that voidness is also considered the object of another perception, since that selflessness is the object of that perception. Therefore, we can understand that the voidness concerning characters, i.e., the thusness characterized as the selflessness or the nonproduction of all dharmas and so forth, is understood through the production of

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[117]See MĀ D159b2-3: *gang zag dang chos la bdag med pa'i mtshan nyid kyi de kho na nyid don dam pa'i sgrar dgongs pa yin te / de ni ye shes dam pa'i spyod yul yin pa'i phyir dang / bdag nyid rigs pa dang ldan pa nyid kyis dam pa yin pa'i phyir ro //* "The word 'the ultimate' means thusness characterized as the selflessness concerning persons and dharmas. This is because that [i.e., the ultimate] is the object of supreme wisdom and because, due to being rationally justifiable, [the ultimate] itself is supreme." Cf. PP D247b7: *dngos po rnams rnam pa thams cad du yongs su ma grub pa ni dngos po'i de kho na yin la /* "The thusness of entities is that entities are utterly unestablished, and ... ."

[118]MĀ D177a2-3: *gang yang rang bzhin mi dmigs pa mi srid do zhes smras pa de la gong du lan btab pa nyid de / tshul 'di ni gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid yin na 'di yang bsgrub par mi 'dod do // 'o na ci zhe na mtshan nyid stong pa nyid yin no //.* See Translation 3 paragraph 3.2.1, **§1**.

the wisdom where nothing appears.

In the MĀ we cannot find any explicit solution to the problem of what the object of *anyopalabdhi* is. However, in Kamalaśīla's BK I, we can find a clearer explanation with reference to the object of *anyopalabdhi*. Kamalaśīla, quoting LAS X 256-257, explains his idea of the progress of meditation, i.e., gradualism. Those LAS verses are as follows:

> "After acceding to the 'mind only' [view, i.e., the position concerning the grasping aspect (*grāhakākāra*)], [a yogin] would not imagine external objects. (v. 256ab)
> Abiding in the [meditation] which has thusness as its object, [the yogin] would transcend the 'mind only' [view, i.e., the yogin would abide in nondual cognition (*advayajñāna*)]. (v. 256cd)
> After transcending the 'mind only' [view], [the yogin] should transcend the nonappearance [of both the grasped aspect (*grāhyākāra*) and the grasping aspect, i.e., the yogin should abandon attachment to the real existence (*vastutva*) of the nondual cognition]. (v. 257ab)
> The yogin who abides in the nonappearance [of the nondual cognition] see the Mahāyāna. (v. 257cd)"[119]

[119]LAS X 256-257 quoted in the BK I p. 210, 9-12: *cittamātraṃ samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet / tathatālambane sthitvā cittamātram atikramet // cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet / nirābhāse sthīto(sic!) yogī mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati //.*

cittamātram in v. 256a. See MAP D128b2-3: *sems tsam la ni brten nas su // zhes bya ba ni 'dzin pa'i rnam pa la gnas nas so//.*

cittamātram atikramet in v. 256d. See BK I p. 211, 8-10: *tad api cittamātram atikramet / grāhakam ākāram atikramet / dvayanirābhāsa evādvayajñāne tiṣṭhed ity arthaḥ /.*

nirābhāsam atikramet in v. 257b. See BK I p. 211, 10-16: *evaṃ cittamātram atikramya tad api dvayanirābhāsaṃ yaj jñānaṃ tad atikramet / ... grāhyagrāhakayoś cālīkatve tadavyatirekāt tasyāpi satyatvam ayuktam iti vicārayet / tatrāpy advayajñāne vastutvābhiniveśaṃ tyajet, advayajñānanirābhāsa eva jñāne tiṣṭhed ity arthaḥ /.* See also MAP D128b4: *snang ba med las shin tu 'da' // zhes bya ba ni gnyis su med pa la mngon par zhen pa de yang tshul 'di la brten nas dor bar bya'o zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go //.*

Note that the Nanjio edition of the LAS offers a different reading of X 257cd: *nirābhāsasthito yogī mahāyānaṃ na paśyate //.* The LAS X 256-257 are also quoted in the MĀ D157a5-6, the MAV D79b3-4, the MAU D230b6-7 and the PPU

As evidenced by his quotation of LAS X 256-257, Kamalaśīla seems to see meditation as involving the following stages: (1) In reliance upon the Yogācāra position (i.e., Satyākāravāda),[120] yogins transcend the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika positions that external objects are really existent; (2) Taking the Alīkākāravāda, yogins abide in the nondual cognition and transcend the Satyākāravāda, i.e, the position that the aspects of cognition are really existent; (3) Eliminating the attachment to the real existence of the nondual cognition, yogins abide in the Mādhyamika meditation and "see the Mahāyāna."

Now, when Kamalaśīla comments on the v. 257cd, he provides the following explanation:

> "Thus, when the yogins abide in the cognition where [even] nondual cognition [itself] does not appear, then due to [their] abiding in the ultimate thusness, they see the Mahāyāna. [The seeing of] the Mahāyāna means just the seeing of the ultimate thusness. The seeing of the ultimate thusness means just the nonseeing [of all dharmas] when there is the illumination of correct wisdom due to examining all dharmas with the eye of wisdom. So it has been said in the *[Dharmasaṅgīti]sūtra*:
>
> > [If you say:] 'What is the seeing of the ultimate?' [we reply that] this is the nonseeing of all dharmas."[121]

Kamalaśīla here explains that the yogins who abide in a state where no dharmas appear — not even nondual cognition itself — abide in the

D161a5-6.

[120]Although in the MAV and MAP Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla ultimately negate both the Satyākāravāda and the Alīkākāravāda, the latter is regarded as a highter philosophical stage than the former. When we understand this idea of the philosophical progression from the Satyākāravāda to the Alīkākāravāda, it seems clear that the term *cittamātra* in v. 256a means the Satyākāravāda, which, as v. 256cd says, should be transcended by the yogins abiding in the nondual cognition advocated in the Alīkākāravāda. See KAJIYAMA (1978) p. 137.

[121]BK I pp. 211, 19-212, 3: *tathā cādvayajñānanirābhāse jñāne yadā sthito yogī tadā paramatattve sthitatvāt, mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati / etad eva tan mahāyānam ucyate yat paramatattvadarśanam / etad eva tat paramatattvadarśanaṃ yat sarvadharmān prajñācakṣuṣā nirūpayataḥ samyagjñānā(va)loke* saty adarśanam / tathā coktaṃ sūtre / "katamaṃ paramārthadarśanam / sarvadharmāṇām adarśanam" iti /.* (* Tib: *yang dag pa'i ye shes kyi snang ba.*)

ultimate thusness, and therefore see the ultimate thusness. Thus, the yogins' nonseeing, or abiding in a state without appearances, is equivalent to their seeing the ultimate thusness.

Since the yogins' seeing of the ultimate thusness is their nonseeing, or abiding in a state where nothing appears, their wisdom which directly understands that thusness should be regarded as having just a state without appearances as its object. In this case, however, how is it possible that their wisdom could have as its object a state where nothing appears? Kamalaśīla's answer to this question is that the yogins' perception can have nonappearance as its object due to reflexive cognition (*svasaṃvedana*).[122] When in the MAP, he comments upon the very same LAS X 257, he gives the following explanation:

> "[The yogins] also meditate upon that [nondual] cognition as to whether it is one[, many] and so forth and transcend [even] the nondual [cognition]. And then, [the yogins] enter [a state] where no [dharmas including nondual cognition] appear. The [yogins] who abide in that [state] enter the Mahāyāna. This has been explained [in the LAS X 257].
>
> [Objection:] In that state, would any yogins exist? Would they see?
>
> [Reply:] Although ultimately, [they] do not see anything and the yogins [themselves] are also nonexistent, [nonetheless] conventionally, just as one says that Devadatta sees and hears, so also for the yogins [i.e., we conventionally say that they see]. Therefore, there is no fault.
>
> [Objection:] By means of what would the yogins' cognition to which nothing [including] nondual cognition appears, be understood as being without appearances? First, that could not be [understood] by [the yogins' cognition] itself. This is because it is contradictory that [something] operates upon itself. [Second,] it could not be [understood] by another [cognition], because it would follow absurdly that there would be an infinite regress (*anavasthā*).
>
> [Reply:] That is not a fault. [The yogins] directly experience [their cognition] as being nondual and without appearances by

[122]On reflexive cognition, see fn. 75.

means of reflexive cognition and then determine [their cognition as being nondual and without appearances] by means of the [judging] cognition which is obtained subsequently (*phyis rjes su thob pa'i shes pa*), but it is not contradictory that [the yogins' cognition] operates upon [their cognition] itself. It is similar for the absence of intrinsic nature[, i.e., the yogins directly experience their cognition as being without intrinsic nature by means of reflexive cognition and then determine their cognition as being without intrinsic nature by means of the subsequent judgment]."[123]

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[123]MAP D128b6-129a2: *shes pa de yang gcig la sogs pa'i ngo bos bsgom zhing gnyis med pa las 'das par byas nas snang ba med pa nyid la 'jug par bya ste / de la gnas pa ni theg pa chen po la zhugs pa yin no zhes bstan pa yin no // gal te de'i (P de'i: D de yi) gnas skabs na // rnal 'byor pa (P rnal 'byor pa: D rnal 'byor de ni) gang zhig yod // gang zhig (P gang zhig: D gang zhig gis) ni lta zhe na // don dam par ni 'ga' yang lta ba med la rnal (D rnal: P om.) 'byor pa (P pa: D par) yang med mod kyi / kun rdzob tu dper na lhas byin lta'o nyan to zhes bya ba la sogs pa ston pa ltar rnal 'byor pa yang de dang 'dra bas nyes pa med do // ji ste rnal 'byor pa'i shes pa gnyis med pa'i shes pa snang ba med par byed pa gang yin pa de yang gang zhig gis snang ba med pa nyid du khong du chud / re zhig de nyid kyis ni ma yin te / bdag nyid la byed pa 'gal ba'i phyir ro // gzhan (P gzhan: D gzhan dag) gis kyang ma yin te thug pa med par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir (D ba'i phyir: P om.) ro zhe na / de ni nyes par mi 'gyur te ji ltar gnyis med pa nyid dang / snang ba med pa nyid du rang rig pas nyams su myong nas phyis (P phyis: D phyir) rjes su thob pa'i shes pas rnam par 'jog par byed la rang la bdag nyid byed (P byed: D med) par 'gal ba yang ma yin pa ltar / rang bzhin med pa yang de dang 'dra'o //.*

For *shes pa de* ("that [nondual] cognition"), see MAP D128b5-6: *de yang yongs su bor nas gzung ba med na de yang med do zhes bsgom pa ni 'dzin pa'i rnam par mtshan nyid sems tsam nyid de yang yongs su spang bar bya zhing snang ba med pa'i shes pa kho na la gnas par bya'o //.* The term *snang ba med pa* (*nirābhāsa*) here means the nonappearance of both the grasped aspect and the grasping aspect.

MAP D286b6-7: *gal te de'i (P de'i: D de yi) gnas skabs na // ... nyes pa med do //.* A parallel argument is found in the BK I. See BK I p. 218, 9-18: *atredānīṃ ko 'sau yogī vidyate yaḥ paśyatīti cet / na paramārthataḥ kaścid ātmādiḥ svatantro 'sti yogī nāpi kaścit paśyati / kiṃ tu saṃvṛtyā yathā rūpādiviṣayākārajñānotpādamātreṇa vijñānam eva loke tathā tathā vyavahriyate devadatto yajñadattaṃ jñānena paśyatīti na tu kaścid ātmādir asti / tathā 'trāpi jñānam evādvayajñānanirābhāsam utpadyamānaṃ tathā vyapadiśyate nirābhāsena jñānena paśyatīti / na hi sarvadharmāṇāṃ paramārthato niḥsvabhāvatve 'pi saṃvṛtyā yogijñānam anyad vā pṛthagjñānaṃ neṣṭam /* "[Objection:] Now, in this case, is there any yogin who sees? [Reply:] Ultimately, no yogin exists as an autonomous self and so forth, and

nor does any yogin see. Conventionally, however, simply due to the arising of the cognition of the aspects of objects like visible matter, the convention 'Devadatta sees Yajñadatta by means of cognition' is thus applied in the world just to [that] cognition, but no self and so forth exist. In the same manner, here too, when just the cognition having [also] no appearance of the nondual cognition arises, the convention '[the yogins] see by a cognition having no appearance' is thus applied [just to that cognition]. Although all dharmas are ultimately without intrinsic nature, we do not conventionally deny yogic cognition or other ordinary beings' cognition."

bdag nyid la byed pa 'gal ba'i phyir ro (*svātmani kriyāvirodhāt*). See MAY (1959) p. 79, 3-15, p. 132, 19-20, fn. 135 and fn. 284. The opponent says that just as a knife blade cannot cut itself, so cognition would not cognize itself, because it is contradictory that something operates upon itself. The opponent's reason *svātmani kriyāvirodhāt* always appears when he criticizes the theory of reflexive cognition. See *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX 18ab: *na cchinatti yathātmānam asidhārā tathā manaḥ /.* See also *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* p. 392, 4-7: *yathā sutīkṣṇāpy asidhārā khaṅgadhārā tadanyavad ātmānaṃ svakāyaṃ na cchinatti na vighāṭayati / svātmani kriyāvirodhāt / tathā manaḥ / asidhārāvac cittam api svātmānaṃ na paśyatīti yojyaṃ /.*

phyis rjes su thob pa'i shes pa. Although the original Sanskrit word for *phyis rjes su thob pa'i shes pa* is not so clear, the meaning of that word is the same as that of the word "*pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna*". Words like *pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna*, *pṛṣṭhabhāvijñāna* and so forth often appear in Kamalaśīla's TSP. That conceptual cognition which occurs subsequent to a perception judges the object of the perception. Although that subsequent cognition is conceptual, it can be non-belying (*avisaṃvāda*) when there is no cause for error. For example, when the conceptual cognition which occurs subsequent to the perception of a pot effectuates the judgment of a pot, that conceptual cognition is non-belying. This subsequent cognition is, however, explained as being neither direct perception nor inference. That is to say, that cognition is not a valid cognition. This is because that cognition has as its objects the things already grasped by valid cognition. See TSPa p. 191, 8-10: *tasmiṃś ca pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte paścād yathā samayāhitabhedaṃ samudāyaviṣayaṃ vāso vāsa iti pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvi sāṃvṛtaṃ paramārthato nirviṣayam eva pratyavamarśajñānam utpadyata ity asiddham asya pratyakṣatvam / nāpy etad anumānaṃ pūrvapratyakṣagṛhītaviṣayatvād alaiṅgikatvāc ca /* "When that [visible matter] is grasped by means of direct perception, there subsequently arises the judgment that has the collection [of parts] as its object and determines that a cloth is a cloth in accordance with conventionally established distinctions; [the judgment] occurs subsequent to direct perception, is a conventional [judgment] and is ultimately without any object. Therefore, it is unestablished that it [i.e., the judgment] is a direct perception. It is also not an inference, for it has as its objects [things] which have been grasped by previous direct perceptions and it is not based upon a reason." See also TSPa p. 388, 9-10: *prayogaḥ - yad gṛhītagrāhi jñānaṃ na tat pramāṇaṃ yathā smṛtiḥ gṛhītagrāhī ca pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvī vikalpa iti*

In this manner, by the force of meditation upon all dharmas as being without real intrinsic nature, the yogins obtain a perception where even the nondual cognition also does not appear. At that point, the yogins' reflexive cognition which directly understands the nonappearance of all dharmas, i.e., the ultimate thusness characterized as the absence of real intrinsic nature, arises, so that they determine all dharmas as being without real intrinsic nature by means of the judging cognition which occurs subsequently. And when the yogins have reached the final phase of that meditation, then, due to their wisdom which directly understands the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas, they also directly understand their cognition itself as being without real intrinsic nature by means of reflexive cognition, with the result

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vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ // "The proof-statement is as follows: [Vyāpti:] The cognition which grasps things which have been [already] grasped is not a valid cognition. It is just like, for example, recollection. [Pakṣadharmatva:] The conceptual [cognition] which occurs subsequent to direct perception grasps the things which have [already] been grasped. [Implicit conclusion: Therefore, the conceptual cognition which occurs subsequent to direct perception is not a valid cognition.] The above is [the statement of] a reason consisting in a perception of what is incompatible with the pervader." Moreover, the judgment which occurs subsequent to the yogic perception of thusness is called "conceptual cognition that is pure on a worldly level" or "judgment that is pure on a worldly level." See TSPa p. 901, 16-17: *tatpṛṣṭhalabdhaiḥ śuddhalaukikaiḥ paramārthato nirviṣayair vastupratibandhād avisaṃvādibhir vikalpair*, p. 931, 11: *paricchedakaḥ śuddhalaukiko vimarśapratyayaḥ pṛṣṭhabhāvī* and p. 932, 6-7: *pṛṣṭhalabdhena ca śuddhalaukikena parāmarśapratyayena.*

In Dignāga's philosophy, the subsequent judgment is called "the cognition of conventionally existent things" (*saṃvṛtisajjñāna*) and is classified as a pseudo-perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*). See PS I kk. 7cd-8ab: *bhrānti-saṃvṛtisajjñānam anumānānumānikam / smārtābhilāṣikaṃ ceti pratyakṣābhāsaṃ sataimiram /.* For English translation and the text, see HATTORI (1968) p. 28 and p. 95, n. 1.53. For Dignāga's explanation in his *Nyāyamukha* (hereafter NM), see KATSURA (1982) pp. 90-91. Dharmakīrti also classifies that judgment amongst pseudo-perceptions. See PV III kk. 288, 289, 290 and 292 , and see TOSAKI (1979) pp. 382-387. Although the subsequent cognition is included amongst pseudo-perceptions and is also not regarded as valid cognition, nonetheless, as was explained above, it is a non-belying cognition. In Dharmakīrti's philosophy, subsequent cognition is also called "recollection" (*smṛti*), "conceptual [cognition] called recognition" (*kalpanā pratyabhijñānasaṃkhyātā*) and so forth. In PVV p. 191, 4, this recognition is explained as a cognition which has a conceptual nature and makes a judgment upon the preceding perception's object (*kalpanātmakatvādhyavasāyinīm*). See PV III k. 238 and HB p. 3*, 11. See also KATSURA (1984b) and (1989).

that they determine their cognition as being without real intrinsic nature by means of a subsequent judging cognition.[124] Thus, it is clear that the yogins' wisdom which directly understands the ultimate thusness is their reflexive cognition. It is precisely that reflexive cognition which should be regarded as the *anyopalabdhi* that is implied by the nonperception of all dharmas.

As was explained earlier, Dharmakīrti, in his interpretation of *anupa-*

[124]This kind of explanation is also found in Kamalaśīla's APDṬ P165b5-166a3 (D138b3-7): *rnam par mi rtog pa'i dbyings la rab tu gnas pas ni shes bya dang khyad par med pa zhes bya ba gsungs te / chos thams cad mi dmigs pa'i rnam par zhugs pas shes pa dang shes bya la bye brag mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir chos thams cad nam mkha'i dkyil dang mtshungs par mthong ste / rnam pa thams cad du ji skad bstan pa'i mtshan ma thams cad kun tu (P kun tu: D kun du) mi 'byung ba'i phyir ro // 'o na de'i tshe sus mthong / (D /: P om.) de ni bden te / don dam par gang zag la sogs pa'i ngo bo rnal 'byor pa'i rang gi rgyud gang (P gang: D gap) yang med pas mthong ba yang med mod kyi / 'on kyang ji ltar don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang kun rdzob tu gzugs la sogs pa yul gyi rnam par 'byung ba tsam gyis* shes pa nyid la lhas byin (P lhas byin: D lta sbyin) nam mchod sbyin (D mchod sbyin: P mtshon sbyin) gyis mthong ngo zhes de lta de ltar 'jig rten na tha snyad 'dogs pa de bzhin du 'dir yang ye shes nyid don dam par ngo bo nyid med mod kyi yang dag pa'i don la bsgoms pa'i stobs kyis chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par rtogs pa'i rnam pas bdag nyid kyang rang rig pas ngo bo nyid med par rtogs pa skye ba'i tshe rnal 'byor pa'i ye shes kyis mthong ngo zhes bstan to //* (* DP *gyi*. This *gyi* should be, however, emended to *gyis* due to BK I p. 218, 11-12: *rūpādiviṣayākārajñānotpādamātreṇa*. See fn. 123.) "It has been explained that the abiding in the sphere of nonconceptual [cognition means] nondifference from cognizable objects. This is because, given that no dharmas are perceived, no difference between cognition and [its] cognizable objects is perceived [either]. Therefore, all dharmas are seen as being like the middle of the space, for never, in any respect, do any of the signs explained earlier arise. [Objection:] Then who sees? [Reply:] That is true. Since ultimately there is no yogin's continuum (*svasantāna*) which constitutes the nature of a person and so forth, there is also no seeing. Nonetheless, although [all dharmas] are ultimately without intrinsic nature, conventionally, simply due to the production of [the perception of] aspects of the objects like visible matter, conventions such as that Devadatta or Yajñadatta sees are applied in the world to [that] very cognition. In the same manner, here too, although [the yogins'] wisdom itself is ultimately without intrinsic nature, nonetheless when the [wisdom which directly] understands [the yogins' cognition] itself as also being without intrinsic nature by means of reflexive cognition, arises due to the aspect [of the wisdom] which [directly] understands the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas by the force of meditation upon the true state of affairs (*bhūtārtha*), [the convention] that [the yogins] see by yogic wisdom is applied [just to that yogic wisdom]."

labdhi, seems to hold that *anyopalabdhi* is sense perception (*indriyapratyakṣa*), rather than reflexive cognition.[125] In his interpretation, the nonperception of X implies both a [sense] perception other than that of X (*anyopalabdhi*) and the existence of something other than X (*anyabhāva*), and when *anyopalabdhi* which has something other than X as its object is established, the nonperception of X is established by means of the awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) of this *anyopalabdhi*. In Kamalaśīla's interpretation of *anupalabdhi*, however, yogins' reflexive cognition is regarded as *anyopalabdhi*. This *anyopalabdhi* does not perceive something other than all dharmas, but directly understands the nonappearance of all dharmas themselves. Therefore, the nonperception of all dharmas implies the *anyopalabdhi*, i.e., awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) of their nonappearance. Kamalaśīla's interpretation of *anupalabdhi* is thus structurally different from that of Dharmakīrti.

Since the subsequent judging cognition which was explained above is conceptual, when yogins determine all dharmas as being without real intrinsic nature, then from the standpoint of the Buddhist *apoha* theory, the exclusion of what is other than the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas should be established. This is because the determination of X is not established without the exclusion of what is other than X (*anyāpoha/anyavyavaccheda*). Although in his texts Kamalaśīla does not explain what should be excluded in this case, it seems that "non-thusness," i.e., dharmas having real intrinsic nature or self, should be excluded. This is because in Kamalaśīla's interpretation of *anupalabdhi*, yogins' perception of the ultimate thusness characterized as the selflessness of all dharmas, which is *anyopalabdhi*, can be regarded as being different from their past perception which referred to dharmas having self or real intrinsic nature. It is said in the BK I:

> "Without eliminating the doubt [that real entities do exist], one cannot exclude the mental action of having attachment to [real entities] like visible matter (*rūpa*) which have been perceived earlier ... . And when there is the illumination of meditation, the yogins who examine [things] with the eye of wisdom do not perceive those perceptible [real entities] like visible matter *which had been perceived earlier.* Thus those seeds of the doubt are eliminated, just like [the elimination of] the [erroneous] cognition of a rope as a serpent, but are not [eliminated] in another way."[126]

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[125]See Chapter 3 pp. 61-64.

[126]BK I pp. 212, 16-213, 2: *saṃśayāprahāṇe tu na pūrvopalabdheṣu ca rūpā-*

Finally, when *anyopalabdhi* has the nonappearance of all dharmas as its object, would its object be an absence (*abhāva*)? If its object were to be an *abhāva*, i.e., the absence of the appearance of all dharmas, it would follow that Kamalaśīla accepts that absence can produce the perception of itself, so that he would invalidate the Buddhist theory of perception, since the Buddhists hold that the objects of perception are entities, and absence which lacks all capacities cannot produce the perception of itself. In addition, if *anyopalabdhi* were to have the absence of the appearance of all dharmas as its object, it would follow that Kamalaśīla accepts the Mīmāṃsaka position that *abhāva* is an entity and is an object of valid cognition (*prameya*).[127]

In Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi*, *anyopalabdhi* has as its object a place lacking a vase, but not the absence of a vase. The absence of a vase is understood by means of the perception of a place which is other than

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diṣv abhiniveśamanasikāraparivarjanaṃ śakyaṃ kartum ... . tac ca saṃśayabījaṃ yoginaḥ samādhyāloke sati prajñācakṣuṣā nirūpayatas teṣāṃ rūpādīnāṃ pūrvopalabdhānām upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānām anupalambhād, rajjau sarpajñānavad apagacchati nānyathā /.

[127]Kumārila, a Mīmāṃsaka, holds that absence is an aspect (*aṃśa*) of entities, and just this aspect is understood by means of a valid cognition. See *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV) IX.12: *svarūpapararūpābhyāṃ nityaṃ sadasadātmake / vastuni jñāyate kaiścid rūpaṃ kiṃcid kadācana //.* "With regard to an entity which is always [both] existent and nonexistent in nature according to its own form and the form of another [respectively], one understands some specific nature in a particular point in time by means of some [valid cognition]." See also ŚV IX.17. Kumārila says that one understands the absence of an entity by means of the sixth valid cognition called "absence" (i.e., *abhāvapramāṇa*). This valid cognition which has a [real] absence as its object is explained as the "nonarising of perception and other [four valid cognitions, i.e., inference, testimony (*śabda*), comparison (*upamāna*) and implication (*arthāpatti*)]" (*pratyakṣāder anutpattiḥ*), which can be interpreted in the two ways: as the "absence of any transformation of the self" (*ātmano 'pariṇāma*), i.e., the non-occurrence of any kind of cognition in the self, or as the "[occurrence of] a cognition in regard to another entity" (*vijñānaṃ ... anyavastuni*). See ŚV IX.11 (= TS k. 1649): *pratyakṣāder anutpattiḥ pramāṇābhāva ucyate / sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastuni //.* For ŚV IX.11, see TABER (2001) p. 74 and pp. 78-80. See also ŚVV on ŚV IX.11: (p. 411, 20-21:) *pratyakṣāder arthāpattir paryantasya yathāviṣayam anutpattir abhāvasya pramāṇasya lakṣṇam ity arthaḥ /.* Cf. HBṬ p. 167, 11-13: *apare tu pratiṣedhyaviṣayajñānarūpeṇāpariṇāmam ātmanaḥ tadanyavastuviṣayaṃ vijñānam eva vā 'bhāvasya gamakaṃ pratyakṣānumānābhyām pramāṇāntaram āhur mīmāṃsakāḥ /.* For Kumārila's concept of the *abhāvapramāṇa* and Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's refutation of it, see KELLNER (1997) pp. 62-80 and pp. 91-102, and TABER ibid.

the vase. Therefore, Dharmakīrti can reject the Mīmāṃsaka position that *abhāva* is real and an object of valid cognition.

In the case of Kamalaśīla's interpretation of *anupalabdhi*, *anyopalabdhi* does not have an entity as its object, but has the nonappearance of all dharmas as its object. So it is possible that the Mīmāṃsakas could criticize Kamalaśīla by thinking that the object of *anyopalabdhi* would be an *abhāva*. How then will Kamalaśīla reply to this possible objection? Although in his Mādhyamika texts, we cannot find an explicit reply to this objection, we can surmise what his position is from the TS and the TSP. It is said in TS kk. 1678-1679:

> Moreover, when [the Mīmāṃsakas] have previously accepted that absence would be an entity, why do [they] further explain that it [i.e., absence] has no nature (*nirūpatā*)?
>
> When what has no nature lacks the nature of cognition, it is not correct that [such] is a valid cognition. That is, that [i.e., being a valid cognition] is characterized as the cognition (*saṃvitti*) of an object of valid cognition.[128]

It is also said in TS k. 1681:

> Moreover, how [could] one understand the absence [of valid cognition], which lacks the nature of cognition? [Objection:] [One understands that absence] by means of the absence of valid cognition, which has that [absence] as its object. [Reply:] If so, then [there would be] an infinite regress.[129]

Commenting upon TS k. 1681ab, Kamalaśīla says in the TSP:

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[128]TSa kk. 1678-1679: *abhāvasya ca vastutve pūrvam aṅgīkṛte sati / nīrūpatā punas tasya kim artham upavarṇyate // nīrūpasya hi vijñānarūpahānau pramāṇatā / na yujyate premeyasya sā hi saṃvittilakṣaṇā //.* For German translation, see KELLNER (1997) pp. 22-23.

[129]TSa k. 1681: *jñānarūpaviviktaś ca so 'bhāvo gamyate katham / tadgocarapramābhāvād evaṃ tarhy anavasthitiḥ //.* For German translation, see KELLNER ibid. p. 24. In the TSP ad TS k. 1681 Kamalaśīla quotes the PV IV k. 275: *anyathārthasya nāstitvaṃ gamyate 'nupalambhataḥ / upalambhasya nāstitvam anyenety anavasthitiḥ //.* "Otherwise [i.e., if nonperception were not established by means of reflexive cognition], one would understand the absence of an object by means of nonperception and would understand the absence of perception by means of yet another [nonperception]. Therefore, there would be an infinite regress."

> Nor is it [the case] that the [absence of valid cognition] would be established by means of reflexive awareness, because how [could] one understand that [absence of valid cognition], which lacks the nature of cognition, by means of reflexive awareness, since by its means, one understands only what has the nature of cognition.[130]

In Kamalaśīla's interpretation of *anupalabdhi*, yogins' nonperception of all dharmas is their perception of the ultimate thusness. Their nonperception however should not be regarded as the absence of the perception of all dharmas. This is because, since the absence of that perception lacks the nature of cognition, it cannot be understood by means of reflexive awareness. In fact, the nonperception of all dharmas has indeed the nature of cognition, since it is yogins' *clear perception where nothing appears*. Therefore, *anyopalabdhi* which is reflexive awareness has as its object such a clear perception of yogins, but not the absence of the perception of all dharmas. Therefore, Kamalaśīla can avoid the fault that the object of *anyopalabdhi* would be an *abhāva*.

Thus, when we compare Kamalaśīla's interpretation of nonperception with that of Dharmakīrti, we can understand that in many respects the former is very different from the latter. The major difference is that Kamalaśīla, as a Mādhyamika, does not accept the Dharmakīrtian idea of *anupalabdhi* as being a perception of some other real entity (*anyabhāva*). The Mādhyamikas hold all dharmas to be ultimately without intrinsic nature due to the voidness concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*), which is ultimate and established without the establishment of any other thing, but not due to the voidness of one thing by another (*itaretaraśūnyatā*), which is conventionally established in reliance upon the establishment of another thing. On the other hand, we can also find some similarities between Dharmakīrti's and Kamalaśīla's interpretations of *anupalabdhi*. The major similarity is that both construe *anupalabdhi* as an implicative negation, implying the existence of another perception (*anyopalabdhi*). In Kamalaśīla's interpretation, however, since no *anyabhāva* is established, *anyopalabdhi* does not have any *anyabhāva* as its object. The yogins' reflexive cognition, which is *anyopalabdhi*, directly understands the nonappearance of all dharmas as their selflessness.

[130]TSPa p. 479, 13-14: *nāpi svasaṃvittyā tasya siddhiḥ, yato jñānarūpavivikto 'sau kathaṃ svasaṃvittyā gamyate / jñānātmana eva tayādhigamāt /.* See KELLNER ibid. p. 25, 16-20.

And when this reflexive cognition is established, then by means of the judgment which occurs subsequent to the perception, the yogins determine all dharmas as being without real intrinsic nature.

This interpretation of Kamalaśīla has been undertaken in order to show that Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi* is applicable to the proof of the Mādhyamika position that all dharmas do not have ultimate intrinsic nature. Therefore, Kamalaśīla certainly does not reject Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi*.[131] It seems more likely that he just expanded the range of its application in order to prove the *lakṣaṇaśūnyatā* of all dharmas.

[131] In his (1990a) article, Moriyama states that Kamalaśīla criticizes Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi*, i.e., the theory of *svabhāvānupalabhi*, as being tantamount to the position of *itaretaraśūnyatā*, which is conventional but not ultimate. Moriyama's statement is not entirely accurate, because although it is correct to think that in the proof of voidness Kamalaśīla does not accept the *anupalabdhi* that proves *itaretaraśūnyatā*, he does think that *lakṣaṇaśūnyatā* can indeed be proved by means of *anupalabdhi*. If *anupalabdhi* were to prove only *itaretaraśūnyatā*, it would be possible to say that Kamalaśīla has criticized Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi*. However, Kamalaśīla does not think that only *itaretaraśūnyatā* can be proved by means of *anupalabdhi*. Rather he thinks that Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi* can be applied to the proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature, and that the *lakṣaṇaśūnyatā* of all dharmas can also be ultimately proved by means of *anupalabdhi*. Since Kamalaśīla follows Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *anupalabdhi* in the proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature and regards the negation in the word *anupalabdhi* as an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*), it is evident that he does not criticize Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi*, but rather applies it in a new way in order to prove the *lakṣaṇaśūnyatā* of all dharmas. In short, just because Kamalaśīla has a new application of Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi*, it does not follow that he has repudiated the whole theory!

English Translations

1. The Establishment of the Absence of Intrinsic Nature in Reality by means of Direct Perception

Illumination of The Middle Way[132]

1.1 OBJECTIONS (*pūrvapakṣa*)

§1. You [i.e., the Mādhyamika] cannot [prove the voidness of all dharmas] by means of reasoning (*yukti*) either.

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[132]In his BNJ, a Tibetan commentary on the *Madhyamakāloka* (MĀ), bsTan dar explains the meaning of the title, especially the meaning of the word *Madhyamaka*. BNJ 2b2-3: *'di'i dbu ma gang la bya zhe na / dbu ma'i tha snyad grub mtha' dang gang zag dang gzhung dang stong nyid sogs du mar 'jug pa las skabs 'di'i dbu ma ni yod med kyi mtha' gnyis dang bral ba'i dbus rten 'byung gi de kho na nyid la bya ste / de'i phyir dbu ma zhes pa'i sgra'i don yang des shes par bya'o // mtha' gnyis dang bral ba'i dbus de nyid la zab mo dbu ma'i lam zhes tha snyad 'dogs te /.* "Now, if it is said: 'What does [the word] *Madhyamaka* in this [title] mean?,' then [we reply that] the convention *Madhyamaka* applies to various things like the doctrinal system, persons, texts and voidness, but [here] *Madhyamaka* in this title means the thusness which is dependent origination, due to the middle being free of the two extremes of existence and nonexistence. Therefore, the meaning of the word 'middle' should also be understood by that [word in the title]. Due to the middle being free of two extremes, [Kamalaśīla] uses the term for the profound Middle Way [i.e., *Mādhyamaka*] in that very [title]." BNJ 11a1-2: *de ltar na gzhung 'dis sngar ji skad brjod ba de lta bu'i zab mo dbu ma'i lam gsal bar kho nar bstan pas dbu ma'i snang ba zhes bya'o //.* "Thus, the profound Middle Way, just as stated earlier, will indeed be clearly explained by this text. Therefore, [this text] is entitled *Illumination of the Middle Way*." According to bsTan dar, the title of this text means the illumination, viz., the clear explanation, of the profound Middle Way. See ICHIGO (1992).

1.1.1 One cannot understand the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas by means of direct perception

§2. [133]That is to say, first of all, one would not understand that all entities are empty by means of direct perception. This is because the objects of that [i.e., perception] are real entities[134]; and because due to [their] lacking intrinsic nature, it is not correct that unreal things would somehow produce cognitions by revealing their forms (*svarūpa*).[135] If [they] were to produce [the cognition], it would follow absurdly that [they would be] real entities. This is because the defining characteristic of a real entity is the capacity for practical efficacy (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*).[136]

1.1.2 It is not correct that direct perception itself would have an intrinsic nature

§3. If direct perception [itself] were also to have an intrinsic nature, then [your] thesis that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature would be undermined.

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[133]The following objections are regarded as being made by Dharmakīrti. See MORIYAMA (1990a).

[134]See NB I 12: *tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam //*, and see NB I 14: *tad eva paramārthasat //*.

[135]It may be also possible to regard the phrase: "*ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis*" as modifying the verb *nye bar ston pas*. In this case, this sentence will be translated as follows: "This is because it is not correct that unreal things produce the cognition [of them] by revealing their own nature (*svarūpa*) somehow as lacking intrinsic nature."

[136]See NB I 15: *arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ //*. For the argument, cf. BSGT 111b2-3: *mngon sum gyis ni chos thams cad bdag med pa mi rtogs par 'gyur te / de ni dngos po'i yul can yin pa'i phyir ro // ma yin na de'i snang ba nyams pa'i phyir de mngon sum nyid ma yin par 'gyur ro // ngo bo nyid med pas ni rang gi ngo bo nye bar ston pa'i shes pa skyed par mi nus pa'i phyir te / don byed nus pa ni dngos po'i mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro //*. "One cannot understand the selflessness of all dharmas by means of direct perception. This is because that [i.e., direct perception] has real entities as its objects. Otherwise [i.e., if direct perception were to have unreal entities as its objects], then since the appearance to that [i.e., direct perception] will be undermined, it would follow that it is not at all a direct perception. This is because (a) it is impossible that what is without intrinsic nature would produce cognitions which reveal [its] own form; (b) the capacity for practical efficacy is the defining characteristic of a real entity."

1.1.2.1 It is also not correct that direct perception would be without intrinsic nature

§4. But if that [perception] were to be without intrinsic nature, how could one understand that all entities are empty by means of that [perception]?[137]

1.1.3 For the Mādhyamikas, there is no entity which is lacking the intrinsic nature of all dharmas; otherwise, by the direct perception of something, one would understand the voidness of all dharmas

§5. Moreover, if one grasps a certain place as being free of another object, then the fact of [the place's] being void of that which is other than it is to be apprehended by means of direct perception. However, for those who accept the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas, there cannot be any [such] entity which is lacking the intrinsic nature of all dharmas; otherwise, by direct perception of something, one would understand that all dharmas are empty. This is because that [entity] is also included amongst all dharmas.[138]

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[137]Cf. BSGT 111b3-4: *yang mngon sum nyid kyang ngo bo nyid med pa yin na ji ltar des chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par rtogs par 'gyur / ci ste ngo bo nyid med pa ma yin na chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa ma yin par 'gyur ro ...* . "If, on the other hand, direct perception itself were to be without intrinsic nature, how could we understand all dharmas as being without intrinsic nature by means of that [perception]? But if [direct perception] were to be not without intrinsic nature, it would not follow that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature."

[138]S. Moriyama's translation of the last half of this paragraph 1.1.3,**§5** is as follows: "Through the direct perception of something, would the [Mādhyamikas] who accept the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas understand that all dharmas are empty? With regard to all dharmas, there is not any entity which would lack intrinsic nature. This is because that [thing which is to be grasped by direct perception] is also included amongst all dharmas." （一切法無自性と提唱する者達（中観派）にとっては、何らかのものを直接知覚として認識することによって、一切法空寂と知るのであろうか、一切法 (*sarvadharma*) には、自性を欠いた事物 (*vastu*) というものは何ら存在しない。それ（直接知覚によって把握されるもの）も、一切法の中に含まれるからである。） See MORIYAMA (1990a) p. 53, 7-12. Moriyama's translation of the last half of this paragraph is not completely clear. It is not correct to take *chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid kyis dben pa'i dngos po ni cung zad kyang med de* as meaning that with regard to all dharmas, there is not any entity which would lack intrinsic nature. M. Ichigō's translation of this

1.1.3.1 It is not correct that such an entity would not be included in all dharmas

§6. But if it were not to be included, your own thesis would be undermined.[139]

1.1.4 It is not rationally justified to say that the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas would be understood by means of the yogic perception of the omniscient Buddha and others

§7. Scholars will not be satisfied either by [your] statement: "This [absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas] is understood by means of the yogic perceptions of the omniscient [Buddha] (*sarvajña*) and so forth[140]." This is

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sentence is also problematic. His translation is as follows: "[However,] in all dharmas, there is not any entity which would lack intrinsic nature." (... 。(が) 一切法で自性を欠く存在など少しもありません。) See ICHIGO (1991) pp. 233, 27-234, 1. As was explained earlier, the opponent here says that one could not understand the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas by means of nonperception (*anupalabdhi*), because *anyabhāva* would not be established. See Chapter 3 pp. 64-65. If the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas had to be understood through the perception of some other entity, then since no such entity is established for the Mādhyamikas who accept the totality of dharmas as being without intrinsic nature, those Mādhyamikas could not prove the absence of intrinsic nature. This is because such an "other entity" should be included in the totality. On the other hand, if such an entity existed outside the totality of dharmas, it would follow that the Mādhyamikas could not prove the totality as being without intrinsic nature, but instead could only prove this fact for a finite or limited number of dharmas. This kind of objection can be found in other Indian texts. See fn. 139.

[139]This kind of objection is already found in Uddyotakara's criticism of Dignāga's *apoha* theory. *Nyāyavārttika* (NV) p. 687, 7-8: *na punaḥ sarvapada etad asti, na hy asarvaṃ nāma kiṃcid asti yat sarvapadena nivartyeta /.* "For the word *sarva*, however, this [i.e., *anyāpoha*] is impossible. This is because there is nothing called *asarva* which would be negated by the word *sarva*." See HATTORI (1980a) p. 25. The objection that other things to be excluded would not be established can always be made when one tries to prove something with reference to all things. In fact, this objection is also found in the proof of the Buddha's omniscience (*sarvajñajñāna*) and in the proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) of all things. See Śākyabuddhi's PVṬ D137b5-138a5, Karṇakagomin's PVSVṬ p. 245, 12-25 and TSP ad TS k. 3627. See also KEIRA (1997).

[140]The meaning of *thams cad mkhyen pa la sogs pa rnal 'byor pa'i mngon sum* is not clear. The following translation is also possible: "the perception of yogins like

because that [statement] is not rationally justified.

1.1.4.1 It is not correct that yogic perception would be nonexistent

§8. If that cognition of yogins were also nonexistent, then how could it be a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*)?

1.1.4.2 It is also not correct that yogic perception would be existent

§9. But if [that cognition] were existent, then [your own] thesis would be undermined.

1.2 REPLIES (*uttarapakṣa*)

1.2.1 It is not correct to say that one cannot understand the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas by means of direct perception

§1. An opponent has said: "You cannot [prove the voidness of all dharmas] by means of reasoning either. That is to say, first of all, one does not understand that all entities are empty by means of direct perception. This is because the objects of that [i.e., direct perception] are real entities." Now, to this [objection], we should make the following reply:

1.2.1.1 Is the selflessness of all dharmas understood by no one's direct perception? Or is it only not understood by the direct perception of those whose eyes of wisdom are impaired?

§2. Is the selflessness of all dharmas understandable by no one's direct perception? Or [is it only not understood by] the direct perception of people like you whose eyes of wisdom are impaired by the thick film due to eye disease (*timira*), i.e., ignorance?

1.2.1.1.1 The former position is not correct

§3. Of the two, first of all, the former position is not correct because there is no valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). There is no valid cognition whatsoever for what is to be determined, namely, [your] statement: "No one's perception functions with regard to the [selflessness of all dharmas]." (1) This is

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the omniscient [Buddha] and so forth."

because the mere absence of one's own perception is erroneous [as a ground for inferring that general statement]. It is only nonperception of something perceptible (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*) which proves that that thing is absent,[141] but the mental operations present in all people's mental continua are not perceptible to a person of limited vision[142] like you. Otherwise

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[141]See HB p. 21*, 18-19: *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhir abhāvahetur abhāvavyavahārahetur vā.*

[142]The term *tshu rol mthong ba* corresponds to the Sanskrit *arvāgdarśana*, *arvāgdṛś*, *aparadarśana*, etc. Kamalaśīla uses this term in the MĀ, the TĀ, the MAP and the TSP. With reference to direct perception by people of limited vision, Kamalaśīla says the following in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the last chapter of the TSP ad TS k. 3186ab [identical with ŚV II.117ab]: *sarvajño dṛśyate tāvan nedānīm asmādādibhiḥ /.* "First of all, people such as us cannot now observe omniscient Being." There it is stated that there are three kinds of perceptions by people of limited vision, i.e., *indriyajñānaṃ*, *mānasaṃ* and *ātmasaṃvedana*. The *yogipratyakṣa* which directly understands the objects of transcendental wisdom (*lokottarajñāna*), e.g., *śūnyatā*, etc., is not included in their perceptions. TSPa p. 830, 19-26: *na tāvat pratyakṣeṇāsmadādibhir arvāgdarśanaiḥ sarvajño dṛśyate, tathā hy arvāgdarśinaḥ pratyakṣaṃ trividham, indriyajñānaṃ mānasaṃ sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanaṃ ceti tad etat trividham api na sarvajñam avagamayitum alam, atadviṣayatvāt, indriyajñānaṃ hi rūpādiviṣayapañcakaniyatamato na tena parasantānasamavāyino buddhidharmā viṣayīkriyante / nāpi mānasena, tasya indriyajñānaparigṛhītaviṣayānantaraviṣayagrāhītvenendriyajñānavat pratiniyatarūpādiviṣayatvāt / nāpi svasaṃvedanena, tasya svasantānavarttivarttamānacittacaittaviṣayatvād ato na tena parasantānavarttinaḥ svasantānikāś cānāgatāś cetodharmāḥ śakyante vedayitum /.* "In the first place, people of limited vision like us cannot see the omniscient person by means of direct perception. That is to say, direct perceptions by people of limited vision are threefold, i.e., sense cognition, mental [cognition] and reflexive cognition of all [one's own] mind and mental operations. None of these three [direct perceptions] are able to make [one] understand the omniscient person. This is because [these three perceptions] do not have the [omniscient person] as their object, because (1) sense cognition is restricted to the five objects such as colors and shapes (*rūpa*). Therefore, the intellectual properties inherent in others' continua cannot be taken as objects by that [i.e., sense cognition]. (2) [People of limited vision] cannot [directly understand the omniscient person] by means of mental [cognition] either. This is because due to the fact that the [mental cognition] takes the object grasped by a sense cognition as [its] immediately preceding object, [the mental cognition] is restricted in [its] objects to colors and shapes, etc., just like sense cognition. (3) [They cannot directly understand it] by means of reflexive cognition either. This is because that [i.e., reflexive cognition] has as [its] objects the present mind and mental operations belonging to one's own continuum. Therefore, the future mental properties which would belong to others'

(*gang gi phyir*)[143] [such a person like you] would know that these [mental operations] do not function with regard to the [selflessness of all dharmas] because he does not himself see [these operations]. (2) This is also because the absence of another [person's] perception is not definite.[144] Therefore, it is not correct for judicious people (*prekṣāvat*) to state that no one understands the [fact of selflessness] at all by means of direct perception.

1.2.1.1.2 The latter position is not correct

§4. On the other hand, if you followed the second position, then there would be [the fault] that one proves something already proven (*siddhasādhana*).[145] We too do not accept that people of limited vision directly

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continua and the continua [of persons of limited vision] themselves cannot be perceived." See KAWASAKI (1992) pp. 299-301. According to LINDTNER (1993), the term *arvāgdarśana* can be traced back to Bhartṛhari's *Vṛtti* to *Vākyapadīya* I 134, and is the evidence which shows that Buddhist philosophers like Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Kamalaśīla and so forth were heavily indebted to Bhartṛhari for much of their technical terminology. See LINDTNER (1993) p. 205. Cf. STEINKELLNER (1979) p. 79, fn. 258.

[143] S. Moriyama and M. Ichigō regard *gang gi phyir* ("so that", "otherwise") as an interrogative (*kasmāt?*). See MORIYAMA (1990a) p. 16-18: "どちして (sic!)、私によって、認識されない故、それ（一切法無我の理解）がそこ（あらゆる人々の直接知覚）に存在しはしないと、知られようか。" See also ICHIGO (1997) p. 138, 17-18: "それ（すべての人の直接知）がそれ（一切法無我）に対してはたらかないとなにゆえ覚知しえようか。" Judging from the fact that in Kamalaśīla's works like TSP and MĀ, we very often meet with sentences which have a *gang gis na/yena* clause, we regard this *gang gi phyir* as *yasmāt* or *yatas*, rather than *kasmāt*. As for a *gang gis na/yena* clause, see fn. 154.

[144] See BSGT 111b5-6: *yang dag pa'i don bsgoms pa las byung ba'i rnal 'byor pa'i mngon sum gyis chos thams cad bdag med par rtogs pa'i phyir skyon du brjod pa dang po ni med do // 'di med do zhes brjod na yang rigs pa ma yin te / gnod par byed pa'i tshad ma med pa'i phyir ro // rang dang gzhan gyi dmigs pa log pas kyang ma yin te / ma nges pa'i phyir ro //.* "Because by means of the yogic perception which arises from meditation upon the real state of affairs, the selflessness of all dharmas will be understood, the first [point] stated as a fault is impossible. If [the opponents] say: "this [yogic perception] does not exist," then too this is not logical. This is because there is no invalidator (*bādhakapramāṇa*). It is not that [we cannot understand selflessness] due to the absence of one's own perception and of others' perceptions. This is because [both reasons] are inconclusive."

[145] *Siddhasādhana* is the fault of a needless proof, which occurs when one proves something already proven. In the Buddhist system of logic, however, it is not so clear which type of fallacy this *siddhasādhana* belongs to. In the Naiyāyika system

understand such a profound thusness of dharmas.[146] Nonetheless, even if we grant that someone like you does not understand such thusness, why is it not still possible to say [the following]: The selflessness of all dharmas is understood by means of the direct perception of supreme yogins, who, by accumulating an immeasurable assemblage of both merit and wisdom (*puṇyajñānasaṃbhāra*) over many aeons, have acquired the power which enables them to realize everything and have dispelled all the darkness of the obscurations by the light of perfect wisdom, arisen from meditation upon the real state of affairs (*bhūtārtha*).[147] The reasoning [used] for [proving]

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of logic, it seems to be a fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*, the fallacy that the subject is unestablished. See *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā* p. 307, 1: *siddhasādhanaṃ tu pakṣatā-vighaṭakatayā āśrayāsiddhāv antarbhavatīti prāñcaḥ /.* Note that in the system of the Navya-Nyāya logic, *siddhasādhana* is regarded as a "point of defeat" (*nigraha-sthāna*). See ibid. p. 308, 1: *nigrahasthānāntaram iti navīnāḥ.* For the Naiyāyika explanation of the fallacy of *siddhasādhana*, see POTTER AND BHATTACHARYYA (1993) p. 345.

[146]Cf. MAK 74: *ma yin thog med rgyud lci bar // dngos por sgro btags dbang byas pas // de phyir srog chags thams cad kyis // mngon sum rtogs par mi 'gyur ro //.*

[147]Not all persons can directly understand the absence of real intrinsic nature. Otherwise, it would be meaningless that those who want to see thusness of entities make efforts at practicing the path of the Noble Ones (*ārya*). Those whose minds are affected by the superimposition (*samāropa*) of real entities cannot directly understand thusness, while those who have eliminated superimposition and erroneous cognitions can directly understand thusness. The possibility and impossibility of directly understanding thusness of entities depend upon the ability of perceiver. For this reason, Kamalaśīla in the MĀ classifies direct perceptions into two types, i.e., ordinary beings' direct perception and yogins' direct perception. The yogins' direct perception is further classified into two types, i.e., a śrāvaka's direct perception and a buddha's direct perception. Only the yogins who are buddhas and bodhisattvas can directly understand the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas. Kamalaśīla says in the MĀ D179a6-b4: *mngon sum ni slob dpon rnams kyis rnam pa gnyis su rnam par phye ste / rnal 'byor pa rnams kyi dang phal pa dag gi'o // de la phal pa dag gi mngon sum gang yin pa de ni don dam pa pa'i dbang du byas nas ma nor ba zhes mi bya'o // de ltar ma yin na thams cad rnal 'byor pa kho nar 'gyur gyi tshu rol mthong ba ni ma yin no // rnal 'byor pa'i mngon sum las phal pa'i mngon sum bye brag yod par yang mi 'gyur bas tha snyad kyi sgo nas rmi lam la sogs pa bzhin du ji ltar grags pa'i don la mi slu ba tsam las de ma 'khrul pa zhes bya bar zad do // nyan thos la sogs pa'i rnal 'byor pa'i mngon sum gang yin pa de ni gang zag la bdag med pa tsam mngon sum du byed par zhugs pa'i phyir de la mi slu ba nyid kyis mngon sum gyi tshad ma yin*

gyi / rnam pa thams cad kyi de kho na nyid spyod yul gyi phyir ni ma yin no // bcom ldan 'das rnams kho na'i mngon sum gang yin pa de ni rnam pa thams cad kyi de kho na nyid spyod yul yin pa'i phyir dngos su de mi slu ba kho na yin pas rnam pa thams cad kyi de kho na nyid kyi dbang du byas te ma nor ba yin te / de nyid rnam pa thams cad kyi de kho na nyid la mi slu bas dngos su ma nor ba yin te / des na sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyis chos thams cad mtshan nyid med par rab tu mkhyen to //. "Direct perception is classified by the masters into two types, i.e., [that of] yogins and [that of] ordinary people. Of the two, it should not be said that ordinary people's direct perception is unmistaken with regard to ultimate things. Otherwise, everyone would actually be a yogin and not a person of limited vision. As [there would be the fault that] ordinary people's direct perception would be undifferentiated from yogins' direct perception, therefore we limit ourselves to affirming that the [ordinary person's direct perception] is unmistaken simply from a conventional point of view in that it just does not belie with regard to the objects as they are generally acknowledged, just like [the perception of] dreams and so forth. The direct perception of yogins such as śrāvakas functions simply to perceive the selflessness of persons (*pudgalanairātmya*), and therefore [this perception] does not belie with regard to the [selflessness of persons]. It is due to this fact that [the śrāvaka's direct perception] is a direct perception which is a valid cognition, but not due to [its] having all aspects of thusness as its object. Since only the Illustrious Ones' direct perceptions have all aspects of thusness as their objects, these [perceptions] never in fact belie, and hence [these perceptions] are unmistaken with regard to all aspects of thusness. Since only this [perception] does not belie with regard to all aspects of thusness, [they] are actually unmistaken. Therefore, the buddhas, who are the Illustrious Ones, understand that all dharmas are without characters." See MORIYAMA (1990c) and (1991b). A parallel passage can be found in Abhayākaragupta's MMA D145a1-4. This type of classification is already found in Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX 3-4ab: *tatra loko dvidhā dṛṣṭo yogī prākṛtakas tathā / tatra prākṛtako loko yogilokena bādhyate // bādhyante dhīviśeṣeṇa yogino 'py uttarottaraiḥ /.* "In connection with these [two truths], people are seen to be of two types: yogins and [ordinary people] who have such an [ignorant] nature. Of these, [the view of] ordinary people is invalidated by the people of yogins. On account of superior understanding, [the views of] yogins are also invalidated by [the views of those] at successively higher levels." In his MAK 74-75, Śāntarakṣita also distinguishes yogins' perception from that of ordinary beings. See MAK 74-75: *ma yin thog med rgyud lci bar // dngos por sgro btags dbang byas pas // de phyir srog chags thams cad kyis // mngon sum rtogs par mi 'gyur ro // de la sgro btags gcod byed pa // shes par byed pa'i gtan tshigs kyis // rjes su dpog rnams shes par byed // rnal 'byor dbang rnams mngon sum gsal //.* "No, [they can not directly understand voidness.] Due to being affected by the superimposition of real entities in [their] beginningless burdensome [mental] continua, not all sentient beings can understand [voidness] by means of direct perception. Inferences make [voidness] known by means of reasons that eliminate superimpositions [of real entities, etc.]

this [yogic perception] will be explained below.[148]

1.2.1.2 It cannot be established that the objects of perception are real entities

§5. Nor is it established that: "This is because the objects of perception are real entities." That is to say, it is not correct that the perception of people of limited vision has as its objects real intrinsic natures of entities, since [it always] has as its objects deceptive visible matter (*rūpa*) and so forth, as does the perception of people suffering from eye disease (*taimirika*). Otherwise, it would follow absurdly that everybody would perceive thusness. The cognition of great yogins who are buddhas or bodhisattvas[149] is also not established as having real entities as its objects. This is because they never see any real intrinsic natures of entities. In the *Ārya Bodhisattvapiṭaka* it is said:

> "Therefore, all dharmas are seen to be naturally nonexistent, unceased, naturally tranquil, completely unproduced, unborn, absolutely unborn and completely extinguished. Therefore, he who sees [correctly] does not see and does not observe. This is the correct vision and the vision [of dharmas] as they are. And if it is asked what is the perception of all dharmas as they are, [we answer that] it is not seeing anything."[150]

In the *Ārya Dharmasaṅgīti* it is also said:

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upon the [voidness] and that make [voidness] known. Those who have mastered yoga have a clear perception [of voidness]."

[148]Kamalaśīla refers to MĀ D175a5-175b7. The point is that yogic perception can be correctly established as a valid cognition, for starting at MĀ D170a5, Kamalaśīla begins to explain this type of yogic perception as not deviating from Dharmakīrti's definition of direct perception. Beginning with paragraph 1.2.1.2 below, Kamalaśīla explains how the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas can be directly understood by means of yogic perception.

[149]Ichigō's translation of *sang rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa' rnal 'byor pa chen po rnams* is as follows: "Buddha and great yogins who are bodhisattvas." （仏や偉大なヨーガ行者という菩薩） See ICHIGO ibid. p. 139, 9.

[150]On this quotation from *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, see fn. 114. Note that M. Ichigō does not regard the last sentence *yang chos thams cad ji lta ba bzhin du mthong ba gang zhe na / gang 'di mthong ba med pa yin no* as the quotation from the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. See ICHIGO (1997) p. 139, 16-17.

"Not seeing any dharmas, this is the supreme seeing."[151]

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[151]This sentence of the *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra* is very often quoted in Mādhyamika texts. See fn. 114. Bhāviveka* and Jñānagarbha also quote this sentence in PP D247b3 and in SDVV D4b1. Their purpose in quoting that sentence is, however, not the same as that of Kamalaśīla. Bhāviveka and Jñānagarbha seek to refute the Yogācāra theory of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*), i.e., the thoroughly imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*), the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) and the thoroughly established nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*). (* As for the name of the author of the PP, see EJIMA (1990).)

In the PP XXV D247b2-3, Bhāviveka attacks the Yogācāra idea of an ultimately pure perception of the thoroughly established nature by saying: *de'i dmigs pa rnam par dag pa nyid kyang ji lta bu yin / gal te rnam par mi rtog pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis so zhe na / dmigs pa can gyi ye she de ni rnam par mi rtog pa zhes bya ba ma yin te / 'di ni di'o zhes rnam par mi rtog kyang yul snang ba'i phyir dper na mig gi rnam par shes pa bzhin pas ... /.* "How could the perception of this [thoroughly established nature] be pure? If you say that it is due to [that perception's] having the nature of nonconceptualization, [then we reply that] the cognition having [its] object cannot be called nonconceptual, because [that cognition] has the appearance of [its] object, even when there is no conceptualization which thinks that one thing has such and such [property]. It is just like, for example, visual cognition." See ECKEL (1985) p. 72, 1-13. And just after saying that, Bhāviveka quotes that sentence of the *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra* as showing that the Yogācāra idea of the ultimate pure perception of the thoroughly established nature contradicts the Buddhist tradition. Bhāviveka holds that perception of the thoroughly established nature is neither pure nor ultimate, and he explains that the thusness of entities is that they are utterly unestablished, i.e., nonproduced. Since thusness cannot in any sense be the object of cognition, it is not correct that thusness would be the object of the direct perception of the thoroughly established nature. See PP XXV D247b7-248a1: *dngos po rnams rnam pa thams cad du yongs su ma grub pa ni dngos po'i de kho na yin la / de ni rnam pa thams cad du yang yul gyi dngos por nye bar mi 'gyur ba'i phyir / dmigs pa nyid du mi rigs so //.* See also ECKEL (1985) p. 73, 2-4.

In the SDVK and the SDVV, the Yogācāras interpret the sentence of the *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra* as showing that the nonseeing of the thoroughly imagined nature is the seeing of thusness, viz., the thoroughly established nature. See SDVK 6ab: *gal te brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid // 'ga' yang mthong ba med ce na //.* And see SDVV D4b1-2: *brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi dbang du mdzad nas 'ga' yang mthong ba med pa ni de kho na mthong ba zhes bya ba 'di gsungs par 'dod te / de ni de lta bu yin no //* "[In the Yogācāra theory,] it is acknowledged that the sentence 'Not seeing anything, this is the seeing of thusness' is made with reference to the thoroughly imagined nature. Such is the [meaning of that sentence]." The Yogācāras claim that the appearance of the thoroughly established nature is the ultimate seeing of thusness. Cf. ECKEL (1987) pp. 115-116. Note that due to the Yogācāra's interpre-

tation of the sentence of the sūtra, we can understand that they regard the negation in the word "nonseeing" (*adarśana*) as having the form of an implicative negation. Against the Yogācāra interpretation of that sentence, Jñānagarbha holds that the ultimate thusness does not appear at all, even to the wisdom of the omniscient Buddha (*sarvajñajñāna*). See SDVV D4a7-4b1: *don dam pa ni ji ltar snang ba bzhin du rnam par gnas pa med de / thams cad mkhyen pa'i mkhyen pa nyid la yang mi snang ba'i phyir ro // de nyid kyi phyir mdo sde las 'ga' yang mthong ba med pa ni de kho na mthong ba zhes gsung so /.* Therefore, both Bhāviveka and Jñānagarbha hold that the thusness of entities is the nonappearance or the nonproduction of all dharmas, and that the appearance of the thoroughly established nature is not the ultimate seeing of thusness.

Also, we can understand that Bhāviveka's and Jñānagarbha's interpretations of the word "nonseeing" (*adarśana*) in the sūtra are the same as that of Kamalaśīla. This is because Kamalaśīla also holds that that nonseeing means the nonperception of all dharmas, and he includes as "unseen" even the Yogācāra's direct perception of the thoroughly established nature. In other words the Yogācāra's nondual cognition (*advayajñāna*) of thusness also falls under the scope of what the sūtra rules out with its phrase *adarśana*. See Chapter 3 pp. 75-81. Bhāviveka's and Jñānagarbha's interpretation of the phrase "seeing thusness" (*de kho na mthong ba*) are not clear, however. In the PP XXV and the SDVV, they do not clearly explain why or how nonseeing should be regarded as seeing thusness. Note that Kamalaśīla quotes the sentence of the *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra* not in order to refute the Yogācāca theory of the three natures, but in order to prove that one can understand the selflessness of all dharmas by means of direct perception. Following Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception (*anupalabdhi*), he regards the negation in the word "nonseeing" as having the form of an implicative negation: nonseeing is the *sādhana* which establishes the seeing of thusness characterized as the selflessness of all dharmas. It seems that Kamalaśīla was the first Mādhyamika philosopher to have clearly said that the nonseeing in question has the form of an implicative negation.

Although Bhāviveka's and Jñānagarbha's interpretations of the word "nonseeing" in that sūtra are the same as that of Kamalaśīla, their interpretations of the negation in that word are not the same. Bhāviveka's interpretation of that negation is not clear, but that of Jñānagarbha can be understood. In his SDVP, a subcommentary on Jñānagarbha's SDVV, Śāntarakṣita** says that the negation in the term "nonseeing" has the form of a nonimplicative negation. See SDVP D18b7: *'ga' yang zhes bya ba ni dngos po dang dngos po med pa la sogs pa'i ngo bo la bya'o // mthong ba med pa zhes bya ba ni med par dgag pa yin no /.* Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita regard the nonappearance of all dharmas as having the form of a nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*). By contrast, due to his regarding nonseeing as a *sādhana*,*** Kamalaśīla says in the MĀ that the negation in "nonseeing" does not have the form of a nonimplicative negation. However, as was explained above, he also accepts that nothing appears ultimately. Although it seems that normally the nonappearance or the nonproduction of all dharmas should

Therefore, it is not established that the objects of perception are real entities.[152]

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be regarded as having the form of a nonimplicative negation, nonetheless would Kamalaśīla categorically reject Jñānagarbha's and Śāntarakṣita's interpretation of that negation and hold that it must always have the form of an implicative negation? In any case it is clear that *if* nonseeing should be a *sādhana* which establishes the seeing of thusness, Kamalaśīla then holds that nonseeing should have the form of an implicative negation. (** Śāntarakṣita is known as the master of Kamalaśīla. The SDVP is ascribed to Śāntarakṣita. In Tibetan Buddhism, however, that subcommentary is not ascribed to the same Śāntarakṣita who was the author of *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*. See SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) p. 69, and ECKEL (1987) pp. 27-31. And See MATSUMOTO (1978) p. 112 and (1984a) p. 142.) (*** According to Dharmakīrti, when *anupalabdhi* is a *sādhana*, *anupalabdhi* must not be interpreted as the absence of perception, i.e., the nonimplicative negation of perception. This is because, since absence or nonexistence lacks all capacities, absence cannot be a *sādhana*. See fn. 96.)

[152]Cf. MMA D144a1-2: *de rnams kyis dngos po yang dag par cung zad kyang ma dmigs te / ji skad du / byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod du gsungs pa / yang chos thams cad ji lta ba bzhin mthong pa gang zhe na gang 'di mthong pa med pa'o zhes so // 'phags pa chos yang dag par sdud par yang gsungs pa / chos thams cad mthong ba med pa ni mthong ba dam pa'o zhes so //.* "They [i.e., tathāgatas] perceive no real entity at all. In the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, it is said: 'If it is asked what is the perception of all dharmas as they are, [we answer that] it is not seeing anything.' In the *Ārya Dharmasaṅgīti*, it is also said: 'Not seeing any dharmas, this is the supreme seeing.'" Cf. also BSGT 111b6-112a2: *gang yang mngon sum dngos po'i yul can du brjod pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te / tshu rol mthong ba'i mngon sum ni gzugs la sogs pa rdzun pa'i yul can yin pa'i phyir dang / sangs rgyas la sogs pa'i ye shes kyis ni dngos po'i ngo bo yang dag pa 'ga' yang ma gzigs pa'i phyir te / ji skad du chos yang dag par sdud pa'i mdo las / chos thams cad mthong ba med pa ni mthong ba dam pa yin no zhes gsungs pa 'di yin no //.* "Nor is it correct to say that direct perception has real entities as [its] objects. This is because (a) direct perception of people of limited vision has deceptive visible matter and so forth as [its] objects; (b) by means of the wisdom of buddha, etc., no real nature of entities is observed. It is said in the *Dharmasaṅgīti*: 'Not seeing any dharmas, this is the supreme seeing.'"

M. Ichigō's Japanese translations of the sentences in the paragraph 1.2.1.2 are not clear. See ICHIGO ibid. p. 139, 9-10: "仏や偉大なヨーガ行者という菩薩の智慧も実有を対象とするものとはいえない。かれらは、実有なる勝義的な自性をごらんになっているわけでは決してないからである。" And see ibid. p. 139, 20: "それゆえ、直接知の対象は勝義的な実有であるとはいえない。" Ichigō seems to hold that in this paragraph 1.2.1.2, Kamalaśīla would say that although the objects of the direct perception of buddhas and bodhisattvas are not necessarily

1.2.1.3 It is not correct to say that unreal things cannot produce perceptions of themselves

§6. It is also not correct to say: "This is because it is impossible that unreal things somehow produce cognition." We too do not accept that unreal things like rabbits' horns and so forth will produce a perceptual cognition. However, great yogins who correctly meditate on all dharmas as being like mirages and echoes obtain the concentration (*samādhi*) which arises from the ultimate limit of meditation upon the true state of affairs (*bhūtārtha*),[153] and therefore they have inconceivable supreme powers. Thus this type of wisdom (*ye shes de lta bu*), which clearly realizes (*mngon sum du byed pa*) the thusness of all dharmas being selfless, arises in these yogins, so that (*gang gis na; yena*)[154] the yogins understand completely directly (*mngon*

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real entities, their direct perception can arise. In fact, Ichigō says in his article cited above p. 131, 24-25: "the direct perception of ordinary beings and that of buddhas and bodhisattvas do not necessarily have real entities as their objects. Even when the objects [of their direct perceptions] are not real entities, [their] perception can arise." （凡夫、菩薩、仏の直接知の対象は実有のものとは限らない。対象が実存在でなくても知は生じる。） Would Ichigō hold that there can ever be a case where the direct perception of ordinary beings and that of buddhas and bodhisattvas would have real entities as their objects? Kamalaśīla certainly does not accept that.

[153]Cf. NB I 11: *bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānaṃ ceti /.*

[154]In the MĀ we often meet with this type of sentence which has a *gang gis na* clause. E.g., MĀ D134a2, D166a4, D171a7, D175a1, D177b5, D184b6, D187b3, D210a7, D221b4, D226b7, etc. This *gang gis na* corresponds in Sanskrit to *yena* and should be translated into English as "so that... ," "with the result that... ," or "otherwise." In quite a number of instances the construction is used to convey a counterfactual hypothesis and an absurdity: "so that [if it were so,] such and such [absurdity] would be the case"; this type of use of *gang gis na/yena* can be less literally rendered as "otherwise such and such would be the case." See, e.g., Translation 1 paragraph 1.1.3, **§5** and paragraph 1.2.2, **§7** et passim. In Tibetan translations, a *gang gis na/yena* clause is often placed at the beginning of the sentence, even though in Sanskrit it comes at the end. This fact often causes difficulty in understanding the sentences which contain such clauses. E.g., HB p. 25* 9-10: *na hy ayam analaṃ paśyann api kevalam analam eva paśyati, yena salilārthī na pravarteta.* (Tib:) *me mthong yang gang gis na chu don du gnyer ba 'jug par mi 'gyur ba me 'ba' zhig kho na mthong ba na ni ma yin no //.* See also fn. 240. In part because of their misconstrual of *gang gis na*, S. Moriyama's and M. Ichigō's translations of this sentence are not correct. See MORIYAMA ibid. pp. 56-57: "(Thus,) this type of wisdom which can understand the selflessness of all dharmas just by means of direct perception in reliance upon [the inconceivable powers of]

sum kho nar) that all dharmas are selfless. It is precisely this that is termed "nonseeing" (*adarśana*) [in the sūtra],[155] but [the negation in "nonseeing"] does not have the form of a nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*).[156]

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that [concentration], that is, which just clearly realizes the thusness of all dharmas being selfless, arises in these yogins." (それ等のヨーガ行者には、その（三昧による不可思議な力）によって、まさしく直接知覚として一切法無我を理解し得る、つまり、一切法無我の真実を極めて明瞭に直観するそういった知が、生起する。) See also ICHIGO ibid. p. 139, 26-28: "This type of wisdom in which the yogins directly understand the selflessness of all dharmas due to [the inconceivable powers], that is, in which [yogins] just clearly realize the selflessness of all dharmas, arises in these yogins. " (かれらヨーガ行者には、それ（不可思議な能力）によってヨーガ行者たちが眼前に一切法無我を覚知する、すなわち、一切法無我を非常にはっきりと現証する、そのような智恵が生じる。) Both seem to have avoided translating *gang gis na*.

[155]S. Moriyama and M. Ichigō regards *de nyid* as *tattva* in Sanskrit and translate this sentence as follows: "[In the *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra*] it is said: 'the thusness is the nonseeing', but ... . " See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 57, 1-2: "〔法集経に〕「真実とは見ないことである」とあるが、" and ICHIGO p. 140, 1: "「真実とは、見ないことである」云々といわれるが ... ." However, it is contextually clear that *de nyid* refers to the fact that the wisdom which clearly realizes the thusness of all dharmas being selfless arises. Moreover, although Moriyama (and probably Ichigō) also think that *de nyid* is included in the quotation from the *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra*, there is no such word in the actual sūtra quotation.

[156]Almost parallel sentences are found in Abhayākaragupta's MMA D144a2-5: *kho bo cag gis ri bong gi rva la sogs pa dang 'dra ba'i dngos po med pa 'ba' zhig mngon sum gyis shes pa so sor skyed par byed par ni khas mi lan gyi / 'on kyang rnal 'byor pa chen po chos thams cad smig rgyu dang mig yor ltar ji lta ba bzhin sgom par byed pa rnams kyis yang dag pa'i don bsgom pa rab kyi mtha' las byung ba'i ting nge 'dzin thob pa la mthu phul du byung ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa dang ldan pa'i phyir rnal 'byor pa rnams la chos ma lus pa bdag med pa'i de kho na nyid mngon du byed pa shin tu gsal ba'i ye shes rnam pa de lta bu nye bar skye ste / de nyid mthong ba med par brjod gyi med par dgag pa'i ngo bo ma yin no //.* In his *Marmakaumudī*, a commentary on *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, Abhayākaragupta also says: (P231b3-5:) *de yang chos yang dag par sdud par / mthong ba med pa nyid ni chos thams cad kyi mthong ba dam pa'o // zhes gsungs te / ji ltar na chos thams cad la bdag med pa rnal 'byor pa rnams kyi mngon sum ste / de ni dngos po med pa'o zhe na / de lta ma yin te / gzugs brnyan lta bu'i phung po lnga po rnams kyi bdag med pa'i de kho na nyid mngon sum du byed pa'i ye shes skye bar 'gyur te / de nyid la mthong ba med par brjod kyi / med pa dgag pa'i tshul gyis ni ma yin te /.* "This is also said in the *Dharmasaṅgīti*: 'Not seeing any dharmas, this is the supreme seeing.' [Objection:] How would yogins directly perceive the selflessness of all dharmas? The [selflessness] is a nonentity.

[Reply:] No. There arises the wisdom which directly realizes the thusness of the selflessness of the five groups (*skandha*) which are like reflections. Precisely this is termed 'nonseeing' [in the sūtra], but [the negation in 'nonseeing'] does not have the form of a nonimplicative negation."

In Kamalaśīla's texts written from the standpoint of his Mādhyamika philosophy, there is at least one other relevant case where he regards the negation as taking the form of an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*). When he explains the reverse order (*pratiloma*) of *pratītyasamutpāda* in his ŚSṬ, a commentary on the *Śālistambasūtra*, he takes the cessation (*nirodha*), i.e., the negation, in the words "the cessation of ignorance" (*avidyānirodha*) as having the form of an implicative negation, and he interprets this cessation of ignorance as the production of the basis (*āśraya*), i.e., the wisdom, which is contrary to ignorance. ŚSṬ P178b5-8: *ma rig pa la sogs pa 'gag pa yang rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba zhes ji skad du bya // smras pa / 'di ni nyes pa med de / 'dir de med par dgag pa la ni ma rig pa la sogs pa dgag pa'o // zhes brjod par byas pa ma yin gyi / sman bcud kyis len zos pa bzhin du lam goms par byas pa'i stobs kyis gang ma rig pa dang mi mthun pa'i gnas 'byung ba gang rig pa skyed pa de ni 'dir ma rig pa 'gag pa zhes te / 'dir ram 'dis ma yin par gyur pa brjod par 'dod pa ma rig pa la sogs pa dgag pa'i phyir ro // de bas na gong nas gong du 'du byed la sogs pa dang mi mthun pa'i gnas 'byung ba nyid 'dir 'du byed la sogs pa 'gag par blta'o //.* (The text has been edited by the present writer using the variants in SCHOENING (1995) pp. 464-465.) "[Why] is it said that the cessation of ignorance and so forth are also *pratītyasamutpāda*? [Reply:] This is faultless. Here [in the sūtra] it is not asserted that ignorance and so forth are eliminated in the sense of the nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) of this [ignorance, etc]. Just as when one pursues a treatment by means of a medicinal elixir, [so too] when, through meditation on the path, there comes to be a basis (*āśraya*) in opposition to ignorance, [or in other words] when wisdom (*vidyā*) arises, this [condition] is termed the 'cessation of ignorance' (*avidyānirodha*), for the ignorance and so forth, which we intend to convey as not being [wisdom], cease on [the basis of] the [wisdom] or due to this [wisdom]. Therefore, it is precisely [these] successive productions of the bases contrary to conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*), etc. which should be seen here as being the cessations of conditioning factors, etc." In his『大乘稻芊經隨聽疏』, a Chinese subcommentary on ŚSṬ, Chos grub （法成）says: (Taisho 85 p. 548b, 16-20:) 問。何故無明滅等名縁生法耶。答。遮有二種。一遮無。二遮非。此遮非故。譬如有人眼其仙藥。此亦如是。以修道力不與無明等相應而得轉依漸令増勝故。無明滅等亦名縁生。"[Objection:] Why would the cessation of ignorance, etc. be designated as things produced in dependence upon conditions (*pratītyasamutpanna*, 縁生)? [Reply:] With reference to negations, there are two kinds. One is nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*, 遮無). The other is implicative negation (*paryudāsa*, 遮非). In this case, it is because of the implicative negation [involved in the cessation of ignorance]. For example, just as some person looks at(?)* his medicinal elixir, so here too, will it be like that. By the force of meditation, [yogin's basis] will be con-

1.2.2 Although perception itself is also ultimately without intrinsic nature, yogins' perception and so forth are conventionally established

§7. When it is said: "If that perception [itself] were also to have an intrinsic nature ... and so forth," then here too [it should be replied that] all dharmas being ultimately unproduced, the perception [of them] as being of the same flavor (*ekarasa*)[157] would also be ultimately without intrinsic nature. Nonetheless, all the presentations of perception and so forth, which rely upon conventional truth, would remain completely undisturbed.[158] Al-

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trary to ignorance, etc. and he will be able to develop step by step the fundamental changes in the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*, 轉依). Hence the cessation of ignorance and the like are also said to be produced in dependence upon conditions." (* The text has the verb "眼" which means to look or watch. In this case, however, the example: "just as some person looks at his medicinal elixir" makes no sense. Judging from the context, the text should have a verb which means to take or eat.) The second half of Chos grub's subcommentary is very close to the BK III p. 2, 11-13: *tato bhāvanāmārgeṇa pa(riśiṣṭāsu(sic!) bhūmiṣv oṣadhi)rasāyanopayogād iva krameṇa viśuddhataratamakṣaṇodayād, āśrayaparāvṛttau satyām, ...* .

[157]S. Moriyama does not correctly translate the term *ro gcig*. His translation is as follows: "In just the same way that all dharmas are ultimately unproduced, so too direct perception would also be ultimately without intrinsic nature ... ." (一切法 (*sarvadharma*) は、勝義として、不生 (*anutpanna*) である、ということと、全く同じく直接知覚も、勝義としては (*paramārthatas*)、無自性 (*niḥsvabhāva*) なのであるが ... .) See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 57, 6-9. *ro gcig* corresponds in Sanskrit to *ekarasa* and means to be of one flavor, i.e., being essentially the same.

[158]Rejecting the objection that it is not correct that the direct perception which understands the absence of intrinsic nature would have an intrinsic nature, Kamalaśīla here explains that although that direct perception itself is also ultimately without intrinsic nature, nonetheless it is established conventionally. See BSGT 112a2-4: *mngon sum nyid kyang ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir zhes pa'i skyon 'di yang med de / gang gi phyir 'di lta bu'i mngon sum ni tha snyad du yang dag pa'i ting nge 'dzin las skye ba dang / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par rtogs pa la sogs pa dang / don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa yin pa'i phyir ro // de bas na bden pa gnyis kyi thabs la mkhas pa dang bcas pa'i rnam par gzhag pa 'di la klan ka'i gnod pa 'ga' yang med do //.* "There is not the following fault either: "Because direct perception itself is also without intrinsic nature ... ." This is because, conventionally, this type of direct perception arises from correct meditative absorption, understands the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas and so forth and is ultimately without intrinsic nature. Therefore, there can be no criticism whatsoever of this skillful presentation of the two truths." Cf. ICHIGO ibid. p. 140, 5-6: "However, all the determinations [by means of] direct perception and so forth, which rely upon con-

though all dharmas are ultimately without intrinsic nature, the Mādhyamikas do not conventionally deny the causes which establish yogins' cognitions, other ordinary beings' cognitions or [that of] Noble Ones and so forth;[159] otherwise all conventions would be eliminated.[160] Rather, [they recognize that] what never has a cause at all even conventionally would never arise, not even conventionally, just like [nonexistent things] such as rabbits' horns and the like. Whatever has [a cause] will arise even though it is ultimately without intrinsic nature, just like illusions, reflections and so forth.[161] Although these illusions and so forth are produced depending on conditions, it does not follow that they are real entities, for that would be invalidated (*bādhita*) by what is commonly acknowledged (*prasiddha*) and by valid cognitions.[162] Equally, although all [conventionally existent] dharmas are

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ventional truth, do not cause confusion." (しかし、世俗諦にもとづく直接知等(による)あらゆる確定は混乱をひきおこすことはない。) Cf. MORIYAMA ibid. p. 57, 9-11.

[159]Cf. BK I p. 218, 16-18: *na hi sarvadharmāṇāṃ paramārthato niḥsvabhāvatve 'pi saṃvṛtyā yogijñānam anyad vā pṛthagjñānaṃ neṣṭam /.*

[160]This is also a sentence which has a *gang gis na/yena* clause. For the use of *gang gis na/yena*, see fn. 154 and fn. 240. We should not regard this *gang gis na* as an interrogative, although S. Moriyama and M. Ichigō do take it in that way. See. MORIYAMA ibid. p. 57, 13: "Why would [the Mādhyamikas] destroy all conventions?" (どうして、あらゆる世間的約束事 (*vyavahāra*) を断ち切ろうか。) See ICHIGO ibid. p. 140, 7: "なにゆえ、一切の言語慣習を断ずることがあろうか。" (Ichigō's translation is almost the same as that of Moriyama.)

[161]Almost parallel sentences can be found in the MMA D144a6-b1: *gal te yang chos thams cad don dam par skye ba med pa ro gcig pa nyid kyis mngon sum yang don dam par rang bzhin med mod / de lta mod kyi kun rdzob kyi bden pa la brten pa mngon sum la sogs pa rnam par gzhag pa thams cad mi 'khrug go // tha snyad du rnal 'byor pa'i shes pa'am gzhan so so'i skye bo'i shes pa ni 'phags pa'i gang zag la sogs pa rnam par gzhag pa'i rgyur mi 'dod pa ma yin gyi / 'on kyang gang thams cad kyi tshe kun rdzob tu yang rgyu med pa de kho na tha snyad du yang mi skye ba kho na ste ri bong gi rva la sogs pa'o // gang yod pa de ni skye ste sgyu ma dang gzugs brnyan la sogs pa'o //.* Cf. *Marmakaumudī* P231b7-8: *gang yang chos rnams thams cad don dam par skye ba med pa dang ro gcig pa nyid du mngon sum pas don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang kun rdzob tu mngon sum la sogs par rnam par gzhag ste /.*

[162]See BK I pp. 218, 22-219 2: *kiṃ tu yasya saṃvṛtyāpi kāraṇaṃ nāsti sa saṃvṛtyāpi notpadyate / yathā śaśaviṣāṇādi / yasya tu vidyate sa paramārthato 'līko 'pi samutpadyata eva / yathā māyāpratibimbādi / na ca māyādeḥ saṃvṛtyā pratītyasamutpāde paramārthato vastutvaprasaṅgaḥ / tasya vicārākṣamatvāt /.* Cf. APDṬ P166a5-7: *gang kun rdzob tu yang rgyu med pa de ni thams cad mi skye ste /*

produced depending on conditions, it does not follow that they are real entities, as that would be invalidated by valid cognitions.

§8. In this vein, just as various illusions like elephants and so forth are produced by spells, drugs and the like, so too will birth and so forth be produced by the force of sentient beings' karma and passions (*kleśa*); and the illusions which are the yogins' cognitions and so forth will also be produced on account of the yogins' own assemblages of merit and wisdom,[163] for these illusions also appear differently due to various conditions.[164] In the *Ārya Prajñāpāramitā* it is said:

> "Some will be magically created by śrāvakas, some will be magically created by bodhisattvas, some will be magically created by tathāgatas, some will be magically created by passions, and some will be magically created by karma. Oh Subhūti! In this manner all dharmas will be like a magically created being."[165]

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kun rdzob tu yang ri bong gi rwa la sogs pa ji lta ba bzhin no // gang yod pa de ni don dam par brdzun yang skye par 'gyur te / sgyu ma dang gzugs brnyan la sogs pa bzhin no // rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba de yang don dam par mi rigs te / sgyu ma la sogs pa yang don dam par 'gyur ba'i skyon du 'gyur ba'i phyir ro //.

[163] A parallel passage is found in the MMA D144b1-3: *de la ji ltar sngags dang sman la sogs pa tshogs pa'i dbang gis glangs po la sogs pa sna thogs pa'i sgyu ma rab tu 'jug pa de bzhin du / sems can rnams kyi nyon mongs pa dang las kyi dbang gis skye ba la sogs pa'i sgyu ma dang / rnal 'byor pa rnams kyi yang rang gi bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs kyi dbang gis rnal 'byor pa'i ye shes la sogs pa'i sgyu ma rab tu 'jug pa kho na'o //.* See also BK I p. 219, 3-5: *tatra yathā kleśakarmamāyāvaśāt sattvānāṃ janmamāyā pravartate, tathā yogināṃ api puṇyajñānasaṃbhāramāyāvaśāt yogijñānamāyā pravartata eva //.*

[164] Cf. *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX 12ab: *sāpi nānāvidhā māyā nānāpratyayasaṃbhavā /.*

[165] *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* Parivarta 82 pp. 135, 22-136, 2: (*Bhagavān āha:*) *yat punaḥ Subhūte sarvadharmā nirmitā, tatra kaścic chrāvaka nirmitaḥ kaścit pratyekabuddha nirmitaḥ kaścid bodhisattva nirmitaḥ kaścit tathāgata nirmitaḥ kaścit kleśa nirmitaḥ kaścit karma nirmitaḥ, anena Subhūte paryāyeṇa sarvadharmā nirmitopamā.*

『摩訶般若波羅蜜經』Taisho 8 p. 415c, 24-28: 一切法皆是化。於是法中有聲聞法變化。有辟支佛法變化。有菩薩摩訶薩法變化。有諸佛法變化。有煩惱法變化。有業因緣法變化。以是因緣故。須菩提。一切法皆是變化。

BK I p. 219, 6-10: *kaścit śrāvakanirmitaḥ / kaścit pratyekabuddhanirmitaḥ / kaścid bodhisattvanirmitaḥ / kaścit tathāgatanirmitaḥ / kaścit kleśanirmitaḥ / kaścit karmanirmitaḥ / anena, subhūte, paryāyeṇa sarvadhārmā(sic!) nirmitotpannaḥ /.*

§9. There is the following difference between ordinary beings and yogins: The latter, like magicians, completely understand these illusions as they are, and therefore they do not have attachment [to them as existing] in reality.[166] Thus it is also said in the *Ārya Dharmasaṅgīti*:

> "Just as a magician strives to free a magically created being and does not have any attachment to [this] magically created being since its [illusory nature] has already been understood [by him], in the same manner, people who have skillfully attained enlightenment, after having understood that the triple world is like a magical creation, will clad themselves in armor for the sake of living beings, since the [illusory nature of] living beings has already been understood."[167]

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[166]Cf. BK I p. 219, 10-13: *ayaṃ tu viśeṣo yogināṃ pṛthagjanebhyaḥ / te hi māyākāravat tāṃ māyāṃ yathāvat parijñānāt satyato nābhiniviśante / tena te yogina ucyante /.* Cf. AAA p. 641, 13-16: *viśeṣas tu ayaṃ yogināṃ pṛthagjanebhyaḥ : te hi māyākārā iva māyāyāṃ yathāvat prasiddhamātrāsatyatāparijñānān na bhāvān satyato 'bhiniviśante, tena te yogina ity ucyante.*

[167]*Chos yang dag par sdud pa* P47a5-6: *dper na sgyu ma khan po zhig // sprul pa thar par bya phyir brtson // des ni snga nas de shes pas // sprul pa de la chags pa med // srid gsum sprul pa 'dra bar ni // rdzogs pa'i byang chub mkhas pas shes // 'gro ba'i ched du go dgos te // 'gro ba de ltar snga nas shes //.*
『仏説法集經』 Taisho 17 p. 627b, 19-22: 如世間幻師 發心度幻人 彼幻不著幻 以未曾有故 知三界如幻 發大菩提心 爲度諸衆生 實知彼衆生
BK I p. 219, 16-19: *māyākāro yathā kaścin nirmitaṃ mokṣaṃ udyataḥ / na cāsya nirmite saṅgo jñātapūrvo yato 'sya saḥ // tribhavaṃ nirmitaprakhyaṃ jñātvā saṃbodhipāragaḥ / saṃnahyate jagad dhetor jñātapūrvaṃ jagat tathā //.*
BK II D54a2-3: *dper na sgyu ma'i mkhan po zhig // sprul pa thar bar bya phyir brtson // des ni snga nas de shes pas // sprul pa de la chags pa med // srid gsum sprul pa 'dra bar ni // rdzogs pa'i byang chub mkhas pas shes // 'gro ba'i ched du go bgos te // 'gro ba de ltar snga nas shes //.*
BK III p. 29, 13-16: *māyākāro yathā kaścin nirmitaṃ moktum udyataḥ / na cāsya nirmite saṅgo jñātapūrvo yato [sya saḥ] // (tri)bhavaṃ nirmitaprakhyaṃ jñātvā saṃbodhipāragāḥ / sannahyanti jagaddhetor jñātapūrve jage tathā /.*

Since the MĀ's quotation of these verses in the *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra* corresponds largely to the quotation in the BK III, we have translated them in reliance upon the Sanskrit verses quoted in the BK III. These verses are also quoted in the MĀ D223a1-2, but again do not strictly correspond to the Sanskrit in the BK III: *dper na sgyu ma'i mkhan po 'ga' // sgyu ma thar bar bya phyir brtson // gang phyir dpe 'di sngon shes pas // sgyu ma la ni 'di mi chags // de bzhin srid gsum sgyu ma ltar // rdzogs pa'i byang chub mkhas pas mkhyen // 'gro ba'i don du go bgos te // 'gro ba*

Like spectators [to magician's creations], the infantile, who are attached to illusions of production and so forth being real as they appear, grasp [these illusions] erroneously, and thus it is for this reason that [these people] are termed "infantile."[168]

§10. In conclusion, in the case of yogins, their yogic perception does exist conventionally, and hence it is not something utterly nonexistent, contrary to rabbits' horns and other such [completely nonexistent things]. Therefore the contradiction [alleged by the *pūrvapakṣa*] does not ensue,[169] as there do [conventionally] exist realizations, through direct perception, that dharmas are without exception selfless. And although the yogins [themselves] are also ultimately without intrinsic nature, [they] are established simply from the perspective of convention, just like ordinary beings and so forth. In the *Ārya Satyadvayanirdeśa* it is said:

"Although ultimately [yogins] do not exist at all, convention-

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snga nas mkhyen pa yin //.

[168] See MMA D144b4: *gang skye ba la sogs pa'i rgyu ma de la byis pa'i skye bo rtog pa can lta bur ji ltar mthong ba bzhin bden par mngon par zhen pa de rnams phyin ci log tu mngon par zhen pa'i phyir byis pa rnams su brjod do //.*

[169] S. Moriyama interprets *'gal ba med do* as meaning that the Mādhyamika thesis that all dharmas are without real intrinsic nature is not contradicted by direct perception, i.e., the Mādhyamikas do not have the fault that their thesis would be invalidated by direct perception (*pratyakṣabādhā*). See MORIYAMA (1990a) p. 60, 4: "There is no contradiction [between the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas and direct perception]." （［一切法無自性と直接知覚には］ 対立はない (*aviruddha*)。） Moriyama explains that because yogins can understand the absence of intrinsic nature by means of direct perception, the Mādhyamika thesis of *niḥsvabhāvatā* is not invalidated by direct perception. See MORIYAMA ibid. pp. 47-49. However, Moriyama's interpretation of MĀ is difficult to defend. First, Kamalaśīla does not argue here about such a fault of the thesis (*pakṣadoṣa*), i.e., an invalidation of the Mādhyamika thesis by means of *ordinary* beings' direct perception. Kamalaśīla here, rejecting the *pūrvapakṣa*, explains that although yogins' perception is also ultimately without intrinsic nature, it is conventionally established, and therefore it is not contradictory that *yogins'* direct perception, which is without intrinsic nature, understands the absence of real intrinsic nature. Second, Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's idea that yogins' perception can directly understand the absence of real intrinsic nature would not serve as the reason for avoiding a fault of *pratyakṣabādhā*. The reason for avoiding this fault would be that the ultimate states of entities, i.e., voidness, *is not* an object of the direct perception of ordinary beings.

ally [they] practice the Way."[170]

1.2.3 The Mādhyamikas accept the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas due to the voidness concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*), not due to the voidness of one thing by another (*itaretaraśūnyatā*)

§11. Nor is it correct to say: "Once one has perceptually apprehended a certain place as being free of another object, then something [i.e., the place] void of that which is other than it will be understood by direct perception ... and so forth." This interpretation [of voidness] is the voidness of one thing by another (*itaretaraśūnyatā*), and not the voidness concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*). It is due to the voidness concerning characters that we accept that all dharmas are ultimately without intrinsic nature,[171] because ultimately their particular and universal characters (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*), as they are established, are void. In the case of entities, the voidness of one thing by another is not ultimate, but rather depends on conventional truth. That is, although all entities are not different [from each other] on account of [their] being of the same flavor[172] in being ultimately unproduced, [they] appear mutually different to the infantile, just as [they appear] in dreams states and so on. Therefore, in this case, this voidness of one thing by another is established for them [i.e., the infantile] as a commonly acknowledged nature in that they grasp one entity as being free of another, but it is not ultimately established. In actual fact dreamt and illusory entities do not admit among themselves any distinct natures. Therefore, the Illustrious One (*bhagavat*)

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[170]We have translated this sentence on the basis of the Sanskrit quoted in the BK I p. 218, 19-20: *paramārthato 'tyantābhāvaś ca saṃvṛtyā ca mārgaṃ bhāvayati.* Cf. APDṬ P166a4-5 (D:139a1): *de don dam par shin tu med kyang gang kun rdzob tu lam bsgom mo //.*

[171]On the voidness concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*), see fn. 113. In the MĀ D177a2-3, Kamalaśīla states that by means of nonperception (*anupalabdhi*) the Mādhyamikas prove the *lakṣaṇaśūnyatā* of all dharmas, but not *itaretaraśūnyatā*. See Chapter 3 pp. 73-75 and Translation 3 p. 159.

[172]S. Moriyama translates *ro gcig pa'i phyir* as "due to being one" （一なるものであるから）. See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 60, 23. His translation of the term *ro gcig* is not, strictly speaking, correct. *ro gcig* corresponds in Sanskrit to *ekarasa* and means to be of one flavor. See fn. 157.

has said that this [voidness of one thing by another] should definitely be abandoned since it is the worst of all, not being founded on ultimate reality. In the *Ārya Laṅkāvatāra* it is said:

> "Oh Mahāmati! You should abandon this voidness of one thing by another since it is the worst of all."[173]

§12. The voidness concerning characters of all dharmas is established as [that which is] understood through the arising of the wisdom to which no dharma appears. [This is so] because [dharmas'] particular and universal characters, as they are established, would be perceptible (*upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāpta*) [if they truly existed], but yogins do not perceive any [such] ultimate aspects.[174] Therefore, the voidness of one thing by another, which is the worst of all, was explained with reference to what is thoroughly imagined by infantile people, but does not have any connection at all [with ultimate truth].

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[173]LAS p. 75, 18-19: *eṣā ca mahāmate itaretaraśūnyatā sarvajaghanyā sā ca tvayā parivarjayitavyā //.* 『大乗入楞伽經』 Taisho 16 p. 599a, 14-15: 大慧。此彼彼空空中最麁。汝應遠離。The term *sarva* (thams cad, 空中) refers to the seven kinds of *śūnyatās*. See fn. 113.

[174]S. Moriyama's translation of this part of MĀ is as follows: "The voidness concerning characters of all dharmas is understood through the arising of the wisdom to which no dharma appears. Even though [dharmas'] particular and universal characters, as they are established, would be perceptible, yogins do not perceive any [such] ultimate aspects, and therefore [yogins] determine the cognition [of that voidness(?)]* due to the arising of the wisdom to which no dharma appears." (* The words in the square brackets were inserted by the present writer.) (一切法の相空性とは、一切法の無顕現な (*nirābhāsa*) 知 (*jñāna*) を生起することによって知られる。なぜなら、それら（一切法）の個別と一般相 (*sva-, sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) が、確定されたままに、知覚の条件を得ていても (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya*) 、諸のヨーギンは、勝義の形象 (*ākāra*) を知覚しないから (*anupalabdher*)、一切法の無顕現な知を生起することによって、知識を確定するのである。) See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 61, 11-16. How should we understand the last sentence of his translation, viz., "[yogins] determine the cognition [of that voidness(?)] due to the arising of the wisdom to which no dharma appears." （一切法の無顕現な知を生起することによって、知識を確定するのである。） It seems that Moriyama has translated the same sentence (*chos thams cad snang ba med pa'i ye shes skye ba'i sgo nas rtogs par rnam par gzhag go //*) two times, but with different meanings, first at the beginning of his translation and again at the end.

1.2.4 Yogic perception of the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas can be rationally justified

§13. [175]Nor is it correct to say: "Scholars are also not satisfied with the statement[176] that the [absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas] can only be understood by means of yogic perception, because this [assertion] is irrational." In fact this [statement] is rational. The point is like this. Scholars define direct perception as follows:

> Direct perception is free of conceptualization and is not mistaken.[177]

§14. Now, clear cognitions arise by the force of habituation (*abhyāsa*) even when the object is nonexistent. It is just as, for example, on account of the repeated, strong habituation of [men] conquered by [passions] such as desire, sorrow, fear and intoxication, there arise cognitions to which [illusory] women and the like appear,[178] and because of these [hallucinated women], the [men] begin to move their bodies in various ways after seeing these ["women"] just as if they were [actually] there in front [of them]. Therefore, it is possible to say that for someone who meditates upon thusness as explained above, a clear cognition of that [i.e., thusness] will also arise. The cognition to which there are clear appearances is definitely free

[175]According to Ichigō's synopsis of the *uttarapakṣa* of the present section, Kamalaśīla, in the preceding paragraphs (1.2.1-1.2.3), has replied to the objection that the perception of ordinary beings cannot understand the absence of intrinsic nature; starting here (i.e., the paragraph 1.2.4), Kamalaśīla replies to another objection that the perception of the yogin could not understand the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas. See ICHIGO (1992) p. 204, 23-24, and (1997) p. 133 and p. 142. In our opinion, Kamalaśīla has already replied to the objection that the perception of yogins could not understand the absence of intrinsic nature. In paragraph 1.2.4 here, Kamalaśīla only proves that the yogic perception which has the selflessness of all dharmas as its object can be established as a valid cognition. See fn. 148.

[176]MĀ *pūrvapakṣa*: *zhes bya ba yang*, *uttarapakṣa*: *zhes bya ba'i tshig kyang*.

[177]NB I 4, PVin I k. 4a, TS k. 1214ab, etc.: *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam /*.

[178]Cf. PV III k. 282: *kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ / abhūtān api paśyanti purato 'vasthitān iva //*. Cf. also TSPa p. 403, 24-25: *abhūtam api bhāvayatāṃ kāmaśokabhayādyupaplutacetasāmanapekṣitasādharmyādismṛter abhyāsasya sphuṭapratibhāsasya jñānotpādanasāmarthyam upalabhyata eva /*.

of conceptualization,[179] for it is not possible that a body['s appearance][180] agitated by the winds of conceptualization, just as in the case of a lamp, would be a clear image.[181]

§15. The proof-statements (*prayoga*)[182] are as follows:

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[179]S. Moriyama translates this sentence of the MĀ as follows: "The cognition which very clearly appears is not permanent." （非常に明瞭に顕現する知は、常住ではない。）See MORIYAMA (1990a) p. 62. This translation is not correct, because *rtog pa med pa* corresponds in Sanskrit to *avikalpa* or *nirvikalpa* and because according to Dharmakīrti, clear appearance to yogins' minds serves as a reason for their yogic cognition's being free of conceptualization, but not as a reason for its not being permanent. PV III k. 283ab: *na vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsitā /.* See TOSAKI (1979) pp. 376-379. Moriyama seems to have read *rtag pa med pa* where he should have read *rtog pa med pa.*

[180]It is not possible that a clear image would appear to the cognition agitated by the winds of conceptualization and that the appearance of its object would be a clear image, since that appearance is also agitated by those winds. What is agitated by those winds is a cognition and the appearance of its object, but not the object itself. Therefore here the word "body" (*lus*) should be regarded as meaning a body's appearance. The appearance, like that projected by a flickering lamp, cannot be a clear image due to the winds of conceptualization.

[181]Almost parallel sentences are found in the MMA D144b5-145a1: *goms pa'i stobs las yang dag pa ma yin pa'i don la yang shes pa shin tu gsal ba kho nar skye ste / dper na 'dod pa dang mya ngan dang 'jigs pa dang smyos pa la sogs pa rnams kyis nye bar bslad pa rnams la shin tu goms pa mang du byas pa las bud med la sogs pa so sor snang ba'i shes pa shin tu gsal ba skye ste / gang gi phyir de rnams kyis de rnams mdun na yod pa ltar mthong nas lus la sogs pa'i bya ba bab chol rnam pa du ma rtsom pa lta bu'o // de'i phyir ji skad bshad pa de kho na nyid sgom par byed pa kha cig kyang de la shes pa shin tu gsal ba skye ba nyid do zhes pa srid do // gang gsal bar snang ba'i shes pa de yang rtog pa med pa kho na ste / rtog pas 'khrugs pa la gsal ba'i rnam pa nyid du skye ba med pa'i phyir ro [zhes tshad ma rnam 'grel la sogs par rgyas par byas so] //.*

[182]A proof-statement (*prayoga/prayogavākya*) is a collection of statements which show a reason having three characteristics (*rūpa*) necessary to establish a proposition in question. In the Buddhist logic, this collection of the statements of a triply characterized reason (*trirūpahetu; trirūpaliṅga*) is regarded as an inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*). However, since inference (*anumāna*) must be a cognition (*jñāna*) and is not a collection of statements, *parārthānumāna* is not a real inference in the strict sense of the term *anumāna*: it is because *parārthānumāna*, i.e., a collection of the statements of a triply characterized reason, leads to a real inference that it is also regarded as an inference — Buddhist logicians have applied the term for the effect to the cause. See NB III 1: *trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṃ parārtham anumānam //*, NB III 2: *kāraṇe kāryopacārāt //.* See also TILLEMANS

[Vyāpti:] The things upon which someone has constantly meditated with great devotion will be experienced by them (*de dag las*)[183]

(2000) p. xv. In Dharmakīrti's later works and post-Dharmakīrtian logic, a *parārthānumāna* should always consist of two statements. The first statement is that of *vyāpti*, i.e., the pervasion or implication. This statement shows that the reason implies the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*). On the other hand, the second statement is that of *pakṣadharmatva*, the fact that the reason is a quality of the subject (*pakṣa*) of the proposition. The thesis-statement (*pakṣavacana*) and the conclusion are not regarded as members of a *parārthānumāna*, as they are known by implication from the above-explained two statements. According to the VN, Dharmakīrti's last work, the thesis-statement is not a means of proof (*sādhana*) for a proposition in question, and its presence in a proof-statement is a "point of defeat" (*nigrahasthāna*) in that it states something useless. See VN p. 17, 9-11: *atha vā tasyaiva sādhanasya yan nāṅgaṃ pratijñopanayanigamanādi, tasyāsādhanāṅgasya sādhanavākye upādānaṃ vādino nigrahasthānam, vyarthābhidhānāt.* Therefore, according to the VN, the thesis-statement should always be absent from a well-formed *parārthānumāna*. This can be regarded as Dharmakīrti's final position on the thesis-statement in a *parārthānumāna*. Note that in Śaṅkarasvāmin's NP and Dignāga's NM and earlier works, the thesis-statement was obligatory in a *parārthānumāna* and had the status of a *sādhana*. See NP p. 140, 23: *tatra pakṣādivacanāni sādhanam /.* See NM in KATSURA (1977) p. 109, 14: 宗等多言説能立. "The statements of the thesis, [the reason and the example (*dṛṣṭānta*)] are called *sādhana*." And see ibid. p. 111, 1-2: 由此應知隨有所闕名能立過. "Thus one should understand that lack [of any of these statements] is called a fault of the *sādhana*." Cf. TILLEMANS (1991b) p. 141, fn. 14. As for the the history of the gradual disappearance of the thesis-statement from *parārthānumāna*, see TILLEMANS (1984a), (1991b) and (2000) pp. xv-xvii and INAMI (1991). In his Mādhyamika texts and TSP, Kamalaśīla normally uses the two-membered proof-statement, without the thesis-statement. In some cases, however, he uses the earlier three-membered version which consists of statements of the thesis, the reason and the example. See MĀ D212b7-213a1, SDNS D277a7-277b1. It is not clear whether Kamalaśīla exactly followed Dharmakīrti's final position on the thesis-statement as was explained above.

[183]The meaning of *de dag las* is not clear. We here regard *de dag las* as *de dag gis* (by them), i.e, by the persons who have constantly meditated upon something. Although Moriyama simply translates *de dag las* as "from them" (それらから), he does not explain what the word "them" refers to. See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 62, 18-19. On the other hand, M. Ichigō regards *de dag las* as meaning the objects of meditation. See ICHIGO (1997) pp. 142, 27-143, 1: "Those who constantly meditate very devoutly upon any [objects] will just clearly experience a cognition which is the effect arisen from the ultimate limit of meditation upon those [objects]." (なんであれ、つねに非常に敬虔に修習する人は、それらを修習する頂点から生じ

in a clear cognition which is the effect arising from the ultimate limit resulting from meditation.

It is just like, for example, the meditation upon a woman and so forth by the persons who are conquered by desire and so forth.

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, certain people have constantly devoted themselves over a long period of time, meditating upon all dharmas as being selfless.

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, dharmas' being selfless will be experienced by these people in a clear cognition.][184]

The above is [the statement of] a reason which is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*).[185]

There is also the following [proof-statement]:

[Vyāpti:] That which has as [its] objects things endowed with [corresponding] valid cognitions is non-belying (*avisaṃvāda*).

It is just like, for example, the cognition of fire and so forth which conventionally arises from one's determining a logical reason like smoke.

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, yogins' cognitions of selflessness also have as [their] objects things endowed with [corresponding] valid cognitions.

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, yogins' cognitions of selflessness are non-belying.]

The above is in fact [the statement of] a reason which is an essential prop-

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た果である知を非常にはっきりと知覚する。) Ichigō's translation is also problematic. That is, due to the word *kha cig gis* "by someone" the word *de ni* just preceding the word *de dag las* must mean the objects of meditation, rather than the person who meditates, as Ichigō has it. Therefore, it is probably not right to take *de dag las* as meaning the objects of meditation. In fact, Ichigō does not translate the word *kha cig gis*.

[184]In Dharmakīrti's later works and post-Dharmakīrtian logic, the thesis-statement and the conclusion are not regarded as members of a *parārthānumāna*, as they are known by implication from the statements of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatva*. (On proof-statement (*prayoga*) and inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*), see fn. 182.) However, it is not easy to immediately understand an implicit conclusion of a *parārthānumāna*, and therefore, we have stated the implicit conclusions in square brackets simply for convenience in understanding.

[185]Cf. *Sarvajñasiddhi* of Ratnakīrti p. 1, 20-24: *yo yaḥ sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsasahitacetoguṇaḥ sa sarvaḥ sphuṭībhāvayogyaḥ / yathā yuvatyākāraḥ kāminaḥ puruṣasya / yathoktābhyāsasahitacetoguṇāś cāmī caturāryasatyaviṣayā ākārā iti svabhāvo hetuḥ /.*

erty. The fact that this [selflessness] is endowed with a [corresponding] valid cognition will be demonstrated below.[186]

[Vyāpti:] When a cognition has a clear appearance of something and arises as non-belying, this [cognition] of that [thing] is a valid cognition consisting in a direct perception.
It is just like, for example, conventionally the visual cognition (*cakṣurvijñāna*) and the other [kinds of cognitions] of visible matter (*rūpa*) and so forth by people with undamaged eyes and so forth.

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, yogins' cognitions taking the selflessness of all dharmas as [their] objects are clear and non-belying.

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, they are valid cognitions consisting in direct perception.][187]

The above is [the statement of] a reason which is an essential property.

§16. Thus, shouldn't scholars be satisfied when yogins' cognitions of the selflessness of all dharmas are proved by means of reasoning?

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[186]Kamalaśīla refers to D190a2-222b1 where he proves the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas by means of five reasons: *vajrakaṇahetu*, **sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu*, *catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedhahetu*, *pratītyasamutpādahetu* and *ekānekaviyogahetu*. See fn. 32. Since yogins' perceptions of the selflessness of all dharmas have as their objects things established by inferences, those perception are non-belying.

M. Ichigō understands that here Kamalaśīla says that in the proof-statement formulated just below, i.e., the proof-statement which proves that yogins' cognitions of selflessness are valid cognitions consisting in a direct perception, he will explain the fact that yogins' perceptions of selflessness have a *pramāṇa*, i.e., validity(?). See ICHIGO ibid. p. 143, 15-16: "これ（ヨーガ行者の直接知）がプラマーナを有することは、次に（推論式を構成して）語られるべきである。" S. Moriyama seems to have the same understanding as Ichigō. See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 63, 12-13: "これ（ヨーギン達の無我の知）が、プラマーナを具えていることが、次に論じられる。" Ichigō's and Moriyama's understanding here is not quite accurate. This is because when *tshad ma dang ldan pa'i don gyi yul can* means the cognitions which have as their objects things endowed with valid cognitions, *tshad ma dang ldan pa nyid* should mean being an object endowed with a valid cognition, rather than being a cognition having validity.

[187]Cf. TSPa pp. 896, 24-897, 4: *etac ca śūnyādijñānaṃ pratyakṣapramāṇaṃ sādhayann āha pratyakṣam ityādi / ... sphuṭapratibhāsitvenāvikalpatayā pramāṇaprasiddhārthaviṣayatvenāvisaṃvāditayā cakṣurādijñānavad pratyakṣapramāṇam etat /.*

1.2.4.1 It is not correct to say that if yogic perception itself were also nonexistent, it would not be a valid cognition

§17. When it is said: "If that yogic cognition [itself] were also nonexistent ... and so forth," then we have already replied earlier to that [objection] too.[188] We do not accept that all entities are utterly nonexistent (*atyantābhāva*) just like rabbits' horns; nevertheless, they are not ultimately existent, like illusions. Therefore, we never deny the conventional at all. This is just as we have explained, i.e., we do not in the slightest refuse conventions, but rather affirm them.

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[188]MĀ D169a1-5.

2. The Proof of the Absence of Intrinsic Nature in Reality by means of Inference

2.1 OBJECTIONS (*pūrvapakṣa*)

§1. Nor can you prove the voidness of all entities by means of inference (*anumāna*).

2.1.1 The reasons (*hetu*) would have the fallacy of being unestablished (*asiddha*)

§2. All reasons (*hetu*) would have [the fallacy that the] locus (*āśraya*) and [reason] itself would be completely unestablished (*asiddha*), because for you there would be no property-possessor (*dharmin*) which would be the locus and because reasons, examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) and so forth would not be produced either. So how could the [voidness of all entities] be proved by these [reasons]? [189]

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[189] See BSGT 112a4-5: *rjes su dpag pa yang dngos po ma lus pa dang* stong pa nyid du bsgrub pa la 'jug par mi 'gyur te / de'i gzhi dpe dang chos can dang gtan tshigs kyi rang gi ngo bo la sogs pa ma grub pa'i phyir te / de yang ma skyes pa'i phyir ro // ci ste de dag grub na ni chos thams cad ngo bo nyid ma grub pa zhes dam bcas pa dang 'gal ba kho nar 'gyur ro ...* . "Inference also cannot operate with regard to either the proof of all entities or [the proof of] voidness. This is because the basis of its example, [its] property-possessor and [its] reason itself, etc. would be unestablished because they [i.e., the reason, etc.] would not be produced either. But if they were to be established, it would just be contradictory with [your own] thesis that the natures of all dharmas are not established." See MIMAKI (1982a) p. 247. (* It may well be better to delete the term *dang* and translate as follows: "Inference also cannot operate with regard to the proof that all entities are void.")

2.2 REPLIES (*uttarapakṣa*)

2.2.1 The reasons do not have the fallacy of being unestablished

§1. It is also irrelevant to say: "Nor can you prove the voidness of all entities by means of inference. All reasons would have [the fallacy that] the locus and [the reason] itself are completely unestablished, because no property-possessor which is the locus is established and because examples and so forth are not produced either."

2.2.1.1 The opponent cannot refute the Mādhyamikas by proving absurd consequences (*prasaṅga*)

§2. That is to say, first, if you prove [this] absurd consequence with regard to what we accept as having no intrinsic nature, then this is not an absurd consequence at all, because we accept that entities are ultimately without intrinsic nature. In this connection too, if you prove the absurd consequence that because the reason, examples, property-possessors (*dharmin*) and so on are ultimately nonexistent, the conventions of inference, inferable objects (*anumeya*)[190] and so forth would not function,[191] [then] since

[190]In this case inference (*anumāna*) means the reason (*hetu/liṅga*), and inferable object (*anumeya*) means the possessor of the property to be proved (*sādhya-dharmin*) and the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*). See the *Hetumukha*, one of the earliest works attributable to Dignāga, which is quoted in PVSV pp. 2, 22-3, 1: *sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharmi-bhedena.* "Absolutely all these conventions of inference and inferable object are due to the distinction between *dharma* and *dharmin*, which just appears to [our] thought." In his PVSVṬ, Karṇakagomin regards *anumāna* as the reason (*liṅga*) and *anumeya* as the *sādhyadharmin* and *sādhyadharma*. See PVSVṬ p. 24, 8. On this passage from the *Hetumukha*, see FRAUWALLNER (1959) p. 104, STEIN-KELLNER (1971) pp. 199-200 and TILLEMANS (1995a) p. 883, fn. 37. For the later Mādhyamika philosophers' explanations of the establishment of those conventions of *anumāna* and *anumeya*, see fn. 201.

[191]Cf. MAV D74b6-75a1: *chos thams cad rang bzhing med par khas blangs na / phyogs kyi chos la sogs pa rang la (P rang la: D rang las) ma grub pa'i phyir rjes su dpag pa dang / rjes su dpag par bya ba'i tha snyad mi 'grub pa ma yin nam / de'i phyir rjes su dpog pa pos ji ltar gtan la dbab /.* "When you accept all dharmas as being without intrinsic nature, [then] since the properties of the subject and so forth are unestablished for [the proponent] himself, would not the conventions of inference and inferable objects be unestablished! Therefore, how could the persons who infer determine [the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas]?"

it is in conformity with [our own] position, this is not in fact an absurd consequence. We too do not accept that all these conventions of inference, inferable objects and so forth operate ultimately; otherwise (*gang gis na; yena*) it could be said [against us] "It follows absurdly that the [conventions of inference etc.] are nonexistent."[192] This is because absurd consequences (*prasaṅga*) are defined as leading to what is unaccepted (*aniṣṭāpatti*).[193] Thus, all which you refute we also hold to be in fact unproduced ultimately.[194] Therefore you should have no occasion at all for criticizing us. Thus the master has said [in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*]:

> "If I apprehended some [entity] by means of things (*artha*) like direct perception or other [valid cognitions], I would either affirm or deny it. [But] since that [entity] does not exist, no

[192]For the use of *gang gis na/yena*, see fn. 154 and fn. 240. Again we should not regard this *gang gis na* as an interrogative. Cf., however, MORIYAMA (2000) p. 466, 14-15: "How would the [conventions of inference, inferable objects and so forth] be nonexistent [even conventionally]?" （どうしてそれ（推理や推理の主題などの言語表現）が［世俗としても］無となろうか。）Cf. also ICHIGO (2000b) p. 427, 17-18: "なぜ、それ（言語機能）が無になってしまうといえようか。" (Ichigō's translation is almost the same as that of Moriyama.)

[193]For the argument, see BSGT 112a6-112b1: *sun 'byin pa 'di nyid rigs pa dang ma 'brel pa yin te / 'di ltar de kho nar dpe la sogs pa ma grub pas de ltar thal bar bsgrubs na grub pa la sgrub pa yin te / kho bo cag de kho nar dpe la sogs pa grub par mi 'dod pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir 'di ni thal ba ma yin te / thal ba ni mi 'dod pa byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro //.*

In the MĀ, the word *aniṣṭāpatti* is often used as the definition of *prasaṅga*. See MĀ D212b2, D222b3 and D231b7. Normally in the case of *prasaṅga*, it is known that the *pakṣadharmatva*, i.e., the fact that the reason qualifies its subject, is not established for proponents because *prasaṅga* uses a reason that is only accepted by opponents (*paraprasiddha*). The absurd proposition, i.e., the consequence proven by *prasaṅga*, will be unacceptable (*aniṣṭa*) to the opponents. See KAJIYAMA (1961a) and MIMAKI (1984). This is, however, not a hard and fast rule: it seems that according to Dharmottara's PVinṬ, there can be also absurd consequences in which the *pakṣadharmatva* is also established for the proponent and where, as a result, the consequence will be acceptable to the proponent, but not to the opponent. See IWATA (1996a) pp. 9-12 and p. 19, n. 26 and (1997b) p. 215, fn. 32 and pp. 228-230.

[194]S. Moriyama regards *bar du* as meaning "during" or "while." See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 466, 16-17: "That is, even during your refuting [us], we accept [entities] as being in fact unproduced ultimately." （というのは、我々は汝が批判している間でも、勝義として不生にほかならない、と認めている。）

criticism [is possible] against me."[195]

2.2.1.2 The opponent's proof of the absurd consequence is not correct

§3. On the other hand, if you prove the absurd consequence that that which is ultimately nonexistent would not exist even conventionally,[196]

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[195]VV k. 30: *yadi kiṃcid upalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā / pratyakṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me 'nupālambhaḥ //.* (Tib:) *rTsod pa bzlog pa'i 'grel pa* D128b6-7: *gal te mngon sum la sogs pa'i // don gyis 'ga' zhig dmigs na ni // bsgrub pa'am bzlog par bya na de // med phyir nga la klan ga med //.* The meaning of *arthais* is not clear. Mimaki regards this *artha* as valid cognition. See MIMAKI (1982a) p. 191. Note that S. Moriyama, following the MĀ's Tibetan translation of this k. 30, regards the phrase *pratyakṣādibhir arthais* as qualifying the words *pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā* and translates *arthais* as meaning the objects of direct perception and other valid cognitions. See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 466, 20-21. In fact, in our text of the MĀ, the phrase *pratyakṣādibhir arthais* qualifies the words *pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā*, but does not qualify the word *upalabheyaṃ*. This however seems to be an error on the part of the translator of the MĀ in interpreting the verse of VV, and is an interpretation that is not borne out by VVV. See VVV p. 62, 11-18: *yady ahaṃ kaṃcid artham upalabheyaṃ pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamaiś caturbhiḥ pramāṇaiś caturṇāṃ vā pramāṇānām anyatamena, ata eva pravartayeyaṃ vā nivartayeyaṃ vā / yathārtham evāhaṃ kaṃcin nopalabhe tasmān na pravartayāmi na nivartayāmi / tatraivaṃ sati yo bhavatopālambha ukto yadi pratyakṣādīnāṃ pramāṇānām anyatamenopalabhya bhāvān vinivartayasi nanu tāni pramāṇāni na santi taiś ca pramāṇair api gamyā arthā na santīti sa me bhavaty evānupālambhaḥ /.*

This verse is quoted in the PrasP p. 16, 9-10, p. 30, 7-8, the BSGT 103a5-6, etc. In striking contrast to Kamalaśīla's use of this quotation, Candrakīrti quotes this verse in the PrasP p. 16, 9-10 in order to explain that the Mādhyamikas must not use autonomous reasonings (*svatantrānumāna*). He quotes it in the PrasP p. 30, 7-8 in the context of criticizing Bhāviveka's autonomous reasonings as having the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha.*

[196]This opponent's objection that things would not be produced even conventionally also appears in the SDVK 25: *rtsod ngan grags pa kha cig ni // yang dag par dngos ma skyes pas* // mo gsham bu la sogs bzhin du // kun rdzob tu yang mi skye zer //.* (* SDVV: pas, SDVK: pa.) "Someone who is notorious as being a 'sophist' states that because entities do not really arise, [they] also do not arise even conventionally, just like the sons of barren women and so forth." Who is this 'sophist'? D. Seyfort Ruegg and M. Eckel have stated that he may be Candrakīrti due to the similarity with Candrakīrti's ideas in *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI kk. 36-38. See SEYFORT RUEGG (1981a) pp. 70-71, and ECKEL (1987) pp. 141-142. Matsumoto also advanced the same view in his (1978) article because of the similarity with Candra-

[then] here too, this is not in fact an absurd consequence because the pervasion (*vyāpti*) is not established.[197] The conventional is not pervaded by the ultimate nature; otherwise (*gang gis na; yena*), when this [ultimate nature] itself is negated, the conventional would also be negated.[198] On the

kīrti's ideas in *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI k. 111. However, he has since revised this statement in his subsequent article (1984b), and has said that it is possible that this 'sophist' is Devendrabuddhi. Matsumoto also argues that the opponent in the MĀ, who makes the same objection, is Śākyabuddhi, due to the fact that the following sentences in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the MĀ (D138a2-4) are identified with the PVṬ (D154b3-5): *gzhan yang gal te zhig pa dang ma zhig pa la sogs pa'i rnam par rtog pa don dam pa pa'i skye pa la gnod pa byed na kun rdzob pa la yang ci'i phyir gnod pa mi byed de / dngos po'i stobs las 'ongs pa'i gtan tshigs kyi yul ni skyes bu'i 'dod pa'i dbang gis rnam pa dbye bar rigs pa ma yin no // 'on te mngon sum gyis gnod par dogs pas de la gtan tshig mi 'jug go zhe na / 'o na ni 'di gtan tshigs ma yin te / gnod par byar rung ba'i phyir ro //.* "Moreover, if concepts such as what has ceased and what has not ceased were to invalidate ultimate production, why would not [such concepts] invalidate conventional [production] too? It is not correct that the domain of reasons which function by the force of entities (*vastubalapravṛtta*) would be differentiated according to a person's wishes. If [you] say that because of the doubt of being invalidated by direct perception, the reasons do not function with regard to [conventional production], then these are not [valid] reasons. This is because [these reasons] can be invalidated." In this case, although it may be possible to consider this opponent in the MĀ as Śākyabuddhi, we do not have strong reasons for regarding the 'sophist' in the SDVK 25 as Devendrabuddhi as Matsumoto has suggested, and therefore the possibility that he may be someone other than Devendrabuddhi will remain. Therefore, taking into consideration the similarity between this opponent's objection and Candrakīrti's ideas, we certainly should not rule out the possibility of this opponent's being Candrakīrti. Finally, in his (1995) and (1997a) articles, Moriyama says that the opponent in the section of the proof by *vajrakaṇahetu* of the MĀ is Candrakīrti, Candrakīrti being the opponent who criticizes Bhāviveka's reasonings. Although it appears that in this case too, there is no definitive philological evidence, the possibility that the opponent is Candrakīrti remains strong.

[197]For the concepts of pervaded (*vyāpya*), pervader (*vyāpaka*) and pervasion (*vyāpti*) or implication, see fn. 291.

[198]Cf. MORIYAMA ibid. p. 466, 25-26: "When the [ultimate existent] themselves are negated, how would the convention be also negated?" （どうして、この（勝義としての存在）自体が排除されるなら、言語表現行為も排除されようか。） M. Ichigō does not regard this *gang gis na* as an interrogative. However, it is not clear how he grammatically understood this *gang gis na*. See ICHIGO ibid. p. 427, 27-29: "言語機能というものは、この自体が否定されれば言語機能も否定されてしまうというような勝義的な自性によって遍充されたものではない。"

contrary, the [conventional] is pervaded by precisely the opposite of the [ultimate nature]. This is because what is conventional is what is not ultimately existent in nature. Although dreams and so forth are without ultimate intrinsic nature, various conventions do still appear to operate. Therefore all these conventions are like magically created beings and dreams and other [such states], and hence there is no contradiction [in them existing conventionally and not ultimately]. It is said [in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*]:

> "Just as a person magically created might obstruct [the actions of another] magical person or an illusory person [created by a magician] might obstruct [the actions of another person] created by [the magician's] own magic, so would this negation be [established]."[199]

2.2.1.3 The Mādhyamikas conventionally use inference and so forth in order to determine thusness

§4. On the other hand, if you point out the fallacy that since in all cases, we apply the conventions of inference and so forth only on the basis of ultimate entities such as the thing to be proved (*sādhya*), the property-possessors (*dharmin*) and the rest, conventions such as inference and so forth could not be applied because there is ultimately no intrinsic nature, [then] this too is not a fault at all. Conventions such as inference and the like could never be established as applying anywhere through ultimately existing property-possessors and so forth, for it would follow absurdly that there would never be any debates.[200] Rather, it is by relying only upon the

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[199]VV k. 23: *nirmitako nirmitakaṃ māyāpuruṣaḥ svamāyayā sṛṣṭam / pratiṣedhayeta yadvat pratiṣedho 'yaṃ tathaiva syāt //.* See VVV p. 57, 6-9: *yathā nirmitakaḥ puruṣo 'nyaṃ nirmitakaṃ puruṣaṃ kasmiṃścid arthe vartamānaṃ pratiṣedhayet, māyākāreṇa vā sṛṣṭo māyāpuruṣo 'nyaṃ māyāpuruṣaṃ svamāyayā sṛṣṭaṃ kasmiṃścid arthe vartamānaṃ pratiṣedhayet, tatra ... .* This verse is quoted in the BSGT 105a2, etc. See MIMAKI (1982a) p. 202, fn. 532.

[200]The objects of valid cognition are conventional things, but not ultimate entities. If one were to apply the conventions like the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* by means of ultimate entities like the *sādhya*, the *dharmin* and the rest, then since the *sādhya*, the *dharmin* and the rest are ultimately established, it would follow that inferential cognitions would have ultimate entities as their objects. Therefore, since everyone would understand the ultimate, there would be no doubt as to thusness and there could be no debate about thusness. See Chapter 2 pp. 23-28. See also TĀ D259b6: *ji ste chos la sogs pa la // don dam grags pa'i yin na ni // de tshe 'di la ci phyir*

property-possessors just as they are generally acknowledged in the world that proponents apply the conventions of inference and so forth in order to determine thusness.[201] It is said [in the *Pramāṇavārttika*]:

> "The determination of properties and property-possessors, and such things as difference and nondifference, is just as acknowledged in the world, without any analysis of their real nature. The establishment of something to be proved (*sādhya*) and the means of proof (*sādhana*) in reliance upon this [distinction between property and property-possessor] in this way is

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rtsod // gtan tshigs rnams kyis bsgrub ci dgos //. "If, on the other hand, properties and so forth were to be ultimately established, then how could there be any debate on these [properties and so forth]? Would there be any need [for them] to be proved by reasons?" Note that M. Ichigō regards the phrase *rtsod pa med par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir* as the reason for the immediately preceding sentence, i.e., *'di yang nyes pa med pa kho na ste*, but does not regard that phrase as being connected to the next sentence, i.e., *don dam pa pa'i chos can la sogs pas rjes su dpag pa la sogs par tha snyad gdags pa ni gang du yang ma grub bo //.* See ICHIGO ibid. p. 428, 10-13, and p. 450, n. 7. On the other hand, S. Moriyama understands that the phrase *rtsod pa med par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir* and the next sentence *don dam pa pa'i ... ma grub bo* are the two parallel reasons for the immediately preceding sentence *'di yang nyes pa med pa kho na ste.* See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 467, 15-17.

[201]Cf. BSGT 112b2-3: *des na 'jig rten na ji ltar grags pa'i chos can la sogs pa la gnas te de kho na nyid la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i tha snyad byed de /.* Śāntarakṣita also explains the establishment of such conventions in his MAV D75a3-5: *rjes su dpag pa dang rjes su dpag par bya ba'i tha snyad thams cad ni phan tshun mi mthun pa'i (P pa'i: D pas) grub pa'i (D grub pa'i: P om.) mthas bskyed pa chos can tha dad pa (D pa: P pa'i) yongs su btang ste / mkhas pa dang bud med dang byis pa'i bar gyi mig dang rna ba la sogs pa'i shes pa la snang ba'i nang can gyi phyogs sgra la sogs pa'i chos can la brten nas 'jug go // de lta min na du ba dang / yod pa la sogs pa'i me dang mi rtag pa nyid la sogs pa bsgrub par 'dod pa thams cad kyi gtan tshigs kyi gzhi 'grub par mi 'gyur te /.* "All the conventions of inference and inferable objects exclude the various property-possessors arisen from mutually opposing doctrines and function in reliance upon property-possessors, like place and sound, which appear to visual, auditory and such cognitions of [everyone] from scholars to women and children. Otherwise [i.e., if those conventions did not function in reliance upon the property-possessors which commonly appear to everyone's cognition], the bases of all reasons like a smoke and existence, which [reasons] are intended to prove a fire, impermanence and so forth, would not be established." See also AAA p. 638, 13-15: *sarva evānumānānumeyavyavahāraḥ parasparaparāhatasiddhāntāhitadharmabhedaparityāgenābālajanapratītāṃ dharmiṇam āśritya pravartate.*

considered by scholars to enable one to have access to the ultimate."[202]

It is also said:

"The establishment of what is to be cognized (*[pra]meya*), the means of valid cognition (*[pra]māṇa*) and the result of the means of valid cognition (*[pramāṇa]phala*) is effectuated with regard to the grasped [aspect], the grasping [aspect] and the reflexive cognition [respectively] in accordance with appearances, although [this division] does not [ultimately] exist. Otherwise, how would it be possible for a single entity [i.e., a cognition,] to have in reality the aspects which appear to be of various natures?[203] Its oneness would be undermined."[204]

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[202]PV I kk. 85-86: *dharmadharmivyavasthānaṃ bhedo 'bhedaś ca yādṛśaḥ / asamīkṣitatattvārtho yathā loke pratīyate // taṃ tathaiva samāśritya sādhya-sādhanasaṃsthitiḥ / paramārthāvatārāya vidvadbhir avakalpyate //.* (Tib:) *chos dang chos can rnam gzhag dang // tha dad tha dad min ci 'dra // de nyid don ni ma brtags par // 'jig rten ji ltar grags de la // de bzhin kho nar brten nas ni // bsgrub bya sgrub pa kun bzhag pa // dam pa'i don la 'jug bya'i phyir // mkhas pa rnams kyis byas pa yin //.* KK. 85-86 are also quoted in Kamalaśīla's TĀ D259b4-5. Cf. BSGT 112b3-4.

[203]In the MĀ's quotation of PV III k. 358, we can find an unusual interpretation of this verse. That is, the word *nānārūpāvabhāsinaḥ* does not qualify the word *ākārās*, but qualifies the words *ekasya bhāvasya*. See MĀ D171b7: *sna tshogs kyi ngo bo snang ba'i dngos gcig la.* If we follow this interpretation, we can translate this sentence as follows: "Otherwise, how could a single entity which appears to be of various natures have in reality [its] aspects?" However, this is not a normal interpretation. See PVV p. 226, 16-18: *anyathā yadi vastuto grāhakādivibhāgo iṣyate, tadaikasya bhāvasya jñānātmano nānārūpāvabhāsino 'nekākārapratibhāsavanta ākārā grāhyādikāḥ kathaṃ satyaṃ syuḥ.*

[204]PV III kk. 357-358 (= PVin I kk. 48-49): *yathānudarśanaṃ ceyaṃ meya-mānaphalasthitiḥ / kriyate 'vidyamānā 'pi grāhyagrāhakasaṃvidām // anyathai-kasya bhāvasya nānārūpāvabhāsinaḥ / satyaṃ kathaṃ syur ākārās tadekatvasya hānitaḥ //.* (Tib:) *gzung ba 'dzin pa rig pa dag // yod pa min yang gzhal bya dang // 'jal byed 'bras bur gnas pa 'di // ji ltar rjes su snang bzhin byas // de lta min na sna tshogs kyi // ngo bor snang can dngos gcig la // rnam pa ji ltar bden 'gyur te // gcig pa nyid de nyams phyir ro //.* K. 357 and k. 358 are quoted in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (NBhūṣ) p. 57, 8-9 and p. 58, 8-9 respectively. See TOSAKI (1993) p. 12, fn. 57 and 58. Kamalaśīla also quotes these kk. 357-358 in his TĀ D259b3-4. Note that k. 358 is also quoted in Jñānagarbha's SDVV as *Antaraśloka* 13-2.

For the importance of the quotations of kk. 85-86 and kk. 357-358, see Chapter

And this is also explained as being the characteristic of the means of valid cognition which arises from the conventional.

§5. All these logical characters of the means of valid cognition are only for the sake of having access to thusness. Otherwise, all [of them] would indeed be meaningless. That is, [persons] from cowherds' wives on up, who have not studied the epistemological treatises, do in fact understand the [existence of] fire and so forth by seeing indices such as smoke and so forth, even without any instruction. Thus, for us too, [those logical characters] are for the sake of having access to thusness. Just in this way, we conventionally apply inferences and so forth, and therefore we do not have any faults at all.

2.2.1.4 There is no fault that the locus is unestablished (*āśrayāsiddha*)

2.2.1.4.1 Kamalaśīla's solution for avoiding this fault: the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* which are mere exclusions, and the establishment of the *svadharmin*

§6. Moreover, when inferences and so forth operate conventionally, one who wishes to prove that a property of entities, such as impermanence, is an existent nature,[205] inevitably needs a property-possessor and so forth which are conventionally entities. In this case, it is not established that *sādhya*s and so forth exist alone without this type of locus. Precisely in this case, because the *sādhya* is negated when this type of locus does not exist, one points out the fallacy that the locus is unestablished.

§7. And in this case, when one negates just the property-possessor as it is, the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) and the rest, which themselves are necessarily connected (*avinābhāva*) [with the property-possessor], are [also] necessarily negated. When the [property-possessor] is unestablished,

2 pp. 38-46.

All five Tibetan editions (CDGNP) of the MĀ share the problem of having incorrect and obscure renderings of PV I k. 86 and PV III kk. 357-358. We translate PV I kk. 85-86 and PV III kk. 357-358 on the basis of the Sanskrit, rather than the MĀ's Tibetan translation of those verses.

[205]Cf. M. Ichigō's translation of *gang la mi rtag pa la sogs pa dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor sgrub par 'dod pa de la*: "for [the proof-statement] which intends to prove that impermanence and so forth are the properties of entities (*bhāvadharma*), i.e., the natures of the existent ... ." （無常であること等が、実在の属性(*bhāvadharma*)、すなわち存在の本性であることを証明せんとする（推論式）では、... 。） See ICHIGO ibid. p. 429, 14-15, p. 430, 1-2, and p. 451, n. 19 and n. 21.

the fallacy that the reason and the rest are unestablished is [also] pointed out. But when a *sādhya* and so forth are not in fact negated, even though some property-possessor designated according to one's position might be negated, it is not correct to point out fallacies such as nonestablishment. This is because in this case, there is no obstacle to the establishment of the [proposition] which one intends.[206]

§8. When one does not wish to prove that a property of entities is an existent nature but instead wishes to state a proof of the mere exclusion of a superimposed property, then the [reason] with regard to which the faults such as being unestablished would be pointed out does not require even conventionally any property-possessor which is an entity.[207] This is because (a)

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[206]Kamalaśīla's statement here seems to rely upon the idea that the negation of an unrelated subject (*kevaladharmin*), which is not qualified by the proponent's *sādhyadharma*, does not imply fallacies like *āśrayāsiddha* or the invalidation of the thesis. As for *kevaladharmin*, see fn. 221. Note that M. Ichigō says that in the present section of the MĀ, the term *kevaladharmin* does not appear, and in the MĀ we cannot find any evidence to show that Kamalaśīla had the idea that *svadharmin* was a conceptual representation. See ICHIGO ibid. p. 447, 12-24 and p. 448, 11-19. Although the term *kevaladharmin* does not appear, since "some property-possessor designated according to one's position" (*rang dgar nye bar brtags pa'i chos can 'ga' zhig*) means some *dharmin* with which the *sādhyadharma* and the rest are not necessarily connected, the concept is almost the same as that of *kevaladharmin*. There is little doubt that Kamalaśīla understood well the concept of *kevaladharmin*.

In the MĀ Kamalaśīla does not clearly say that *svadharmin* is a conceptual representation. However, in the MĀ we can see that there is a move to combine the notions of *svadharmin* and conceptual subject. See fn. 212, and Translation 4 paragraph 4.2.1.4.1, **§30** and fn. 352.

[207]The Tibetan translation of the sentence, i.e., *ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te /*, is problematic. This sentence will make no sense if we simply translate it literally as follows: "The expression of faults, such as being unestablished, does not require even conventionally any *dharmin* which is an entity." It seems better to regard the words "*ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa brjod pa*" as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, i.e., that for which the faults such as being unestablished would be pointed out. It will be the reasons to which such faults would be pointed out. Cf. LOPEZ (1987) p. 358, 18-20: "the expression of faults, such as not being established, does not require, even conventionally, a subject that is a thing ... ." Cf. KOBAYASHI (1987) pp. 215, 31-214, 2: "Pointing out fallacies such as being unestablished does not require even a *dharmin* which is coventionally real." （不成等の過失を指摘することは、言説として実在となれる基体さえも必要としない。）Cf. ICHIGO ibid. p. 430, 3-4: "Pointing out fallacies such as being unestablished does not require

the [superimposed property] is not the property of the [property-possessor]; (b) with reference to the [property-possessor] too, it is not correct that it is the property-possessor of that [superimposed property]; (c) although the [property-possessor of the superimposed property] is unestablished, there is no obstacle to the establishment of the [proposition] which [he] intends [to prove by] the reason necessarily connected with the *sādhya*.[208]

§9. Because [opponents] seek to refute the establishment of the proponent's intended thing, the proponent investigates whether the locus is established or not, but not [simply] due to [his] own likings.[209] Even though [an opponent] says that the locus is unestablished and so forth, there is no refutation of the proponent's intended thing at all, so what is the point of saying this? By stating what is not actually a fault, the opponents do nothing but rush into the dust-filled [place] of falsehoods, but it is not so in the other case [i.e., where the fallacy stated by the opponents invalidates the propo-

even conventionally any *dharmin* which is an entity." （不成等の誤謬の指摘は、言語機能上も、実事たるダルミンを必要としない。）Cf. IWATA (1999b) p. 167, 3-5: "..., then neither allusion to the fallacy of the nonestablishment [of the reason in the subject] etc. nor the subject which is the [factual] entity on the [level of] verbal convention need [to be assumed]." Note that Iwata regards *yang* in *tha snyad du yang* as "and " (*ca*) and understands that both *nyes pa brjod pa* and *tha snyad du dngos por gyur pa'i chos can* are the subject for the predicate *mi dgos te*. However, he also says in the note of his article cited above that there might be a corruption in the Tibetan translation *nyes pa brjod pa*. See IWATA ibid. p. 167, fn. 42.

[208]See PVV ad PV IV k. 142, p. 461, 16-17: *evaṃ dharmibādhane 'pīṣṭasya sādhyasya kācana bādhā na vidyate /.* Cf. LOPEZ ibid. p. 358, 22-27 and ICHIGO ibid. p. 430, 9-11. See also ICHIGO ibid. p. 452, n. 22.

[209]The meaning of the last part of this sentence, i.e., *chags pas ni ma yin no*, is not completely clear. The present writer has regarded this *chags pa* as the proponent's own likings (*vyasana*) because of the similarity to the sentence of the PVSV p. 110, 3-4 (= PVin II p. 18*, 6-8): *sarva evāgamam anāgamaṃ vā pravṛttikāmo 'nveṣate prekṣāpūrvakārī na vyasanena* /.* (* PVSVṬ p. 396, 17: *na vyasanenā-saktimātreṇa /.*) PVin II p. 18*, 6-8: *rtog pa sngon du gtong ba can lung ngam lung ma yin pa tshol ba thams cad ni 'jug par 'dod pas yin gyi zhen pas ni ma yin no //.* "Every person who acts due to [his] deliberation (*prekṣāpūrvakārī*) investigates whether it is a [trustworthy] *āgama* or not, because he wants to act, but does not [investigate simply] due to [his] own likings." See STEINKELLNER (1979) p. 66, 6-8. Kamalaśīla wants to say here that the examination of whether the *dharmin* is established is not an optional matter of a proponent's own likings or interests, but is to be made just in order to know whether proponent's intended proposition is established or not.

nent's intended thing]. Therefore, in order to make the property-possessor which is in keeping with the property to be proved understood, the logicians have stated the restriction of it being "the property-possessor of [the *sādhya*] itself" (*svadharmin*)[210] in the context of the definition of the thesis (*pakṣa*).

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[210]All five Tibetan editions (CDGNP) of the MĀ have *rang gi chos*. However this should be emended to *rang gi chos can* due to the verse of the TĀ, which corresponds to this sentence of the MĀ: (TĀ D260b2-3:) *bsgrub bya'i chos dang rjes mthun pa // rigs pa shes pas chos can* du // rtag tu byed pa de yi phyir // mkhas pas rang gi chos can smos //.* (* CDGNP *nyid*. However, *nyid* should be emended to *can* due to the BSGT's quotation of this verse of the TĀ: (106a4-5:) *bsgrub bya'i chos dang rjes mthun pa // rigs pa shes pas chos* ***can*** *du // rtag tu med pa de yi phyir // mkhas pas rang gi chos can smos //.*) In their translations of the MĀ, S. Moriyama and M. Ichigō take the incorrect reading of the CDGNP and do not emend *rang gi chos* to *rang gi chos can*, although Ichigō was aware that *rang gi chos* did not correspond to the term *rang gi chos can* in the PS III k. 2 which makes the definition of thesis (*pakṣa*). See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 469, 21: "［実在］自身にとってのダルマ." See ICHIGO ibid. p. 430, 23-24: "「固有の属性」(*rang gi chos, svadharma*)" and p. 452, n. 26. Moriyama and Ichigō do not refer to the verse of the TĀ nor the BSGT's quotation of that verse.

Now, the meaning of *sva* in the term *svadharmin* is not so clear. Dharmakīrti and his commentators do not explicitly explain the meaning of *sva* in that term. T. Tillemans, in his English rendering of *svadharmin*, regards *sva* as meaning proponent (*vādin*) due to Vibhūticandra's gloss on that term in his PVV-n p. 459, fn. 5: *vādineṣṭasya svasya dharmī svadharmī tatra*. See TILLEMANS (1998) p. 112, n. 2. However, it seems possible to read this gloss of Vibhūticandra differently. That is, we can also regard the term *svasya* in his gloss as meaning *vādineṣṭasya*, rather than *vādinā*. *vādineṣṭa* here can be regarded as meaning the [*dharma*] intended by the proponent, i.e., the proponent's intended *sādhyadharma*. Therefore, we can also regard that gloss of Vibhūticandra as showing that *sva* means *sādhyadharma*. Although that gloss of Vibhūticandra does not serve as a strong reason for regarding *sva* as meaning proponent, it may also be possible to hold *sva* to mean proponent due to the words in the PV IV 136, i.e., *vādino dharmo yaḥ svasādhyatayepsitaḥ taddharmavati*, and Prajñākaragupta's comment on PV IV 136, i.e., PVA p. 549, 14-15: *yaḥ* ***svayam vādinā*** *dharmaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭas taddharmavati dharmiṇi ...* . In this case *svadharmin* can be translated as "the possessor of the property [intended by the proponent] himself" or "the possessor of the [proponent's] own [intended] property." On the other hand, rejecting Tillemans' rendering of *svadharmin*, M. Ichigō regards *sva* as meaning *sādhya* due to Kamalaśīla's expression: "the *dharmin* which is in keeping with the *sādhya*" (*bsgrub par bya ba'i chos dang rjes su mthun pa'i chos can*). See ICHIGO ibid. pp. 439, 12-440, 7, p. 441, 20-25 and p. 454, n. 67. This is indeed Kamalaśīla's understanding of the term *svadharmin*. Kamalaśīla also says in the TĀ D260b2-3:

2.2.1.4.2 On the *svadharmin*: Kamalaśīla's dependence upon PV IV kk. 136-137ab and kk. 141-143

§10. Thus:

[Vyāpti:] The thing which does not simultaneously produce all its own results does not have unimpeded power, is not permanent and does not have a single nature.

It is just like, for example, the son of barren woman and so forth.

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, space (*ākāśa*) and so forth, which is the opponents' intended thing, does not simultaneously produce results consisting in sounds and so forth.

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, space and so forth which is the opponents' intended thing does not have unimpeded power, is not permanent and does not have a single nature.]

The above is [the statement of] a reason consisting in the nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). [In response] to this explanation, some people say: "This reason has also the fallacy of incompatibility (*vi-*

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bsgrub bya'i chos dang rjes mthun pa // rigs pa shes pas chos can du // rtag tu byed pa de yi phyir // mkhas pas rang gi chos can smos // dngos po med pa nyid kyi chos // bsgrub bya'i* ***bdag nyid*** *rjes mthun pa'i // dngos po med nyid chos can yin // de bas 'di ma grub pa min //* (* CDGNP *nyid.* However, *nyid* should be emended to *can.*) "Logicians always consider property-possessors to be in keeping with the properties to be proved. Therefore, the scholars have stated [the term] *svadharmin.* [In the proof of the exclusion of a superimposed property, the *svadharmin*] is the unreal *dharmin* which is in keeping with the *sādhya* itself [consisting in] the property of being unreal. Therefore, this [*dharmin*] is not unestablished." See also MĀ D172b6-7: *de bas log par rtog pa bsal ba'i phyir* ***rang dang rjes su mthun pa'i chos can*** *kho na la gnod pa byas na bsgrub par bya ba bkag pa yin gyi / chos gzhan dang ldan pa'i chos can ni ma yin no ... /.* Due to the TĀ cited above, the MĀ's word *rang dang rjes su mthun pa'i chos can* should be translated as "the *dharmin* which is in keeping with [the *sādhya*] itself." In the MĀ and TĀ Kamalaśīla seems to regard *sva* in the term *svadharmin* as *sādhya*, rather than proponent. Although in Dharmakīrti's and his commentators' texts, *sva* in that term seems to mean proponent, rather than *sādhya*, when we translate Kamalaśīla's texts, we should in principle follow his ideas. So we here take *sva* as meaning *sādhya* due to his expression cited above. Note that in his BGZ Tsong kha pa, in the context of the explanation of *svadharmiṇi* (*rang rten la*) in the PS III k. 2, also seems to regard *sva* as *sādhya*. See BGZ p. 43, 5-8: *des na bsgrub bya'i chos rang gi rten gyi chos can dang de gnyis tshogs pa bsal na / skyon yin pa bstan pa'i don du rten zhes gsung pa bshad do //.*

rodha). [Moreover,] just as [it] proves the *sādhya*,[211] because this [reason] also proves that property-possessors such as real space and so forth do not exist, this reason also has the fallacy that the locus is unestablished."

§11. Here, in this case too, although property-possessors such as real space and so forth are negated, there is no refutation at all when [the proponent] intends the *sādhya* to be merely an exclusion; nor is it so that the reason characterized as a mere exclusion is unestablished. This is because although the property-possessor is not an entity, these two [i.e., *sādhya* and *sādhana*,] are established.[212] Therefore, in order to eliminate erroneous un-

[211] CDGNP: *'di ji ltar bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed pa de bzhin du nam mkha' la sogs pa'i chos can dngos po'i ran gi ngo bor gyur pa med pa yang sgrub par byed pas ...* . In this case, it seems impossible to understand why this *ji ltar* clause is parallel to the *de bzhin du* main clause. It seems better to understand that this sentence means that just as this reason proves the absence of one in nature, etc., viz., the *sādhya*, so will it prove that a *dharmin* like space, etc. is nonexistent, and therefore because it proves the opposite of subjects, this reason is contradictory and has also the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*. Cf. MĀ D221b7-222a1: *ji ltar* gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i mtshan nyid kyi gtan tshigs bdag med par bsgrub (GNP bsgrub: CD bsgrubs) pa ltar chos can dngos po med pa yang de dang 'dra bas chos can las bzlog pa sgrub (GNP sgrub: CD bsgrub) pa'i phyir gtan tshigs 'gal ba yin no ...* . (* CDGNP *'di ltar*. Emendation to *ji ltar*.)

[212] Kamalaśīla says that when one proves the mere exclusion of a property superimposed by the opponent, it is not necessary that the *kevaladharmin* be an entity even conventionally.

Here, however, Kamalaśīla does not explain how the reason characterized as being a mere exclusion can be established with regard to the *svadharmin*. In the MĀ Kamalaśīla says that when an imperceptible entity imagined by the opponent is negated, the *dharmin*, i.e., *svadharmin*, is always just imagined, i.e., it is a conceptual representation, and then he quotes the NM's phrase: 亦假安立不可得法 (*kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharma*). "Nonperception is a property of the imagined [object]." As for this phrase of NM, see KATSURA (1992) and TILLEMANS (1998). See Translation 4 paragraph 4.2.1.4.1, **§30** and fn. 352 and fn. 353.

Now, in order to avoid fallacies like *āśrayāsiddha*, Kamalaśīla in the MĀ adopts the idea that the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* are mere exclusions. This is, however, not his original idea. This idea was already formulated before Kamalaśīla by Dharmakīrtian commentators, like Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi. See PVP D296b6-7, P354b1-3: *de lta bur gyur pa'i chos can bsal ba na yang / de ltar bsgrub byar 'dod pa la rnam par gcod pa tsam du 'dod pa la (P rnam par gcod pa tsam du 'dod pa la: D om.) gnod pa ci yang med pa yin pa'am / gtan tshigs rnam par gcod pa'i ngo bo ma grub pa nyid ma yin no // 'dir yang chos can 'ba' zhig 'gog pa yang gnod pa 'dod pa yin na yang mi 'dod de / chos can dngos por gyur pa bsal*

derstandings, [the commentator, i.e., Dharmakīrti,] has explained that when one refutes precisely the property-possessor which is in keeping with [the *sādhya*] itself, the *sādhya* will also be negated, but not [when one refutes] the property-possessor which has some other property. Then, take the following [definition of thesis]:

> "[A valid thesis] is one which is intended by [the proponent] himself as something to be stated in its proper form alone [i.e., as a *sādhya*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent's] own subject, it is not opposed by perceptible objects, by inference, by authorities or by what is commonly recognized." [213]

The commentator [i.e., Dharmakīrti] has explained that in the context of the

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ba na yang bsgrub par bya ba rnam par gcod pa'i ngo bo grub pa'i phyir ro //. For an English translation, see IWATA (1999b) p. 160, 20-27 and p. 162, 1-3. Śākyabuddhi clearly states in his PVṬ D269a4-5 that the mere exclusions (*vyavacchedamātra*) are regarded as nonimplicative negations (*prasajyapratiṣedha*). Kamalaśīla seems to have followed Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi on this point. See KOBAYASHI (1987) and TILLEMANS AND LOPEZ (1998) p. 116, n. 8.

[213]PS III k. 2: *rang gi ngo bo kho na bstan // bdag 'dod rang gi chos can la // mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang // yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba'o //.* (Skt:) *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi //.* English translation follows TILLEMANS (2000) p. 3, 9-16.

As is the case for MĀ's quotations from PV, its quotation of PS III k. 2 is also incorrect and very different from the original Sanskrit of this verse. Although M. Ichigō was aware that the Tibetan translation of k. 2 in MĀ was different from the Sanskrit, he nonetheless chose to translate on the basis of the Tibetan. See ICHIGO (2000b) p. 431 and pp. 440-441. Note that S. Moriyama also chooses to translate this k. 2 on the basis of the Tibetan, although he does not regard this verse as the direct quotation from PS. See MORIYAMA (2000) p. 470, 16-18. The Tibetan text in question is MĀ D172b7-173a1: *bdag nyid 'dod pa dang / mngon sum dang / rjes su dpag pa dang / yid ches pa dang / grags pas ma bsal (CD bsal: GNP bstsal) ba rang gi ngo bo kho na bstan par bya ba ni rang gi chos can no (CDNP no: G om.).* Disregarding the Sanskrit, this would have to be translated as follows: "*Svadharmin* is intended by [the proponent] himself, is not opposed by perceptible objects, by inference, by authorities or by what is commonly recognized and is something to be stated in its proper form alone [i.e., a *sādhya*]." Absurdly, in this Tibetan translation of PS III k. 2, the subject of the verse is *rang gi chos can*, and not "a valid thesis." Although nobody knows the historical circumstances of this strange Tibetan translation of k. 2, it seems pointless to translate k. 2 in reliance upon the MĀ's wrong Tibetan translation, all the more so because other quotations from logical works, such as those taken from PV, are also extremely unreliable in

the Tibetan of the MĀ.

Significantly, a revisor of the Tibetan translation of the MĀ seems to have already noticed that this translation of the quotation of k. 2 was problematic. After the phrase *bdag nyid 'dod pa dang* in the GNP editions of the MĀ, the following remark by the Tibetan revisor is inserted: *'dir dpe gzhan las / der bdag nyid 'dod la mngon sum dang / rjes dpag lung dang grags pa yi (yis?) /* ***rang chos can la*** *ma bsal (GN bsal: P gsal) ma (ba?) // ma bsal* ***chos can bdag nyid kyi*** *// rang gi ngo bor bstan pa nyid dang / ces sogs 'dug pas legs par brtag par rigs so //.* Ichigō, in his article cited above p. 453, n. 36, expressed some puzzlement concerning this inserted remark and seems not to have taken it seriously, nor to have realized that it was a revisor's addition.

Although the subject "a valid thesis" is not included in the verse, it clearly figures in the analogous definition of the thesis given in NM: 是中唯隨自意楽 為所成立説名宗 非彼相違義能遣 (*tatra tu svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ*). "Now, here, a [valid] thesis is just one which is intended by [the proponent] himself as a *sādhya*; [and] it is not opposed by incompatible things." See also NB III 38: *svarūpeṇaiva svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti.*

As for the word *svadharmiṇi*, it seems better to simply regard the locative case in that term as meaning *adhikaraṇa*, i.e., place or location, due to Dignāga's PSVa P43a6-8: *gang sgrub par 'dod pa'i chos kyis khyad par du byas pa'i chos can* ***de la*** *bsgrub par bya ba'i chos dang 'gal ba'i mngon sum dang / rjes su dpag pa dang / lung dang grags pa rnams te / chos gzhan gyis ma bsal ba'o // de ltar na bsgrub par bya ba kha na ma tho ba med par bstan pa yin no // de lta ma yin na ni de ltar snang ba ste /* (= the PSVb P125a2-4), which almost corresponds to the PVA p. 551, 30-31: *yo hi dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭas* ***tatra*** *yadi sādhyadharmaviruddhena pratyakṣānumānāgamaprasiddhena na bādhyate sa pakṣo 'nyathā tadābhāsa iti.* English translation in TILLEMANS (2000) p. 5, 11-17: "The presentation of what is to be proved [i.e., the thesis] is irreproachable, providing that, with regard to that subject (*dharmin*) which [the proponent] intends to prove to be qualified by the property, it [i.e., the thesis] is not opposed by some other property, that is to say, by something in contradiction with the property to be proved, i.e., by perception (*pratyakṣa*), by inference (*anumāna*), by scripture (*āgama*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*). Otherwise, it is a fallacious thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*) ... ." Note that Ichigō, in his Japanese translation of MĀ, calls our attention to Jinendrabuddhi's (new?) interpretation of the locative case in the term *svadharmiṇi*, since in his PSṬ Jinendrabuddhi interprets the locative case as *rgyu mtshan gyi bdun pa* (*nimittasaptamī*), i.e., cause or reason. See ICHIGO ibid. pp. 438-439. In effect, Jinendrabuddhi says that *because* of the *svadharmin*, a valid thesis is not opposed. See PSṬ P157a1-2: *rang gi chos can la'o zhes pa 'di rgyu mtshan gyi bdun pa ste / rang gi chos can yin pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis ma bsal ba'o zhes pa'i don to //.* See also KOBAYASHI (1987) p. 202, n. 12.

Note that Kitagawa divides PS's definition of the thesis into three parts: (1). *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ*, (2). *svayam iṣṭo*, (3). *anirākṛtaḥ pratyakṣārthānumānā-*

definition of the thesis, the master [i.e., Dignāga] had stated the term "the property-possessor of [the *sādhya*] itself" (*svadharmin*). This is explained in detail [in the *Pramāṇavārttika* as follows]:

> "Always, invalidation [of the thesis] would occur in the case of [an invalidation of] the possessor of that property which the proponent himself intends to prove (*sādhya*), but not in the case of [an invalidation of] a subject (*dharmin*) [qualified] by some other property.[214] Otherwise, when a subject is invalidated in respect to some other [property], why should it [viz., the subject which is qualified by the property under discus-

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ptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi. Kitagawa regards the first two parts (1)(2) as what is actually or really meant as the definition of thesis. On the other hand, Tillemans divides the definition into two parts: (1). *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo*, (2). *anirākṛtaḥ pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi.* See ICHIGO ibid. pp. 436-437. Tillemans relies upon Dharmakīrti's interpretation of PS's definition of the thesis. In PV IV Dharmakīrti, in the context of a comparison of the PS's and NM's definitions of the thesis, holds that the word *iṣṭa* should be related with the word *nirdeśya* in the PS's definition. See PV IV k. 87: *svayamiṣṭābhidhānena gatārthe 'py avadhāraṇe / kṛtyāntenābhisambandhād uktaṃ kālāntaracchide //.* English translation in TILLEMANS ibid. p. 119, 9-13: "Although the restriction [by *eva*] is something understood through stating [the words] *svayam iṣṭa*, still, because [in the PS] [*iṣṭa*] is related with [*nirdeśya* ('to be stated')] which ends in an affix showing obligation (*kṛtyānta*), [the restriction] was specified to eliminate times other [than the present]." See also PVV p. 443, 19-24, and TILLEMANS ibid. p. 119, fn. 422.

We translate the MĀ's quotation of PS III k. 2 here in reliance upon Dharmakīrti's interpretation. Since Kamalaśīla quotes PV IV kk. 136-137ab and kk. 141-143 and follows Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *svadharmin* in order to avoid the fault of *āśrayāsiddha*, it is clear that Kamalaśīla depends upon Dharmakīrti's interpretation of PS's definition of the thesis.

[214]See PVV p. 460, 2-5: *yathā śrāvaṇatvavati śabde bādhite bādhā pakṣasya / na tu vādīṣṭād dharmād anyena dharmeṇa dharmavati dharmiṇi bādhite bādhā pakṣasya syād iti [sva?]dharmigrahaproyojanaṃ yathākāśaguṇatvavati śabde bādhite na pakṣabādhā /.* English translation in TILLEMANS (2000) p. 199, 3-10: "For example, when one invalidates the sound possessing audibility (*śrāvaṇatvavati śabde bādhite*), then there is invalidation of the thesis. But there would be no invalidation of the thesis when one invalidated a possessor of a property, i.e., a *dharmin*, [connected with] a property other than the property intended by the proponent. Hence the need for saying '[the proponent's] own [intended] subject.' For example, when one invalidates the sound which possesses [the *dharma* 'being a quality of space' (*ākāśaguṇatvavati śabde bādhite*), there is no invalidation of the thesis."

sion][215] then be negated?"[216]

And then, in order to indicate the objects to be negated which are erroneous understandings, it is said [in the *Pramāṇavārttika*]:

> "For example, when [the Buddhist] states that space, etc. do not have a novel nature[217] unproduced by other [conditions] because they are not causes for [producing their qualities such as] sound, etc. all at once, then the [Vaiśeṣika] adversary might say that in a similar way the subject, space, etc., would also not have the nature of a real entity. [Dharmakīrti's position:] In this fashion [even though the subject is invalidated],[218] there is in fact no invalidation of the intended [proposition] to be proved (*sādhya*) at all. Indeed, given that both [i.e., the combination of the subject and the property (*dharmidharmasamudāya*)][219] constitute that which is being proved (*sādhyatva*), then when invalidating the subject negates the property to be proved, in that case there will be an invalidation [of the thesis].[220] Such is what is expressed by the [words 'his own subject']."[221]

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[215]See PVV p. 460, 8-9: *anyathā yady evaṃ neṣyate tadānyatra dharme dharmiṇi bādhite 'sya prakṛtadharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ ka uparodho bādhā //.*

[216]PV IV kk. 136-137ab: *sarvatra vādino dharmo yaḥ svasādhyatayepsitaḥ / taddharmavati* bādhā syān nānyadharmeṇa dharmiṇi // anyathāsyoparodhaḥ ko bādhite 'nyatra dharmiṇi /.* (* Read *taddharmavati* instead of Miyakasa's *tad dharmavati.*) (Tib:) *kun tu rgol ba bdag nyid kyi // bsgrub byar 'dod pa'i chos gang yin // chos de ldan la gnod 'gyur gyi // chos gzhan gyi ni chos can min // gzhan du chos can gzhan la ni // gnod kyang 'di la ci zhig bkag //.* English translation follows TILLEMANS ibid. pp. 198, 27-199, 2 and p. 199, 25-27.

[217]S. Moriyama, following Miyasaka's edition of the PV IV k. 141, adopts the reading of *anutpādyā pūrvarūpan*. See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 471, 2-3: "例えば、他によって生起されない故に、虚空などは東という自性をもたない。" *anutpādyā pūrvarūpan* should be emended to *anutpādyāpūrvarūpaṃ.* See TILLEMANS ibid. p. 202, fn. 672. See also fn. 221 below.

[218]See PVV p. 461, 16: *evaṃ dharmibādhane 'pi.*

[219]See PVV p. 462, 3: *dvayasya dharmidharmasamudāyasya.*

[220]See PVV p. 462, 4: *tatra pakṣabādhā yuktā.*

[221]See PVV p. 462, 4: *ity etena svadharmigrahaṇena varṇṇitam /.*

PV IV kk. 141-143: *yathā parair anutpādyāpūrvarūpaṃ* na khādikam / sakṛc chabdādyahetutvād ity ukte prāha dūṣakaḥ // tadvad vastusvabhāvo 'san dharmī vyomādir ity api / naivam iṣṭasya sādhyasya bādhā kācana** vidyate // dvayasyāpi hi sādhyatve sādhyadharmoparodhi yat / bādhanaṃ dharmiṇas tatra bādhety etena

§12. We should definitely understand [the matter] in this way. Otherwise, how could the scholars refute the real entities imagined by others by [a reason such as] the absence of the capacity of practical efficacy

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varṇitam //. (* Miyasaka: *anutpādyā pūrvarūpan* is wrong. ** Miyasaka: *kvacana.* Cf. Tib: *'ga' yang.*) (Tib:) *dper na mkha' sogs gzhan dag gis // sngon med rang bzhin skyed med min // cig car sgra sogs rgyu min phyir // zhes bshad pa la sun 'byin pa // de bzhin mkha' sogs chos can gyi // ngo bo'ang dngos med ces brjod bzhin // de ltar 'dod pa'i bsgrub bya la // gnod pa 'ga' yang med pa nyid // 'dis ni gnyis ka bsgrub bya nyid // yin na chos can la gnod gang // bsgrub par bya ba'i chos 'gog pas // de la gnod ces bstan pa yin //.* English translation follows TILLEMANS (2000) p. 202, 8-15 and p. 204, 23-28.

All five Tibetan editions (CDGNP) of the MĀ have an incorrect Tibetan rendering of PV IV k. 142: *mkha' sogs chos can dngos med kyi // ngo bo nyid kyang de dang 'dra // (CD //: GNP om.) zhes smras pa ni / 'dod pa bsgrub par bya ba la // gnod pa ci yang med pa nyid // de bzhin mkha' sogs chos can gyi // dngos po'i ngo bo'ang med par 'gyur //.* That is, CDGNP duplicate the translation of PV IV k. 142ab: *tadvad vastusvabhāvo 'san dharmī vyomādir ity api /* (Tib: *de bzhin mkha' sogs chos can gyi // ngo bo'am dngos med ces brjod bzhin //*). Note that M. Ichigō and S. Moriyama regard the two stanzas underlined above, i.e., *de bzhin mkha' sogs chos can gyi // dngos po'i ngo bo'ang med par 'gyur //*, as Kamalaśīla's own words. See ICHIGO ibid. p. 432, 8 and MORIYAMA ibid. p. 471, 10-11.

In PV IV kk. 141-142, Dharmakīrti holds that a thesis showing that the Vaiśeṣika's version of space is nonexistent only proves nonexistence of an unrelated subject (*kevaladharmin*). Note that the term *kevala[dharmin] = chos can 'ba' zhig pa* does not seem to figure in Dignāga, but is introduced first in PV IV k. 140: *nanv etad apy arthasiddhaṃ satyaṃ kecit tu dharmiṇaḥ / kevalasyoparodhe 'pi doṣavattāṃ upāgatāḥ //.* English translation in TILLEMANS (2000): "[Objection:] But surely this [fact that both are included] is also established by implication. [Reply:] That is true. But some hold [the thesis] to be faulty even when an unrelated (*kevala*) subject is negated." The *kevaladharmin* is the subject which is simply imagined by the opponent and is unconnected with the property intended by the proponent. In his PVA p. 551, 2-3, Prajñākaragupta speaks of this *kevaladharmin* as *tadasambaddhaparaparikalpitadharmin* ("a subject imagined by the opponent and unrelated to that [property to be proved]"). See TILLEMANS (1998) p. 113, fn. 4.

According to Dharmakīrti, although there is invalidation of the unrelated subject, i.e., the Vaiśeṣika space, the thesis does not have faults like *āśrayāsiddha*. If the Buddhist proponent's intended subject, i.e., the *svadharmin*, were being refuted, such faults should occur. However, since that thesis only proves the nonexistence of the unrelated subject imagined by the Vaiśeṣika, but does not prove the nonexistence of the Buddhist proponent's intended subject, faults like *āśrayāsiddha* do not occur.

(*arthakriyāśakti*) pervaded by successiveness and simultaneity and so forth? When real entities exist, they cannot truly be something to be negated in any way. When [real entities] do not exist, [then here] too, if one could not [negate them] simply because of the fallacy that the locus was unestablished, then nothing could ever be negated in any fashion. Therefore, how did the Yogācāras refute external objects and so forth by saying such things as [the following]:

> "The object is not one; nor is it many when it is taken as [individual] atoms.[222]
> Nonmomentary things do not exist because they would have the contradiction of being successive and simultaneous."[223]

When one wishes to negate things imagined by vile (*ngan pa*) non-Buddhists, things such as substance, quality, action, universals and so forth, then too, why would there not be fallacies such as that the locus is unestablished?

2.2.1.4.3 One cannot negate pseudo-entities by proving absurd consequences

§13. If, on the other hand, one says that because one accomplishes this [negation of the things imagined by others] only by proving absurd consequences [the fallacy] will not occur, then how would the convention that these [things imagined by others] are utterly nonexistent be established by proving an absurd consequence which is not a means of valid cognition? [That would not be established] because the [convention of being nonexistent] relies upon valid cognitions.

§14. But if one accepts that the proof of an absurd consequence is also in fact a valid cognition, then in that [proof], will there not be fallacies like that the locus is unestablished? It is not correct for judicious people to purely

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[222]VimŚ k. 11ab: *na tad ekaṃ na cānekam viśayaḥ paramāṇuśaḥ /.* See VimŚV pp. 6, 29-7, 1: *na tāvad ekaṃ viṣayo bhavaty avayavebhyo 'nyasyāvayavirūpasya kvacid apy agrahaṇāt / nāpy anekaṃ paramāṇūnāṃ pratyekam agrahaṇāt /.* "Firstly, the object is not single. This is because [the single substance] being of the nature of a whole different from [its] parts cannot be grasped anywhere at all. Neither is it multiple. This is because atoms cannot be grasped individually." This verse is also quoted in the MĀ D219b7: *de ni gcig na yul min la // tha dad rdul du du ma'ang min //.*

[223]PVin II k. 56cd: *de la rim dang rim ma yin // 'gal phyir skad cig ma yin med //.* (Skt:) *asanto 'kṣaṇikās tasmāt* kramākramavirodhataḥ //.* (* NBhūṣ p. 509, 19: *teṣāṃ.*)

arbitrarily prove fallacies and such things that are [actually] to be derived logically.

2.2.1.4.4 In the proof of the nonexistence of a pseudo-entity, the property-possessor (*dharmin*) cannot be a mental existent which is an entity

§15. [224]The following might be held: When one wishes to prove the negation of external objects and so forth, [then] there is indeed a property-possessor (*dharmin*) which is a real entity and which is mental in character; it is with reference to just this very [*dharmin* which is mental and a real entity] that one negates that external things and the primordial matter (*pradhāna*) and so forth produce anything.[225] Consequently, in this case,

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[224]Starting here, Kamalaśīla examines the existence of the property-possessor (*dharmin*) in the proofs of the nonexistence of pseudo-entities like *pradhāna*, i.e., "primordial matter" accepted in Sāṃkhya philosophy. On *pradhāna* (= *prakṛti*), see fn. 315. Kamalaśīla here introduces two Buddhist objections: the objection made by the Satyākāravādin and the one made by the Alīkākāravādin. The Satyākāravādin, i.e., those who accept that the aspects (*ākāra*) of cognition are really existent, holds that *ākāra* and cognition have the same nature, i.e., a dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), while the Alīkākāravādin, i.e., those who accept that the aspects of cognition are false and do not ultimately exist, holds *ākāra* to have a thoroughly imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*). On Satyākāravāda and Alīkākāravāda, see KAJIYAMA (1965b) and OKI (1982). See also JSSN p. 202, 2-25 and MIMAKI (1976) p. 203, 3-28. And see fn. 234. In the MĀ Kamalaśīla first definitively rejects the Satyākāravādin's idea that *dharmin* is the mental existent which is an entity, or is real. This is because when a real, mental *dharmin* has the property of being without intrinsic nature, then since that *dharmin*'s nature of being an entity is negated, one cannot avoid the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*. On the other hand, Kamalaśīla accepts the Alīkākāravādin's idea that *dharmin* is the unreal, mental existent established by the conceptualizations stemming from the ripening of beginningless karmic tendencies. See fn. 233.

[225]M. Ichigō translates this sentence as follows: "One proves that that [*dharmin*, i.e., cognition,] should not be produced as the external, the *pradhāna* and so forth." (そ（のダルミン・智）が、外的なものとして、又、第一原因 (*pradhāna*) 等として生ぜしめられるべきものではないことを証明するのである。) See ICHIGO (1999) p. 3, 10-12. Note that all five Tibetan editions (CDGNP) have *phyi rol dang gtso bo la sogs* ***par***. However, we emend this *par* to *pas* for the following reasons: (1) the TĀ which corresponds to the present sentence of MĀ says: (TĀ D261a2:) *phyi dang gtso bo la sogs* ***pas*** *// de la bskyed bya nyid 'gog na //*; (2) the present sentence of MĀ is repeated in the MĀ D174a1: *blo la phyi dang gtso bo la sogs* ***pas*** *bskyed par bya ba nyid dgag pa bsgrubs su zin kyan ... /*; (3) the TĀ which

faults such as *āśrayāsiddha* and the like do not occur at all.

§16. [Reply:] Suppose that were so. Now suppose that the reasons consisting in negative properties, viz., the absence of oneness or manyness or the fact of being void of the capacity of practical efficacy (*arthakriyā*) pervaded by successiveness and simultaneity,[226] were not at all acknowledged as being properties of that [mental] property-possessor. In this case, how could the intended property to be proved ever be established in such a manner with regard to the [mental *dharmin*]? No reason which is not a property of the subject (*pakṣadharma*) and is just merely necessarily connected with the *sādhya* can ever correctly establish the *sādhya*. Were this possible, then why would [a reason] like being an object of the eyes not also end up proving impermanence with reference to a property-possessor such as sound?

§17. If it is held that these [reasons] are acknowledged with reference to that [real, mental *dharmin*], then [this *dharmin*] would have to be acknowledged as being without intrinsic nature, for the mental [entity] itself would lack the properties which [must] pervade real entities such as the capacity [of practical efficacy] and being one or many, just as [pseudo-entities] like external things, the primordial matter and so forth [also lack these properties]. This is because these [reasons] would be properties of that [mental *dharmin*]. [The proponents] are not proving some other property with reference to some other [*dharmin*];[227] and no [real] entity void of the capacity

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corresponds to the sentence in the MĀ D174a1 also says: (TĀ D261a4:) *phyi dang gtso bo la sogs* ***pas*** *// de la bskyed bya nyid bkag kyang //.* By emending *par* to *pas*, we understand the present sentence of MĀ as saying that with regard to this mental *dharmin* which is an entity, one negates that pseudo-entities like *pradhāna* have the operation (*vyāpāra*) or nature of producing anything.

[226]This is Dharmakīrti's famous reasoning that proves the nonexistence of non-momentary things (*akṣaṇika*). See VN p. 2, 2-4: *yadi na sarvaṃ sat kṛtakaṃ vā pratikṣaṇavināśi syāt, akṣaṇikasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāyogād arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇato nivṛttam ity asad eva syāt.* For a German translation, see MUCH (1991) p. 4, 12-17. See *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (vyatirekātmikā)* of Ratnakīrti p. 83, 13-14: *yasya kramākramau na vidyete na tasyārthakriyāsāmarthyam / yathā śaśaviṣāṇasya / na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramākramāv iti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ /.* For this proof-statement of Ratnakīrti, see MIMAKI ibid. pp. 59-66.

[227]Ichigō translates *chos gzhan yang gzhan la sgrub pa ma yin la /* as follows: "Another property [than 'the lack of the capacity of *arthakriyā*' and '*ekānekaviyoga*'] is not established for the opponent." （（「効力を欠く」「一・多の自性を欠く」とは）別の属性が、反論者に成立しているわけでもないし、... 。）

[of practical efficacy] and so forth can be established. Otherwise, [the proponents] could not prove that external things, the primordial matter and so forth are also without intrinsic nature by relying upon these [reasons]. [But] if it is acknowledged that this [mental entity] also is without intrinsic nature, then the faults such as *āśrayāsiddha* would also remain in that case; and it would not follow that the [opponent's] own thesis would be undermined.[228]

§18. Let us grant that with reference to the mental [*dharmin*], [the proponent] might have negated that external things, the primordial matter and so forth produce anything. Still he would in no way negate the [pseudo-entities] themselves, like the primordial matter, etc., which are imagined by others, for the [mental] image of those things [i.e., the image of the primordial matter, etc.,] is something other [than the pseudo-entities themselves].[229] If the [negations of the pseudo-entities themselves] are not established, then how is it possible that there would also be conventions of nonexistence that pertain to [the proposition] that the primordial matter and so forth, which are imagined by others, do not exist?[230] If the one thing [i.e., primordial matter, etc.] is actually established, it is not logical to apply the conventional designation [of nonexistence] differently to the other

See ICHIGO (1999) p. 4, 3-4.

[228]M. Ichigō's translation of the present sentence is as follows: "It would not follow that my assertion [or view] would be broken." （私の主張がくずれることにもならない。） See ICHIGO ibid. p. 4, 8. Ichigō seems to regard *rang gi phyogs* as meaning Kamalaśīla's own assertion.

[229]Cf. ICHIGO ibid. p. 4, 11-12: "Because the aspects of the [natures of the *pradhāna* and so forth] are different things [from the cognition]." （そ（の第一原因等の本性）の形象は（智とは）別のものであるゆえに。） Cf. MORIYAMA ibid. p. 473, 21-22: "Because [for others,] the aspects (*ākāra*) of those things [i.e., the *pradhāna* and so forth] are different things [from the cognition]." （［他者にとって］その（プラダーナなどの）形象 (*ākāra*) は［知とは］別なものであるからである。）

[230]This sentence, i.e., *de ma grub na gzhan gyis kun brtags pa'i gtso bo la sogs pa med do zhes bya ba'i yul can med pa'i tha snyad du yang ji ltar 'gyur te /*, is problematic. How should we understand *du* of *med pa'i tha snyad du*? This sentence seems to make no sense when it is literally translated as follows: "If the [negations of the pseudo-entities themselves] are not established, then how would [something] also be [established] as the convention of nonexistence that pertains to [the proposition] that the primordial matter and so forth, which are imagined by others, do not exist?" In this translation, it is not clear what the subject (i.e., something) refers to.

things [i.e., the mental images].[231]

§19. Suppose that one is to negate what is imagined by some of the ignorant as being real entities, and which consist in the three unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*),[232] i.e., the cessation with insight (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), etc., [these being pseudo-entities] that effectuate nothing. Then how could the property-possessor (*dharmin*) be mental, for the opponents do not accept that the [mental entity] has the property of being produced by these [unconditioned things]? Consequently, the negations of the [unconditioned things themselves] would never be established at all.

2.2.1.4.5 The property-possessor is a mental existent which is not an entity

§20. [Objection:][233] It is just something existing in the mind which is

[231]If pseudo-entities themselves were not negated, and hence existed, then it would be absurd to say that it is precisely the mental image of such entities that does not exist. The point in refuting a Sāṃkhya, if such a refutation is to be effective, is to show him that the primordial matter *itself* is nonexistent, and not to show him that his *image* is nonexistent.

[232]On *asaṃskṛta* in Buddhist philosophy, see BAREAU (1951). For the Vaibhāṣikas' three sorts of unconditioned things, i.e., space (*ākāśa*), cessation with insight (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*) and cessation without insight (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*), see AK I 5-6: *anāsravā mārgasatyaṃ trividhaṃ cāpy asaṃskṛtam / ākāśaṃ dvau nirodhau ca tatrākāśam anāvṛtiḥ // pratisaṃkhyānirodho yo visaṃyogaḥ pṛthak pṛthak / utpādātyantavighno 'nyo nirodho 'pratisaṃkhyayā //.* See also AKBh ad AK II 55d, p. 91, 4-5: *saṃskṛtasyaiva dharmasya hetuphale bhavataḥ / nāsaṃskṛtasya te //.* For a French translation, see LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (1980) Tome I pp. 7, 11-10, 2 and p. 276, 5-6.

[233]We follow the English translation of these passages in TILLEMANS AND LOPEZ (1998) pp. 124, 23-125, 7, with the exception of one passage. See fn. 235.

The objection is that of the Alīkākāravādin. The Alīkākāravādin says that when one proves the nonexistence of pseudo-entities like *pradhāna*, one proves it with regard to the mental *svadharmin* which is not a real entity. The mental existent, i.e., the *svadharmin*, is unreal and different in nature from the mind. When the *sādhya* which proves the absence of intrinsic nature is established with regard to the mental *svadharmin*, fallacies like *āśrayāsiddha* do not occur, because the *dharmin* is not contradictory with the *sādhya* consisting in the absence of intrinsic nature. According to the Alīkākāravādin, although one proves the nonexistence of a pseudo-entity with regard to the mental *svadharmin*, this is also a proof of the negation of the pseudo-entity itself, because, due to error, the mental existent is regarded as not being different from the pseudo-entity itself.

The Alīkākāravādin's idea that one proves the nonexistence of pseudo-entities

the property-possessor, [something] established by conceptualizations stemming from the ripening of their own beginningless [karmic] tendencies [and] which is metaphorically designated by the infantile as being external and real. Thus it is with reference to that [fictional mental existent] that one negates the primordial matter and so forth. Although that [mental existent] does not ultimately have any intrinsic nature, still, due to error, it is conceived of as if it were external, as if it were not different from the primordial matter and the like and as if it had all the various properties like being void

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with regard to a *dharmin* that is a mental existent established by conceptualization can be found in Dharmakīrti's texts. In the PV and the PVin Dharmakīrti says that although a pseudo-entity, such as *pradhāna*, does not exist as something real and external, its conceptual representations, or in other words, the object of the word (*śabdārtha*) exists, and therefore, due to the existence of the *svadharmin*, the fault of *āśrayāsiddha* does not occur. See PV I kk. 205-206 (= PVin III kk. 53-54): *anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpaparinisṭhitaḥ / śabdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhayāśrayaḥ // tasmin bhāvānupādāne sādhye 'syānupalambhanam / tathā hetur na tasyaivābhāvaḥ śabdaprayogataḥ //.* English translation in TILLEMANS (1998) pp. 117-118: "The verbal object (*śabdārtha*), which is completely derived from conceptualization proceeding from beginningless tendencies, is a *dharma* of three kinds: based on something existent, something nonexistent or both. When this [verbal object, such as *pradhāna*, etc.], which is without any existent substratum, is being proven, then the nonperception of this as being in such a way [i.e., as existing externally] is the logical reason. The nonexistence of this very [*śabdārtha*] itself is not, for we do use words [like '*pradhāna*,' etc.]." As for three kinds of *śabdārtha* above, see TILLEMANS ibid. p. 117, fn. 13. See also PVSV p. 106, 23-24: *yadi hi śabdārtha evāpohyeta pradhānaśabdavācyasya dharmiṇa eva nirākaraṇān nirādhāraḥ sādhyadharmaḥ syāt /.* "If the verbal object itself were to be negated, [then] since just the *dharmin* which is the object expressed by the word *pradhāna* would be negated, the *sādhyadharma* would have no basis." And see PVSV p. 106, 6-7: *tasya bhāvānupādānatve sādhye sa eva pratyātmavedyatvād apratikṣepārho 'rtho dharmī /.* "When this [verbal object, such as *pradhāna*, etc.], which is without any existent substratum, is being proven, then since just this [object appearing in conceptual cognition] is reflexively cognized, the *dharmin* is an object which cannot be denied." See also PVSVṬ p. 385, 25-27: *tasya pradhānādivikalpapratibhāsasya bhāvānupādhānatve dharme sādhye sa eva vikalpapratibhāso buddhisvabhāvatayā pratyātmavedyatvāt svasaṃvedanapratyakṣasiddhatvād apratikṣepārho 'rtho dharmī /.*

In his MĀ Kamalaśīla seems to rely upon this idea of Dharmakīrti, because Kamalaśīla also holds that when one proves the negation of a pseudo-entity, the *dharmin*, i.e., the *svadharmin*, is always just a conceptual representation (*brtags pa*).

of the capacity [for practical efficacy] and so forth. In that case, when we negate the intrinsic natures of the primordial matter and so forth, the *sādhya* consisting of negations of the primordial matter, etc. and the *sādhana* [for these negations] not only have the same locus but are in fact established. This is because the infantile grasp this [mental existent] alone as being external and as being the primordial matter, etc., and the proponent and opponent both apply conventional designations simply because they think that this [mental existent] is not different from the [pseudo-entities themselves], just as when a person suffering from eye disease (*taimirika*) sees the moon as two. Although this [mental existent] is something [merely] imagined by the mind, it is metaphorically designated as the mind due to its being an image. In reality, however, it is not of the nature of the mind, in that it appears as something different in character from the [mind]. Hence even though it is acknowledged that this [mental existent] is without intrinsic nature, it does not follow that the mind is without intrinsic nature.[234] In that case, the

[234]The Alīkākāravādins hold that cognition and its aspects or images (*ākāra*) are different in nature. That is, although cognition or mind is real, the *ākāra* is false and conceptually created. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem to take the Alīkākāravādins' position as being that an *ākāra* has a thoroughly imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*), but not a dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*). For example, in the MAV and the MAP, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla refute the Alīkākāravāda by saying that if an unreal *ākāra* had a cause, it would have a dependent nature, but would not have a thoroughly imagined nature. See MAK 58: *rgyu med na ni gang zhig gis // res 'ga' 'byung ba 'di rung 'gyur // rgyu dang ldan na gang zhig gis // gzhan gyi dbang las bzlog par 'gyur //.* "If an *ākāra* has no cause, how would [its] arising at specific times be possible? If it has a cause, how could it avoid [the fault of its] having a dependent nature?" See also MAP ad MAK 58cd D107a6-7: *'o na rgyu dang ldan par 'gyur ro snyam pa la / rgyu dang ldan na'ang 'ga' zhig gis // zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so // gzhan gyi dbang zhes bya ba ni rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba yin pa'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang gi rang bzhin du 'gyur gyi / kun brtags pa ni ma yin no zhes bya ba'i tha tshigs go //.* Cf. AAA p. 631, 8-10: *atha mā bhūd ayaṃ doṣa iti hetumattvam abhyupagamyate tadā pratītyasamutpannatvād grāhyagrāhakākārayoḥ kalpitatvābhāvāt paratantratāsvabhāvaḥ prasajyate.* In the Alīkākāravāda theory, since *ākāra* and cognition are different in nature, there is no identity between them. However, since the *ākāra* which is the object of cognition is not external but internal, the *ākāra* is not completely different from cognition. In the Buddhist arguments for idealism based on the reason that subjective and objective states are necessarily co-apprehended (*sahopalambhaniyama*), Dharmottara, who is regarded as an Alīkākāravādin in Tibetan literature on doctrinal systems, says in his PVinṬ that although an *ākāra* is not different from its cognition, this nondifference does not

negations of intrinsic natures such as the external and the primordial matter, etc. are proved by means of a valid cognition. But one does not apply the reasons in order to negate the [mental existent] itself.[235] Even where there is a property-possessor, like sound and so forth, which is external and a real entity, there too, in order to prove properties such as impermanence, we rely upon just that property-possessor which exists mentally and is metaphorically designated as being nondifferent from the external sounds and so forth. This is because (a) the external sounds, etc., which are restricted to different places, times and conditions, do not appear directly in their own [individual] natures to the minds of the proponent and opponent; (b) since it [i.e., an external entity,] is partless, there cannot be various properties like *sādhya* and *sādhana*. Consequently, all these conventions of inferable objects and inference and so forth operate only in reliance upon property-possessors existing in the mind.[236] This is because any other way is impossible.

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imply the identity between the *ākāra* and its cognition, but simply means the absence of difference between them. See PVinṬ I D157a5-7: *don gzhan pa'i rang bzhin nyid ma yin te zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba ston pa'o // 'di skad du 'di dag gcig par ni bsgrub par bya ba ma yin gyi / 'on kyang tha dad pa (D pa: P om.) dag dgag pa tsam yin no zhes ston pa yin no // ci'i phyir tha dad pa dgag pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi / gcig nyid du ni bsgrub pa ma yin no zhes smra / gcig tu ni 'thad pa ma (P ma: D om.) yin te / gang gi phyir gal te gzung ba'i rnam par gsal ba yang mi bden na / rig pa yang bden pa nyid du gang gis rtog (D rtog: P rtogs) par byed /.* "The words *na ... arthāntararūpatvam* ('the blue is not a different thing in nature from [its] perception') indicates what is to be proved [by reason of *sahopalambhaniyama*]. This shows the following: it should not be proved that these two [i.e., the blue and its perception] are identical, but it is simply negated that [they] are different. [Objection:] Why do you say that the mere negation of [their] difference should be proved, but [their] identity [should] not be proved? [Reply:] It is not correct [to prove] that [those two] are identical. This is because, if the appearance of the grasped aspect is unreal, how would it be held that [its] cognition is real?" See MATSUMOTO (1980c) pp. 281-278 and IWATA (1991a) Teil I, pp. 173-183.

[235] See fn. 233. See also AAA pp. 638, 26-639, 1 (= MAP D123a5-6): *[paramārthata iti viśeṣaṇāt] pratibhāsamāne dharmiṇi samāropitatāttvikabhāvaniṣedhaḥ sādhyate. na tu dharmisvarūpaniṣedha ...* . And see ICHIGO ibid. p. 5, 15-17, MORIYAMA ibid. p. 484, n. 147. Cf. TILLEMANS AND LOPEZ (1998) p. 124, 42-45.

[236] S. Moriyama regards the sentence *rjes su dpag par bya ba dang / rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i tha snyad 'di thams cad ni blo la yod pa'i chos can kho na la brten nas 'jug pa nyid de /* as the quotation from Dignāga's *Hetumukha* cited in PVSV pp. 2, 22-3, 1: *sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhena*

§21. [Reply:] Suppose this were so. Now, even when one proved negations and so forth in reliance upon imagined property-possessors, though they be ultimately without intrinsic nature, no fault like *āśrayāsiddha*, etc. would be committed. So then why direct [your] criticisms so vociferously against us![237] Just as you develop ideas of *sādhya* and *sādhana* in reliance upon imagined property-possessors in order to negate the primordial matter, etc. so that you may have access to the ultimate, in the same fashion we too, in order to negate superimpositions of intrinsic natures like existence and nonexistence, etc. upon commonly recognized things like visible matter and sound, demonstrate to the infantile that these [commonly recognized things like visible matter, etc.] are like illusions, mirages, dreams and reflections. In that case, just as [for you], even though [you] do negate the superimposed intrinsic nature of being a real entity with reference to imagined property-possessors [like the primordial matter, etc.], there are no faults like [*āśraya-*]*asiddha*[*-hetu*], because [these property-possessors][238] appear to both the proponent and the opponent; so too, since visible matter and so forth also appear to everyone from cowherds' wives on up, how is it that they would be unestablished (*asiddha*)?[239] An appearance does not

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dharmadharmibhedena. See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 475, 6-8, p. 485, n. 149. This sentence of MĀ, however, should be regarded as being the opponent's own statement, and not as a quotation.

[237]It is evident from Kamalaśīla's reply here that he accepts the position of the Alīkākāravādin.

[238]See TĀ D261b2: *brtags pa la sogs sgro btags pa'i // dngos po'i chos ni 'gog byed la // dngos po'i ngo bo rnams bkag kyang // ji ltar brtags pa'i chos can dag // snang ba'i phyir na ma grub min // gzugs la sogs pa'ang de bzhin ltos //.* "When you negate the superimposed property of being a real entity [with reference to] imagined things and so forth, then although the nature of being a real entity is negated, [property-possessors] are not unestablished because imagined property-possessors appear [to both opponent and proponent]. In the same manner, [with regard to] visible matter and so forth too, we should observe [that they are not unestablished]."

[239]In Buddhist logic the requirements that the reason and the property-possessor should be established for both parties of a debate (*ubhayasiddha*) were laid down by Dignāga in his PS III k. 11: *dvayoḥ siddhena dharmeṇa vyavahārād viparyaye / dvayor ekasya cāsiddhau dharmyasiddhau ca neṣyate //.* (Skt. found in the PVA p. 647, 9.) Therefore, in the proof of the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas too, the property-possessor and so forth should be established for both parties. In order to follow such requirements, later Mādhyamika philosophers like Jñānagarbha say that inference arises only when the *dharmin*, *dharma*, etc. that commonly appear

entail the intrinsic nature of being true — otherwise (*gang gis na; yena*) the former would be excluded if the latter [i.e., the intrinsic nature of being true,] were absent, for falsities do also appear.[240] If that were not so, then

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to the consciousness of both parties are established. See SDVK 18-19: *rgol ba gnyi ga'i shes pa la // ji tsam snang ba'i cha yod pa // de tsam de la brten nas ni // chos can chos la sogs par rtog // de tshe rjes su dpag pa 'byung // gang gi tshe na gzhan na min // de bas rigs pa smra ba rnams // de skad smra la su zhig 'gog //.* "It suffices that there is a datum that appears to the consciousness of both parties for one to conceptualize property-possessor, property and so forth in reliance upon that [datum]. In the case [where property-possessor, property, etc. that appear to their consciousness are established]*, inference arises, but not in another case. Therefore, who can refute what logicians have thus stated [in k. 18]?" (* SDVV D9b6-7: *rjes su dpag pa dang rjes su dpag par bya ba 'di tha snyad kyi rgol ba dang / phyir rgol ba dag gi blo'i bdag nyid la snang ba'i chos can dang chos dang dpe nyid du rnam par gzhag par 'byung gi //.*) Jñānagarbha also says in the SDVV D5b6: *rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba'i shes pa la snang ba'i cha la ni rtsod pa su yang med do // rtsod par byed na ni mngon sum la sogs pas gnod par 'gyur ro //.* "Nobody has any debate about the datum that appears to the consciousness of the proponent and the opponent. If they did debate [about it], they would be refuted by direct perception and so forth." Śāntarakṣita also has the same idea and says in the MAK 78: *bdag ni snang ba'i ngang can gyi // dngos po dgag par mi byed de // de lta bas na sgrub pa dang // bsgrub bya bzhag pa 'khrugs pa med //.* "We do not deny entities which are of the nature of appearance. Therefore, there is no incoherence in the establishment of *sādhana* and *sādhya*." In his MAP ad MAK 78, Kamalaśīla, commenting on the problem of the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*, explains that the Mādhyamikas prove the negation of the real intrinsic nature superimposed by the opponent upon such an appearing *dharmin*, but do not prove the negation of the *dharmin*'s own nature. See MAP D123a5-6: *chos can snang ba 'di la yang rang bzhin yang dag par sgro btags pa dgag pa sgrub par byed kyi / chos can gyi rang gi ngo bo 'gog par ni ma yin pas ... /*, which corresponds to the AAA pp. 638, 26-639, 1: *[paramārthata iti viśeṣaṇāt] pratibhāsamāne dharmiṇi samāropitatāttvikabhāvaniṣedhaḥ sādhyate. na tu dharmisvarūpaniṣedha ... .* Since the Mādhyamika proponent establishes the *dharmin* in reliance upon the perceived phenomenon, or datum, which commonly appears to both parties of a debate, he can obtain a common locus of a debate. That is, although the Mādhyamikas prove the negation of the superimposed property with regard to the *dharmin*, nonetheless the *dharmin* does appear since deceptive things like illusions can also appear. Therefore, the *dharmin* is not unestablished. On "commonly appearing property-possessors" (*chos can mthun snang ba*) and Tibetan explanations of this notion, see TILLEMANS (1982) pp. 105-112, LOPEZ (1987) p. 78 and HOPKINS (1989). On Candrakīrti's position against such a commonly appearing *dharmin*, see TILLEMANS (1990) pp. 41-53.

[240]This is also a sentence which has a *gang gis na/yena* clause. For the use of

[it would follow absurdly that] everyone would perceive thusness, for only thusness would appear.

§22. Just as when [you] state properties like being without capacity [of practical efficacy] in order to correctly establish that an imagined property-possessor too has no intrinsic nature [such a statement] establishes that [lack of intrinsic nature] with reference to the primordial matter, etc. because [these properties] entail that [lack of intrinsic nature], so too we cite [properties] like really being without capacity in order to prove the fact of really [lacking intrinsic nature] with reference to all imagined entities. Why would not it too be a *sādhana*?

2.2.1.4.6 There is no fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha* due to being committed to a doctrinal system (*siddhānta*)

§23. Moreover, judicious people commit themselves [to things] after examination; and it is when it is ascertained that a nature of something is [deemed] correct. It is not when they are [in the process of] making the examination [that judicious people commit themselves],[241] for the [nature]

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gang gis na/yena, see fn. 154. So *gang gis na* (*yena*) should be translated into English as "otherwise" or "so that."

The parallel sentence can be found in MAP and AAA. MAP D123a6-7: *gang gis na don dam pa pa'i rang bzhin log na ldog par 'gyur ba / don dam pa pa'i rang bzhin nyid kyis snang ba la khyab pa ni med de / zla ba gnis dang skra shad la sogs pa brdzun pa yang snang ba'i phyir ro //.* AAA p. 639, 3-5: *na hi pāramārthikasvabhāvatvena pratibhāso vyāpto yena tannivṛttau nivartet, alīkasyāpi dvicandrakeśoṇḍukāder bhāsanāt.*

[241] Kamalaśīla here imagines the objection that when the Buddhists negate the superimposed intrinsic nature of being a real entity with reference to imagined property-possessors like *pradhāna*, etc., they have already committed themselves to a doctrinal system, such as that of the Sāṃkhya, and therefore such a proof has faults like *āśrayāsiddha*. This type of argument seems to have been derived from the argument in the PVin III. See SDVK 26cd: *rigs pa shes pas dpyad pa yi // 'og tu khas blangs bya bar bshad //.* "The logician has explained that [one] should commit himself [to things] after examination." SDVV D12a1-2: *brtags pa'i 'og tu khas blang gi // khas blangs nas brtag pa 'jug pa ni ma yin no zhes bya ba'i don 'di ni tshad ma rnam par gtan la dbab pa la sogs par rab tu dpyad zin pa'i phyir ro //.* "This is because this meaning of the following sentence has been already analyzed in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, etc.: '[One] commits himself [to things] after examination, but one does not embark upon the examination after [his] commitment [to things].'" PVin III D187b5: *des na khas blangs nas brtag pa 'jug pa ni ma yin gyi / 'on kyang brtags nas khas len pa yin te /.* "Therefore,

has not yet been ascertained and the examination is what is supposed to ascertain that [nature]. Therefore, when ascertaining thusness by means of valid cognitions nobody is committed to any doctrinal system (*siddhānta*), and thus at that time who can one reproach with [faults] like the property-possessor being unestablished due to *āśrayāsiddha*?[242]

2.2.1.4.6.1 It is not correct to say that when someone demonstrates a proposition to others, he already has a commitment to a doctrinal system

§24. Now suppose it were held that the proponent himself had earlier on ascertained this thusness by a valid cognition, that it was because he then wished to prove it to others that the [proof] was set in motion, and that [his] commitment to a doctrinal system was therefore [already] in fact there earlier.[243] This would also be incorrect, for when he himself is making

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[one should] not make an examination after [his] commitment [to things]; to the contrary, [one should] commit himself [to things] after examination." PVin III D188b2: *brtag pa'i dus na 'ga' yang khas blangs pa med pa'i phyir ro //.* The Sanskrit sentence is found in the NBhūṣ p. 232, 23 and p. 234, 11: *nāpi parīkṣākāle kasyacid abhyupagamaḥ.* See MATSUSHITA (1985) p. 37 and (1984) pp. 13-14. And see IWATA (1993b) p. 35 and (1995) p. 162. Note that the basic same type of discussion already figures in PV IV. See PV IV k. 49: *vādatyāgas tadā syāc cen na tadānabhyupāyataḥ / upāyo hy abhyupāye 'yam anaṅgaṃ sa tadāpi san //.* English translation in TILLEMANS (2000): "[Objection:]* But in that case the debate would be relinquished. [Reply:] No, because there is no acceptance [of a treatise] at the time [of making a *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*]. Indeed, this [investigation (*vicāra*)] is the method for accepting [a treatise]; [so] even if there is [acceptance of a treatise] at this time, this is not a factor." (* The opponent here is the Naiyāyika. See *Nyāyasūtra* (NS) I.2.1 and I.2.6.) See also PV IV k. 53, kk. 42-43 and TILLEMANS ibid. pp. 83-84 and pp. 68-72.

[242]M. Ichigō's translation of the present sentence is as follows: "With regard to some [proposition] (*gang la*), one [ascertains thusness by] arguing [faults] like the property-possessor being unestablished due to *āśrayāsiddha*." （或る（命題）について、所依不成のゆえに、ダルミンは成立しない、云々と議論（して真実であることを確定）するのである。） See ICHIGO ibid. p. 7, 6-8. Although Ichigō regards *gang la* as an indefinite pronoun, this does not seem to be possible. In this case *gang la* should be regarded as an interrogative pronoun, *kasya* or *kasmin*. And *rgol bar byed* seems to correspond in Sanskrit to *codayati*, "reproach" or "criticize."

[243]The opponent here holds that inference-for-oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) rely upon two different valid cognitions and that after ascertaining thusness by means of a *svārthānumāna*, proponents commit themselves to a doctrinal system before proving it to others. The Buddhists, how-

it understood [to opponents], he does not commit himself to any doctrinal system. Whatever be the valid cognition on the basis of which the proponent himself, who had not earlier committed himself to a doctrinal system, comes to understand thusness, it is by means of that very [valid cognition] that he makes opponents understand.[244] If that is so, then how could it be said that he had committed himself to a doctrinal system? When he himself had ascertained this [thusness] earlier on by means of a valid cognition, then a proof for opponents on the basis of a mere doctrinal system alone is not established either; no judicious opponent would ever believe in a proposition lacking a valid cognition just because of the [proponent's] mere words. Therefore, since [the situation] is the same when demonstrating [a proposition] to an opponent as when the [proponent] himself ascertains it, in all events one ascertains thusness exclusively on the basis of a valid cognition. If this is so, then because no one has a commitment to a doctrinal system, how is it that you state [criticisms] like the property-possessor being unestablished due to this [prior commitment to a doctrinal system]?

2.2.1.4.6.2 One should not rely upon a property-possessor merely postulated by doctrinal systems

§25. [Objection:] Although the proponent's intended *sādhya* is estab-

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ever, hold that *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* both rely upon the same valid cognition. That is to say, the valid cognition which is used for *svārthānumāna* and which is free of doctrinal commitment, is the same valid cognition that will be communicated in words by a *parārthānumāna.*

[244]See PVin III D187a7-187b1 (= PSVa P42b8-43a1; PSVb P124b3-4): *ji ltar rang nyid tshul gsum ba'i rtags las rtags can la shes pa skyes pa de (P de: D om.) kho na ltar gzhan la rtags can gyi shes pa bskyed par 'dod pas tshul gsum ba'i rtags ston par byed pa ni gzhan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste /.* This sentence is quoted in the *Syādvādaratnākara* p. 23, 13-15: *yathaiva hi svayaṃ trirūpāl liṅgato liṅgini jñānam utpannaṃ tathaiva paratra liṅgijñānotpipādayiṣayā trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṃ parārtham anumānam* "Just as on the basis of a triply characterized reason, an understanding of that which possesses the reason [i.e., *sādhyadharma*,] arises for [the proponent] himself, in the same manner due to [his] desiring to produce the understanding of that which possesses the reason [i.e., *sādhyadharma*,] to others, will [the proponent] state the triply characterized reason, [and precisely this statement of the triply characterized reason] is the inference-for-others." Cf. DhP p. 150, 18-19: *yenārthakrameṇātmanaḥ parokṣārthajñānam utpannaṃ tenaiva krameṇa parasantāne liṅgijñānotpipādayiṣayā trirūpasya liṅgasya khyāpakaṃ yad vacanaṃ tat parārtham anumānam.* See TANI (1987) p. 2, and see IWATA (1993b) p. 28 and pp. 39-40 and (1995) pp. 154-156.

lished due to a genuinely valid cognition, he is committed to a doctrinal system, and thus the [doctrinal system] can invalidate the [*sādhya*].[245] [Reply:] What reasoning could ever be different from the [judicious person's way of proceeding independently of doctrinal commitment]? When thinking about the thusness of entities, no one relies upon a property-possessor which is completely a postulate of a doctrinal system, for this type of property-possessor is never established for the proponent and opponent.[246] For example, when the Buddhists and others accept things such as a property-possessor like sound being derived from atoms, the Vaiśeṣikas and others will not [accept these property-possessors] in this way, for they imagine that it [i.e., sound,] is a quality of space (*ākāśaguṇa*), etc.[247] Consequently, if

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[245]M. Ichigō's translation of the present sentence is as follows: "Although it* proves the proponent's intended *sādhya* by means of a correct *pramāṇa*, [nonetheless]** due to being accepted as a doctrinal system, that is invalidated in this case." (* In Ichigō's translation, it is not clear what the subject of this clause is. ** This word was inserted by the present writer.) (正しいプラマーナによって立論者の主張する所証を証明するのであるが、定説として承認されていることを理由に、その場合それは拒斥される、... 。) See ICHIGO ibid. p. 7, 24-25. Ichigō's translation is not clear. What is invalidated by what?

[246]See MAK 76-77:*gzhung gis bskyed pa'i bye brag gi // chos can spangs nas mkhas pa dang // bud med byis pa'i bar dag la // grags par gyur pa'i dngos rnams la // bsgrub dang sgrub pa'i dngos po 'di // ma lus yang dag 'jug par 'gyur // de lta min na gzhi ma grub // la sogs lan ni ji skad* gdab //.* "The various property-possessors invented by [philosophical] schools are excluded and the relationship between *sādhya* and *sādhana* functions correctly for all [proponents and opponents] with regard to the entities generally acknowledged by [everyone] from scholars to women and the infantile. Otherwise, how could we answer [criticisms] like *āśrayāsiddha* and so forth?" kk. 76-77 are quoted in the BSGT 106a2-3: *gzhung gis bskyed pa'i bye brag gi // chos can spangs nas mkhas pa dang // bud med byis pa'i bar dag la // grags par gyur pa'i dngos rnams la // bsgrub dang sgrub pa'i dngos po 'di // ma lus yang dag 'jug par 'gyur // de lta min na gzhi ma grub // la sogs lan ni ji ltar* gdab //.* (* It seems better to emend *ji skad* into *ji ltar* due to the quotation in the BSGT.)

[247]For the idea of sound being a quality of space, see *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh) ad NS II.2.12, pp. 588-589.

The MĀ's argument here is based upon the PV IV's argument on the term *svayam* in Dignāga's definition of the thesis (*pakṣa*), i.e., kk. 42-83. See TILLEMANS (2000) pp. 68-114. See also PV IV kk. 147-148 and TILLEMANS ibid. pp. 209-210. Cf. PrasP p. 29, 1-2: *tathā hi / yadi cāturmahābhautikaḥ śabdo gṛhyate sa parasyāsiddhaḥ / athākāśaguṇo gṛhyate sa bauddhasya svato 'siddhaḥ /.* When one makes an inference which functions by the force of entities (*vastubala-*

this sort of property-possessor was unestablished, no one would ever set about proving [the *sādhya*]. But if this sort of a property-possessor were to be established, then its properties would also in fact be established for both [the proponent and the opponent], with the result that there would be no debate.

2.2.1.4.6.3 Conclusion

§26. Therefore, all who wish to understand thusness reject the various types of property-possessors established through traditions and [instead] develop ideas of *sādhya* and *sādhana* purely in reliance upon what everyone from cowherds on up recognizes. Hence, it is totally irrelevant to raise [faults] like *āśrayāsiddha* in reliance upon doctrinal systems. It is only correct to raise this [fault] when the property-possessors and so forth are not acknowledged even conventionally; but for us, it is not the case that visible matter and so forth are unestablished even conventionally.

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pravṛttānumāna), a treatise (*śāstra*) is not taken into account. The property which the proponent intends himself is what is to be proved. If treatises were to be taken into account, property-possessors like sound would not be established for both parties of debate. See MAP D123b2-3: *bye brag pa la sogs pa ni phyogs la sogs pa chos can yan lag can yin pa dang / sgra yang nam mkha'i yon tan yin no zhes bya bar 'dod de / chos can de dag ni sangs rgyas pa la sogs pa la ma grub po //.* "Vaiśeṣikas and so forth accept that property-possessors like place have a whole, and that sound is a quality of space. Those property-possessors are unestablished for the Buddhists and so forth."

3. The Proof of the Absence of Intrinsic Nature in Reality by means of Nonperception (*anupalabdhi*)

3.1 OBJECTIONS (*pūrvapakṣa*)

§1. Nor can nonperception[248] prove the [absence of intrinsic nature].

3.1.1 Reasons consisting in nonperception of an entity itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*) cannot prove the absence of intrinsic nature

§2. There are the following [arguments]. First of all, to take the proof of the convention of nonexistence (*abhāvavyavahāra*)[249] consisting in nonperception of an entity itself:[250] when it is understood perceptually that an entity is free of something else, then this [proof] is applied in order to prove this convention [of nonexistence] to someone who is confused from hearing untrue treatises and cannot apply the convention that something is free of something else.[251] For you, however, there can never be any such real

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[248]On Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception, see Chapter 3 pp. 52-64.

[249]For the meaning of *abhāvavyavahāra*, see fn. 92.

[250]Cf. Chapter 3 p. 61. Cf. NB II 31: *svabhāvānupalabdhir yathā nātra dhūma upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher iti //.* "Nonperception of an entity itself is as follows: here there is no smoke, because though perceptible it is not [in fact] perceived."

[251]On the words *de la gzhan gyis dben par tha snyad*, see TĀ D258a7-258b1: *gzhan yang gzhan gyis dben pa'i don // mngon sum rtogs pa yod na ni // de la gzhan don dben pa yi // tha snyad bsgrub pa rab tu byed // rang bzhin mi dmigs pa*

entity understood perceptually which would be separate from all dharmas and with regard to which this convention [of intrinsic nature's being nonexistent] would be proved. This is so because [otherwise] it would follow that your own thesis [of all dharmas being without intrinsic nature] would be undermined. All this has already been explained.[252]

3.1.2 Reasons consisting in a perception of things incompatible with the things in question (*viruddhopalabdhi*) are impossible

§3. [Reasons consisting in] a perception of things incompatible with the [thing in question] and so forth[253] will also be utterly impossible. This is because, since the [absence of intrinsic nature] is radically inaccessible (*atyantaparokṣa*), nothing incompatible with the emptiness (*viviktatā*) of all dharmas is established. If, on the other hand, [such an incompatible thing] were to be established, then because these very things which would be incompatible with that [emptiness] would be established as real entities, then no unacceptable consequence [for us] would ensue.

3.1.2.1 Two types of incompatibilities (*virodha*)

§4. The incompatibility of entities is classified in a twofold manner:[254]

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dag gis // thams cad dben par mi 'gyur te // des na bdag nyid mi dmigs pas // re zhig de ni sgrub mi byed //. "Moreover, when there is the direct perception (*mngon sum rtogs pa*) of something being free of another [object], [this direct perception] will effectuate the proof of the convention that something is free of another object. By means of nonperception of an entity itself, it is not possible [to understand] that all things are void. Therefore, first, you cannot prove the [voidness of all things] by means of nonperception of an [entity] itself." The convention that something X is free of something Y is also an *abhāvavyavahāra*, i.e., the convention that Y is nonexistent with regard to X.

252 MĀ D134b3-4. See Translation 1 pp. 91-92.

253 Cf. NB II 34: *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhir yathā nātra śītasparśo vahner iti //.* "Perception of something which is incompatible with the thing in question is as follows: here there is no sensation of cold, because there is fire."

254 Cf. NB III 72: *dvividho hi padārthānāṃ virodhaḥ.* "The incompatiblity of entities is of two sorts." Cf. TSPa pp. 928, 25-929, 1: *dvividha eva hi bhāvānāṃ virodhaḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā sahānavasthānatā ca / tatra ye parasparaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇās teṣām aikyaṃ viruddham / ye tu sahānavasthāyinas teṣām ekadeśāvasthānaṃ viruddham /.* "The incompatibility of entities is just of two sorts: [one] is that which is characterized as mutual exclusion, and [the other]

[one] is that which is characterized as non-coexistence (*sahānavasthāna-lakṣaṇa*) and [the other] is that which is characterized as mutual exclusion (*parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇa*).

3.1.2.1.1 The incompatibility which is characterized as non-coexistence

§5. If something with complete causes is necessarily absent when something else is present, then these two are established as [having] the first [kind of] incompatibility. It is just like, for example, the sensation of cold and that of warmth.[255]

3.1.2.1.2 The incompatibility which is characterized as mutual exclusion

§6. When with reference to some [basis], the affirmation of something is necessarily connected with the negation of something else, these two are established as [possessing] the second [kind of] incompatibility with reference to that [basis]. It is just like, for example, an entity being present and being absent at the same time in the same property-possessor (*dharmin*).[256]

3.1.2.2 Neither of these two types of incompatibilities is possible for the Mādhyamikas

§7. Neither of these types of incompatibilities is possible at all for one who asserts that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature. This is because although sky-lotuses and so forth might not have incomplete causes, they would not be determined when something else was negated, for this would end up in [them being] real entities.

3.1.2.2.1 The incompatibility which is characterized as mutual exclusion is impossible for the Mādhyamikas

§8. It is true that you might determine the [absence of intrinsic nature]

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is that which is [characterized as] non-coexistence. Of the two, when [two] things are characterized by mutual exclusion, their identity is contradicted. But when [two] things do not coexist, their presence in the same place is opposed."

[255]Cf. NB III 73-74: *avikalakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvād virodhagatiḥ. śītoṣṇasparśavat.* "If something with complete causes is absent when something else is present, we understand [their] incompatibility, as in the case of the sensation of cold and that of warmth."

[256]Cf. NB III 75: *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatayā vā bhāvābhāvavat.* "There is also [incompatibility of entities] due to being characterized as mutual exclusion, as in the case of existence and nonexistence."

by negating [that something] exists. Nonetheless, this [absence of intrinsic nature] too would be established on the condition that something existent was negated somewhere. You however cannot accept that something ever exists when something [else] is negated.[257]

3.1.2.2.2 The incompatibility which is characterized as non-coexistence is impossible for the Mādhyamikas

§9. If the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas were to be in proximity [to things], then for you nothing with complete causes could ever be established as existent.[258]

3.1.2.2.3 If the incompatibility which is characterized as non-coexistence were to be established, real entities would be established

§10. If, on the other hand, something were to be established, then that very thing which has complete causes would be established as a real entity.

3.1.2.2.4 If the incompatibility which is characterized as mutual exclusion were to be established, real entities would be estab-

[257]The objection is as follows. If the absence of intrinsic nature were to be determined when something else was negated, the existence of this "something else" would have to be accepted. For the Mādhyamikas who accept the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas, however, it is impossible to accept the existence of such a thing. If they were to accept the existence of that thing, their own thesis would be undermined. Therefore, the opponent here says that the Mādhyamikas could not accept the incompatibility which is characterized as mutual exclusion.

S. Moriyama translates *khyed ni gang du yang gang zhig rnam par gcad par 'gyur ba gang yang yod par mi 'dod do* as follows: "You [i.e., the Mādhyamikas] do not accept that even with regard to something (X), something (B) which would be excluded would also [establish] the existence of something (A)." (汝（中観派）は、何らのものXについても、排除されることになるBが、何らのAの有なることをも［成立させるとは］認めはしない。) See MORIYAMA (1990b) p. 28, 9-10. It can readily be seen that our interpretation differs from that of Moriyama.

[258]The opponent here says that for the Mādhyamikas, the incompatibility which is characterized as non-coexistence (*sahānavasthānalakṣaṇavirodha*) is also impossible. That is, if something X with complete causes is necessarily absent when something Y is in proximity to X at the same time, X and Y are established as having that incompatibility. However, when the Mādhyamikas accept all dharmas as being without intrinsic nature, they could not speak about non-coexistence of X (i.e., dharmas) and Y (i.e., absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas), as this would imply that the X (i.e., dharmas) would have to really exist.

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§11. Suppose that by negating that all dharmas have no intrinsic nature it were determined that they have some intrinsic nature. Then this would itself mean that our real entities have also been proved.

3.1.2.3 Conclusion: *viruddhopalabdhi* is impossible

§12. So, in the first place, perception of what is incompatible with the [thing in question] (*viruddhopalabdhi*) is impossible.

3.1.3 Reasons consisting in a perception of that which is pervaded by an incompatible thing (*viruddhavyāptopalabdhi*) are impossible

§13. When that [perception of what is incompatible with the thing in question] is impossible, perception of what is pervaded by the incompatible thing and so forth[259] are also completely impossible. This is because, since all these [pervaded properties] are qualified by incompatible things, they are also impossible when the incompatibility is not established.

3.1.4 Reasons consisting in nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) are impossible

§14. Nonperception of the pervader[260] is also applied in order to negate pervaded things when the relation between pervaded and pervader is correctly established. However, in the case of all dharmas having no intrinsic nature, no pervasion by anything at all will be established. If, on the other hand, [the pervasion] were to be established, just this pervasion would be established as a real entity.[261]

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[259]Cf. NB II 36: *viruddhavyāptopalabhir yathā na dhruvabhāvī bhūtasyāpi bhāvasya vināśaḥ, hetvantarāpekṣaṇād iti //.* "Perception of what is pervaded by an incompatible thing is as follows: The destruction of produced entities also does not necessarily arise, because it depends upon other causes."

[260]Cf. NB II 33: *vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā nātra śiṃśapā, vṛkṣābhāvād iti //.* "Nonperception of the pervader is as follows: here there is no *śiṃśapā* tree, because there is no tree." For the concepts of pervaded (*vyāpya*), pervader (*vyāpaka*) and pervasion (*vyāpti*) or implication, see fn. 291.

[261]Cf. TĀ D258b1-2: *khyab bya khyab par byed pa yi // dngos po la sogs grub yin na // khyab bya la sogs dgag pa la // khyab byed mi dmigs la sogs sbyor // chos rnams kun gyi rang bzhin ni // khyab par bya la sogs grub par // 'ga' dang lhan cig*

3.1.5 Reasons consisting in nonperception of the cause (*kāraṇānupalabdhi*) are impossible

§15. Nonperception of the cause[262] is also applied in order to negate an effect itself when causal relationship has been established. However, in the case of all dharmas being without intrinsic nature, the relation between cause and effect will not be established. If [the relation] were to be established, this very relation between cause and effect would be established as a real entity.

3.1.5.1 There is no single cause such that its negation would establish all dharmas as being without intrinsic nature

§16. [263]There is no single cause for all dharmas such that these [dharmas] would be established as being without intrinsic nature by negating it.

3.1.5.1.1 Even though one might negate *Īśvara* and so forth, this could not establish all dharmas as being without intrinsic nature

§17. Even though the *Īśvara* and so forth acknowledged by someone as the single cause [of all dharmas] were negated, these [dharmas] could not be established as being without intrinsic nature. This is because all things are produced only by their own causes. It is also impossible that each individual cause of these [things] be negated, for it is common knowledge [that this cannot be done].

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ci ste nges // de tshe dngos por bcas pa yin //.

[262]Cf. NB II 39: *kāraṇānupalabdhir yathā nātra dhūmo vahnyabhāvād iti //.* "Nonperception of a cause is as follows: here there is no smoke, because there is no fire."

[263]M. Ichigō and S. Moriyama do not regard what follows as being included in this *pūrvapakṣa* concerning nonperception. See ICHIGO ibid p. 267, 6-10 and (1992) p. 205, 16-21, and MORIYAMA (1990b) pp. 27, 4-29, 3. However, the opponent argues in **§16** and **§17** that there is no single cause by the negation of which the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas could be established, and that even by negating the *Īśvara* and so forth (who is imagined by others as the single cause of all dharmas), the absence of intrinsic nature cannot be proved. So it is clear that these sentences also say that by means of nonperception of the cause, the Mādhyamikas cannot prove the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas.

3.2 REPLIES (*uttarapakṣa*)

3.2.1 It is not correct to say that reasons consisting in nonperception of an entity itself are impossible for the Mādhyamikas

§1. When it is said: "Nonperception of an entity itself is impossible"[264] then we have in fact replied earlier to this [objection].[265] If this interpretation [of voidness] is the voidness of one thing by another (*itaretaraśūnyatā*), we also do not intend to prove this. Now if you say: "Well, what [do you intend to prove]?" [we reply that we prove] the voidness concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*).[266]

3.2.2 It is not correct to say that reasons consisting in a perception of things incompatible with the things in question are impossible for the Mādhyamikas

§2. When it is said: "[Reasons consisting in] a perception of things incompatible with the [thing in question] and so forth will also be utterly impossible" then that is also completely irrelevant. That is, although nothing is established as [ultimately] incompatible and so on with the emptiness of all dharmas, in the case of illusions, sky-lotuses and so forth, people generally do acknowledge that there are such things as [conventionally existing] incompatibilities with the absence of intrinsic nature [i.e., incompatibilities between having an intrinsic nature and not having one].[267] Otherwise, how

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[264]This is not a direct quotation, but a summary of the sentence from the *pūrvapakṣa* (D135a6-136b1).

[265]MĀ D169b6-170a5. See Translation 1 pp. 110-111.

[266]S. Moriyama's translation of *'di yang bsgrub par mi 'dod do // 'o na ci zhe na mtshan nyid stong pa nyid yin no //* is as follows: "[We Mādhyamikas] do not accept that this could also prove [the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas]. Now if you say: 'Well, why [do you not accept it]?' [we reply that the voidness which we Mādhyamikas accept] is the voidness concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*)." (これも［一切法無自性を］証明するとは、［我々中観派は］主張しない。［反論］なぜであるか。［答論］［我々中観派の意味する「空」とは］相空性 (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*) である。) See MORIYAMA (1990b) p. 29, 8-11. M. Ichigō's translation of those sentences of MĀ is almost the same as that of Moriyama. See ICHIGO ibid. p. 6, 17-19.

[267]Kamalaśīla's point is that it would be conventionally accepted as contradictory for anything, even nonexistent things like magical illusions, to both have and not have real intrinsic natures. Cf., however, M. Ichigō's translation of *sgyu ma dang*

could you ever prove that the *Īśvara* and so forth imagined by others are without any intrinsic nature? Therefore, when people commonly correctly establish something like the conventional incompatibility [of having an intrinsic nature] with the mere absence of intrinsic nature, then later when [the Mādhyamikas] examine all dharmas from the ultimate point of view, they then prove the absence of real intrinsic nature by citing such facts as incompatibilities and the like. How could there be any opposition to that?

3.2.2.1 The opponent's consequence (*prasaṅga*) is not correct

§3. The consequence that the very things that are incompatible etc. with that [emptiness] would be entities, is not correct. This is because due to the property of the absence of ultimate intrinsic nature, the seeming (*gsal ba*) natures of real entities do not exist at all as the [actual] natures of real entities themselves.[268] If, on the other hand, [the seeming natures of real entities] existed [as actual natures], the incompatibility between these [actual natures] and the [absence of ultimate intrinsic nature] would not be established at all. Therefore, it should not be stated: "If the things incompatible etc. with the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas were to be established, it would follow that the very things etc. which would be incompatible with that [absence of intrinsic nature] would be real entities."[269]

3.2.2.1.1 Incompatibility and other such notions are established only conventionally, but not really

nam mkha'i padma la sogs pa dag la spyir ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang lhan cig 'gal ba la sogs pa rab tu grub pa kho na'o //: "with regard to illusions, sky-lotuses and so forth, what is incompatible with the absence of intrinsic nature and so forth is generally established correctly" (幻や空華等に関していえば、一般に、「無自性と対立するもの」等は、正しく成立しているといえる。) See ICHIGO ibid. p. 6, 25-26.

[268]We regard *gsal ba'i* as meaning "apparent" or "seeming" and take Kamalaśīla's statement here as meaning that due to the absence of ultimate intrinsic nature, the seeming natures of real entities, such as "being one" and "arising from others," do not exist as ultimate natures of entities.

[269]See MĀ D135b2 and Translation 3 paragraph 3.1.2, **§3**.

The logical reason in the opponent's consequence has the fault of being inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), because, although certain things are acknowledged to be incompatible, they are not established as having a real intrinsic nature. Due to the absence of ultimate or real intrinsic nature of all entities, the thing incompatible with that absence should be a conventional nature of entities, but not a real nature.

§4. Incompatibility and so forth are established only conventionally, but not really.[270] That is, if people determine the entities characterized as lamps and so forth as having an unstable nature, [they] determine [them] to be without a stable nature. This is because it is not right to determine [them] to be [things with an unstable nature] when that [i.e., a stable nature] is not excluded.[271] When, with reference to some [basis], the affirmation of something is necessarily connected with the negation of something else, these two are established as being incompatible with regard to that [basis] due to them being characterized as mutually exclusive.[272] Likewise, incompatible

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[270]Cf. TĀ D247b1-2: *dngos po rnams kyi 'gal ba ni // tha snyad pa yi tshad ma nyid // 'di la brten nas brjod pas na // de phyir yang dag rtogs pa min //.* "The incompatibility of entities is stated in reliance upon just this conventional valid cognition, and therefore, [the incompatibility] is not understood [to exist] in reality."

[271]Cf. TĀ D247b2: *'di ltar mar me la sogs pa // skye zhing 'jig pa'i chos can rnams // brtan pa'i (P brtan pa'i: D brten pa'i) rnam pas rnam gcad pas // 'gal bar rtogs pa rnams la ltos (D ltos: P bltos) //.* "That is to say, the lamps and so forth which have the properties of production and cessation are excluded by a stable nature, and therefore [to determine them as being impermanent] we rely upon [our] understandings of them as being incompatible [with things of a stable nature]."

[272]Cf. TSPa p. 389, 23-25: *yau hi parasparaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇau tayor ya ekaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ so 'paravidhināntarīyakaḥ / parasparaparihāreṇa vā 'nyatvatattve vyavasthite, anyatarasvabhāvavyavacchedenānyatarasya paricchedāt / tasmān nāsti tṛtīyarāśisambandhaḥ //.* TSPa pp. 680, 26-681, 4: *tathā hi bhedābhedau parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇau tayor ekasvabhāvavyavacchedenaivāparasya paricchedāt, yasya hi yadātmavyavacchedam antareṇa na svabhāvaḥ paricchidyate sa tatparihāreṇa sthito yathā bhāvābhāvayor anyataraḥ, yau ca parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇau tayor ekasvabhāvaniṣedho 'paravidhināntarīyaka ity anyatvaniṣedhe sāmarthyāt tādātmyavidhir ... .* TSPa p. 880, 16-17: *yadvyavacchedanāntarīyako yasya paricchedas tayor eva parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇo virodha ... .*

Cf. TĀ D247b2-3: *gang tshe rnam pa rnam gcad pa (D gcad pa: P bcad pa) // med na med par nges pa yi* // chos de gang yin de gnyis ni // mtshan nyid kyis ni 'gal bar 'dod //.* (* DP *yis*. Emendation to *yi*.) "When the property (*dharma*) of something is determined as being necessarily connected with the negation of an another property, these two are incompatible due to being characterized [as mutually exclusive]."

In his translation of the MĀ, M. Ichigō suggests that *kyis* in *yongs su spang te gnas pa'i mtshan nyid kyis* should be emended to *kyi*. See ICHIGO ibid. p. 18, n. 21. However, we do not necessarily need to emend *kyis* to *kyi* due to TSPa p. 226, 26-27: *bhedābhedayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatayā yugapad ekatra*

things like existence and nonexistence, successiveness and simultaneity and so forth are to be regarded in the same manner. We see that the sensation of cold and so forth are not existent when things like fire and so forth are nearby, even though the causes may be complete, and thus these two are established as being in an incompatibility which is characterized as non-coexistence.[273]

3.2.2.1.1.1 Although the incompatibility which is characterized as mutual exclusion is acknowledged, it is not correct that the locus of this incompatibility would necessarily be an existent entity

§5. Although this very incompatibility [which is characterized as mutual exclusion] is acknowledged, it is not correct that lamps and so forth are necessarily entities. This is because, with regard to deceptive things like illusions and so forth also, properties such as production, cessation do appear.[274] That way, according to the masters, incompatible properties like

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viruddhatvāt / (Tib D284a5-6: *tha dad pa dang tha mi dad pa dag la ni phan tshun spangs te gnas pa'i mtshan nyid kyis cig car gcig la 'gal ba'i phyir ro//*).

[273]Cf. TSPa p. 880, 23-24: *yasya hy avikalakāraṇasya bhavato yatsannidhānād abhāvas tayor eva sahānavasthānalakṣaṇo virodhaḥ, ...*

[274]Cf. TĀ D247b3: *skye 'jig dag dang 'brel ba ni // sgyu ma la sogs la yang yod // de tsam gyis na de dag ci // yang dag dngos po nyid yin nam //.* "The possession of [the properties of] production and cessation occurs in the case of illusions and so forth too. Would they be real entities just because of this?"

Kamalaśīla accepts that the incompatibility which is characterized as mutually exclusion can also be established with regard to nonentities (*avastu*) like illusions, because illusions and other nonexistent things cannot be both permanent and impermanent. Although it is not so clear whether Dharmakīrti himself held that this incompatibility could also be established in the case of nonentities, it is clear that Dharmottara did hold that position. See NBṬ p. 207, 4-7: *tato bhinnavyāpārau virodhau / ekena virodhena śītoṣṇasparśayor ekatvaṃ vāryate / anyena sahāvasthānam / bhinnaviṣayau ca / sakale vastuny avastuni ca parasparaparihāravirodhaḥ / vastuny eva katipaye sahānavasthānavirodhaḥ / tasmād bhinnavyāpārau bhinnaviṣayau ca / tato nānayor anyonyāntarbhāva iti //.* "Thus, the two incompatibilities are different in function. One incompatibility [i.e., *parasparaparihāravirodha*] negates any identity (*ekatvam*) between the sensation of warmth and that of cold. The other incompatibility [negates] the coexistence [of these two sensations]. And [the two incompatibilities] are different in terms of [their] objects. The incompatibility which is [characterized as] mutual exclusion is with regard to all entities and nonentities. The incompatibility which is [characterized as] non-

permanence and impermanence are also established just as they appear with reference to things such as lamps in order to have access to the ultimate.[275] Lamps and so forth which have the nature of external objects or have the nature of consciousness are not really established, since both natures have also been negated by those very [masters].[276] The ultimate nature of entities themselves [i.e., *śūnyatā*] does not occur at all in the sphere observed by persons of limited vision; otherwise (*gang gis na*), these [lamps and so forth] would be directly understood as being contradictory with the real intrinsic nature of entities [i.e., *śūnyatā*].[277]

3.2.2.1.1.2 The incompatibility which is characterized as non-coexistence is also just conventional

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coexistence is with regard to just certain entities. Therefore, [the two] are different in function and in objects. Therefore, these two are not included in each other."

[275]Kamalaśīla's statement here relies upon the PV I kk. 85-86 and the PV III kk. 357-358, especially k. 86 and k. 357, quoted at the beginning of the section of the proof by means of inference in the MĀ. See Chapter 2 pp. 38-46. Jñānagarbha also says in his SDVK 18-19: *rgol ba gnyi ga'i shes pa la // ji tsam snang ba'i cha yod pa // de tsam de la brten nas ni // chos can chos la sogs par rtog // de tshe rjes su dpag pa 'byung* // gang gi tshe na gzhan na min // de bas rigs pa smra ba rnams // de skad smra la su zhig 'gog //.* (* See SDVV D9b6-7: *rjes su dpag pa dang rjes su dpag par bya ba 'di tha snyad kyi rgol ba dang / phyir rgol ba dag gi blo'i bdag nyid la snang ba'i chos can dang chos dang dpe nyid du rnam par gzhag par 'byung gi //.*) For our translation of SDVK 18-19, see fn. 239.

[276]It is well known that in the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā* of the TS, Śāntarakṣita proves that no external objects can be established, and that in the MAV he proves that all entities which are either external or mental are without real intrinsic natures because of being neither really one nor many in nature.

Cf. TĀ D247b3-4: *shes pa'i rnam pa nor phyir dang // phyi rol don yang ma grub phyir // mar me la sogs rnams la yang // yang dag dngos po cung zad med //.* "Because the aspects of cognitions are erroneous and because external objects are not established, lamps and so forth have no real [nature of] entities at all."

Cf. S. Moriyama's translation of *gnyi ga'i ngo bo yang de dag nyid kyis bsal ba'i phyir ro //*: "This is because it is also negated by means of [establishing] those two [kinds of incompatibilities] that [lamps and so forth] have the nature of those two." See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 30, 22-24: "［灯火等が、その］両者を本性とするということも、その二［種の対立の確定］によって、否定されるからである。" Cf. ICHIGO ibid. p. 7, 27-28: "（灯火等が）両者（外境と知）を自性とすることも、その両者（の否定）によって否定されるゆえに。"

[277]For the use of *gang gis na/yena*, see fn. 154 and fn. 240. This construction is misunderstood in MORIYAMA (ibid. pp. 30, 24-31, 1) and ICHIGO (ibid. p. 7, 28-30).

§6. The incompatibility which is characterized as non-coexistence is also just a conventional thing.[278]Entities are simply destroyed by themselves, but not by other things.[279] This is because if something else caused

[278]Starting here, Kamalaśīla explains that the incompatibility between fire and cold should also be regarded as conventional. Kamalaśīla says that because the "cause of destruction" (*vināśahetu*), i.e., a fire, cannot bring about the destruction of cold, it is not correct to say that a fire would be really incompatible with cold. The fundamental point is that entities are destroyed due to their nature (*svabhāvatas*), but not by other things. The argument here in the MĀ can be regarded as a summary of the argument in the TSP ad TS kk. 357-364. That argument in the TSP is as follows:

[1]. The destruction of entities does not depend upon causes of destruction. (TSP ad TS k. 357, i.e., TSPa p. 133, 14-16.)

[1.1] When destruction is an entity (*vastu*), causes of destruction could not bring it about. (TSPa pp. 133, 20-135, 4.)

[1.1.1] When destruction is not a different thing (*anarthāntarabhūta*) from the causes of destruction, those causes could not bring about the destruction. (TSPa pp. 133, 24-134, 7.)

[1.1.2] When destruction is a different thing (*arthāntarabhūta*) from the causes of destruction, then again those causes could not bring about the destruction. (TSPa pp. 134, 8-135, 4.)

[1.2] When destruction is not an entity (*avastu*), the causes of destruction would not bring about destruction. (TSP ad TS kk. 363-364, i.e., TSPa p. 135, 5-18.)

[279]M. Ichigō's translation of *dngos po rnams ni bdag nyid kyis kho nas 'jig gi gzhan gyis ni ma yin no //* is as follows: "[If that incompatibility were not to be conventional,] it would not follow that entities are destroyed by themselves and destroyed by others." （（もしその対立が世俗のものでなければ）諸存在は、自ら滅し、他によって滅することがなくなる。） See ICHIGO ibid. pp. 7, 32-8, 1. This is a misunderstanding of the argument.

The point is that Buddhists reject the Naiyāyikas' idea that entities depend upon "causes of destruction" (*vināśahetu*) when they perish — entities perish just due to their nature and not due to something else. See HB pp. 7*, 17-8*, 1: *katham idam avagamyate sad avaśyaṃ naśvarasvabhāvam iti yenānvayavyatirekasaṃbhava iti cet, vināśahetvayogāt. svabhāvata eva naśvarā bhāvāḥ; naiṣāṃ niṣpannānām anyato vināśotpattiḥ, tasyāsāmarthyāt; na hi vināśahetur bhāvasvabhāvam eva karoti, tasya nirvṛtteḥ. nāpi bhāvāntaram eva, bhāvāntarakaraṇe bhāve tadavasthe na kiṃcit karotīti tathopalabdhyādiprasaṅgaḥ.* For a German translation, see STEINKELLNER (1967) pp. 42, 33-43, 13. See TSa k. 357: *sarvatraivānapekṣāś ca vināśe janmino 'khilāḥ / sarvathā nāśahetūnāṃ tatrākiñcitkaratvataḥ //.* "With regard to [their] destruction, no produced things depend upon any [causes of destruction] at all, because causes of destruction effectuate nothing at all with regard to [produced things]." On the proof of entities' being destroyed due to their natures

the destruction, [those] causes of destruction would effectuate nothing.[280] But even if [the things which cause the destruction] were not other things, the causes of the destruction of those [objects] would not do anything. This is because the [destruction] arises exclusively from the cause which is the entity itself. If, on the other hand, you say: "Due to the fact that destruction is not an entity, it is not correct for it to be considered as being identical or different," then the causes of destruction do not at all effectuate this [destruction], because [destruction] is without intrinsic nature.[281] Therefore,

(*vināśitvānumāna*) and the refutation of the permanence of entities (*sthirasiddhi-dūṣaṇa*), see MIMAKI (1976).

[280]Cf. M. Ichigō's translation of this sentence: "This is because if the destruction [of fire meant to] cause another thing [i.e., the sensation of cold], the causes of the destruction [of fire would function in order to cause the sensation of cold, but those causes] effectuate nothing." ((火の) 滅ということが、別のもの (冷触) をつくることだとするならば、(火を) 滅する諸原因が (冷触をつくるために作用するはずであるが) 何ら作用することはないからである。) See ICHIGO ibid. p. 8, 1-3. However, the argument here in the MĀ should be regarded as corresponding to the argument in the TSPa pp. 133, 24-134, 7: "When destruction is a different thing (*arthāntarabhūta*) from causes of destruction, those causes could not bring about destruction." Kamalaśīla, in the MĀ, wants to say that a fire, which cannot cause the destruction of cold, is not really incompatible with cold, and therefore the incompatibility between fire and cold that we speak about should be regarded as purely conventional. See MĀ D178a1-2 translated in this same section below. In short, Kamalaśīla does not say here, as Ichigō would have it, that the causes of the destruction of fire could not function with regard to the *production* of the sensation of cold. Rather, he says that the causes of destruction, i.e., fire, cannot effectuate the *destruction* of the sensation of cold.

[281]The argument here corresponds to the argument in the TSPa p. 135, 5-18: "When destruction is not an entity (*avastu*), causes of destruction would not bring it about." See TSPa p. 135, 11-13: *bhāvābhāvātmakaḥ — bhāvaniṣedhātmako nāśo na kenacit kriyate, avastutvāt, kharaviṣāṇavat / anyathā hi kāryatvād aṅkurādivad vastutvam eva syāt /.* "Destruction, which consists in the nonexistence of an entity (*bhāvābhāvātmaka* = *bhāvaniṣedhātmaka*), is not brought about by anything whatsoever, because it is not an entity, just like, for example, the horns of a donkey. Otherwise, since [destruction] would be an effect, it would have to be an actual entity, just like a sprout and so forth."

M. Ichigō regards this sentence as saying that destruction is not an effect arisen from causes of destruction, because those causes are without intrinsic nature. See ICHIGO ibid. p. 8, 9-10: これ (滅) は、全く、滅の諸原因が作用した (結果) ではない。(それらは) 無自性だからである。In keeping with the parallel argument in the TSPa, we should understand that Kamalaśīla here in MĀ intends to say that destruction, which is without intrinsic nature, cannot be regarded as the effect of

how would fire and so forth, which effectuate nothing, be really incompatible [with cold etc.]? However, we simply apply the conventional designation that fire and so forth are incompatible [with cold] just to the fact that this fire gives rise to final and extreme moments characterized by a progressive diminution of the cold's powers. Therefore, the masters have spoken of the *idea* of incompatibility, but not of [genuine] incompatibility itself. Thus, this incompatibility has also been stated only in reliance upon conventional things, but is not anything real.[282] This is because (a) fire, coldness and so forth, which would have the nature of [being] real external objects, are not established; (b) [fire and so forth,] which would have the nature of [being] aspects of consciousness, are imagined [things].[283] Also, since cold and warmth can appear to one and the same consciousness, how could they be [genuinely] incompatible? This is because (a) these two are subjectively experienced simultaneously[284] and (b) because many cognitions which are of

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causes of destruction, because, if it were to be the effect of those causes, it would not be without intrinsic nature, but would be a real entity.

[282] *'gal ba'i tshul* which we have translated as "the idea of incompatibility" seems to correspond in Sanskrit to *virodhagati*. With reference to *virodhagati*, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla also explain in the TS(P) that real incompatibility is not established with regard to entities. See TSa k. 443: *bādhyabādhakabhāvas tu vastuno naiva tāttvikaḥ / vidyate tata evoktaṃ virodhagatir ity api //*. "With regard to entities, however, the relation between invalidated and invalidator is not ultimately existent at all. And therefore, the word *virodhagati* has been said." See also TSPa p. 157, 7-9: *ata evāvikalakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvād virodhagatir ity ācāryeṇoktam / virodhagatiḥ virodhavyavasāyaḥ, na tu virodhas tāttvika iti bhāvaḥ /*. "Therefore, the master has stated: 'Due to the fact that although [its] complete cause is existent, it is nonexistent when something else is existent, the incompatibility [between the two] is understood.' [The word] *virodhagati* means that incompatibility is determined, but incompatibility [itself] is not ultimately real."

[283] See fn. 276.

[284] According to AKBh, cold and warmth can appear to one and the same tactile cognition (*kāyavijñāna*). See AKBh p. 7, 16-19: *kadācid ekena dravyeṇa cakṣurvijñānam utpadyate yadā tatprakāravyavacchedo bhavati / kadācid bahubhir yadā na vyavacchedaḥ / tad yathā senāvyūham anekavarṇasaṃsthānaṃ maṇisamūhaṃ ca dūrāt paśyataḥ / evaṃ śrotrādivijñānaṃ veditavyam / kāyavijñānaṃ tu paraṃ pañcabhiḥ spraṣṭavyair utpadyata ity eke / caturbhir mahābhūtair ekena ca ślakṣṇatvādinā / sarvair ekādaśabhir ity apare /*. "In some cases, a visual cognition arises from one entity when the characteristics of that [entity] are distinguished. In other cases, [a visual cognition arises] from many entities when there is no distinction [between the characteristics of those entities]. For example, it is like when one sees from a distance an assembled army or a collection of multicolored and

the same class cannot arise simultaneously.[285] Therefore, things like cold, [warmth] etc., which are purely illusory like dreams, do appear simultaneously,[286] and hence do not have any real incompatibility at all.[287]

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multishaped jewels. Auditory cognition and other [cognitions] should be understood in the same way. However, some say that a tactile cognition arises from at most five [kinds of] tactile objects, i.e., the four elements and one of [the following seven:] softness (*ślakṣṇatva*), [roughness (*karkaśatva*), heaviness (*gurutva*), lightness (*laghutva*), cold (*śīta*), hunger (*jighatsā*) and thirst (*pipāsā*)]. Others' opinion is [as follows]: [a tactile cognition arises] from all eleven [kinds of objects]." Warmth (*uṣṇatā*) is regarded as one of the four elements. See AK I. 12ab: *bhūtāni pṛthivīdhātur aptejovāyudhātavaḥ /.* See also AKBh p. 8, 19: *uṣṇatā tejodhātuḥ /.* Kamalaśīla also says in the TSP that even when things are considered to be conventionally incompatible with each other, they can still coexist in the same consciousness and therefore are not ultimately, or genuinely, incompatible at all. See TSPa pp. 928, 15-929, 17.

[285]If cold and warmth were to have real incompatibility or real non-coexistence, then as the previous reason makes clear, they could never appear to one and the same tactile cognition. In fact, they *can* appear simultaneously, and therefore they do not have any real incompatibility. Now, one might argue that two different tactile cognitions, i.e., the sensation of cold and that of warmth, could arise simultaneously, so that a real incompatibility between them could be established. However, this is impossible because in Buddhist philosophy, although different kinds of cognitions can arise simultaneously, multiple cognitions which are of the same class cannot so arise. See PV III k. 501cd: *tāsāṃ samānajātīye sāmarthyaniyamo bhavet //.* "With regard to what is of the same kind, those [cognitions] would have a restriction on [their] capacity." See also TOSAKI (1985a) pp. 184-185. Thus, when cold and warmth are simultaneously experienced, they must appear to *one and the same* tactile cognition, and therefore there could not be any real incompatibility between them: non-coexistence should also be regarded as conventional.

[286]This sentence, i.e., *de lta bas na grang ba la sogs pa'i dngos po rmi lam la sogs pa bzhin du brdzun pa kho na dag* ***cig*** *snang bas de'i phyir 'di dag la yang dag par na 'gal ba med pa nyid do //*, is problematic. It seems better to emend *cig* into *cig car*, because just the *simultaneous* appearance of incompatible things serves as the reason for saying that they do not have any real incompatibility. It does not seem proper to translate *cig* as "some" and regard this sentence as saying that because some illusory things like cold and warmth appear, they do not have any real incompatibility. Earlier in this same paragraph the phrase *cig car* did figure prominently. So we can hypothesize that *cig* here is a simple omission and should be *cig car*.

[287]Cf. TĀ D247b4-5: *de lta bas na 'jig rten gyi // don la brten nas 'gal ba dag // don dam nyid la 'jug bya'i (D bya'i: P bya) phyir // rigs pa shes pa rnams kyis gzhag (D gzhag: P bzhag) // de bzhin gzhan yang 'gal ba dag // tha snyad yin par*

3.2.2.1.1.3 The relation between pervaded and pervader (*vyāpya-vyāpakabhāva*) is also conventional

§7. The relation between pervaded and pervader is also established due to the determination of a relation between a [generic] universal and a subspecies (*viśeṣa*), which [relation] is imagined just in reliance upon conventional things such as trees, *śiṃśapā* trees and so forth. In reality, there is actually nothing at all that we call a universal such as tree-ness (*vṛkṣatva*) and so forth, and which would be a pervader. The subspecies and so forth which are observed are not of the nature of the external objects and are not established either as real things whose nature consists in an aspect of consciousness. Nonetheless, scholars suspend judgment concerning absolute natures (*tattvārtha*) and [provisionally accept universals etc.] acting like elephants who shut their eyes [to things they wish to ignore].[288] They rely exclusively upon deceptive things, i.e., upon types of trees and so forth such as the different illusory subspecies, *khadira* etc., that are experienced in dreams and other such [states]. They then [in reliance upon these things] establish a pervaded-pervader relation simply in order to have access to thusness, for [the establishment of this relation] is conducive to access to the ultimate.[289]

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shes par byos // yang dag dngos po nyid la ni // 'gal ba nyid ni 'ga' yang med //. "Therefore, according to logicians, two [kinds of] incompatibilities are established in reliance upon conventional things in order to have access to the ultimate. And also in this manner, one should understand that two [kinds of] incompatibilities are conventional. In the case of real entities, there is no incompatibility at all."

[288]See PV III k. 219: *tad upekṣitatattvārthaiḥ kṛtvā gajanimīlanam / kevalaṃ lokabuddhyaiva bāhyacintā pratanyate //.* "Therefore, shutting [their] eyes just like elephants, those [scholars] who suspend judgment concerning absolute natures, proceed to examine external things simply through worldly understanding." See also TSPa p. 12, 7-9: *kiṃ tu yathaivāvicāritaramaṇīyatayā loke śabdārthaḥ siddhas tathaiva bhagavadbhir api samupekṣitatattvārthair (TSPb -tattvārthair: TSPa -tatvārthair) gajanimīlikayā paramārthāvatārāya tadbhāvanāsaṃvṛttyā* prakāśyate (TSPb prakāśyate: TSPa prākāśyate), upāyāntarābhāvāt /.* (* Tib D143a4: *brjod pa'i kun rdzob du* (*udbhāvanāsaṃvṛttyā*?) See SH. WATANABE (1967) p. 18.)

[289]Cf. TĀ D262a2-3: *khyab bya khyab byed dngos la sogs // tha snyad la ni shin tu 'grub // don dam pa la 'jug bya'i (D bya'i: P bya) phyir // mkhas pa de la rten (D rten: P brten) mi byed //.* "A pervaded-pervader relation and so forth are thoroughly established conventionally. In order to have access to the ultimate, would not scholars rely upon that [relation]?" We regard the last two stanzas as an interrogative sentence. Otherwise, this verse will make no sense. This type of verse also appear in TĀ D245a3: *des na'ang rjes su 'gro med na // ldog pa de ni yod min*

3.2.2.1.1.4 The causal relationship is also conventional

§8. In the same fashion, the causal relationship is designated purely in reliance upon conventional things such as seeds, sprouts and so forth, but is not something real.[290] This is because (a) real seeds and the like are not established; (b) deceptive things such as these do also appear in dreams and other such [states]; and, what is more, (c) when awake, we see illusions and the like, which are unreal and are causes and effects. Consequently, although from a conventional point of view entities having an intrinsic nature are pervaded by [being in] causal relationships, nonetheless they are not established as having an ultimate intrinsic nature due to this [fact of being in a causal relationship]: one does not recognize that the pervaded term [i.e., having an ultimate intrinsic nature,] necessarily follows from the existence of the pervader [i.e., being in a causal relationship].[291] Rather, when one negates real relationships such as causality which are the pervaders of entities being real, then the [entities] being real, which is actually just a conceptual construct, will be excluded, just as in the case of illusions and so forth.[292]

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te // de dngos rjes su mi 'brang gang // de ldog can du de mi 'gyur //. "Therefore, when there is no co-presence (*anvaya*), its co-absence (*vyatireka*) will not exist. When X is not co-present with Y, [how] would Y be absent when X is negated?" The last two stanzas correspond to the MĀ D189a3-4: *gang zhig gang yod na yod pa ma yin pa de ni ji ltar de log pa na ldog par 'gyur te /.*

[290]Cf. TĀ D262a3: *rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos la sogs // ji ltar mthong ba bzhin du 'dod //.* "Causal relationships and so forth are acknowledged in accordance with appearances."

[291]Pervaded (*vyāpya*) and pervader (*vyāpaka*) are respectively the antecedent and consequent in a true material implication. Thus, if X has the *vyāpya* property, then X has the *vyāpaka* property. But the converse need not be true, i.e., it does not follow that if X has the *vyāpaka* property, then X has the *vyāpya* property. For example, X's being a *śiṃśapā* implies X's being a tree, but being a tree obviously does not imply being a *śiṃśapā*. Cf. MĀ D189a6: *khyab par byed pa nye ba ni khyab par bya ba'i khyad par nges par gtan la 'bebs par nus pa ma yin te / de ni gzhan la yang srid pa'i phyir ro // de lta ma yin na shing nyid kyis kyang shing sha pa la sogs pa'i khyad par rnams nges par rtogs par 'gyur ro //.* "It is impossible that the existence of a pervader necessarily determines a specific pervaded thing. This is because the [pervader] also can apply to other things. Otherwise, one would necessarily understand specific [things like] *śiṃśapā* because of tree-ness."

[292]The argument is as follows: (1) Being real would imply being in a real causal relationship. (2) Things are not in a real causal relationship. (3) Therefore they are not real. Cf. TĀ D262a3-4: *chos rnams kun gyi ngo bo la // khyab par byed pa*

3.2.2.1.2 The Mādhyamikas accept the Buddhist's correct definition of conventionally established valid cognitions

§9. So since establishing things such as incompatibility and so forth make it possible to have access to thusness, therefore scholars, in order to show what thusness is and explain that the valid cognitions and so forth imagined by non-Buddhists do not correspond to thusness, exclude the [non-Buddhist valid cognitions etc.] and compose texts which define genuinely valid cognition. That is to say, some non-Buddhists want to prove completely false natures of entities, such as selves and so forth, and want to deny conventionally established things, like omniscience, absence of passions, the relationship between karma and its retribution.[293] They therefore invent what is in fact an erroneous definition of valid cognition. This is why scholars refute that [non-Buddhist version of valid cognition][294] and formulate a correct definition of valid cognitions such as direct perception etc. [These cognitions] are the reason for the existence of conventionally established things like the relationship between karma and its retribution and so forth,[295] [conventionally established things] which help us have access to the thusness that persons and dharmas are without selves. Since that [self-

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yang dag min // yang dag nyid du de log na // sgyu ma la sogs ltar brtags par // dngos po rnams kyi don dam pa'i // ngo bo nyid ni ldog par 'gyur //. "The pervaders of all *dharmas*' natures are not real. When in reality, the [pervaders] are negated, entities' ultimate natures, which are conceptual constructs, will be excluded, just as in the case of illusions and so forth."

[293]The MĀ's Tibetan translation of these words is as follows: *thams cad mkhyen pa nyid dang / 'dod chags dang bral ba nyid dang / las dang 'bras bur 'brel ba la sogs pa kun rdzob pa rnam par gzhag pa.* Note that M. Ichigō seems to regard *kun rdzob pa* as qualifying only the term *las dang 'bras bur 'brel ba*. See ICHIGO ibid. p. 9, 28-29: "一切智性、離貪性、世俗の業果の関係等、の確定を否定せんとしているから、... 。"

[294]Cf. MORIYAMA ibid. p. 33, 3: "Therefore, the scholars [i.e., Dharmakīrti, etc.] negate the [selves]." （それ故に、賢者 (Dharmakīrti) 達は、それ（自我）を否定して、... 。）

[295]S. Moriyama and M. Ichigō regard *kun rdzob pa* as qualifying the term *las dang 'bras bur 'brel ba*, "relation between karma and its retribution." See MORIYAMA ibid. p. 33, 4-5, and see ICHIGO ibid. p. 10, 1. Here, however, it seems better to regard the word *kun rdzob pa* as qualifying *rnam par gzhag pa*, since this is how it is used in MĀ D178b7: *thams cad mkhyen pa nyid dang / 'dod chags dang bral ba nyid dang / las dang 'bras bur 'brel ba la sogs pa kun rdzob pa rnam par gzhag pa sel bar 'dod pas.* See fn. 293.

lessness] is also in fact acknowledged by the Illustrious One, therefore we accept the correct definition of valid cognition, which is conducive to the ultimate.

3.2.2.1.3 Conclusion: The opponent's consequence is actually inconclusive (*anaikāntika*)

§10. Thus, the consequence that the nature of real entities would have to be accepted because incompatibility and so forth are simply conventionally acknowledged, is actually inconclusive. This is because although those [i.e., incompatibility, etc.] are acknowledged, a real nature of entities is not established.

4. The Proof of the Absence of Intrinsic Nature in Reality by means of "Neither One Nor Many" Reason

4.1 OBJECTIONS (*pūrvapakṣa*)

4.1.1 The reason "being neither one nor many" (*ekānekaviyoga-hetu*) would be unestablished (*asiddha*)

4.1.1.1 The reason would be unestablished for the other party

§1. When [you] say: "All entities are without intrinsic nature because of being neither one nor many in nature," then here too if [this reason] proves an absurd consequence (*prasaṅga*), then since other people do not accept this, the reason is unestablished (*asiddha*). That is, nobody accepts that entities are neither one nor many in nature .

§2. Thus, although the reason might be established to the liking of one of the parties, it is not established for the other also.[296]

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[296]Cf. MAP D88a2-3: *'o na 'di ci thal bar 'gyur bar sgrub pa yin nam / 'on te rang gi rgyud kyis sgrub pa yin / gal te dang po yin par rtog na ni de'i tshe gtan tshigs ma grub pa yin te / gzhan dag dngos po thams cad la gcig dang du ma dang bral ba khas mi len pa'i phyir ro // ji ste gnyis pa yin no zhe na ni / de lta na yang shin tu ma grub pa yin te / bdag nyid gzhi khas mi len pa'i phyir dang / phyir rgol ba la yang rang gi ngo bo ma grub pa'i phyir ro ...* . "In this case, would this [reason of being neither one nor many] prove an absurd consequence or prove [the absence of nature] by autonomous reasoning? If [you] accept the first position, then the reason is unestablished. This is because others do not accept that entities would all be neither one nor many. If, on the other hand, [you] say that [you accept] the second position, even then [the reason] is completely unestablished. This is be-

4.1.1.2 The locus (*āśraya*) would also be unestablished

§3. This type of property-possessor (*dharmin*) would be unestablished for [the proponent] himself, and therefore the locus would also be unestablished.

4.1.2 The reason would be inconclusive (*anaikāntika*)

§4. And due to the fact that the exclusion from the dissimilar instances is doubtful (*saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvāt*), [the reason] is also inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).

4.1.2.1 Do the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* have the form of an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) or the form of a nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)?

§5. Moreover, suppose that in this context, what is to be proved (*sādhya*) [i.e., the absence of intrinsic nature] and the means of proof (*sādhana*) [i.e., being neither one nor many] would have the form of an implicative negation or the form of a nonimplicative negation.[297]

4.1.2.1.1 When the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are implicative negations, then the opponent would acknowledge that real entities are neither one nor many in nature

§6. If [the *sādhya* and *sādhana*] had the form of implicative negations, then [the opponent] would acknowledge that there are things which have the nature of being a real entity but which are neither one nor many in nature. Therefore the [*sādhya*] would not be unacceptable [to the opponent] either.

4.1.2.1.2 When the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are nonimplicative negations, the epistemic relation (*gamyagamakabhāva*)[298] could not be

cause [the Mādhyamikas] themselves do not accept the locus (*āśraya*) and because [the reason] itself is also unestablished for the opponent." Cf. TSPa pp. 115, 26-116, 6: *kadācid idaṃ svātantryeṇa sādhanaṃ syāt prasaṅgasādhanaṃ vā / yadi svātantryeṇa tadā 'nyatarāsiddho hetuḥ / ... atha prasaṅgasādhanam iti pakṣas tathā 'pi sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanād anaikāntikatā hetvoḥ /.* Cf. also TSPa p. 885, 1-2: *atra vikalpadvayaṃ kadācid vatkṛtvaṃ svātantryeṇa sādhanaṃ vābhipretaṃ bhavet prasaṅgasādhanaṃ vā /.*

[297] On the two kinds of negations, i.e., implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) and nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), see fn. 67.

[298] *gamyagamakabhāva* means literally "the relation between what is understood and what makes one understand." This is typically the relationship between a

established

§7. If, on the other hand, [the *sādhya* and *sādhana*] had the form of non-implicative negations, then there would be no epistemic relation (*gamyagamakabhāva*) [between them]. This is because both would be without intrinsic natures, because they would not be related to each other and because they would not be different.

4.1.2.1.2.1 Formal presentation of the first reason, i.e., "because the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are without intrinsic natures"

§8. [Vyāpti:] Things characterized as being beyond any ostensive specification (*upākhyā*)[299] make one understand nothing and are not understood either.
It is just like, for example, horse's horns.

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sādhya and a *sādhana*. For convenience we translate *gamyagamakabhāva* as "the epistemic relation," the central idea being that one thing serves to make known another.

[299]Being beyond ostensive specification (*upākhyā*) seems to be a characteristic of nonexistence. See TSPa pp. 357, 27-358, 1: *abhāvā hi sarvopākhyāvirahalakṣaṇā ye jñānam api na janayanti te kiṃ vijñeyā* "That is, why would nonexistent things, which are characterized as being beyond any ostensive specification and which do not even produce a cognition [of themselves], be cognizable objects?" See also STEINKELLNER (1979) p. 89, Anm. 323. And see VN p. 2, 5: *sarvasāmarthyopākhyāvirahalakṣaṇaṃ hi nirupākhyam iti.* German translation in MUCH (1991) p. 4, 17-19: "Was nämlich dadurch charakterisiert ist, dass man (von ihm) keine Fähigkeit aussagen kann, ist das Nichtseiende (*nirupākhya*)." Śāntarakṣita's *Vādanyāyaṭīkā Vipañcitārthā* p. 10, 7-8: *sarveṣāṃ sāmarthyānām upākhyā śrutiḥ, upākhyāyate anayeti kṛtvā, tasya virahaḥ abhāvaḥ / sa eva lakṣaṇaṃ yasya nirupākhyasya sa tathākhyāyate /.* Cf. TSPa p. 806, 14-15. In his commentary on PVA Yamāri says that *upākhyā* is a verbal description which, being based upon perceptual judgment, specifies that this is that. See *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhī* D161a7-b1: *nus par nye bar brjod pa thams cad ces bya ba ni mngon sum gyi rjes las byung ba'i rnam par rtog pas bskyed pa de ni 'di'o zhes bya ba bsnyad pa'o //.* See SHI. MORIYAMA (2000) p. 70 fn. 14. Not being able to specify that such and such is a horse's horn means that there is no perception of a horn of a horse which would subsequently produce the corresponding judgment, "This is a horn of horse." Therefore one can then conclude that horse's horns do not exist, because they lack the capacity for producing a perception of themselves. Note that the term *nirupākhya* appears as a characteristic of nonexistence in k. 66 in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* chapter of *Vākyapadīya*. See HOUBEN (1995) pp. 283-285 and fn. 448.

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* mentioned above are characterized as being beyond any ostensive specification.

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* mentioned above make one understand nothing and are not understood either.]

4.1.2.1.2.2 Formal presentation of the second reason, i.e., "because the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are not related to each other"

§9. [Vyāpti:] Two mutually unrelated things cannot be in an epistemic relation (*gamyagamakabhāva*).
It is just like, for example, the Vindhya mountains and the Himalaya mountains.[300]

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are not mutually related.

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are not in an epistemic relation.]

4.1.2.1.2.3 Formal presentation of the third reason, i.e., "because the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are not different"

§10. But suppose that because both are of the nature of nonentities (*dngos po med pa, abhāva*), there would in fact be a relation characterized as same nature (*tādātmya*) [between them]. Then, this is also not correct, because same nature is established only between entities.

[Vyāpti:] When X does not have the nature of being different from Y, then there is no epistemic relation (*gamyagamakabhāva*) between them.
It is just like, for example, *taru* and *vṛkṣa*, [which are synonyms for "tree"].

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now the *sādhya* and *sādhana* mentioned above do not have the nature of being different.

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* mentioned

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[300]In the TSP too, the example of the Vindhya mountains and the Himalaya mountains is often used for explaining the absence of mutual influence, or literally "the absence of relation between what is helped and what helps." Cf. TSPa p. 93, 25-26: *parasparam upakāryopakārakatvābhāvād vindhyahimavator iva nātmaśarīrayoḥ saṃbandho asti* "Due to the absence of mutual influence, there is no relation between the self (*ātman*) and the body, just as [there is no such relation between] the Vindhya mountains and the Himalaya mountains."

above do not have any epistemic relation.]

Nor would [this reason] be inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) on account of [properties like] being produced (*kṛtakatva*) and being impermanent (*anityatva*), [properties which are not different and yet still stand in an epistemic relation]. This is because in the latter case, there is a difference made through conceptual exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*).[301]

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[301]According to Dharmakīrti, "(conceptual) exclusion" (*vyāvṛtti* or *apoha*), i.e., "exclusion of others" (*anyavyāvṛtti*, °*-vyavaccheda/anyāpoha*), means a complex double negation, viz., the exclusion of all heterogeneous (*vijātīya/parabhāva*) things and the exclusion of all homogeneous (*sajātīya/svabhāva*) things. See PV I k. 40: *sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṃ yasmād vyāvṛttibhāginaḥ //.* English translation in TILLEMANS (1993b) p. 70, 20-21: "Since all entities by nature abide in their own-natures and are thus endowed with exclusions from both similar and dissimilar entities, (40)" Note that in his TBh Mokṣakaragupta says that a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) of entity is excluded from both homogeneous and heterogeneous things (*sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛtta*). See TBh p. 21, 8-13. Mokṣakaragupta also says that universal (*sāmānya*) is twofold, i.e., the concept of an individual (*ūrdhvatālakṣaṇa*, "vertical universal") and the concept of a class (*tiryaglakṣaṇa*, "horizontal universal"), and that the concept of an individual is constructed through the exclusion of all homogeneous things, and the concept of a class is constructed through the exclusion of all heterogeneous things. See TBh p. 22, 2-6: *tatra sāmānyaṃ dvividhaṃ, ūrdhvatālakṣaṇaṃ tiryaglakṣaṇaṃ ceti / tatraikasyām eva ghaṭādivyaktau sajātīyavyāvṛttāyām anekakṣaṇasamudāyaḥ sāmānyaṃ ūrdhvatālakṣaṇaṃ sādhanapratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ / vijātīyavyāvṛttās tv anekavyaktayaḥ tiryaksāmānyaṃ vyāptigrāhakapratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ /.* For an English translation, see KAJIYAMA (1966a) pp. 58-59, §7.1.2. See KATSURA (2002) and MIKOGAMI (1978) and (1979).

Śākyabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla say that there are three kinds of *anyāpoha*s. For Śākyabuddhi's explanation of three kind of *anyāpoha*s, see DUNNE (1999) pp. 149-152. In the TS and TSP Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla first say that *anyāpoha* is of two kinds (1) *apoha* that is characterized by implicative negation (*paryudāsalakṣaṇa*) and (2) *apoha* that is characterized by nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedhalakṣaṇa*). The former is further divided into the two: (1a) *apoha* that has the nature of mind or appearance (*buddhyātma* or *pratibimbalakṣaṇa*) and (1b) *apoha* that has the nature of entity or *svalakṣaṇa* (*arthātma*). See TSa k. 1004: *tathā hi dvividho 'pohaḥ paryudāsaniṣedhataḥ / dvividhaḥ paryudāso 'pi buddhyātmārthātmabhedataḥ //.* Of the three kinds, i.e., (1a,1b and 2), the *apoha* that implies appearance to conceptual cognition, i.e., *pratibimbalakṣaṇo 'poha*, is the direct meaning of the word (*mukhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ*). The other two *apoha*s, i.e., the *apoha* that implies a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the *apoha* that is a nonimplicative negation, are regarded as the indirect meaning of the word (*gauṇaṃ śabdārthatvam*). According to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, these

§11. [Rejoinder:] Here too, [i.e., in the proof of the absence of intrinsic nature] there would be a difference made through conceptual exclusion.

§12. [Adversary's reply:] That is not correct. [If that were the case,] then just like blue and yellow, those two [i.e., the *sādhya* and *sādhana*] would be real entities.[302]

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two *apoha*s are understood by implication (*sāmarthyena/arthāt*) from the establishment of the *apoha* that implies the appearance to a conceptual cognition. See TSa kk. 1013-1014. For Kamalaśīla's explanation of three kinds of *apoha*s, see TSPa pp. 317, 5-319, 27.

Dharmakīrti says that because *apoha* or *vyāvṛtti* means a complex double negation, i.e., the exclusion of all heterogeneous things and that of all homogeneous things, the particularity which is understood through one property (*dharma*) cannot be understood by any other things than this property. Therefore, even when two properties (e.g., being produced (*kṛtakatva*) and being impermanent (*anityatva*)) are not different in nature, a differentiation between those properties can be established by means of such exclusions. See PV I k. 42: *tasmād yo yena dharmeṇa viśeṣaḥ saṃpratīyate / na sa śakyas tato 'nyena tena bhinnā vyavasthitiḥ //.* English translation in TILLEMANS ibid. p. 70, 25-28: "Consequently, the particularity which is understood through one dharma cannot be [understood] by anything other than this [dharma], and it is in this way that there is a differentiation [between two merely conceptually distinct properties such as producthood (*kṛtakatva*) and impermanence (*anityatva*)]."

Due to the establishment of a difference made thorough conceptual exclusion, a reason which is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*) does not incur the fallacy that the reason is a part of the proposition (*pratijñārthaikadeśa*) — this is the fallacy that the reason is the same as the property-possessor (*dharmin*) or the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*). For example, due to such conceptual difference, the reason of being produced is not the same as the *sādhyadharma* (i.e., being impermanent), and therefore the reason (i.e., being produced) does not have the fallacy of being a part of the proposition that one wishes to prove. See IWATA (1989b) pp. 206-207. See also PVSV pp. 24, 14-26, 1. Note that Ichigō translates *ldog pas byas pa'i bye brag* as "the difference caused by concomitance in difference" (*vyatireka*) (否定的必然性によってつくられる相違). See ICHIGO (1991) p. 244, 8. This translation of Ichigō, however, seems to miss the point that what is at stake is *vyāvṛtti*, not *vyatireka*.

[302]The opponent seems to hold that a difference made through conceptual exclusion can be established only with regard to existent entities. For this reason, he says that a difference made through conceptual exclusion can be established with regard to being produced and being impermanent, which *are* existent entities, but that such a difference cannot be established with regard to being neither one nor many and being without intrinsic nature, which would be nonentities (*abhāva*). Thus the opponent can argue that his reason "X and Y are not mutually different"

4.1.3 The reason would be contradictory (*viruddha*)

§13. Moreover, just as the reason "being neither one nor many in nature" proves that entities are without intrinsic nature, so too that same reason will prove that the property-possessor (*dharmin*) is a nonentity (*abhāva*). And in that case, because it proves the negation of the property-possessor, the ["neither one nor many"] reason would be a contradictory [reason] (*viruddhahetu*).[303]

§14. In conclusion, there are absolutely no valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*) at all for proving that things are without intrinsic nature.[304]

4.2 REPLIES (*uttarapakṣa*)

§1. The objections that certain opponents have made to the "neither one nor many" reason, such as that it is unestablished and so forth, have also all been answered earlier by the previous master [i.e., Śāntarakṣita]. Nonetheless, some people, out of hostility, here criticize [Śāntarakṣita's answers] as being deceptive. We [thus] need to explain how these [criticisms] are misunderstandings.

4.2.1 The reason is not unestablished (*asiddha*)

4.2.1.1 Even when the reason proves an absurd consequence (*prasaṅga*), it is not unestablished for the other party

is not inconclusive for proving that there is no epistemic relation between X and Y.

[303]The opponent accuses the Mādhyamika of presenting a reason that proves the opposite of the property-possessor itself (有法自相相違因 *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*). This is one of four kinds of contradictory reasons (*viruddhahetu*) explained by Dignāga. See TILLEMANS (2000) pp. 52-53 and the references in his footnote 185. See also KOBAYASHI (1989b) p. 76, n. 26.

[304]This should be regarded as the conclusion to *all* the various objections to Kamalaśīla's five reasons for proving the absence of real intrinsic nature, such as *vajrakaṇahetu*, **sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu*, *catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedhahetu*, *pratītyasamutpādahetu* and *ekānekaviyogahetu*; it is not only the conclusion to the objections to the "neither one nor many" reason. Cf. KOBAYASHI ibid. p. 74, n. 33.

§2. [305]In this case, if this [reason] proves an absurd consequence, the

[305]From this point on, Kamalaśīla replies to the opponent's objection that whether the "neither one nor many" reason proves an absurd consequence (*prasaṅga*) or whether it proves the absence of real intrinsic nature by an autonomous reasoning (*svatantrahetu*), the reason in question would not be established. Kamalaśīla first considers the *prasaṅgasādhana* scenario, and demonstrates that the reason would not be unestablished for the opponent. Next, in MĀ D217b2, he considers the scenario where the "neither one nor many" reason is a *svatantrahetu*, and argues that here too the reason is not unestablished: just as on the first scenario, it is established for both opponent and proponent.

Note that in the case of the "neither one nor many" reasoning, the *prasaṅgasādhana* version of the argument would be a rather special type of use of unacceptable consequences and would be significantly different from the usual *reductio ad absurdum* style of argumentation that one associates with *prasaṅga*. For, normally in the case of *prasaṅga*, the *pakṣadharmatva*, i.e., the fact that the reason qualifies its subject, is not established for the proponent because *prasaṅga* uses a reason that is only accepted by opponents (*parasiddha*). Moreover, the absurd proposition, i.e., the consequence proven by a *prasaṅga*, will be unacceptable (*aniṣṭa*) to both the opponent and the proponents. Here, however, when the proof-statement by means of the "neither one nor many" reason is a *prasaṅgasādhana*, the fact that this reason qualifies its subject *is* established for the Mādhyamika proponent, and the consequence that all entities are without real intrinsic nature is acceptable to just the Mādhyamikas, but not to the opponents. (According to Iwata, this special type of *prasaṅga* was also accepted by Dharmottara. See IWATA (1996a) pp. 9-12 and p. 19, n. 26 and (1997b) p. 215, fn. 32 and pp. 228-230.) In fact, this special type of *prasaṅgasādhana* is itself very similar to a *svatantrahetu*. But although the two are similar in logical structure, the *prasaṅgasādhana* provides a distinctive way to avoid the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhahetu*, in that the property-possessor in a *prasaṅga* need not exist. The *svatantrahetu* provides another way to avoid this fallacy, a way that is elaborated upon in the MĀ. See Translation 2 pp. 127-152.

Finally, in his (1997b), (1997c) and (1997d) articles, S. Moriyama hypothesizes that Kamalaśīla's five proof-statements for the absence of real intrinsic nature — i.e., the *vajrakaṇa*, **sadasadutpādapratiṣedha*, *catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedha*, *pratītyasamutpāda* and *ekānekaviyoga* — are *prasaṅgaviparyaya*s, or "contrapositions of absurd consequences." However, this seems highly problematic. If Kamalaśīla's proof-statements were to be *prasaṅgaviparyaya*s, there would have to be corresponding *prasaṅga*s that would undergo conversion to *prasaṅgaviparyaya*s. That is, for example, if the proof-statement involving the "neither one nor many" reason were to be a *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, it should be regarded as the contraposition of the following statement: "If all entities postulated by our coreligionists and by those in heterodox schools as being really existent were to have a real intrinsic nature, then they would ultimately have to be one or many

reason is still not unestablished. That is, although it is not accepted by others that entities are neither one nor many, they do acknowledge properties that are pervaded (*vyāpta*) by [being neither one nor many]. Therefore, the latter [i.e., being neither one nor many] is also in fact acknowledged by implication (*shugs kyis, sāmarthyāt*).[306]

4.2.1.1.1 All cognizable objects (*jñeya*) are neither one nor many in nature

4.2.1.1.1.1 *Īśvara* and so forth are neither one nor many in nature

§3. In this vein, first of all, those who imagine *Īśvara* (i.e., "God") and so forth as having permanence and oneness acknowledge that [*Īśvara* and so forth] have the property of influencing results produced successively,[307]

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in nature." Here, we can immediately understand that this statement does not prove *any* absurdity for the opponent, because the consequence that all entities would ultimately *be* one or many in nature is *not at all* unacceptable (*aniṣṭa*) to the realist opponents. In fact, it is what they themselves believe. In short, we cannot come up with credible candidates for the original *prasaṅga*s, and so it is very difficult to follow Moriyama in taking the proof-statements as *prasaṅgaviparyaya*s.

[306]Although the opponents hold that each entity would be one in nature, the Buddhist can supposedly persuade them (with considerable argumentation) that these same entities have certain properties which would logically imply that they could not be one in nature. This is what Kamalaśīla expresses by saying that "they do acknowledge properties that are pervaded (*vyāpta*) by [being neither one nor many]."

This method for proving that the "neither one nor many" reason qualifies its subjects already figures in the MAP of Kamalaśīla. See MAP D88a5-6: *de la re zhig bdag la sogs pa ma grags pa'i rang gi ngo bo rnams kyang rang bzhin gcig pa nyid du khas blangs mod kyi / de dag ni 'bras bu rim can rnam par shes pa la sogs pa la nye bar sbyor bar khas len te / shugs kyis rang bzhin gcig pa nyid med pa 'dren par byed pas re zhig gcig pa nyid dang bral bar grub pa kho na yin no //.* "In this case, first, a [pseudo-entity] such as *ātman* and the like, although of a nature unacknowledged [by Buddhists], is nonetheless accepted [by non-Buddhist opponents] as being one in nature. Still, [these non-Buddhist opponents] accept them [i.e., *ātman*, etc.] as contributing to a series of results, such as cognitions and so forth. [Therefore,] since the absence of oneness is derived by implication [from *ātman* etc. producing a series of results], first, [*ātman*, etc.] are in fact established as being without oneness."

[307]When later Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla refute the existence of *Īśvara*, the creator of the universe, the main target of their refutation is the *Īśvara* acknowledged by Naiyāyikas. For the Naiyāyikas' idea of *Īśvara*, see NS IV.1.19-21: *īśvaraḥ kāraṇaṃ puruṣakarmāphalyadarśanāt // na puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ // tatkāritvād ahetuḥ //.* In his NV Uddyotakara

and therefore they also in fact acknowledge the absence of oneness by implication. This is because given that something which is one in nature is no different [later] from what it was [earlier] when it did not produce [results], then it could not produce [results] later, just as [it did not produce results] earlier. If, on the other hand, it did in fact produce [results], then because of the difference of character from its former state, its oneness would be undermined.[308]

§4. It is not correct either that this [*Īśvara*] really has manyness. This is because it has been already proved earlier that simultaneously or otherwise [i.e., serially], there could not really be any connection between his continuum and that of the other things [that he creates].[309]

4.2.1.1.1.2 The three sorts of unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*) are neither one nor many in nature

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says that *Īśvara* is an efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of the universe and the intelligent cause (*buddhimatkāraṇa*) which controls the activities of *pradhāna* ("primordial matter"), atoms and karma. See NV p. 943, 13 and p. 945, 12-15. As for *Īśvara*'s qualities such as permanence, see NV p. 952, 10-11: *jñānanityatvāc ca na saṃskārāḥ — nityaṃ vijñānam īśravasyeti* ... . For the Naiyāyikas' proofs of the existence of *Īśvara* and his qualities, see CHEMPARATHY (1972) and VATTANSKY (1984).

[308]Cf. MAK 2: *'bras bu rim can nyer sbyor bas // rtag rnams gcig pu'i bdag nyid min // 'bras bu re re tha dad na // de dag rtag las nyams par 'gyur //.* "Because of [their] influencing successive results, permanent things cannot be one in nature. If each result is distinct, the permanence of those [causes] will be undermined." See also MĀ D210b5-7: *'di ltar gcig las gcig kho na skye na rtag pa'i ngo bo las sam / mi rtag pa'i ngo bo las skye bas 'gyur grang na / re zhig rtag pa'i ngo bo las ni ma yin te / de ni de mi skyed pa'i gnas skabs dang khyad par med pa nyid kyis sngon dang phyi ma'i dus bzhin du bar du yang skyed par byed pa nyid du 'gal ba'i phyir ro // 'on te skyed na ni de bzhin du sngon dang phyi ma'i dus su yang skyed par thal ba yin te / skyed par byed pa'i rang bzhin rjes su 'brang ba'i phyir ro // rjes su mi 'brang na ni de'i rtag pa nyid nyams pa yin pas rim dang cig shes dag gis 'di'i skyed par byed pa nyid rgyas par bsal ba yin no // de'i phyir re zhig rtag pa las skye bar rigs pa ma yin no //.*

[309]Our interpretation of this passage is uncertain. Kamalaśīla criticizes here the hypothesis that *Īśvara* is multiple in nature and is impermanent. In the MĀ Kamalaśīla refutes that *Īśvara* has an impermanent nature by showing, in the section on the *catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedhahetu*, that one effect is not produced from just one cause. See MĀ D211a4-6. Unfortunately, this argument presents considerable difficulties of interpretation. See KOBAYASHI (1986) p. 33, n. 3. The argument is not found in the MAV nor in the MAP.

§5. The [Vaibhāṣikas] who accept that the three sorts of unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*),[310] such as space (*ākāśa*), have oneness and do not influence any results also acknowledge that these [unconditioned things] are cognizable objects of successively arising cognitions,[311] and therefore they do in fact acknowledge the absence of oneness by implication.[312] This is because each individual cognition of these things as well as the objects to be cognized by these respective cognitions will [all] be separate things. If not, then given that [the objects] would not be different, the [unconditioned things] could not be cognizable by their cognitions later just as [they could not be] earlier.[313] Therefore, it is not correct that these [unconditioned

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[310]For the Vaibhāṣikas' three sorts of unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*), i.e., space (*ākāśa*), cessation with insight (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*) and cessation without insight (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*), see fn. 232.

[311]According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the three unconditioned things are cognizable objects. See AK V 31cd: *anāsravās tridhātvantyatrayānāsravagocarāḥ //.* French translation in LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (1980) Tome IV pp. 68, 26-69, 2: "Les *dharmas* purs (*anāsrava*) sont le domaine ou l'objet des trois dernières connaissances des trois sphères et de la connaissance pure." Note that pure (*anāsrava*) dharmas consist of the truth of the way (*mārgasatya*) and the three unconditioned things. See AK I 5ab: *anāsravā mārgasatyaṃ trividhaṃ cāpy asaṃskṛtam /.* See AKVy p. 481, 2-6: *pratisaṃkhyānirodhāryamārgau tāvat tadālambanānāṃ mithyādṛṣṭivicikitsāvidyāsaṃprayuktānāṃ bhāvanāprahātavyānām anāsravasya ca dharmajñānānvayajñānapakṣasya yathāyogam ālambanam. ākāśāpratisaṃkhyānirodhau tu bhāvanāprahātavyasyaivākliṣṭasya cittasyālambanam iti veditavyam.*

[312]Cf. MAK 3: *bsgoms las byung ba'i shes pa yis // shes bya 'dus ma byas smra ba'i // lugs la'ang gcig min de dag ni // rim can shes dang 'brel phyir ro //.* "Even in the doctrinal system of the [Vaibhāṣikas] who maintain unconditioned things to be cognizable by the cognition that arises from meditation, [unconditioned things] are not one [in nature], because they are connected with successive cognitions."

[313]This can also be explained as follows. If the objects of the cognitions were not different, the cognitions themselves would not be separate in time either, but would be simultaneous. See MAP D89b5: *gal te rjes su 'brang ba yin na ni de'i tshe rnam par shes pa snga ma la sogs pa dus gcig pa nyid du 'gyur te /.* "If [the object cognizable by the preceding cognition] were to continue, then the preceding cognition and [the subsequent one] would be simultaneous." See MĀ D201b5: *de'i shes pas shes par bya ba'i rang bzhin rjes su 'brang na de'i shes pa yang de 'dra ba nyid du rjes su 'brang ba'i phyir rtag bar thal bar 'gyur ro //.* "If the natures of what is cognizable by the cognitions of [*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*, etc.] continue, then since the cognitions of them also continue to be like the [*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*, etc.], it would follow absurdly that [the cognitions] would be permanent." Cf. MAK 4: *rnam shes snga mas shes bya ba'i // rang bzhin rjes su 'brang na ni // shes pa snga*

things] are one in nature.

§6. It has been proved earlier on that [these unconditioned things] are not many in nature either.[314]

4.2.1.1.1.3 The permanent causes of the various worlds, such as time (*kāla*), Spirit (*puruṣa*), primordial matter (*pradhāna*), *Brahman* and so forth, are neither one nor many in nature

§7. Time (*kāla*), Spirit (*puruṣa*), primordial matter (*pradhāna*), *Brahman* and so forth, which are imagined by some people to be the causes establishing the various worlds, all the while being permanent and one in nature,[315] are also acknowledged by those [same people] to possess, suc-

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ma'ang phyi mar 'gyur // phyi ma'ang de bzhin snga mar 'gyur //.

[314]It seems that Kamalaśīla refers here to the refutation of permanent things' successive causal efficacy, or *arthakriyā*, in the MĀ D192a7-193a3. If permanent causes were to produce successively their effects, they would be impermanent and hence multiple in nature. Note that if Kamalaśīla is indeed referring to D192a7-193a3, he has linked the "neither one nor many" argument to the argument about the *vajrakaṇahetu.*

[315]In the Vaiśeṣika system, time (*kāla*) is a permanent substance (*dravya*) and is the cause of the production, continuation and destruction of all products. See VS II.2.7 and PBh p. 332, 7: *sarvakāryāṇāṃ cotpattisthitivināśahetus.*

In the Sāṃkhya system, Spirit (*puruṣa*) is regarded as the *ātman* which has the nature of intelligence (*caitanya/cetanā*). *Puruṣa* is permanent (see SK 3 and 10-11) and is many in nature since it exists in each individual person (see SK 18). However, for one person, intelligence can be one in nature. So in his TS Śāntarakṣita refutes the existence of *puruṣa* by saying that if the Sāṃkhya accept that for one person, intelligence would be one in nature, it could not have different natures when one perceives colors and sounds. See TS k. 287. See also TS k. 288.

The Sāṃkhyas say that primordial matter (*pradhāna* = *prakṛti*) is permanent, one in nature, nonspiritual (see SK 10-11) and is composed of three qualities (*triguṇa*), i.e., ontological excellence (*sattva*), agitation (*rajas*) and dullness (*tamas*) (see SK 11). All phenomena other than *puruṣa* are transformations (*pariṇāma*) of *pradhāna*. Such transformations start when primordial matter has joined with *puruṣa* (see SK 21).

In the [Advaita-]Vedānta philosophy, *Brahman* which is one in nature is regarded as the cause of various deceptive worlds. See *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* ad *Brahmasūtra* II.1.14 pp. 372, 15-373, 2. All phenomena (*nāmarūpa*) are the illusions (*māyā*), powers (*śakti*) or material causes (*prakṛti*) of the omniscient *Brahman*. According to scripture, i.e., *Chāndogyopaniṣad* VIII.14.1, those phenomena are contained in *Brahman*. See ibid. p. 382, 2-5: *sarvajñasyeśvarasyātmabhūta*

cessively or simultaneously, the [manifold] natures of the various real or deceptive collections of entities [that constitute the different worlds]. Hence, the absence of oneness is in fact acknowledged by implication. Indeed, it is not correct that things which are one in nature could possess in this way the [manifold] natures of the various worlds.[316]

§8. If they [i.e., time etc.] are not established as being ones, they cannot logically be many either, for the latter [i.e., manyness] consists in being a collection of the former [i.e., ones].[317]

4.2.1.1.1.4 *Pudgala* is neither one nor many in nature

§9. The [Vātsīputrīya Buddhists],[318] who imagine that the entity called *pudgala* cannot be said to be permanent or impermanent in nature, explicitly (*dngos su*) acknowledge too that it is neither one nor many: it is not logical that something might have oneness and yet that it could not be said to be permanent; nor is it logical that things directly experienced as having different natures would nonetheless not be said to be momentary.[319]

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ivāvidyākalpite nāmarūpe tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīye saṃsāraprapañcabīja-bhūte sarvajñasyeśvarasya māyāśaktiḥ prakṛtir iti ca śrutismṛtyor abhilapyate / tābhyām anyaḥ sarvajña īśvaraḥ, ākāśo vai nāmarūpayor nirvahitā te yad antarā tad brahma iti śruteḥ /.

[316]Cf. *Madhyamakahṛdaya* III k. 223, PP D50b7-51a1 and TS k. 1882abc. For Kamalaśīla's refutation of a real *Brahman* which would have deceptive appearances, see MAP D100b6-101a5. Note that Śāntarakṣita refutes the Vedānta's position on the oneness of *Brahman* in the MAV ad k. 40.

[317]This is the "normal" way to refute manyness and is found in the MAV and MAP. See MAK 61 and MAV D68a4-5. See also ICHIGO (1985) p. 172.

[318]When in the TS and TSP, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla refute the existence of *pudgala*, the opponents are the Vātsīputrīyas. The Vātsīputrīyas (and the Sāṃmitīyas also) do explicitly hold that *pudgala* cannot be said to be one with or different from the psycho-physical aggregates (*skandha*). See *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI k. 146: *kha cig de nyid gzhan nyid rtag mi rtag / la sogs brjod med gang zag rdzas yod 'dod / rnam shes drug gi shes byar de 'dod cing / de ni ngar 'dzin gzhir yang 'dod pa yin //.* Cf. TS kk. 336-337. For the Vātsīputrīya and Sāṃmitīya Buddhist schools, see BAREAU (1955) pp. 114-126.

[319]Cf. MAK 9 and MAV D58a7-58b1: *skad cig par grub na ni du ma'i rang bzhin du 'gyur te / skad cig re re la yang rang bzhin gzhan dang gzhan 'byung ba'i phyir ro // skad cig ma yin na ni rtag tu bstan pa gcig bu'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir gcig bu'i rang bzhin du 'gyur ro // gnyi ga ltar yang brjod du med na ni tshegs med par gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin gyis stong pa nyid du grub po //.*

4.2.1.1.1.5 The refutation of single substances which consist in wholes (*avayavin*) and atoms

4.2.1.1.1.5.1 Wholes are not one in nature

§10. When [the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika] imagine that impermanent things, like bodies, earth, mountains and so forth, are each single substances consisting in a whole (*avayavin*),[320] they also acknowledge that [this single substance] has the property of pervading the many substances which make up the parts and that are located in various places. Therefore, they do acknowledge [wholes] as not being ones. If the [whole] is not of a different nature corresponding to each part, then it could not pervade the [parts] either. It is also not possible for partless things to have contradictory properties such as being covered and not being covered (*āvaraṇānāvaraṇa*).[321]

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[320]The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas say that whole (*avayavin*) is another substance (*dravya*) than its parts (*avayava*). They hold that the simple collection of parts, i.e., atoms (*paramāṇu*), cannot be the object of perception, because atoms are imperceptible things. So if there were no such wholes, the perceptions of substances, qualities (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*) and so forth would not be established. In fact, those perceptions are established. Therefore, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas say that wholes are really existent. See NS II.1.34: *sarvāgrahaṇam avayavyasiddheḥ //.* See also NBh ad NS II.1.34 p. 497, 4-8. And see NV p. 497, 11-17. As for the oneness of the whole, see NBh ad NS II.1.35, pp. 499, 2-500, 2.

Cf. TSa k. 596: *nanu ye lokataḥ siddhā vāsodehanagādayaḥ / ta evāvayavitvena bhavadbhir upavarṇitāḥ //.* "But you explain that it is precisely the things established in the world, like cloths, bodies, mountains and so forth, which are wholes!"

[321]In order to refute the existence of wholes, Buddhists seem to use two types of reasons. One is that parts cannot exist in a whole which is one in nature, and such a whole cannot exist in its parts either. So this type of reason consists in *vṛttyanupapatti*, "impossibility of existence." This type of reason can be found in *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* p. 143, §§32-34, NS IV.2.6-10, TS kk. 605-611 and so forth. See also NBhūṣ pp. 104, 16-106, 2. And see YAMAKAMI (1999) pp. 160-161 and FUNAYAMA (1990). The other type of reason is that if whole were to be one in nature, it would be impossible for such partless things to have contradictory properties such as being covered and not being covered (*āvaraṇānāvaraṇa*). This type of reason seems to have been developed by Dharmakīrti. See PVin I pp. 84, 18-86, 9 (= NBhūṣ p. 104, 8-16. See STEINKELLNER (1972) pp. 204-206). In his PVin I Dharmakīrti says that it is impossible that wholes, which are one in nature, would have the following three sets of contradictory properties: (1) shaking and not shaking (*kampākampa*), (2) being covered and not being covered (*āvaraṇānāvaraṇa*), (3) being red-colored and not being red-colored (*raktārakta*). This type of reason can also be found in TS kk. 593-594 etsq.

4.2.1.1.1.5.2 Atoms are not one in nature

§11. The [Vaiśeṣikas, etc.],[322] who imagine each atom individually as being one because the body and so forth are simply aggregates of atoms, also acknowledge that [atoms] have the property of uniting and aggregating. Hence they do in fact also acknowledge the absence of oneness by implication. Partless things lack sides on account of which we could experience their uniting, [aggregating] and so forth. And what does not connect with a part or what does not aggregate also cannot exist extended over space.[323] Nor could the parts logically be one in nature [when they are collected together], for they would be nothing more than a gathering together (*saṃghāta*) of parts [and such gatherings are metaphorical designations].[324]

Kamalaśīla here clearly follows Dharmakīrti and proves the absence of oneness of the whole due to the impossibility of contradictory properties like *āvaraṇānāvaraṇa*. (Cf. MAK 10cd.) However, Kamalaśīla also proves the absence of oneness of the whole by means of the reason consisting in the whole's property of pervading the many substances which make up the parts, although Dharmakīrti himself does not seem to use such a reason in his works. Although it is not clear who was the first to use that reason, Śāntarakṣita uses it in his TS k. 601. See FUNAYAMA ibid. p. 618 and p. 633, n. 15. See also KAJIYAMA (1961c) and TOLA AND DRAGONETTI (1994).

[322]The opponents here are the Vaiśeṣikas, the Vaibhāṣikas (and Śubhagupta) and the Sautrāntikas. See fn. 323 below.

[323]Cf. TSPa p. 556, 7-12: *tatra kecid āhuḥ parasparaṃ saṃyujyante paramāṇava iti,* sāntarā eva nityaṃ na spṛśāntīty apare,** nirantaratve tu spṛṣṭasaṃjñety anye,*** tatraitasmin pakṣatraye 'pi madhyavarttinaḥ paramāṇor bahubhiḥ parivāritasya yadi digbhāgabhedo na syāt tadā cittacaittādikalāpasyeva pracayo na syād anaṃśatvāt / tathā hi — yenaikarūpeṇaikāṇvabhimukho madhyavarttī paramāṇus tenaivāparaparamāṇvabhimukho yadi syāt tadā parivārakāṇām aṇūnām ekadeśatvaprasaṅgāt pracayo na syāt /.* (* Vaiśeṣika position. See MAV D59a1-2. ** Vaibhāṣika (and Śubhagupta's) position. See YAMAGUCHI AND NOZAWA (1953) p. 78, n. 2 and MAP D92b2. *** Sautrāntika position. See ICHIGO (1985) p. 52 n. 2.) Cf. MAK. 11-13 and TS kk. 1989-1991.

[324]This last argument is not found in the MAV and the MAP. Kamalaśīla refutes the objection that although the parts are not one in nature, the collection of the parts would be one. According to S. YAMAGUCHI (1941) pp. 414-415 and KAJIYAMA (1982) pp. 40-41, Bhāviveka held that *bsags pa* (*saṃcita*) and *'dus pa* (*saṃghāta*) were different. The same kind of atoms aggregating in reliance upon the same basis, such as a pot, are called *bsags pa* and can be objects of cognition. On the other hand, *'dus pa* are metaphorically designated things like armies and woods, which are mere gatherings of different kinds of substances depending upon different bases.

4.2.1.1.1.5.3 Atoms and wholes (*avayavin*) are not many in nature

§12. Nor is it possible that both these substances, i.e., atoms and wholes, are many in nature. This is because, since that [i.e., being many] is characterized as a collection of ones, when oneness is not established, that [i.e., manyness] would not be established either as it is established in reliance upon those [i.e., ones].

4.2.1.1.1.6 Qualities (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universals (*sāmānya*), particulars (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) are not established at all

§13. In this manner, when the substances (*dravya*) which are causes and effects are established as being neither one nor many in nature, [then] qualities (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universals (*sāmānya*), particulars (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*), which are designated in dependence upon [substances], are not established at all, for they are dependent upon [substances].[32

See TJ D210a6-7. See also DREYFUS (1997) pp. 83-105. Kamalaśīla also seems to hold that *bsags pa* and *'dus pa* are different. See KOBAYASHI (1986) p. 34, n. 11.

[325] In Vaiśeṣika philosophy, one can obtain supreme bliss (*niḥśreyasa*), i.e., liberation (*mokṣa*), by means of the correct understanding of six categories (*padārtha*), which consist of substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universals (*sāmānya*), particulars (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). These six categories have three common characteristics: existence (*astitva*), being cognizable (*jñeyatva*) and being expressible (*abhidheyatva*). The five categories other than substances, i.e., qualities, motion, universals, particulars and inherence, depend upon substances. Inherence depends upon substances, qualities, motion, universals and particulars. See VS VII.2.29: *iheti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ /.* (Note that according to VSV, inherence can also be established for non-effects and non-causes (i.e., universals and particulars). See VSV p. 61, 15-16: *kāryakāraṇagrahaṇasyopalakṣaṇatvāt jāter vyaktau viśeṣāṇāṃ ca nityadravyeṣu samavāyaḥ ity uktaṃ bhavati /.*) Universals and particulars depend upon substances, qualities and motion. See VS I.1.7: *sad anityaṃ dravyavat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti dravyaguṇakarmaṇām aviśeṣaḥ /.* Qualities and motion depend upon substances. See VS I.1.15-16: *dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam / ekadravyam* aguṇaṃ saṃyogavibhāgeṣv anapekṣaṃ kāraṇam iti karmalakṣaṇam /.* (* VSV: *ekam asya karmaṇo dravyam āśrayaḥ, na dve, ekam eva vā dravye vartata ity ekadvavyam /.*) Thus, due to the fact that the five categories other than substances depend upon substances, Kamalaśīla says that when substances do not really exist, the other five categories also cannot really exist.

Cf. MAK 14-15.

4.2.1.1.1.7 Conclusion: cognizable things are neither one nor many in nature

§14. Thus, in the first place, we have explained that [our adversaries] acknowledge by implication that all cognizable things are indeed void of being one or many.

4.2.1.1.2 Cognition (*vijñāna*) is not one in nature

4.2.1.1.2.1 Cognition for the Nirākāravādins is not one in nature

§15. Although [the Nirākāravādins][326] also imagine cognition as being one, nonetheless they acknowledge that this [cognition] has the property of grasping its objects as variegated in nature, and therefore they too do acknowledge the absence of oneness by implication. That is to say, they have to accept that cognition is inevitably endowed with aspects (*ākāra*). Otherwise, it would not be possible that this [mental] substance, untinged by the aspects of its objects, could be established as grasping the objects.[327] If you accept it as being endowed with aspects, you obviously will accept that this [cognition] is not one in nature. This is because (a) cognition's nature would be variegated; (b) being variegated and being one are contradictory.[328]

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[326]For the identification of the opponent here, see MAP ad MAK 21 D96a2-3.

The Nirākāravādins are those who accept that cognition is not endowed with aspects (*ākāra*), i.e., with images or representation of its object. According to them, cognition is clear like a clean slate, and even when it perceives the external objects, it is itself not tinged by the aspects of the objects. In Indian philosophy, the Buddhist Vaibhāṣikas, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas and the Jainas are regarded as the Nirākāravādins. On the other hand, the Buddhist Sautrāntikas, the Buddhist Yogācāras, the Sāṃkhyas and the Vedāntas are the Sākāravādins, those who accept that cognition is endowed with aspects. The Sākāravādins hold that cognition does not cognize the external objects themselves — what is cognized by cognition does not exist outside the sphere of cognition. See KAJIYAMA (1965b) and MOOKERJEE (1935) pp. 76-78.

[327]Cf. MAK 21: *don gyi rnam pas bsgyur ldan pa'i // rnam shes su zhig mi 'dod pa // de la phyi rol rig pa yi // rnam pa 'di yang yod ma yin //.* "But for [the Nirākāravādins] who do not accept that cognition is tinged by the aspect of the object, there is not even this way of knowing external [objects]." See TSa k. 2006: *yena tv iṣṭaṃ na vijñānam arthākāroparāgavat / tasyāyam api naivāsti prakāro bāhyavedane //.*

[328]The words *sna tshogs dang gcig pa nyid dag kyang 'gal ba'i phyir* do not serve as a reason for the next sentence, i.e., *shes pa thams cad dngos po sna tshogs kyi yul can du khas blangs pa yin te /.* Rather, those words should serve as a reason for

4.2.1.1.2.2 The refutation of the Sautrāntika theory

§16. [The Sautrāntikas][329] accept that all cognition have variegated entities as their objects. That is to say, our coreligionists accept that the group of five sense cognitions have aggregates (*saṃcita*) [of atoms] as their objects.[330] The sixth [sort of] cognition [i.e., mental consciousness (*mano-*

cognition's absence of oneness. See MAV ad k. 23: *rnam par shes pa de rnam pa du ma dang tha dad pa ma yin pa'i lus yin na ni / rnam pa de dag gi bye brag bzhin du du mar 'gyur ro // gal te rnam par shes pa ni gcig pu kho na'i rang bzhin yin la / rnam pa ni du ma yin na de'i tshe 'gal ba'i chos su gnas pas rnam pa dang rnam pa shes pa nyid tha dad pa ma yin par mi 'gal lo //.* See also KOBAYASHI (1986) p. 25 and p. 35, n. 14.

The argument here is undertaken in reliance upon the refutation of the *citrādvaita* theory, viz., the theory that the one consciousness and the variegated aspects are non-distinct. On *citrādvaita*, see IWATA (1991a) Teil I p. 36, p. 42, pp. 52-54, pp. 56-58, (1983) pp. 39-40 and (1982) pp. (2)-(4). See also TOSAKI (1979) p. 317. Cf. MAK 23; see also TSa k. 2038: *ākārāvyatiriktatvāt jñāne vānekatā bhavet / anyathā katham ekatvam anayoḥ parikalpyate //.*

[329]The Sautrāntika is an Indian Buddhist school that accepts the Sākāravāda, the theory that cognition is endowed with aspects. They also accept cognition's reflexivity (*svasaṃvedana*). On *svasaṃvedana*, see fn. 75. In the Sautrāntika theory, although cognition cannot cognize the external objects themselves, the external objects are really existent, and their existence can be inferred from the arising of the aspects of cognition. Although the Sautrāntikas accept the real existence of atoms, their theory of atoms is different from that of the Vaiśeṣikas and that of the Vaibhāṣikas. See fn. 323.

In Tibetan Buddhism, Sautrāntika epistemology is divided in terms of the following three positions on how it solves the problem of how one consciousness can understand variegated objects: *gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa* ("equality between the number of subjects and objects"), *sna tshogs gnyis med pa* (*citrādvaita*, "non-distinction between one consciousness and variegated aspects") and *sgo nga phyed tshal pa* ("half egg"). On *gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa*, see fn. 332. For the idea of *citrādvaita*, see fn. 328. *sGo nga phyed tshal pa* means the position that a cognition successively arises (very quickly) grasping only one aspect in each moment. For example, when one perceives a multicolored carpet, visual perception grasps one aspect of white in the first moment, one aspect of yellow in the second moment, one aspect of red in the third moment, one aspect of blue in the fourth moment and so on. The Sautrāntikas says that since those successive perceptions can arise very quickly, one can understand the variegated colors of the carpet. The position *sgo nga phyed tshal pa* is sometimes called *sna tshogs rim 'dzin pa* ("successively grasping the manifold"). For the details of the Sautrāntika theory and the three positions on aspects, see MIMAKI (1980a) and (1988).

[330]Cf. AKBh p. 34, 1-2: *saṃcitāśrayālambanatvāt pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānām /.*

vijñāna)] also has minds (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) as its objects. And [the Sautrāntikas] recognize that all cognitions are endowed with variegated aspects, because [they hold that] when we look at a single picture, we experience a cognition having variegated aspects.[331] In that case, [we reply that] it is not right either to think that, in order to establish the position that aspects are variegated, many cognitions would have to arise [simultaneously].[332] This is because, since those [cognitions] are not physical things, they are not similar to things that are extended over space; it is not correct [to think] that even if [the cognitions] were not like that [i.e., were not extended], the aspects could still be manifold.[333]

See HATTORI (1968) p. 26, 20-22 and p. 88, n. 1.38, and see TOSAKI (1979) pp. 294-298.

[331]The Sautrāntikas say that when one looks at a picture, one can experience that a cognition has variegated aspects, but that such experience is not a visual perception of a picture, but is rather the reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) of that visual perception.

For the refutation of the Sautrāntika theory, see MAK 34: *rnam shes lnga yi khams rnams ni // bsags la dmigs pa'i rnam pa yin // sems dang sems byung dmigs pa ni // drug par bzhag pa byas pa yin //.*

[332]This is the refutation of the Sautrāntika position called "equality between the number of subjects and objects" (*gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa*), viz., the position that for each of various aspects (e.g., color, shape, etc.) that is grasped there must be a distinct cognition that grasps this aspect. This position is laid out in MAK 31: *ri mo'i gzhi rnams mthong ba'i tshe // de la de bzhin sems mang po // ci ste cig ca'i tshul gyis su // 'byung bar 'gyur bar 'dod na go //.* "When one sees various paintings, then there would be many minds corresponding to those [paintings], if it is accepted that [these minds] arise simultaneously." The term *gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa* figures in Tibetan doctrinal treatises such as CG (ka 87a3-5), but does not seem to have a Sanskrit antecedent.

[333]Kamalaśīla first criticizes the Sautrāntika position that there are an equal number of subjects and objects (*gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa*) as making a false analogy between the mind's way of representing multiple aspects (e.g., color, shape, etc.) of an object and physical representations or copies of objects. In the latter case, the representations might have to be as numerous as the objective aspects being represented. (E.g., if one page copies another, every copied mark has a corresponding copying mark.) However, in the case of consciousness, which is not physical, this one to one correspondence is not possible, according to Kamalaśīla.

In the second reason Kamalaśīla rejects the Sautrāntika view that although the multiple consciousnesses corresponding to multiple aspects are not themselves extended over space, the aspects can *appear* to be extended. The refutation of this Sautrāntika position is to be found in AAA p. 627, 15-17:

4.2.1.1.2.3 Cognition for the Vaiśeṣikas is not one in nature

§17. Because they acknowledge that substances with qualities, motion and the rest are also directly apprehended simultaneously by cognition, the [non-Buddhist] adversaries too accept that cognition has variegated objects.[334]

4.2.1.1.2.4 Cognition for the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas is not one in nature

§18. The [Jainas, etc.], who explain that all entities are like agates (*mecakamaṇi*) because of the specific modes (*paryāya*) of substance,[335] also

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deśavitānapratibhāsinām ākārāṇāṃ satyatvam icchatā jñānānām adeśānām api satāṃ bahūnāṃ tathādeśavitānotpādaḥ parikalpyate. "Those who accept that [cognition's] aspects, which appear to be extended, are real [have to] imagine [wrongly] that multiple cognitions, though not extended, would come into being extended just like the [aspects].

[334]In the Vaiśeṣika system, perception is established by contact of the soul (*ātman*), the sense faculties (*indriya*), the mind (*manas*) and the object (*artha*). See VS III.1.13: *ātmendriyamano 'rthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat /.* (For the fact that Dignāga regards VS III.1.13 as the Vaiśeṣika definition of perception in respect to substances, see HATTORI (1968) p. 134, n. 4.3.) Perception of four categories, i.e., qualities, motion, universals and particulars, presupposes perception of the substances to which they are related. See VS VIII.4-5: *guṇakarmasv asaṃnikṛṣṭeṣu jñānaniṣpatter dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca / sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāt tata eva* jñānam /.* (* VSV: *dravyasaṃnikarṣād eva.*) See also HATTORI ibid. p. 134, n. 4.2. The Vaiśeṣikas say that when one perceives a substance, then the perceptions of its qualities, motion and so forth can successively arise. So Kamalaśīla says here that it follows that cognition has variegated objects. See VS VIII.6-7: *sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣaṃ dravyaguṇakarmasu / dravye dravyaguṇakarmāpekṣam /.* See also PBh p. 553, 2-5: *sāmānyaviśeṣa-dravyaguṇakarmaviśeṣaṇāpekṣād ātmamanaḥsannikarṣāt pratyakṣam utpadyate — sat dravyaṃ pṛthivī viṣāṇī śuklo gaur gacchati — iti /.* Cf. VSV p. 63, 8-9. See HATTORI ibid. p. 137, n. 4.15. Note that according to TSP, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that inherence is not the object of perception, but the object of inference. See TSPa p. 265, 24-27: *evaṃ tāvad vaiśeṣikāṇāṃ matena — ihabuddhiliṅgānumeyaḥ samavāyaḥ, naiyāyikamatena tu — ihabuddhipratyakṣagamya eva / tathā hi te — akṣavyāpāre satīha tantuṣu paṭa ityādipratyayotpatteḥ pratyakṣatvam ācakṣate /.*

For a similar argument, see MAK 35.

[335]According to the MAP ad MAK 36, the opponents here are the Jainas (Digambaras) and the Mīmāṃsakas. For the Jainas' idea of *paryāya*, modes of substance (*dravya*), see Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* (TAAS) v. 38: *guṇaparyāyavad*

agree that the objects of the mind which focuses upon these [substances] are multiple entities.[336]

4.2.1.1.2.5 Cognition for the Cārvākas is not one in nature

§19. The [Cārvākas],[337] who imagine the objects [of cognition] as being

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dravyam. Substance with its qualities exists in some form or state, which mode of existence is termed *paryāya*. For example, the substance, gold, which possesses qualities like yellow color, takes a form such as a bracelet, necklace and so forth. Modes of substance are subject to change, while substance with its qualities are changeless or permanent. See RADHAKRISHNAN (1923) vol. 1. p. 314, 13-22. See also Jitāri's AAVN p. 81, 2-9: *ihāmī digambarāḥ dravyaparyāyarūpeṇa utpattisthitipralayātmakaṃ bhāvagrāmaṃ varṇayanti / tatrāvasthāsu sakalāsu anugatasvabhāvaṃ dravyam ācakṣate, yathā keyūrakaṭakakuṇḍalādyavasthāsv anuyāyi suvarṇam / satyadravyātmani utpādavyayadharmakāḥ paryāyāḥ / yathā saty api dravye jāyamānā vyavamānāś ca keyūrādayaḥ / yathā ghaṭaṃ bhañjayitvā mauliḥ kriyate tathā ghaṭo naśyati maulir utpadyate, suvarṇaṃ tu nodeti na vyeti iti utpādavyayadhrauvyātmakaṃ vastu /.*

For the example of *mecakamaṇivat* or *mecakaratnavat*, see *Syādvādaparīkṣā* of TSPa p. 489, 1-5: *ayam atra paramārthaḥ — mecakaratnavad ekam eva vastv anekākāram, te cākārāḥ kecid anuvṛttibuddhigrāhyāḥ kecid vyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyāḥ / ... tatrānuvṛttibuddhir bhāvo bhāva ityādy abhedākārā, vyāvṛttibuddhir ghaṭo 'yaṃ na paṭa ityevamādi bhedākārā //.*

The Mīmāṃsaka opponent here can be identified as Kumārila by TSP ad TSa kk. 1745-1746 p. 493, 25. K. 1745 is identical with ŚV V.12.57cd and V.12.58ab, and k. 1746 with ŚV V.12.62cd and V.12.63ab. K. 1745 of TSa is quoted in the MAV ad k. 36, i.e., D63b5-6.

The point of argument is that the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas hold that the objects of cognition are multiple entities because they can be both one and many in nature. See Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* I.30: *pramāṇasya viṣayo dravyaparyāyātmakaṃ vastu.* Note that substances (*dravya*) are permanent and one in nature, while modes (*paryāya*) are impermanent and many in nature. See NAGASAKI (1988) p. 267 and p. 96-105. See also TAAS v. 29: *utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat.* And see ŚV V.12.56ab: *kenacid dhy ātmanaikatvaṃ nānātvaṃ cāsya kenacit /.* Kamalaśīla cannot accept this idea of the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas because it is contradictory for him that cognition which is one in nature would have multiple entities as its objects.

[336]Cf. MAK 36: *nor bu gzi yi bdag nyid ltar // dngos po kun zhes lta ba la // de la 'dzin pa'i sems kyang ni // gcig pu'i ngo bor snang mi rigs //.*

[337]The opponents here are the Cārvākas (*tshu rol mdzes pa dag*). See MAV D63b6: *lha'i bla ma'i lta ba'i rjes su 'brang ba.* "The followers of the view of Suraguru." See also MAP D99b2: *lha'i bla ma ni phur bu'o // phur bu'i lta ba'i rjes su 'brang ba rnams ni tshu rol mdzes pa dag go //.* "Suraguru is Bṛhaspati. The

simply of the nature of the four elements,[338] also acknowledge that cognition has multiple entities as its objects.[339]

4.2.1.1.2.6 Cognition for the Sāṃkhyas is not one in nature

§20. The [Sāṃkhyas], who hold that objects [of cognition] are simply of the nature of [the three qualities] ontological excellence (*sattva*), agitation (*rajas*) and dullness (*tamas*),[340] also accept that the objects of cognition themselves are multiple entities. This is because they accept that the objects are themselves of the nature of three entities.[341]

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followers of the view of Bṛhaspati are Cārvākas." See NAMAI (1996) p. 2.

[338]The Cārvākas say that the only valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is sense perception, and that the four elements, i.e., earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*āpas*), fire (*tejas*) and wind (*vāyu*), which are permanent, are the only things that really exist (*tattva*). Collections of the four elements are simply designated as bodies, sense organs and objects of cognition. (Cf. TSPa p. 520, 19-20: *na hi mahābhūtavyatirekeṇendriyādīni santi ... /*.) According to the Cārvākas, mind (*caitanya*) also arises from the four elements. They explain the variety of things by the idea of an uncausal spontaneous generation (*svabhāvavāda*). Cf. the following fragments of the *Bārhaspatyasūtra*: *pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni // tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṃjñāḥ // tebhyaś caitanyam // jalabudbudavaj jīvāḥ // 'byung ba sna tshogs tha dad pa'i phyir 'gro ba yang sna tshogs pa ste (citrajanmabhedāj jagad api citram) // rma bya'i mdons kyi ri mo bzhin no (mayūracandrakavat) // pratyakṣam evaikaṃ pramāṇam // anumānam apramāṇam //*. For these fragments, see NAMAI ibid. pp. 6-8. Cf. TS kk. 1859-1860.

[339]Cf. MAK 37.

[340]For the Sāṃkhyas' idea of three qualities (*triguṇa*), see SK 11-12: *triguṇam aviveki viṣayaḥ sāmānyam acetanaṃ prasavadharmi / vyaktaṃ tathā pradhānaṃ tadviparītas tathā ca pumān // prītyaprītiviṣādātmakāḥ prakāśapravṛttiniyamārthāḥ / anyo'nyābhibhavāśrayajananamithunavṛttayaś ca guṇāḥ //*. According to the Sāṃkhyas, all phenomena other than Spirit (*puruṣa*) are transformations (*pariṇāma*) of primordial matter (*pradhāna/prakṛti*), which is composed of three qualities. Objects of cognitions are thus also composed of three qualities. The distinction among the classes (*jāti*) of sounds and other such objects of cognition is simply due to the increase and decrease of the three qualities. See HATTORI ibid. p. 52, 11-20. See also SK 38.

[341]Cf. MAK 38-39: *snying stobs la sogs bdag sgra sogs // phyogs la'ang don gcig snang ba can // shes pa rigs pa ma yin te // gsum gyi bdag nyid yul snang phyir // dngos po'i ngo bo rnam gsum la // de ni gal te rnam gcig ste // de dang mi mthun snang na go // de ni der 'dzin ji ltar 'dod //*. Cf. TSa k. 39: *tryākāraṃ vastuno rūpam ekākārāś ca tadvidaḥ / tāḥ kathaṃ tatra yujyante bhāvinyas tadvilakṣaṇāḥ //*.

4.2.1.1.2.7 The refutation of the Sautrāntika theory of mental cognition (*manovijñāna*)

§21. Some people[342] say that mental cognition (*manovijñāna*), focused on the past and so forth, has no [external] objects at all.[343] It is not logical to maintain, in keeping with their position, that [mental cognition] has [just] one single aspect, for it has the [various] aspects of words. This is because [the words] appear in the form of many letters.[344] Since we experience that dream consciousnesses and the like also have appearing to them variegated aspects such as blue and so forth, they cannot be of one nature.

4.2.1.1.2.8 Cognition for the Yogācāras is not one in nature

§22. Some maintain that the world is of the nature of mind alone (*vijñānamātra*) and acknowledge that because no cognitions have real external [things] as [their] objects, [cognition] just ends up being reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). These people [i.e., the Yogācāras] accept that cognition is not one in nature because they also hold that all cognitions arise having the appearance of various aspects, such as visible matter and so forth, on account of perpetually erroneous karmic tendencies coming to

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[342]The opponent here is identified as a Sautrāntika by MAP ad MAK 41 D101a5-6.

[343]In his AKBh pp. 299, 16-300, 19, Vasubandhu refutes the Vaibhāṣikas' idea that the objects of cognition are all really existent, and says that mental cognition (*manovijñāna*), which understands past and future dharmas, does not have any really existent object. See LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (1980) Tome IV pp. 60, 9-63, 15. According to the 『成實論』 (*Cheng shi lun*), the mental cognition which has a past dharma as its object seems to be a recollection of that dharma. See 『成實論』 Taisho 32 p. 364a15-16: 又第六識於自陰中都無所緣。無現法故是識不能緣色等法 See also ibid. p. 364b5-7: 又是人先取此法相此法雖滅而能生憶想分別法。若法於此人心生此法失滅後意識生能知此事。See KATO (1989) pp. 284-295. Note that rejecting the Vaibhāṣikas' *sarvāstivāda*, i.e., the theory that past, present and future dharmas are all really existent, the Sautrāntikas say that only present dharmas are really existent and do not accept the real existence of past and future dharmas. See AKBh p. 299, 1-2: *vayam api brūmo 'sty atītānāgatam iti / atītaṃ tu yad bhūtapūrvam / anāgataṃ yat sati hetau bhaviṣyati / evaṃ ca kṛtvā 'stīty ucyate na tu punar dravyataḥ /.* See also AKBh p. 301, 5-6: *tasmān naivaṃ sarvāstivādaḥ śāsane sādhur bhavati / yad atītānāgataṃ dravyato 'stīti vadati /.* And see LA VALLÉE POUSSIN ibid. Tome IV pp. 58, 4-64, 15.

[344]Cf. MAK 41: *rnam mkha' la sogs shes pa dag // ming tsam du ni snang ba rnams // yi ge du ma snang ba'i phyir // sna tshogs snang bar gsal ba yin //.*

their maturation.[345]

4.2.1.1.2.9 No cognition is many in nature

§23. Therefore, cognition is not established as being one in nature in any doctrine at all. When that [i.e., oneness] is not established, manyness is not established either. This has been explained earlier.[346]

4.2.1.2 The "neither one nor many"reason is also established if we take it as a *svatantrahetu*

§24. Thus, the reason is also not unestablished when the proof is effectuated autonomously (*svātantryeṇa*). This is because if we proceed in the way which we just explained, it can be established to both the proponent and the opponent that all dharmas are simply neither one nor many.

4.2.1.3 There is no fallacy that the locus is unestablished

§25. So long as [*sādhya* and *sādhana*] are mere exclusions (*vyavacchedamātra*), it is possible that there is an unreal property-possessor corresponding to the *sādhya* and the *sādhana*. This has already been explained earlier.[347] Therefore, the above-explained ["neither one nor many" reason] would in fact be established for both parties, even with reference to

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[345]Kamalaśīla at this point discusses the general perspective of the Yogācāras. In his MAK 44-60, Śāntarakṣita divides the Yogācāra theory into two positions, i.e., Satyākāravāda and Alīkākāravāda, and refutes each position individually, attacking its respective version of the single nature of cognition. Śāntarakṣita's refutations of the Satyākāravāda and the Alīkākāravāda are undertaken in MAK 46-51 and MAK 52-60 respectively.

[346]See MĀ D216b2-3: *de dag gcig pa nyid du ma grub na du ma nyid du yang rigs pa ma yin pa kho na ste / de ni de bsags pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir ro //.* See fn. 317.

[347]See MĀ D172a6-b1: *gang la dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi (CD kyi: GNP kyi /) 'on kyang sgro btags pa'i chos rnam par gcad pa (CD rnam par gcad pa: GNP rnam par bcad pa) sgrub pa tsam zhig brjod par (DGNP par: C pa) 'dod pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i (CD pa'i: GNP pa'i /) nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te / de ni de'i chos ma yin pa'i phyir ro // de la ltos nas (CD ltos nas: GNP bltos nas) kyang de'i chos can nyid du mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // de ma grub tu zin kyang bsgrub par bya ba med na (GNP med na: CD med na de) mi 'byung ba'i gtan tshigs mngon par 'dod pa'i don grub (CDNP grub: G 'grub) pa la gags byed pa med pa'i phyir ro //.* For our translation, see p. 128.

a property-possessor (*dharmin*) imagined by our coreligionists or by those in heterodox schools, due to the fact that *sādhyadharma* is a mere exclusion (*vyavacchedamātra*).[348]

4.2.1.4 How is the reason established with regard to its property-possessor?

§26. [Objection:] How is this reason established? If [it were established] due to nonperception, then since that [nonperception] is also established in reliance upon another nonperception, it would follow that there is an infinite regress (*anavasthā*). Nor is the absence of perception (*upalabdhyabhāva*) in fact established perceptually either, because it [i.e., the absence of perception] is not an object of a [perception].[349]

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[348]M. Kobayashi translates *bsgrub pa'i chos rnam par bcad pa tsam gyis* as "together with the *sādhyadharma* which is a mere exclusion (排除のみなる所証としての属性とともに)." See KOBAYASHI (1986) p. 28, 6-7. On Kamalaśīla's position on avoiding *āśrayāsiddha* when proving a mere exclusion (*vyavacchedamātra*), see Translation 2 pp. 127-152 and fn. 352.

[349]The opponent questions how one can understand the fact that the "neither one nor many" reason, which is said to consist in the "nonperception of a pervader" (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*), qualifies its subject (*pakṣadharmatva*). This opponent seems to regard nonperception as the absence of perception (*upalabdher abhāva* or *upalabdhyabhāva, dmigs pa med pa*). Since the absence of perception is not an object of cognition, it cannot be understood perceptually, not even by means of reflexive cognition (*svasaṃvedana*). See Chapter 3 pp. 83-85. If the absence of perception had to be understood by means of another nonperception, and this second nonperception by means of a third nonperception, there would be an infinite regress. The argument figures in Dharmakīrti's PVSV p. 4, 15-17: *atrānupalabdher liṅgād asattāyām upalabdher abhāvo 'py anyayānupalabdhyā sādhya ity anavasthānād apratipattiḥ syāt / (= PVin II p. 11*, 16-20: mi dmigs pa'i rtags kyis med pa bsgrub par bya ba yin na dmigs pa med pa yang mi dmigs pa gzhan gyis bsgrub par bya dgos pas thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir mi rtogs par 'gyur ro //).* See also PV IV k. 275: *anyathārthasya nāstitvaṃ gamyate 'nupalambhataḥ / upalambhasya nāstitvam anyenety anavasthitiḥ //.* "Otherwise [i.e., if nonperception were not established by means of reflexive cognition], one would understand the absence of an object by means of nonperception and would understand the absence of perception by means of yet another [nonperception]. Therefore, there would be an infinite regress." K. 275 is quoted in the TSPa p. 479, 16-17. See KELLNER (1997) p. 25, 28-32. See also KOBAYASHI (1986) p. 36, n. 27.

For Dharmakīrti nonperception is a cognition which is intrinsically valid (*svataḥpramāṇa*). Nonperception does not mean the absence of perception, because the negation (*an-*) in the word "nonperception" (*anupalabdhi*) is regarded

§27. [Reply:] That has also been completely refuted. This is because the reason is established in the manner explained above [i.e., by implication from other accepted properties].[350]

4.2.1.4.1 In the case of imperceptible things (*dbang pos mi sod pa*), the reason is established by implication

§28. First of all, [the adversaries] acknowledge that imperceptible things (*dbang pos mi sod pa*), like *ātman* and so forth, have the property of influencing successive results, [a property] which is pervaded by that [i.e., by being neither one nor many]. Therefore, they also acknowledge that being neither one nor many is established.

§29. [Objection:] When this property-possessor is itself unestablished, then with reference to what would this absence of [oneness and manyness] be established?

§30. [Reply:] That is not correct. This is because when this type of entity is negated, the property-possessor is always just the imagined thing [i.e., verbal and conceptual representation].[351] Nonperception is a property of just that [i.e., the imagined object].[352] This has been already explained

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as having the form of an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*), so that nonperception is interpreted as implying another perception (*anyopalabdhi*) and another object (*anyabhāva*). When the perception of something X other than Y [i.e., another perception] is established, the nonperception of Y is established by means of reflexive cognition (*svasaṃvedana*), and thus the fault of an infinite regress is supposedly avoided. For Dharmakīrti's theory of nonperception and Kamalaśīla's adaptation of this theory to the Mādhyamika purposes, see Chapter 3 pp. 52-86.

[350]See Translation 4 paragraph 4.2.1.1 and fn. 306.

[351]See fn. 212, fn. 221 and fn. 233. See also MĀ D174a4-175a3.

[352]NM: 亦假安立不可得法, PVSV p. 107, 9-10: *kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharma.* See KATSURA (1978) pp. 110-114, YAITA (1985) p. 5 and KOBAYASHI (1986) p. 36, n. 28. Dharmakīrti comments on this phrase of the NM in the PV I k. 212: *śabdārthaḥ kalpanājñānaviṣayatvena kalpitaḥ / dharmo vastvāśrayāsiddhir asyokto nyāyavādinā //.* The "imagined thing" (*kalpita*) is explained in this verse of Dharmakīrti as being a "verbal object" (*śabdārtha*) and "an object of conceptual thought" (*kalpanājñānaviṣaya*). For Dharmakīrti this verbal and conceptual representation does not actually exist as genuine particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) capable of practical efficacy (*arthakriyā*). Dharmakīrti says that when a pseudo-entity, such as *pradhāna*, is negated, the *dharmin* is nothing more than the verbal object, i.e., the mere conceptual representation. See PV I kk. 205-206 (= PVin III kk. 53-54): *anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpapariniṣṭhitaḥ / śabdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhayāśrayaḥ // tasmin bhāvānupādāne sādhye 'syānupalambhanam /*

earlier.[353] Otherwise [i.e., if the property-possessor always had to be something real], why would not the following criticism be applicable to you too: "When negating those [entities, viz., *ātman* etc.], how could the reason defined as 'the absence of the capacity of practical efficacy' be established?" [The criticism would apply,] for given that the opponents do in fact acknowledge such successive results with regard to the property-possessors that they imagine, the property that pervades these [successive results] is established in dependence upon the position of the [opponents], and thus the property-possessor in question would be something imagined.

§31. Also, when [one] understands [the establishment of that reason] in reliance upon an inference, it does not follow that there is an infinite regress. This is because: (a) that [i.e., inference] is a cognition which is intrinsically valid (*svataḥpramāṇa*);[354] (b) it has been already explained earlier that from

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tathā hetur na tasyaivābhāvaḥ śabdaprayogataḥ //. For English translation, see TILLEMANS (1998) pp. 117-118. See also fn. 212, fn. 221, fn. 233 and TILLEMANS ibid. p. 117, fn. 13.

[353]MĀ D176b7-177a2: *ji ltar khyed kyi sum cu pa la sogs pa las / gang zag la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid med par sgrub (P sgrub: D bsgrub) pa'i phyir gang kun brtags pa'i ngo bo yin pa de ni brdzun pa kho na ste / dper na mo gsham gyi bu la sogs pa lta bu'o // bdag la sogs pa yang kun brtags pa'i ngo bo yin no zhes sbyor ba dgod pa'i sgo nas rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs smos pa de bzhin du gzhan du yang (P gzhan du yang: D gzhan yang) gzhan dag gis brtags pa'i chos mi dmigs so zhes ci ste brjod par mi bya / ji ltar slob dpon dag gis brjod pa de bzhin du chos thams cad la ngo bo nyid med par bsgrub par khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid kyi chos ci ste mi brjod de / de bzhin du 'og nas bstan par bya'o //.* "In the *Triṃśikā* and so forth, in order to prove [positively the property consisting in] the absence of [real] intrinsic nature of persons and so forth, you have stated a *svabhāvahetu* by formulating the proof-statement: 'What is of the nature of being imagined is indeed false. It is just like, for example, the children of barren women and the like. Now, *ātman* and so forth are of the nature of being imagined.' Similarly in another case [of proving nonexistence], why should not it be stated that nonperception is a property of the [object] imagined by others? In keeping with what the masters have said, why could not we state a property characterized as a nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) in order to prove that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature? Accordingly, this will be explained below." Cf. KOBAYASHI ibid. p. 36, n. 28.

[354]In his TSP Kamalaśīla says that Buddhists accept the following as *svataḥpramāṇa*: perception consisting in reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa*), yogic cognition (*yogijñāna*), cognition of practical efficacy (*arthakriyājñāna*), inference (*anumāna*) and familiar perception (*abhyāsavat pratyakṣa*). See TSPa p. 775, 6-8. See also STEINKELLNER (1992). For the Buddhist position on *svataḥ-*

a conventional point of view it is established that the *sādhya* pervades the *sādhana*.[355]

4.2.1.4.2 In the case of observable things, the reason can be established by means of direct perception

§32. The fact that observable (*lkog tu ma gyur pa*) property-possessors, like visible matter and so forth, are also not one in nature is perceptible. This is because, since they always appear in various aspects, [visible matter and so forth] are not experienced as having undifferentiated oneness. When the absence of oneness is established, the absence of manyness is also established as perceptible, for manyness consists in a collection of ones. It has been already explained earlier that valid cognitions, like direct perception etc., are not nonexistent either on the level of conventions.[356]

4.2.1.4.2.1 It is not correct to say that if direct perception does not exist ultimately, it would not exist even conventionally

§33. [Objection:] [Vyāpti:] What does not exist ultimately does not exist even conventionally and is not at all experienced either.
It is just like, for example, rabbits' horns.
[Pakṣadharmatva:] Direct perception is also like that [i.e., direct perception does not exist ultimately].
[Implicit conclusion: Direct perception does not exist even conventionally.]

§34. [Reply:] We have already answered this earlier by saying that because there is no such necessary connection [i.e., pervasion], this reason is completely inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).[357]

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pramāṇa and *parataḥpramāṇa*, see KAJIYAMA (1966a) p. 27, §2.4 and fn. 19. See also INAMI (1992) pp. 65-66 and p. 73, n. 18 and n. 19.

[355] See Translation 3 paragraphs 3.2.2.1.1.3-3.2.2.1.1.4, i.e., MĀ D178a5-178b5.

[356] See Translation 1 pp. 105-106, i.e., MĀ D169a1-3.

[357] See Translation 2 paragraph 2.2.1.2 and fn. 196. The same kind of argument can also be found in the section where Kamalaśīla proves that things lack real intrinsic nature by means of the reason that nothing existent or nonexistent is produced (**sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu*). See MĀ D210a3-5: *gang dag gal te dngos po thams cad don dam par ma skyes pa yin na de bzhin du kun rdzob tu yang skye bar mi 'gyur ro // gang dag don dam par ma skyes pa de dag la kun rdzob tu yang skye ba med de dper na ri bong gi rva la sogs pa lta bu'o zhes zer ba de dag gi yang sgyu ma la sogs pas ma nges pa yang yin la / bsgrub par bya ba las bzlog na gnod pa can gyi tshad ma nye bar ma bstan pa'i phyir gtan tshigs*

4.2.1.4.2.2 Direct perceptions can understand things as not being really existent

§35. [Objection:] [Vyāpti:] Whatever [cognition] has [as its objects] things whose nature consists of superimpositions (*samāropa*), that [cognition] understands [things] in that way [i.e., in terms of superimpositions], but not as not being so in reality.
It is just like the cognition of a mirage as being water.

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now all direct perceptions have [as objects] only things whose natures consist of superimpositions.

[Implicit conclusion: Direct perceptions all understand things in terms of their superimposed natures.]

So, how could these [direct perceptions] understand the absence of oneness and manyness?

§36. [Reply:] Here this [reason] is completely inconclusive due to [counterexamples such as] the direct perception of magicians as well as inferential cognitions. That is to say, a magician's cognition has superimposed aspects (*ākāra*) of elephants and so forth, but does not have any attachment to their intrinsic natures [as existing] in reality. Because [he] is not attached to these [appearances of elephants as having real intrinsic natures], [his cognition] is the cause that gives rise to the determination that [the superimposed images] really lack those [intrinsic natures]. Hence [the magician's cognition] is established as having [the absence of those real intrinsic natures] as its object. Similarly, when judicious people (*prekṣāvat*) give rise to another perception,[358] i.e., one which is completely exempt of

mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa la the tshom za ba yang yin no //. "[Objection:] If all entities were not to be produced ultimately, [then] in the same manner, they would not be produced even conventionally. That which is not produced ultimately would not have even conventional production. It is just like, for example, rabbits' horns. [Reply:] The [opponent's reason] is inconclusive due to [counterexamples such as] illusions; and because [the opponent] does not present a *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*, the reason is also one whose exclusion from dissimilar instances is doubtful (*saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttika*)." Cf. MATSUMOTO (1984b) pp. 404-403. *Sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* is "a means of valid cognition that serves to refute [the presence of reason] in the opposite of the [property] being proved." See STEINKELLNER (1991b), MIMAKI (1976) pp. 59-66 and SEYFORT RUEGG (2000) pp. 288-296.

[358]Note that it is not clear how M. Kobayashi understood the word *gzhan* here. He does not regard *gzhan* as qualifying the term *mngon sum*. He seems to regard *gzhan* and the word *yang* which follows *gzhan* as making a phrase, i.e., *gzhan yang*

causes for error but nonetheless has superimposed aspects, then as they are not really attached to those [intrinsic natures], [their perception] causes the determination [that there are no real intrinsic natures]. So that therefore it is indeed shown that [their perception] has the absence of those [real intrinsic natures] as its object.

§37. In the same manner, although it has [as objects] superimposed aspects consisting in entities' universal characters (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), inferential cognition does correctly understand the thusness of entities, and therefore has [thusness] as its object.

§38. Thus since [the magician's perception and inferential cognition which have superimposed aspects] are valid cognitions, [your] reason is inconclusive.

4.2.1.4.2.3 Absences can be objects of direct perception

§39. It is wrong to say: "This is because it [i.e., absence of perception] is not an object of a [perception]." We do not accept that entities are thoroughly like horns of horses. Now if you say: "How [do you accept them]?" [then we reply that] they are like illusions and so forth. Just like illusions, the [entities] are also in fact perceived. [Entities] are grasped as being neither one nor many in nature. Nonetheless, this fact is not understood by certain people who produce superimpositions on account of error inducing factors like studying false treatises. However, when others [i.e., judicious people] do understand [this by means of direct perception], how could they establish being neither one nor many by means of nonperception [if it is taken to be a mere absence of perception]?[359] Alternatively, if absence of oneness is established everywhere by means of reasons like "[because things have] variegated aspects," then absence of manyness is also established. This is because that [manyness] consists in a collection of ones.[360]

4.2.2 The reason is not inconclusive (*anaikāntika*)

4.2.2.1 The reason is not one whose exclusion from dissimilar instances is doubtful (*saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttika*)

§40. Being one and being many pervade all possible cases, because

(*api ca/punar api*). See KOBAYASHI ibid. p. 31, 7-8.

[359]Our interpretation here is speculative.

[360]It is evident from Kamalaśīla's explanation that the "neither one nor many" reason is sometimes established by means of direct perception, especially when the subjects are readily observable things.

those two [properties] are characterized as mutually exclusive (*paraspara-parihārasthitalakṣaṇa*).[361] That is to say, when someone conventionally determines a pot, which belongs to a specific place and so forth, which is unaccompanied, and to which the convention of being one can be applied, he determines it by eliminating the character opposite to it, such as being accompanied and so forth; in the same manner too, when one determines entities which consist of several kinds of substances and to which the convention of being many can be applied, he determines them by eliminating opposite aspects, such as being unaccompanied. When the determination of something X is necessarily connected with the negation of Y, these two are characterized as mutually exclusive.[362] Any two properties which are characterized as mutually exclusive pervade all possible cases.

[Vyāpti:] When two properties pervade all possible cases, they exclude another [i.e., third] alternative (*rāśyantara*).
It is just like, for example, the distinction between what is embodied and what is not embodied, etc.

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, being one and being many are like that [i.e., being one and being many pervade all possible cases]

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, being one and being many exclude any third alternative].[363]

Since it is certain that by the exclusion of the pervader (*vyāpaka*), the pervaded things (*vyāpya*)[364] are also eliminated, the reason is not one whose exclusion from dissimilar instances is doubtful (*saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttika*). This is because there can be no other [i.e., third] alternative.

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[361]On incompatibility characterized as mutual exclusion (*parasparaparihāra-sthitalakṣaṇa*), see MĀ D177b3-4: *'gal ba de kho na rab tu grub kyang mar me la sogs pa gcig tu dngos po nyid du mi 'thad de / sgyu ma la sogs pa brdzun pa yang skye ba dang 'jig pa la sogs pa'i chos snang ba'i phyir ro //.* For our translation, see p. 162. Kamalaśīla holds that this type of incompatibility can also be established with regard to nonentities (*avastu*) like illusions, because illusions and other nonexistent things cannot have incompatible properties such as permanence and impermanence. See also fn. 274.

[362]AAA p. 635, 15-18: *yad rūpavyavacchedanāntarīyakaparicchedanaṃ hi yat tat tat parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇaṃ, tadyathā bhāvo 'bhāvavyavacchedanāntarīyakaparicchedaḥ. parasparārūpavyavacchedanāntarīyakaparicchedа evaikatvānekatve tasmāt parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇa iti.*

[363]AAA p. 635, 18-21: *yau ca parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇau tāv ekavidhānasyāparapratiṣedhanāntarīyakatvād rāśyantarābhāvaṃ gamayataḥ, tadyathā bhāvābhāvau. anyonyaparihārasthitalakṣaṇe caikatvānekatve.*

[364]For the concepts of pervaded (*vyāpya*) and pervader (*vyāpaka*), see fn. 291.

4.2.2.2 Co-presence (*anvaya*) and co-absence (*vyatireka*) are established for the Mādhyamikas[365]

§41. Therefore, [because the reason is not one whose exclusion is doubtful,] we have in fact replied to all those people who say: "The relation between pervaded and pervader is not established for [the Mādhyamikas] themselves [because that relation cannot be established without the determination of co-presence (*anvaya*)]. Therefore, the reason [i.e., being neither one nor many] is not established [as conclusive]. Similarly, [since the establishment of the *anvaya* would imply the existence of a real intrinsic nature,] the exclusion of the pervaded [things] is not established by the exclusion of pervader [i.e., the *vyatireka* is not established] with regard to the property-possessor (*dharmin*) in which the relation between pervader and pervaded [i.e., the *anvaya*] is established."[366] That is to say, it has already

[365]For the concepts of co-presence (*anvaya*) and co-absence (*vyatireka*), see KATSURA (1983b) p. 541, 27-30: "In Indian philosphy *anvaya* and *vyatireka* joinly make up a sort of method of induction. This may be formulated as follows: 'When x occurs, y occurs (*anvaya*), and when x is absent, y is absent (*vyatireka*).'" See also TILLEMANS (2000) p. 55. And see CARDONA (1967-68) for the use of those terms in Indian grammar. When *anvaya* and *vyatireka* mean a pervasion (*vyāpti*), the *vyatireka* is regarded as the contraposition of the *anvaya*: "when x occurs, y occurs (*anvaya*), and when y is absent, x is absent (*vyatireka*)." See TBh pp. 25, 7-26, 20 and KAJIYAMA (1966a) p. 67, §10.1 and p. 69, §10.2. See also MIMAKI (1976) p. 299, n. 345. In the following argument in the MĀ, the *vyatireka* is that what is neither one nor many in nature is ultimately without intrinsic nature. And the *anvaya* is that what has an intrinsic nature is [conventionally] one or many in nature. The *vyatireka* is the contraposition of the *anvaya*.

[366]This objection is based upon the argument found in MĀ D189a2-6: *ji (CD ji: GNP ci) ste gal te yod pa dang med pa'i tha snyad la tshad mas khyab po zhes bya bar khas len par gyur na de'i tshe dngos po grub pa kho nar 'gyur te / 'di ltar khyab par bya ba (CDG ba: NP om.) dang / khyab par byed pa'i dngos po ni gang du yang rjes su 'gro ba nges pa med par ldog pa tsam gyi sgo nas 'grub par mi srid do // ldog pa nges pa yang rjes su 'gro ba nges pa med par mi srid de / gang zhig gang yod na yod pa ma yin pa de ni ji ltar de log pa na ldog par 'gyur te / 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro // de lta bas na gdon mi za bar tshad mas khyab pa'i rjes su 'gro bar 'dod pa dang dngos po yod pa'i tha snyad khas blang bar bya'o // de khas blangs na ni 'ga' zhig tu gang la 'di yod pa kho na yin no zhes yod pa'i tha snyad tshad ma yod pa'i rjes su byed pa can rab tu grub pa de nyid kho bo cag gi (CDP gi: G gis; N ill.) dngos po rab tu grub pa yin no zhe na / de ni rigs pa ma yin te / 'di ltar (CDG 'di ltar: N ill.; P ji ltar) yod pa'i tha snyad tshad mas khyab tu zin kyang tshad ma tsam gyi sgo nas ni 'di nges par don dam pa pa'i dngos por yod pa'i yul*

been explained earlier that everything, like the relation between pervaded

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can du mi 'grub ste / khyab par byed pa nye ba ni khyab par bya ba'i khyad par nges par gtan la 'bebs par nus pa ma yin te / de ni gzhan la yang srid pa'i phyir ro // de lta ma yin na shing nyid kyis kyang shing sha pa (CD shing sha pa: G shi sha pa; N ill.; P shim sha pa) la sogs pa'i khyad par rnams nges par rtogs par 'gyur ro //. "[Objection:] If it is acknowledged that the conventions of being existent or nonexistent (*sadasadvyavahāra*) imply valid cognitions, then it will follow that entities are indeed established. That is to say, it is impossible that the relation between pervaded (*vyāpya*) and pervader (*vyāpaka*) would ever be established simply due to co-absence (*vyatireka*) without the determination of co-presence (*anvaya*). The determination of co-absence is also impossible without the determination of co-presence. When X does not [necessarily] exist when Y exists, why should Y be negated when X is negated? This is because there is no connection (*sambandha*). Therefore we must inevitably accept that it is conventions of *real entities*' existence (*dngos po yod pa'i tha snyad*) and acknowledged co-presences (*anvaya*) which imply valid cognitions. And if that is accepted, then [at least] in some cases, we would have to acknowledge entities that are the very [grounds] upon which we think that such and such exists and thus [conceive of] conventions of existence that are co-present with valid cognitions. [Reply:] This is not logical. That is to say, although conventions of existence imply valid cognitions, nonetheless simply due to valid cognitions, [those conventions] cannot be established as bearing upon the fact that these are necessarily existent as being ultimate entities. It is impossible that the presence of a pervader necessarily determines various pervaded things. This is because the [presence of a pervader] is also possible for some other [pervaded thing]. Otherwise, various [pervaded] things like *śiṃśapā* and so forth would also be necessarily understood due to tree-ness (*vṛkṣatva*)."

The opponent's position is that pervasion (*vyāpti*) or universal implication cannot be established without the determination of *anvaya*. In the argument above (i.e., paragraph 4.2.2.2, §**41**), the opponent's objection consists of the two points: (1) If the Mādhyamikas were to accept the establishment of the *anvaya* that what has an intrinsic nature is one or many, it would follow that they accept the existence of an ultimate intrinsic nature; (2) It would be contradictory that by means of the exclusion of the pervader (i.e., oneness and manyness), the Mādhyamikas prove the nonexistence of the pervaded (i.e., intrinsic natures) with regard to the property-possessor (*dharmin*) in which that *anvaya* is established.

Kamalaśīla's position is that the Mādhyamikas can accept the establishment of *anvaya*. His reply to the objection (1) above is that the Mādhyamikas accept the *anvaya* that a conventional intrinsic nature is one or many in nature, but they never accept the following as the *anvaya*: an ultimate intrinsic nature is one or many in nature. Kamalaśīla rejects the opponent's objection (2) by saying that the *anvaya* is established with regard to conventional *dharmin*s or in reliance upon the conventional truth, and the *vyatireka* is established in reliance upon the ultimate truth.

and pervader and so forth, is generally established by relying upon conventional truth.[367] It is not so that when a pervader is present, the various pervaded [things] are necessarily understood. This too has been explained earlier.[368] So, although conventionally, simply having an intrinsic nature is pervaded by being one or many in nature, nonetheless things are not determined as having an ultimate intrinsic nature due to the fact [of them having a conventional nature of oneness or manyness]. This is because conventional pots and so forth which are one in nature or many in nature do also appear.

§42. To be specific, the establishment of the relation between pervader and pervaded relies upon conventional property-possessors; generally, the exclusion of the pervader is proved of all property-possessors that are bases for debates relying on the ultimate.[369] Hence, how would these two [i.e., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*] rely upon the same property-possessor?

§43. Even if we suppose that [these two] were to rely upon the same property-possessor, there would be no fault at all because of the different perspectives (*ltos pa*) involved. That is to say, the establishment of the relation between pervader and pervaded relies upon the conventional truth; the exclusion of the pervader indeed relies upon the ultimate truth. Therefore, there is no contradiction at all.

4.2.2.3 Do the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* have the form of a nonimplicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) or the form of an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*)?

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[367] See MĀ D177a7-177b1: *'gal ba la sogs pa tha snyad kho nar grub pa yin gyi / yang dag par ni ma yin no //.* "Incompatibility and so forth are established only conventionally, but not really." See also MĀ D178a5-6: *khyab par bya ba dang khyab par byed pa'i dngos po yang shing dang shing sha pa la sogs pa'i dngos po tha snyad pa kho na la brten nas kun brtags pa'i spyi dang khyad par gyi dngos po rnam par gzhag pas rnam par 'jog pa yin te / dngos su ni gang khyab par byed par 'gyur ba shing nyid la sogs pa spyi dang zhes bya ba ni yang dag par cung zad kyang med do //.* For our translation, see p. 168.

[368] See MĀ D189a6. See fn. 366.

[369] Kamalaśīla seems to say here that the establishment of co-presence (*anvaya*) and that of co-absence (*vyatireka*) rely upon different subjects. Although one can understand that the establishment of *anvaya* relies upon conventional subjects, it is not clear exactly what subjects the establishment of *vyatireka* should rely upon. Note that if we adopted the reading of CD, *don dam pa la brten par*, we would have to translate as follows: "the exclusion of the pervader is generally proved in reliance upon the ultimate whenever a property-possessor is the basis for a debate."

§44. [370][Objection:] Do the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* have the form of a nonimplicative negation or the form of an implicative negation? If [you] follow the first position, then those two cannot be what is understood and what makes one understand, respectively. This is because [both] are without [intrinsic] nature,[371] because [they] are not related [to each other] and because [they] are not different.

[Vyāpti:] Things characterized as being beyond any ostensive specification (*upākhyā*) make one understand nothing and are not understood either.
It is just like, for example, horse's horns.

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* mentioned above are characterized as being beyond any ostensive specification.

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* mentioned above make one understand nothing and are not understood either.]

[Vyāpti:] Two mutually unrelated things cannot be in an epistemic relation (*gamyagamakabhāva*).
It is just like, for example, the Himalaya mountains and the Vindhya mountains.

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are not mutually related.

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are not in an epistemic relation.]

[Vyāpti:] When X does not have the nature of being different from Y, then there is no epistemic relation between them.
It is just like, for example, *taru* and *vṛkṣa*, [which are synonyms for "tree"].

[Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are not different.

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[370]Starting here, Kamalaśīla refutes the objection that whether the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* have the form of a nonimplicative negation or the form of an implicative negation, the "neither one nor many" reason would have the fallacy of being inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). (On the two kinds of negations, see fn. 67.) This argument is not found in the MAV and the MAP. In Tibetan Buddhism, Tsong kha pa refers to this argument in the MĀ and regards the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* as having only the form of a nonimplicative negation. See BGZ pp. 47, 6-49, 11. lCang skya also refers to this argument in his CG kha 95b2-96b4.

[371]MĀ *pūrvapakṣa*: *ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir*, *uttarapakṣa*: *ngo bo med pa'i phyir.*

[Implicit conclusion: Therefore, the *sādhya* and *sādhana* do not have any epistemic relation.][372]

§45. Now suppose that [you] followed the [second] position: "[those two] have the form of an implicative negation." In that case, it would be acknowledged that there are real entities, having neither a single nor a multiple nature, but capable of practical efficacy. Thus there would not follow anything that was unacceptable [to the realist opponent].[373]

§46. [Reply:] That is not correct either. This possibility is completely similar to the case of the negation of the *Īśvara* and so forth imagined by others. That is to say, *Īśvara* and so forth must invariably be negated only by negating the property of the pervader. This is because such completely imperceptible things (*parokṣa*) cannot be directly negated.[374] Therefore, why would not all [these] criticisms also arise in that case?[375]

§47. Moreover it was said:

> "The object is not one; nor is it many when it is taken as [individual] atoms."[376]

In the same way, [it is said:]

> "That form in which entities are [normally] perceived does not exist in reality, for these [things] have neither a unitary nor a

[372]The three proof-statements are entirely a repetition of the *pūrvapakṣa*. See Translation 4 paragraphs 4.1.2.1.2.1-4.1.2.1.2.3.

[373]Cf. MĀ *pūrvapakṣa* D139a1-2: *gal te ma yin pa'i ngo bo nyid yin na ni de'i tshe gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i dngos po'i ngo bo (GNP ngo bo: CD ngo bor) khas blangs par gyur bas de yang (CD de yang: GNP om.) mi 'dod par 'gyur ba ma yin no //.*

[374]It is impossible to prove the nonexistence of imperceptible pseudo-entities like *Īśvara* by means of a reason consisting in nonperception of a perceptible object (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhi / dṛśyānupalabdhi*). Later Buddhist philosophers like Kamalaśīla and Dharmottara thus hold that the nonexistence of those pseudo-entities should be proved by means of nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*).

[375]Kamalaśīla first rejects the objection by saying that the opponent would have the fault of self-refutation, for the opponent would have the same problem when he proves the nonexistence of imperceptible pseudo-entities like *Īśvara* and *pradhāna* by means of the reason consisting in nonperception of the pervader.

[376]VimŚ k. 11ab: *na tad ekaṃ na cānekam viśayaḥ paramāṇuśaḥ /.* This verse is also quoted in the MĀ D173a6. See fn. 222. The Tibetan translation of this verse as it figures in the MĀ would lead to a completely different understanding.

multiple form.[377]

Also when you negate imagined external objects and so forth using these verses, why would this criticism [about the *sādhya* and *sādhana* being implicative or nonimplicative negations] not arise [here too]?

4.2.2.3.1 It is not correct to say that when the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are non-implicative negations, the epistemic relation (*gamyagamakabhāva*) could not be established

4.2.2.3.1.1 The opponent's reason "because the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are without intrinsic nature" is not correct

§48. Furthermore, when what is without intrinsic nature does not make one understand anything, then although horse's horns do not make one understand something, why do you put it forth [as an example]? Also with reference to your proof-statement: "Things characterized as being beyond any ostensive specification (*upākhyā*) make one understand nothing ... and so forth," how would the *sādhya* and the *sādhana*, which have the form of negations, be in a relation between what is understood and what makes one understand [i.e., how would they have an epistemic relation]? Therefore, just like wrongly learning how to use a weapon, this proof-statement states nothing more than self-refutation, and hence [the opponents] are not actually proficient in reasoning at all.

§49. Because it would follow absurdly that all entities would be ascertained by everyone at all times, no one can accept that only real reasons that are real entities (*vastubhūta*) make one understand.[378] This is because

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[377]PV III k. 360: *bhāvā yena nirūpyante tad rūpaṃ nāsti tattvataḥ / yasmād ekam anekaṃ vā rūpaṃ teṣāṃ na vidyate //.* (Tib:) *gang gis dngos po rnam dpyad na // de nyid du na de dngos med // gang gi phyir na de dag la // gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin med //.* We follow the English translation of this verse in STEINKELLNER (1990) p. 78, 30-32. Cf. VETTER (1964) p. 82, 33-36 and KATSURA (1969) p. 27a, 7-9. Kamalaśīla quotes this k. 360 in order to show that the opponent (i.e., Yogācāra) also uses the "neither one nor many" reason, and should hence also himself be vulnerable to the same criticism he levels against the Mādhyamikas. Cf. the quotation of k. 360 in the MAV D68b1-2 and Kamalaśīla's comment in the MAP D111a3-5. See STEINKELLNER ibid. pp. 78-81. Cf. also TBh's quotation of this verse in p. 70, 7-8. See KAJIYAMA ibid. pp. 148-149 and KATSURA ibid. p. 27a, 10-18.

[378]When one proves or negates a property with regard to something, the property-possessors (*dharmin*) which appear to the reasoner's mind must be verbal ob-

any one [valid] reason must be necessarily established as making one understand something else. Therefore, precisely the determination of the reason directly makes one understand [the *sādhya*], for it leads to the determination of the aspects (*ākāra*) of the *sādhya*.[379] We can know that it is only metaphorically speaking that reasons are posited as making one understand [the *sādhya*]. Therefore, although the reason lacks intrinsic nature, determining it causes one to ascertain the aspects of the intended *sādhya*. Thus, because we metaphorically designate [the reason] as making understood [the *sādhya*], the fault [invoked by the opponent] does not occur.[380]

§50. It is not so either that one always presents only reasons that are real entities, for we have explained earlier that the reasons for refuting [pseudo-entities] like space (*ākāśa*) and so forth are just purely imagined

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jects (*śabdārtha*), i.e., conceptual appearances, and not the real entities (*vastu*) themselves. See PV IV 228 (= PVin II k. 19): *tasmād āśritya śabdārthaṃ bhāvābhāvasamāśrayam / abāhyāśrayam atreṣṭaṃ sarvaṃ vidhiniṣedhanam //*. English translation in TILLEMANS (1999b) p. 282, n. 34: "Therefore, we accept that [positive] proof and negation here [in practical activity (*vyavahāre*)] in reliance upon a verbal object, which is the basis for being and non-being [and] which has no external basis." If *dharmin*s were to be real entities, then the differences between their properties would not be made simply by conceptual exclusions and would be found "in" the entities themselves. Therefore, it would follow that when one proves or negates one property of an entity, all other properties of the entity would be proved or negated. Cf. PV IV kk. 230-231a (= PVin II kk. 21-22a). See STEINKELLNER (1979) p. 42, 17-22. In the same manner, if reasons were to be real entities, then one reason would make us understand all properties.

379Cf. Dharmottara's PVinṬ III D5b5-6: *rtags ni sgron ma bzhin du rung ba nyid kyis go bar byed pa ni ma yin te / 'on kyang yod pa kho na bsgrub par bya ba med na ni mi 'byung bar nges pa nyid na / dngos po'i sgrub par byed pa yin no /*. English translation in TILLEMANS ibid. p. 19 fn. 71: "A [valid] reason does not bring understanding through its [own] ability, like a lamp. But rather, when an actually existent state of affairs is ascertained as necessarily connected with the *sādhya*, then it is a *sādhana* for [this] real entity." See TILLEMANS (2000) p. 19, 8-19. Cf. PV IV k. 10, TILLEMANS ibid. p. 19, 3-7.

380Even though reasons are not entities, they still can be said to make one understand the *sādhya*, because the *understanding* or *determination* of a reason leads to the *determination* of the *sādhya*. Therefore, an epistemic relation (i.e., relation between what is understood and what makes one understand) can be established even when the reason and the *sādhya* are not entities. Thus, Kamalaśīla can avoid the fault that the *sādhya* and *sādhana* which are nonimplicative negations would not have an epistemic relation.

things (*kalpita*).[381]

4.2.2.3.1.2 The opponent's reason "because the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are not related to each other" is not correct

§51. Suppose it is said: "This is because [those two] are not related to each other." Then here too, if you mean that a relation that is real entity is what constitutes the reason, then the reason [i.e., "because they are not related to each other"] would be inconclusive, for this type of relation is never established with regard to entities either.[382] This [in turn] is because the opponents conceive that [relation] as having its cause in the two [relata (*sambandhin*)] being dependent or in the natures of the two being fused together,[383] but it is also impossible that the two already established [entities,

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[381]It seems that Kamalaśīla here refers to D217b6-7: *dngos po de lta bu'i dgag pa la thams cad du chos can brtags pa kho na yin pa'i phyir te / de kho na'i chos mi dmigs pa yin no zhes sngar bstan zin to //.* "This is because when this type of entity is negated, the property-possessor is always just the imagined thing. Nonperception is a property of just that [i.e., the imagined object]. This has been already explained earlier." See Translation 4 paragraph 4.2.1.4.1, **§30**. When nonperception is a property of the imagined object, nonperception itself is also imagined, but is not an entity. See also MĀ D176b7-177a2 and fn. 353 and fn. 352.

[382]Kamalaśīla regards the opponent's second reason as meaning that the *sādhya* and *sādhana* which are nonimplicative negations do not have a relation which is a real entity (*vastubhūta*). This reason of the opponent would be inconclusive, because such a real relation is never established even when the relata (*sambandhin*) are entities. Here, Kamalaśīla, following Dharmakīrti's position that relations are conceptual, holds that a relation can also be conceptually established between nonentities, so that the *sādhya* and *sādhana* can have an epistemic relation (*gamyagamakabhāva*). For Dharmakīrti's position on relations and his *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, see FRAUWALLNER (1934).

Cf. KOBAYASHI (1989b) p. 87, 21-22: "This is because[, first,] for some people, such [real] relation is not established even with reference to entities" （なぜなら、（そもそも）或る人々にとっては実在についてさえもそのような（実在となれる）関係は成立しないからであり、...）.

[383]Cf. Prabhācandra's *Vyākhyā* on the SP p. 139, 5-6: *tathā hi sambandho 'rthānāṃ pāratantryalakṣaṇo vā syāt, rūpaśleṣalakṣaṇo vā syāt ?* "That is, would the relation between entities be defined as 'dependence upon others' or defined as 'the fusion of natures'?"

The term *rūpaśleṣa* seems to mean not only a conjunction or union (*saṃyoga*), such as a union of atoms, but also the [Mīmāṃsakas'] relation between a word (*śabda*) and its object (*artha*). In ŚVV p. 430, 15, the term *saṃśleṣalakṣaṇaṃ sambandham* which appears in the *Śabarabhāṣya* p. 43, 3 is regarded as meaning

which lack dependence,][384] could have their natures fused together, as they exist in their own individualities. If they were to be fused, then the two [relata] would turn into one single thing, and that would be a contradiction. If they were to be one, [the relation] could not have dependence upon these two [relata].[385] In the case [of the relation being a real entity],[386] if [the relation] were to be something other than the two relata, then since [the relation and the relata] exist in their own individualities, how could [the relata] be related in nature?[387] If [the relation] was not something other than [the

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saṃyogalakṣaṇasambandham. On the Vaiśeṣika definition of *saṃyoga*, see *Nyāyakandalī* p. 357, 9: *pūrvam aprāptayor dravyayoḥ paścād yā prāptiḥ parasparasaṃśleṣaḥ sa saṃyogaḥ /*. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the relation between word and object is permanent and not made by man (*apauruṣeya*). In his PV I Dharmakīrti, rejecting that Mīmāṃsaka position, says that the fusion (*saṃśleṣa*) of a word and its object are simply made by man (*pauruṣeya*). So *rūpaśleṣa* which is taken as a real relation can also be regarded as meaning the Mīmāṃsakas' permanent relation between a word and its object. See PVSV I pp. 115, 24-116, 2: *tāv eva bhāvābhāvāv āśrityāsaṃsṛṣṭāv api saṃsṛṣṭāv iva puruṣasya vyavahārabhāvanātaḥ pratibhāta iti pauruṣeyo bhāvānāṃ saṃśleṣaḥ /*. See also PVSVṬ p. 420, 16-20: *arthadvāreṇa śabdasya yau bhāvābhāvau tāv āśritya svabhāvenāsaṃsṛṣṭāv api śabdārthāv asambandhinau saṃsṛṣṭau sambaddhau puruṣasya pratibhātaḥ / vikalpabuddhau pratibhāsete / kutaḥ / vyavahārabhāvanātaḥ / anādikālīnavyavahārābhyāsataḥ / iti hetoḥ pauruṣeyo bhāvānāṃ śabdārthānāṃ saṃśleṣaḥ sambandhaḥ /*. See OMAE (1988a) pp. 25, 25-26, 5.

[384]"Being already established" (*siddha*) normally serves as the reason for negating a real relation consisting in dependence (*pāratantrya*), since entities existing in their own individualities do not depend upon others. So due to the word *yang*, this sentence can be understood as saying that the two already established entities, i.e., two relata, have neither dependence nor fusion of their natures (*rūpaśleṣa*). See PVSV p. 113, 24-25: *nāmiśrāṇāṃ siddhānāṃ kaścit saṃbandho 'bhedaprasaṅgāt anapekṣaṇāc ca /*. See also PVSVṬ p. 412, 18-20: *tathā siddhānāṃ niṣpannānāṃ rūpānāṃ na kaścit pāratantryalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ / siddhe pāratantryāyogāt /*.
For the MĀ's critique, see paragraph **§52**, i.e., p. 213. See also fn. 391.

[385]Cf. SP k. 2: *rūpaśleṣo hi sambandho dvitve sa ca kathaṃ bhavet / tasmāt prakṛtibhinnānāṃ sambandho nāsti tattvataḥ //*. "[If it is said:] relation is the fusion of natures, then if [the relata] are two, how would there be the [fusion of natures]? Therefore, for things with different natures, there is really no relation."

[386]The term *de la* here means the case where relation would be an entity. See PV I k. 236ab: *saṃbandhasya ca vastutve syād bhedād buddhicitratā /*. See also PVSV p. 117, 18-19: *sa cāyaṃ saṃbandho vastu bhavan niyamena śabdārthābhyāṃ bhedābhedau nātivartate /*.

[387]Cf. SP k. 5: *tau ca bhāvau tadanyaś ca sarve te svātmani sthitāḥ / ity amiśrāḥ*

relata], then since it is nothing more than the relata,[388] the relation would be completely imagined and would not be real.

§52. The relation said to be characterized as causality (*tadutpatti*)[389] is also completely imagined, as cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously. Between two things which are not in proximity, there is no relation.[390] Moreover, when effects have a thoroughly established (*niṣpanna*) nature, then since they lack dependence, they do not rely upon any other things at all, with the consequence that they are unrelated to anything. But if the [nature] is not thoroughly established, then at the time when [the effects] have a relationship to their causes, [they] cannot be in proximity [to those causes], and hence are unrelated to them.[391] In conclusion, [one] links

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svayaṃ bhāvās tān miśrayati kalpanā //. "Those two entities [i.e., the two relata] and the thing different from them [i.e., the relation], all of them exist in their own individualities. Therefore, entities do not combine by themselves. But conceptualization combines them." See Prabhācandra's *Vyākhyā* p. 141, 8-10: *tau ca bhāvau sambandhinau tābhyām anyaś ca sambandhaḥ, sarve te svātmani svasvarūpe sthitāḥ / tenāmiśrā vyāvṛttasvarūpāḥ svayaṃ bhāvāḥ, tathāpi tān miśrayati yojayati kalpanā //.*

[388]Cf. Prabhācandra's *Vyākhyā* p. 140, 14-16: *kiñ cāsau sambandhaḥ sambandhibhyāṃ bhinnaḥ, abhinno vā ? yady abhinnaḥ; tadā sambandhināv eva, na sambandhaḥ kaścit, sa eva vā, na tāv iti /.* "Moreover, would this relation be different from the relata or not different? If [the relation] were not different [from the relata], then [they] would be nothing more than relata, and there would be no relation. Or they would be nothing more than the relation, and there would not be those two [relata]."

[389]In Dharmakīrti's philosophy, pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the reason and the *sādhyadharma* can be established when there is a "necessary connection" (*pratibandha, sambandha*) between those two terms. Buddhist logicians accept the following two types of necessary connections: "same nature" (*tādātmya*) and "causality" (*tadutpatti*). See STEINKELLNER (1971) pp. 201-207.

[390]Cf. SP k. 7: *kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'pi tayor asahabhāvataḥ / prasiddhyati kathaṃ dviṣṭho 'dviṣṭhe sambandhatā katham //.* "How would the relation between cause and effect also be established as consisting of two, because those two [i.e., cause and effect] are not coexistent? When [the relation] does not consist of two, how would [that] be a relation?" Prabhācandra's *Vyākhyā* p. 142, 1-6: *kāryakāraṇabhāvas tarhi sambandho bhaviṣyatīty apy asamīcīnam, kāryakāraṇayor asahabhāvatas tasyāpi dviṣṭhasyāsambhavāt / na khalu kāraṇakāle kāryaṃ tatkāle vā kāraṇam asti, tulyakālaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvānupapatteḥ, savyetaragoviṣāṇavat / tan na sambandhinau sahabhāvinau vidyete yenānayor vartamāno 'sau sambandhaḥ syāt / adviṣṭhe ca bhāve sambandhatānupapannaiva //.*

[391]"Being thoroughly established" (*niṣpanna*) and "not being thoroughly estab-

entities simply conceptually. [The *Pramāṇavārttika*] too says:

> "As they have been established on the basis of their causes,[392] the effects, although unreliant on other things, are related [to their causes] by conceptual thought. Why would noneffects somehow be [related]?"[393]

§53. The relation characterized as same nature (*tādātmya*)[394] is also not a real thing. This is because (a) that [relation] relies upon two things [i.e., relata]; (b) if [those relata] had the same nature, being twofold would be impossible. If there were no duality [between them], the two relata could not exist, and therefore what would be connected to what?[395]

§54. Thus, since every relation is a conceptual projection, there is no error at all in it applying among unreal things too, and therefore the [opponent's] reason [i.e., "because those two are not related to each other"] is completely unestablished.

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lished" (*aniṣpanna*) typically serve as the reasons for refuting real dependence (*pāratantrya*). See Prabhācandra's *Vyākhyā* p. 139, 7-9: *prathamapakṣe kim asau niṣpannayoḥ sambandhinoḥ syāt, aniṣpannayor vā. na tāvad aniṣpannayoḥ, svarūpasyaivāsattvāt śaśāśvaviṣāṇavat / niṣpannayoś ca pāratantryābhāvād asambandha eva /.*

[392]According to the PVP, it also seems possible to translate *niṣpatter* with the phrase: after having been established. See PVP D134b2-3: *gzhan yang re zhig myu gu la sogs pa / sa bon la sogs pa de'i 'bras bu gang yin pa de yang rang gi rgyu las grub pa'i phyir te / grub pa nyid kyi phyir cung zhig la ltos pa med pa yin no // de nyid kyi phyir de la grub pa'i 'og tu sa bon la sogs pa yang cung zad kyang mi byed pa de bas na / ...* . Cf. TOSAKI (1979) p. 90.

[393]PV III k. 26: *niṣpatter aparādhīnam api kāryaṃ svahetutaḥ / sambadhyate kalpanayā kim akāryaṃ kathañ cana //.* (Tib:) *rang gi rgyu las grub pa'i phyir // 'bras bu rag las med par yang // rtog pa yis ni 'brel bar byed // 'bras min ji ltar yang ci zhig //.*

[394]See fn. 389.

[395]Kamalaśīla nonetheless accepts Dharmakīrti's idea that between two properties which have the same nature (*tādātmya*), such as being a product (*kṛtakatva*) and being impermanent (*anityatva*), a difference can still be made by means of conceptual exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*). See fn 301. According to Dharmakīrti, because a difference between the relata is made through conceptual exclusion, the relation itself is only established conceptually, and is hence not real. Kamalaśīla argues that if it were to be real, the same nature between the relata would imply that there could not be two relata, but only one. It is clear that Kamalaśīla's argument follows the broad lines of Dharmakīrti's *apoha* theory.

4.2.2.3.1.3 The opponent's reason "because the *sādhya* and *sādhana* are not different" is not correct

§55. Moreover, if there were no relations at all [between unreal *sādhya* and *sādhana*], why did you state the other reason, i.e., "because [those two] are not different." When [those two relata] are not different, you would then be asserting that there is in fact a relation of same nature (*tādātmya*) [between them].

§56. [Objection:] A relation of same nature is only between real entities, and not between other [i.e., unreal] things.

§57. [Reply:] That is not correct. This is because the "same nature" is a synonym of "non-difference," and since two things lacking intrinsic natures are also similar in being selfless, there is no contradiction at all [in unreal things] having a relation of same nature. Otherwise [i.e., if that relation did not hold between unreal things], you could not assert "because [those two] are not different."[396]

§58. In that vein, if you stated this reason, "because [those two] are not different," from the ultimate (*paramārtha*) point of view, then it would be inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). This is because we see that there can be an epistemic relation (*gamyagamakabhāva*) between things even though they are not ultimately different, as is the case between being produced and being impermanent. If, on the other hand, you accept that even conventionally there is no difference between the [unreal *sādhya* and *sādhana*], then such a [reason] is unestablished (*asiddha*), for there is a difference [between them] imagined due to differences of conceptual exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*).[397] That is, when property-possessors, such as sound, are determined as being excluded from nonproducts and so forth, they will be determined as excluded from permanent things, etc. Thus, although being a product and being impermanent are not really different, they are imagined to be established as different things in reliance upon differences of conceptual exclusion. And so the epistemic relation is established. In the same manner, when entities are excluded from oneness and manyness in reality just like reflections and the like, they are also determined as being excluded from ultimate intrinsic na-

[396]Kamalaśīla, in effect, accuses his opponent of self-contradiction. The opponent insists that unreal *sādhya* and *sādhana* do not have a relation and are not different. But "not being different" is a synonym for "having the same nature." Thus, he nonetheless ends up having to accept that there is a relation of the same nature between unreal *sādhya* and *sādhana*.

[397]On *vyāvṛtti* and *apoha*, see fn. 301.

tures. Therefore, there is a difference made in reliance upon differences of conceptual exclusion, and hence [the *sādhya* and *sādhana*] have the epistemic relation. In addition, the other case [i.e., the argument that entities do not have any real intrinsic natures because they are neither one nor many] is analogous to the proof that permanent entities are excluded from being [real] entities because they are excluded from things possessing the capacity for practical efficacy (*arthakriyā*). Therefore, there is no contradiction at all.

§59. [Objection:] If the difference between these two were to be made by differences of conceptual exclusion, then it would follow that they [i.e., the *sādhya* and *sādhana*] are real entities. It is just like two things having the nature of blue and that of yellow respectively.

§60. [Reply:] This is also irrelevant, because [your reason] is inconclusive due to cases such as being a product and being impermanent. We would say that the difference between being a product and being impermanent is made through conceptual exclusions, but simply due to this it would not follow that those two [properties] are real entities. When one negates permanent entities, a difference is made through conceptual exclusions between the lack of practical efficacy and the absence of intrinsic nature. It nevertheless does not follow that [those two] are real entities. It is the same in the other case [i.e., the Mādhyamika proof of entities' having no real intrinsic natures because of being neither one nor many]. So this argument is bad. What you stated as the example, viz., "like two things having the nature of blue and that of yellow respectively," is not established as being an ultimate entity, and therefore it is not correct at all.

4.2.2.3.2 Even if the *sādhya* and *sādhana* were implicative negations, real entities which are neither one nor many in nature could not be established

§61. The criticism stated concerning the [second] position that [the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* have the form of] an implicative negation is also not correct at all. When it is said that [those two] have been stated in term of implicative negations (*paryudāsa*), this much alone would not establish anything anywhere as an ultimate entity. This is because although imagined things like space and so forth are described by words such as "not physical," they remain nonentities. In that case, the above-explained mentally existent property-possessors are expressed accordingly in terms of implicative negations, but it is not correct that they are real entities. Even for realists, there could not be real entities without oneness and manyness, with the re-

sult that [there not being real entities that are neither one nor many] would be a proof of the obvious (*siddhasādhana*).[398] This is because such a thing [i.e., real entities that are neither one nor many] is not even conceivable and because we have proved earlier that being one or many pervades all intrinsic natures.[399] If you mean by entities even things which are ultimately without

[398]On the fault of *siddhasādhana*, see fn. 145.

[399]See MĀ D218b6: *gcig dang du ma nyid dag gis ni rnam par thams cad la khyab ste / de dag ni phan tshun spangs te gnas pa'i mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro //.* "Being one and being many pervade all possibilities. This is because those two are characterized as mutually exclusive."

Being one and being many pervade all possibilities of intrinsic natures of objects of cognition. Therefore, here, Kamalaśīla wants to say that since there cannot be any real entities having neither single nor multiple natures, it is impossible that such entities would be implied if we construed neither oneness nor manyness as an implicative negation. Even for realists, nonexistence of such entities is self-evident and thus proving it is simply "proof of that which has been already proved" (*siddhasādhana*). See Tsong kha pa's BGZ pp. 48, 11-49, 4: *'on te bden par med ces ma byas par bden pa ma yin zhes brjod kyang de tsam gyi don dam pa'i ngo bor mi 'grub ste / nam mkha' dang sgra don lus can ma yin pa sogs kyi sgras bstan pa bzhin no // gcig dang du bral gyi dngos po yang dag par grub pa khyed la yang med de / de gnyis gang du 'ang mi zhen par dngos po tsam zhen pa rtogs pa la 'ang med pa'i phyir dang / gcig dang du mas rang bzhin snang ba las / rtags chos gnyis ka rnam bcad tsam yin par gsal bar gsungs pa'i phyir na med dgag kho na'o //.*

Note that here in the MĀ, Kamalaśīla refutes the objection that the implicative negation of oneness and manyness would imply an entity which has neither nature. But, interestingly enough, he does not seem to reject outright that the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* can have the form of implicative negations. See fn. 400. Although it is not yet clear whether Kamalaśīla in fact accepted such an interpretation, there was an interpretation of the *sādhya* [and the *sādhana*?] as having the form of an implicative negation. In his BGZ Tsong kha pa, commenting upon the MĀ's argument above, quotes and refutes an earlier Tibetan scholar's view that the *sādhya* has both the form of a nonimplicative negation and that of an implicative negation. See p. 49, 4-10: *'di la sngar gyi bod kyi mkhas pa kha cig gcig dang du bral gyi snang bas bden med kyi snang ba dang / gcig du bral gyis bden med kyi tha snyad bsgrub na / ma yin dgag sgrub yin la gcig dang du bral gyis* don dam gyi dngos po'i tha snyad du byas rung bas stong pa sgrub pa na med dgag sgrub pa yin zhes zer te ... .* (* The text has *gyi*. However, this should be emended into *gyis*.) This Tibetan scholar's view is described in CG kha 96b1-3, and we can identify him as Phya pa chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169). Cf. *dBu ma shar gsum gyi stong thun* p. 87, 13-18: *[gnyis pa myed dgag dang ma yin dgag bsgrub byar byed pa'i tshul ni] yang dag pa'i gcig dang du mas stong pa[s] yang dag pa'i dngos por yod pa'i tha snyad bkag pa tsam gyi myed dgag sgrub na khyab byed mi dmigs pa ste / rjes dpag*

intrinsic nature and are not different from illusions and the like, then this is completely unobjectionable.[400] All that happens is that you refute yourself by undermining the [realist] position that you yourself accept. Therefore, the reason [i.e., being neither one nor many] is not inconclusive.

4.2.3 The reason is not contradictory (*viruddha*)

§62. [The reason] is not contradictory (*viruddha*) either. This is because [the reason] is present in similar instances (*sapakṣa*) such as reflections and so forth. It is not possible that things like reflections and so forth have ultimate oneness or manyness. It has been explained earlier that in fact they too are not really established as being of the nature of cognitions or cognizable things.[401]

§63. [Objection:] Just as the reason characterized as "being neither

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de'ang dngos kyi bsgrub bya la ltos nas rigs pa'i shes pa yin no // yang dag pa'i gcig dang du ma myed dgag las rang bzhin myed pa'i tha snyad du byar rung ba dpog pa dang yang dag pa'i gcig dang du mas stong bar snang ba'i rtags las sgyu ma lta bur dpog pa la sogs pa ma yin dgag dpog pa rnams ni rang bzhin gyi rtags te rjes dpag de'ang dngos kyi bsgrub bya la ltas nas tha snyad pa'i shes pa'o //. In this passage, Phya pa chos kyi seng ge holds that when the *sādhya* has the form of an implicative negation, the "neither one nor many" reason is regarded as a reason which is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*), and that this reason also positively proves that entities are unreal like illusions.

In the MĀ D176a5-6, Kamalaśīla says that it is possible to prove positively the property consisting in the absence of real intrinsic nature by means of a reason which is an essential property and by means of a reason consisting in an effect (*kāryahetu*). Although it is not yet clear how a *kāryahetu* can be used in this context, Kamalaśīla seems to accept the following *svabhāvahetu*: [Vyāpti:] What is of the nature of being imagined is indeed false [i.e., unreal]. It is just like, for example, the children of barren women and the like. [Pakṣadharmatva:] Now *ātman* and so forth are of the nature of being imagined. [Implicit conclusion: Therefore, *ātman* and so forth are indeed false, i.e., unreal.] See MĀ D176b7-177a2.

Since Kamalaśīla also seems to hold that the proof of things' unreality constitutes a positive proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature, it might be possible to surmise that in such a positive proof, Kamalaśīla also regards the *sādhya* as having the form of an implicative negation.

[400]From this sentence, it is clear that Kamalaśīla knows that the negation of ultimate intrinsic natures can also imply something like illusions. He seems to have the idea that the "neither one nor many" reason does not have any fault even when the negation of those intrinsic natures implies something like illusions.

[401]MĀ D176b3-6.

one nor many" proves selflessness, so too [it will prove] that the property-possessor is unreal. Therefore, because of its proving the opposite of the property-possessor, the reason is contradictory.[402]

§64. [Reply:] That is just tantamount to not understanding anything at all by means of valid cognitions. If we wanted to prove that the property-possessor had a real nature, then the reason would be contradictory because it would in fact prove the opposite of that [property]. However, when we prove that the [property-possessor] is without intrinsic nature, then how is it that the reason would be contradictory, even though what is intended by the proponent would be established? When we prove the absence of intrinsic nature, things having real natures also would not be the property-possessor either. This is because [such real property-possessors] would not be in keeping [with the *sādhya* and the *sādhana*]. This has already been explained earlier.[403] Therefore, since in the case [of the proof] stated above, we acknowledge that the property-possessor is not real due to the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* [which are mere exclusions], how would the reason prove the opposite of the [property-possessor]?[404] If we were to prove [the unreal property-possessor] as having a real nature, [the reason] would prove the opposite of the [property-possessor]. Therefore, the following statement is also irrelevant: "Just as this reason proves selflessness, so too [it will prove] that the property-possessor is unreal." There is no difference made between being selfless and being unreal, even through conceptual exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*); otherwise, we could claim that the reason is contradictory by saying that two [distinct] properties are being proved.[405] This [lack of

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[402]MĀ *pūrvapakṣa* D139a7-139b1: *gzhan yang ji ltar gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral pa'i gtan tshigs 'di nyid kyis dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du sgrub par byed pa de bzhin du chos can yang dngos po med par sgrub na ni chos can las bzlog pa bsgrub pa'i phyir gtan tshigs 'gal ba yin te /.*

[403]MĀ D172a6-173a4. For our translation, see pp. 128-136.

[404]Cf. KOBAYASHI ibid. p. 83, 18-21: "Therefore, since [we] intend [to prove] the [mental] subjects as was explained above* just as being unreal by means of the *sādhya* and the *sādhana*, how would the reason prove the opposite of the [subjects]?" (それ故、(我々は) 所証と能証によって、前述の如き (知の中に存在する) 基体が、非実在 (*avastubhūta*) に他ならないことを (論証しようと) 望んでいるのだから、どうして証因がそれ (基体の本来の相) と矛盾したことを論証しようか。) (* Note that Kobayashi emends *ji skad bshad pa la* to *ji skad bshad pa'i*. See KOBAYASHI ibid. p. 75 n. 29.)

[405]This is a sentence which has a *gang gis na/yena* clause. For the use of *gang gis na/yena*, see fn. 154 and fn. 240. We should translate this *gang gis na* as

difference] is because those two are synonymous.[406]

Therefore, so [if you wanted to show that we were proving two properties and were thus proving a contradiction] you end up saying that just as [the reason] proves selflessness, so will it prove selflessness. Whoever had such eloquence?

4.2.4 Conclusion

§65. Thus, [this reason] indeed proves all dharmas as being ultimately without intrinsic nature.

4.2.5 The reason is explained by the Illustrious One himself

§66. This ["neither one nor many"] reason is explained by the Illustrious One himself. It is said [in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*]:

> "Just as visible matter, which has neither identity nor difference, is seen on the surface of a mirror, but is not actually there, so too for the being belonging to things."[407]

Hence, we have also replied to the objection: "There is no reason at all which proves the absence of intrinsic nature."

"otherwise," or "so that." Cf. KOBAYASHI ibid. p. 83, 26-28: "That is to say, with reference to being selfless and being unreal, there is even no mutual difference [made] through exclusion, which [difference] would make it possible to say that the reason is contradictory, by stating the establishment of those two properties." （すなわち、＜無我＞と＜非実在＞には、その二つの属性の成立を指摘することによって「証因は矛盾である。」と言うことができることになるような、排除によって（作られる）相互の差別さえも存在しない。）

[406]In the context of the later Mādhyamikas' proof of the absence of real intrinsic nature, being selfless and being unreal can be regarded as synonymous. This is because the later Mādhyamikas intend to prove the mere exclusion of the property superimposed by others as being really existent, viz., the mere exclusion of superimposed reality. See Chapter 2 pp. 30-38.

[407]Cf. LAS X k. 709: *yathā hi darpaṇe rūpam ekatvānyatvavarjitam / dṛśyate na ca tan nāsti tathā cotpādalakṣaṇam //.* K. 709 quoted in the MĀ does not correspond to this reading of the verse, but corresponds to the verse as quoted in BK I p. 204, 4-5: *yathaiva darpaṇe rūpam ekatvānyatvavarjitam dṛśyate na ca tatrāsti tathā bhāveṣu bhāvatā.* K. 709 is also quoted in MAV D70a1-2, MAU D228a1, PPU D142a6 and D148a2.

Tibetan Texts

1. The Establishment of the Absence of Intrinsic Nature in Reality by means of Direct Perception

dBu ma snang ba

1.1 *Phyogs snga ma (pūrvapakṣa)*

§1. rigs pa'i sgo nas kyang ma yin te / C134b2,D134a7 G177a6,N136a1 P144a8

§2. 'di ltar re zhig (G177b) mngon sum gyis ni dngos po ma lus pa dben par rtogs par mi 'gyur te / de'i yul ni dngos po yin (P144b) pa'i phyir (D134b) ro // dngos po med pa ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis ji ltar yang rang gi ngo bo nye bar ston pas rnam par shes pa skyed par byed pa nyid du rigs pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // ji ste skyed par byed pa nyid yin na ni dngos po nyid[1] du thal bar 'gyur te[2] / dngos po'i mtshan nyid ni[3] don byed nus pa yin pa'i phyir ro //

§3. mngon sum gang yin pa de yang ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa yin na ni de'i tshe chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du dam bcas pa nyams par 'gyur ro //

§4. 'on te de[4] ngo bo nyid med pa yin na ni /[5] ji ltar des dngos po ma lus pa dben par rtogs par 'gyur /

§5. gzhan yang don gzhan gyis dben pa'i phyogs la sogs pa 'ga' zhig 'dzin na ni de las gzhan pas stong pa nyid mngon sum gyis rtogs par bya ba yin par 'gyur na / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du smra ba

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[1] DGNP dngos po nyid: C dngos po med pa nyid. [2] DGNP te: C to. [3] CDGP ni: N na. [4] CD de: GNP om. [5] CD /: GNP om.

rnams la ni gang 'ga' zhig mngon sum du dmigs pas chos thams cad dben par[1] rtogs par 'gyur ba chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid kyis dben pa'i dngos po ni cung zad kyang med de / de yang chos thams cad kyi nang du 'dus pa'i phyir ro //

§6. 'on te nang du ma 'dus na ni rang gi[2] dam bcas pa nyams par 'gyur ro //[3]

§7. 'di ni thams cad mkhyen pa la sogs pa rnal 'byor pa'i mngon sum gyis yang dag par rtogs par bya ba yin no zhes bya ba yang mkhas pa rnams yongs su tshim par mi 'gyur te / de la rigs pa med pa'i phyir ro //

§8. gal te rnal 'byor pa'i shes pa (N136b) de yang med pa zhig yin na ni /[4] de'i tshe de ji ltar (G178a) tshad mar 'gyur /

C135a7,D134b6 G178a1,N136b1 P144b6 **§9.** 'on te yod na ni de'i tshe dam bcas pa nyams par 'gyur ro //

1.2 *Phyogs phyi ma (uttarapakṣa)*

C167b3,D168a1 G226a1,N174b5 P183a1 **§1.** gang yang rigs pa'i sgo nas kyang nus pa ma yin te / 'di ltar[5] re zhig mngon sum gyis ni dngos po ma lus pa dben pa rtogs par mi 'gyur te / de'i yul ni dngos po yin pa'i phyir ro[6] zhes smras pa gang yin pa de la yang brjod par bya ste /

§2. ci skyes bu thams cad kyi mngon sum gang yin pa de[7] chos thams cad bdag med par rtogs par mi nus pa nyid yin nam / 'on te khyed lta bu'i[8] mi shes pa'i rab rib kyi ling tog[9] rab tu stug pos shes rab kyi mig nyams par byas pa[10] rnams kyi mngon sum gang yin pa yin /

§3. de la re zhig phyogs dang po ni tshad ma med pa'i phyir rigs pa ma yin te / de la skyes bu thams cad kyi mngon sum rab tu mi 'jug go[11] zhes nges par bya ba la tshad ma ci yang med do // (N175a) rang gi dmigs pa log pa tsam ni 'khrul ba'i phyir te / dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa mi dmigs pa kho

[1] CD par: GNP pa. [2] CGNP gi: D gis. [3] DGNP //: C om. [4] CD /: GNP om. [5] CDGNP de ltar. Emendation to 'di ltar due to *pūrvapakṣa*. [6] CD ro: GNP ro /. [7] CD de: GNP de thams cad. [8] CD bu'i: GNP bu. [9] GNP tog: CD thog. [10] DGN mig nyams par byas pa: C mi nyams par byas pa; P mig nyams par byams par byas pa. [11] CD go: GNP go /.

na de med par sgrub par byed pa yin na[1] gang gi phyir bdag gis mi dmigs pas de de la mi 'jug par rtogs par gyur pa skyes bu thams cad kyi sems kyi rgyud la yod pa'i sems kyi 'jug pa ni tshu rol mthong ba khyed kyi dmigs pa'i rig bya ma yin no // gzhan gyi dmigs pa log pa yang ma nges pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir rtog pa dang ldan pas mngon sum gyis de rtogs pa med pa kho na'o zhes brjod pa 'di ni rigs pa ma yin (G226b) no //

§4. 'on te phyogs gnyis pa (C168a) ltar na de'i tshe grub pa sgrub pa nyid de / kho bo cag kyang tshu rol mthong ba rnams kyis chos kyi de kho na nyid zab mo de lta bu mngon sum du mthong bar ni khas mi len to // 'on kyang gal te khyed lta bu de kho na nyid de lta bu rtogs pa med du chug kyang rnal 'byor pa dam pa bskal pa mi nyung bar bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs dpag tu med pa (P183b) bsags pas mtha' dag 'byor par byed pa'i thabs thob pa / yang dag pa'i don bsgoms pa las byung ba'i yang dag pa'i ye shes kyi snang bas sgrib pa'i mun pa mtha' dag bsal[2] ba rnams kyi mngon sum gyis chos thams cad bdag med par rtogs so[3] zhes bya bar go ci ste mi srid de / 'di la yang rigs pa phyis brjod par bya'o //

§5. gang yang mngon sum gyi yul ni dngos po yin pa'i phyir ro zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang ma (D168b) grub pa yin te / 'di ltar tshu rol mthong ba rnams kyi mngon sum gang yin pa de ni rab rib can gyi mngon sum bzhin du gzugs[4] la sogs pa brdzun pa'i yul can yin pa nyid kyis dngos po'i ngo bo nyid yang dag pa pa'i yul can nyid du rigs pa ma yin no // de lta ma yin na thams cad de kho na nyid mthong bar thal bar 'gyur ro // sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems (N175b) dpa' rnal 'byor pa chen po rnams kyi ye shes gang yin pa de yang dngos po'i yul can du rab tu ma grub ste / de dag gis dngos po'i ngo bo nyid yang dag pa pa[5] 'ga' yang ma gzigs pa'i phyir te / 'phags pa byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod las / ji skad du /

> des chos thams cad ngo bo nyid kyis med pa dang / 'gag pa med pa dang / rang bzhin gyis nye bar zhi ba dang / shin tu ma skyes pa dang / ma byung ba dang / kun tu[6] ma byung ba dang / shin tu yongs su mya ngan las 'das par yang mthong la / des gang gis mthong ba de (G227a) yang mi mthong rnam par mi mthong ste / 'di ni yang dag pa'i[7] mthong ba dang ji lta ba bzhin gyi mthong ba yin no // yang chos thams cad ji lta ba bzhin du mthong ba gang zhe na / gang 'di mthong ba med pa yin no

[1] DGNP na: C na /. [2] GNP bsal: CD bstsal. [3] CD so: GNP so //. [4] CDGN gzugs: P gthugs.
[5] CDP yang dag pa pa: GN yang dag pa. [6] CGNP tu: D du. [7] CD pa'i: GNP pa.

zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o // 'phags pa chos yang dag par sdud pa las kyang /[1]

chos thams cad mthong ba med pa ni mthong ba dam pa yin no

zhes gsungs so // de'i phyir mngon sum gyi yul ni yang (C168b) dag pa pa'i dngos po yin par ma grub po //

§6. gang yang dngos po med pa ni ji ltar (P184a) yang rnam par shes pa skyed par byed pa[2] nyid du mi rung ba'i phyir ro zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te / kho bo cag kyang dngos po med pa[3] ri bong gi rwa la sogs pa lta bu ni gang yang mngon sum gyi shes pa skyed par byed pa nyid du khas mi len to // 'on kyang rnal 'byor pa chen po chos thams cad smig rgyu dang sgra brnyan lta bur ji lta ba bzhin du sgom par byed pa rnams kyis / yang dag pa'i don bsgoms pa'i rab kyi mtha' las byung ba'i ting nge 'dzin thob pa'i phyir mthu phul du[4] byung ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa dang ldan pas rnal 'byor pa de dag la gang gis na rnal 'byor pa rnams kyis mngon sum kho nar chos ma lus pa bdag med pa rtogs par 'gyur pa chos ma lus pa (D169a) bdag (N176a) med pa'i de kho na nyid gsal rab tu mngon sum du byed pa'i ye shes de lta bu nye bar skye ste / de nyid mthong ba med ces bya'i / med par dgag pa'i ngo (G277b) bo ni ma yin no //

§7. gang yang mngon sum de yang gal te ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa yin na ni zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa de la yang chos thams cad don dam par ma skyes par ro gcig pa nyid kyis[5] mngon sum yang don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa yin mod kyi / 'on kyang mngon sum la sogs pa rnam par gzhag[6] pa kun rdzob kyi bden pa la brten pa thams cad rnam par mi 'khrugs pa kho na'o // dbu ma pa rnams ni chos thams cad don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang / gang gis na tha snyad thams cad chad[7] par 'gyur ba / tha snyad kyi sgo nas rnal 'byor ba'i shes pa dang / so so'i skye bo gzhan gyi[8] shes pa dang / 'phags pa'i gang zag la sogs pa rnam par gzhag[9] pa'i rgyu mi 'dod pa ni ma yin no // 'on kyang gang la[10] dus thams cad du kun rdzob tu yang rgyu med pa de ni tha snyad du yang mi skye ba nyid de / dper na ri bong gi rwa la[11] sogs pa lta bu'o // gang la yod pa de ni don dam par[12] ngo bo

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[1] CD /: GNP om. [2] CD skyed par byed pa: GNP bskyed par byed pa. [3] CD pa: GNP pa'i. [4] CD du: GNP tu. [5] CDGNP kyi. Emendation to kyis due to the MMA's quotation of this sentence of MĀ. MMA D144a6-7: gal te yang chos thams cad don dam par skye ba med pa ro gcig pa nyid kyis mngon sum yang don dam par rang bzhin med mod /. Cf. *Marmakaumudī* P231b7: gang yang chos rnams thams cad don dam par skye ba med pa dang ro gcig pa nyid du mngon sum pas don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang ... /. [6] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [7] CD chad: GNP om. [8] CD gyi: GNP gyis. [9] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [10] CDP la: GN las. [11] CDGN la: P om. [12] GNP don dam par: CD don dam pa.

nyid med kyang skye ste[1] dper na sgyu ma dang gzugs brnyan la sogs pa lta bu'o // (P184b) sgyu ma la sogs pa 'di rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba yin yang dngos po nyid du thal ba ma yin te / grags pa dang tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir ro // de dang 'dra bar chos thams cad rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba yin yang dngos po nyid du thal ba ma yin pa kho na ste / tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir ro //

§8. de la ji ltar (C169a) gsang sngags dang / sman la sogs pa'i dbang gis glang po la sogs pa sgyu ma sna tshogs rab tu 'byung ba de bzhin du sems can (G228a) rnams kyi las dang nyon mongs pa'i dbang gis skye ba la sogs pa yang rab tu 'byung la[2] rnal 'byor pa rnams kyi rang gi bsod nams (N176b) dang ye shes kyi tshogs kyi dbang gis rnal 'byor pa'i shes pa la sogs pa'i sgyu ma yang rab tu 'byung ba kho na ste / rkyen sna tshogs kyi dbang gis sgyu ma de yang sna tshogs nyid du snang ba'i phyir ro // 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las kyang //

> kha cig ni nyan thos kyis sprul pa / kha cig ni byang chub sems dpas[3] sprul pa / kha cig ni de bzhin gshegs pas sprul pa / kha cig ni nyon (D169b) mongs pas sprul pa / kha cig ni las kyis sprul pa ste / rab 'byor rnam grangs 'dis na[4] chos thams cad sprul pa lta bu yin no

zhes gsungs so //

§9. so so'i skye bo dag las rnal 'byor pa rnams khyad par ni 'di yod de / de dag ni sgyu ma'i mkhan po bzhin du sgyu ma de dag yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du yongs su shes pa'i phyir de kho na nyid du mngon par zhen pa med do // de skad du[5] 'phags pa chos thams cad yang dag par sdud pa las kyang /

> dper na sgyu ma'i mkhan po 'ga' //
> sprul pa[6] thar par[7] bya phyir brtson //
> gang phyir 'dis[8] de[9] mngon shes pas //
> 'di ni sprul pa[10] chags pa med //
> rdzogs pa'i byang chub mkhas pa rnams //
> 'gro ba de ltar snga nas shes //
> srid gsum sprul pa ltar shes nas //
> 'gro ba'i don du go cha gyon //

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[1] CD ste: GNP ste /. [2] CD la: GNP la /. [3] CDNP sems dpas: G sems dpa'. [4] DGNP 'dis na: C 'dis ni. [5] CD du: GNP du /. [6] DGNP pa: C par. [7] CD par: GNP pa. [8] GNP 'dis: CD 'dus. [9] DGNP de: C te. [10] CD pa: GNP la.

zhes gsungs so // byis pa gang dag ltad mo pa'i (G228b) skye bo bzhin du skye ba la sogs pa'i sgyu ma (P185a) de dag ji ltar snang ba bzhin bden pa nyid du mngon par zhen pa de dag ni / phyin ci log tu mngon par zhen pa'i phyir byis pa dag ces bya'o //

§10. de'i phyir kun rdzob tu rnal 'byor can gyi rnal 'byor pa'i mngon sum gnas pa'i phyir ri bong gi rwa la sogs pa bzhin du gtan med pa ma yin no // de'i phyir mngon sum gyis chos ma lus pa bdag med par rtogs pa yod pa nyid pas 'gal ba med do // rnal 'byor pa yang don dam par ngo bo nyid med[1] kyang / so so'i skye bo la sogs pa bzhin du tha snyad kyi sgo nyid nas rnam par gzhag[2] ste / (N177a) 'phags pa bden pa gnyis bstan pa las / ji skad du[3]

> de[4] don dam par shin tu ma skyes pa yin[5] yang kun rdzob tu lam (C169b) sgom[6] par byed do

zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o //

§11. gang yang don gzhan gyis dben pa'i phyogs la sogs pa 'ga' zhig mngon sum gyis bzung nas[7] de las gzhan pas[8] stong pa mngon sum gyis rtogs par bya bar 'gyur zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te / tshul 'di ni gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid yin gyi / mtshan nyid stong pa nyid ni[9] ma yin no // mtshan nyid stong pa nyid kyis ni don dam par[10] chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par 'dod de / don dam par de dag gi rang dang spyi'i mtshan nyid ji ltar rnam par gzhag[11] pa stong pa'i phyir ro // dngos po rnams kyi gcig gis (D170a) gcig stong pa nyid gang yin pa de ni don dam pa ma yin gyi /[12] 'on kyang tha snyad kyi (G229a) bden ba la brten pa yin no // 'di ltar dngos po thams cad don dam par skye ba med par ro gcig pa'i phyir tha dad pa med pa [13] yin mod kyi / 'on kyang byis pa rnams la rmi lam la sogs pa'i gnas skabs bzhin du phan tshun tha dad par snang ngo // de'i phyir de la grags pa'i ngo bor[14] de dag la don gzhan gyis dben pa'i dngos po 'dzin pa'i sgo nas gcig gis gcig[15] stong pa nyid 'di rnam par gzhag[16] gi // don dam par ni[17] ma yin te / yang dag par na[18] rmi lam (P185b) dang / sgyu ma lta bu'i dngos po rnams la ngo bo nyid phan tshun tha dad pa med do // de nyid kyi phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis 'di ni don dam pa la brten pa ma yin

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[1] CDNP med: G om. [2] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [3] CD du: GNP du /. [4] GNP de: CD: om. [5] GNP yin: CD yin pa. [6] CDGN sgom: P bsgom. [7] CD nas: GNP nas /. [8] GNP pas: CD pa. [9] CD ni: GNP om. [10] CDNP don dam par: G don par. [11] CD rnam par gzhag: G bzhag; NP rnam par bzhag. [12] CDGN /: P: om. [13] CDGNP add ma. Judging by the context, however, we should delete this word. [14] CD ngo bor: GP ngor; N: ill. [15] CDNP gcig gis gcig: G gcig. [16] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [17] GNP ni: CD om. [18] CD na: GNP ni.

pa nyid kyis[1] thams cad kyi tha chad yin pa'i phyir[2] spang bar bya ba kho nar gsungs te / 'phags pa lang kar gshegs pa las / ji skad du[3]

> blo gros chen po gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid 'di ni thams cad kyi tha chad yin pas de ni khyod kyis spang bar bya'o

zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o //

§12. chos thams cad kyi (N177b) mtshan nyid stong pa nyid[4] gang yin pa de ni de dag gi rang dang spyi'i mtshan nyid ji ltar rnam par gzhag[5] pa dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa las rnal 'byor pa rnams kyis don dam pa'i rnam par mi dmigs pa'i phyir chos thams cad snang ba med pa'i ye shes skye ba'i sgo nas rtogs par rnam par gzhag[6] go // (G229b) de'i phyir gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid thams cad kyi tha chad byis pa'i skye bos kun brtags pa la brten nas glengs mod kyi / de ni 'brel pa med pa kho na'o //

§13. gang yang de ni rnal 'byor pa'i mngon sum gyis yang dag par rtogs par bya ba kho na'o zhes bya ba'i (C170a) tshig kyang mkhas pa rnams yongs su mgu bar byed pa ma yin te / de la rigs pa med pa'i phyir ro[7] zhes smras pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te / 'di la rigs pa yod pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar mkhas pa rnams ni

> mngon sum ni[8] rtog pa dang bral zhing ma 'khrul pa yin no[9]

zhes mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid 'chad do //

§14. goms pa'i stobs kyis kyang don yod pa ma yin pa la yang shes pa gsal rab tu skye ste / dper na 'dod pa dang / mya ngan dang / skrag pa dang / smyo[10] ba la sogs pas nyams pa rnams shin tu goms pa lan (D170b) mang du byas pa'i sgo nas bud med la sogs par gsal rab tu snang ba'i shes pa skye ste / gang gi phyir de dag gis de dag mdun na 'dug pa bzhin du mthong nas mod la lus la sogs pa'i g-yo ba rnam[11] pa du ma (P186a) rtsom[12] pa lta bu'o // de'i phyir ji skad bshad pa'i de kho na nyid sgom par byed pa[13] kha cig kyang de la shes pa gsal rab tu skye'o zhes bya ba srid do //[14] gsal rab tu snang ba'i shes pa gang yin pa de ni rtog pa med pa kho na yin te / mar me bzhin du rtog pa'i rlung gis dkrugs[15] pa'i lus la rnam pa gsal rab pa nyid mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro //

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[1] CD kyis: GNP kyis /. [2] CDNP phyir: G phyin. [3] CD du: GNP du /. [4] CD stong pa nyid: GNP stong pa nyid stong pa nyid. [5] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [6] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [7] CD med pa'i phyir ro: GNP med do. [8] CDGP ni: N na. [9] CD no: GNP no /. [10] CD smyo: GNP skyo. [11] CDNP rnam: G rnams. [12] CDGN rtsom: P rtsob. [13] CD sgom par byed pa: GNP bsgoms par byed pa. [14] CDNP //: G om. [15] DGNP dkrugs: C dkugs.

§15. sbyor ba dag[1] ni kha cig gis gang dang gang rtag (G230a) tu shin tu gus par bsgoms pa de ni de dag[2] las bsgoms pa'i 'bras bu rab kyi mtha' las skyes pa'i 'bras bu shes pa (N178a) gsal rab tu nyams su myong bar 'gyur te / dper na 'dod chags la sogs pas nyams pa dag gis bud med la sogs pa bsgom pa lta bu'o // kha cig gis kyang yun[3] ring po nas rtag tu gus par byas te / chos thams cad bdag med par bsgoms pas rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs yin no //

de la yang tshad ma dang ldan pa'i don gyi[4] yul can gang yin pa de mi slu ba[5] yin te / dper na tha snyad kyi sgo nas du ba la sogs pa rtags nges pa las byung ba me la sogs pa'i shes pa lta bu'o // rnal 'byor pa rnams kyi bdag med pa'i shes pa de yang tshad ma dang ldan pa'i don gyi yul can yin pas rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs kho na yin no // 'di tshad ma dang ldan pa nyid ni 'og nas bstan par bya'o //

shes pa gang zhig gang la gsal rab tu snang zhing mi slu bar[6] skye ba de ni de la mngon sum gyi tshad ma yin te / dper na tha snyad du gzugs la sogs pa la /[7] mig la sogs (C170b) pa ma nyams pa'i skyes bu'i mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa lta bu'o // rnal 'byor pa rnams kyi shes pa chos thams cad bdag med pa'i yul can yang gsal rab cing mi slu ba[8] yin pas rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs so //

§16. de ltar na rnal 'byor pa rnams kyi[9] chos thams cad bdag (G230b) med pa'i shes pa ni rigs pas bsgrub par bya ba yin na ci ste mkhas pa rnams[10] yongs su (P186b) mgu bar byed pa ma yin /

§17. gang yang gal te rnal 'byor pa'i shes pa de yang med pa zhig yin na ni zhes bya ba la (D171a) sogs pa[11] smras pa de la yang gong du lan btab zin ba nyid de / dngos po thams cad ri bong gi rwa dang 'dra bar shin tu med pa nyid du ni mi 'dod kyi / 'on kyang sgyu ma la sogs pa bzhin du don dam par med pa nyid do // des na[12] tha snyad thams cad ma bkag pa kho na ste / ji skad du[13] kho bo cag tha snyad kyang khas mi len pa ma yin te / brjod do
C170b3,D171a2 G230b3,N178b1 P186b3 (N178b) zhes bshad pa lta bu'o //

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[1] CD dag: GNP om. [2] DGNP de ni de dag: C de ni dag. [3] DGNP yun: C yan. [4] CD gyi: GNP om. [5] CD mi slu ba: G ni bslu ba; NP mi bslu ba. [6] CD mi slu bar: GNP mi bslu bar. [7] CDGN /: P om. [8] CDG mi slu ba: N ill.; P mi bslu ba. [9] GNP kyi: CD kyis. [10] CDNP rnams: G om. [11] GNP pa: CD pa de. [12] CDNP des na: G de nas. [13] CD du: GNP du /.

2. The Proof of the Absence of Intrinsic Nature in Reality by means of Inference

2.1 *Phyogs snga ma (pūrvapakṣa)*

§1. rjes su dpag pa'i sgo nas kyang dngos po ma lus pa stong pa nyid du bsgrub par nus pa ma yin te / C134b7,D134b6 G178a1,N136b1 P144b7

§2. khyed la gzhi chos can 'ga' yang (C135a) med pa'i phyir dang[1] gtan tshigs dang dpe la sogs pa yang ma skyes pa'i phyir gtan tshigs thams cad gzhi dang rang gi ngo bo ma grub pa kho na yin na[2] ji ltar des de bsgrub par 'gyur / C135a1,D134b7 G178a2,N136b2 P144b8

2.2 *Phyogs phyi ma (uttarapakṣa)*

§1. gang yang rjes su dpag pa'i sgo nas kyang dngos po ma lus pa stong pa nyid du sgrub par nus pa ma yin te / gzhi chos can 'ga' yang ma grub pa'i phyir dang / dpe la sogs pa yang ma skyes pa'i phyir gtan tshigs thams cad gzhi dang rang gi ngo bo ma grub pa kho na'o zhes smras pa de yang 'brel pa med pa yin te /[3] C170b3,D171a2 G230b3,N178b1 P186b3

§2. 'di ltar re zhig gal te kho bo cag gis ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du khas blangs pa la khyed thal bar 'gyur bar sgrub na ni de'i tshe 'di thal ba ma yin pa kho na ste / gang gi phyir kho bo cag gis dngos po rnams don dam

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[1] CD dang: GNP dang /. [2] DGNP na: C de. [3] CD /: GNP om.

par ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du khas blangs so // de la yang gal te don dam par gtan tshigs dang[1] dpe dang[2] chos can la sogs pa med pa'i phyir rjes su dpag pa[3] dang / rjes su dpag par bya ba la sogs pa'i tha snyad mi[4] (G231a) 'jug go[5] zhes thal bar sgrub na ni ji ltar 'dod pa bzhin yin pa'i phyir 'di thal ba ma yin pa kho na ste / kho bo cag kyang rjes su dpag pa dang rjes su dpag par bya ba la sogs pa'i tha snyad 'di thams cad don dam par 'jug pa mi 'dod na[6] gang gis na de med par thal ba zhes bya ste / thal ba'i mtshan nyid ni mi 'dod par 'gyur ba yin pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar kho bo cag[7] ni khyed kyis sun 'byin pa'i bar du yang don dam par ma skyes pa kho nar khas len te / de'i phyir nyes pa'i go skabs 'ga' yang mi rnyed pa nyid do // de nyid kyi phyir slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas /

> gal te cung zad (C171a) cig dmigs na (P187a) ni mngon sum la sogs pa'i don gyis 'jug pa'am / ldog par bya na de med pa'i phyir kho bo la klan ka med do

zhes gsungs so //

§3. 'on te gang zhig don dam par med pa de tha snyad du yang 'jug par mi 'gyur ro zhes thal bar sgrub[8] na ni 'dir yang khyab pa ma grub pa'i phyir thal ba ma yin pa kho na ste / tha snyad ni gang gis na 'di bdag nyid log na tha (D171b) snyad kyang log par 'gyur ba (N179a) don dam pa pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis khyab pa ni med do // 'on kyang 'di ni de las bzlog pa kho nas khyab ste / tha snyad ni don dam par med pa nyid kyi ngo bo nyid yin pa'i phyir ro // rmi lam la sogs pa dag ni[9] don dam pa pa'i ngo bo nyid dang bral ba yang tha snyad sna tshogs 'jug pa yang[10] snang ste / de'i phyir tha snyad 'di thams cad kyang sprul (G231b) pa dang / rmi lam la sogs pa dang 'dra bas 'gal ba med do // de skad du /

> sprul pa yis[11] ni sprul pa dang //
> sgyu ma'i skyes bus sgyu ma sprul //
> dgag pa byed pa ci 'dra bar //
> dgag pa de yang ci 'drar 'gyur //[12]

zhes bshad do //

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[1] CD dang: GNP dang /. [2] CD dang: GNP dang /. [3] CDGP pa: N om. [4] CDNP mi: G mi mi. [5] CD go: GNP go /. [6] CD 'dod na: GNP 'dod na ni. [7] CDNP kho bo cag: G kho cag. [8] CDNP sgrub: G bsgrub. [9] CD ni: GNP na. [10] CD yang: GNP om. [11] NP yis: CDG yi. [12] CD //: G om.; NP /.

§4. 'on te thams cad du bsgrub par bya ba dang / chos can la sogs pa don dam pa pa'i dngos por gyur pa kho nas rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i tha snyad 'dogs pa'i phyir don dam par ngo bo nyid med pas rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i tha snyad gdags par mi 'gyur ro zhes nyes pa brjod na ni / 'di yang nyes pa med pa kho na ste / rtsod pa med par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir don dam pa pa'i chos can la sogs pas rjes su dpag[1] pa la sogs par[2] tha snyad gdags pa ni gang du yang ma grub bo //[3] 'on kyang 'jig rten na ji ltar grags pa'i chos can kho na la gnas te / rab tu smra ba rnams de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa'i phyir rjes su dpag pa[4] la sogs pa'i tha snyad 'jug par byed de / de skad du /

chos dang chos can rnam gzhag dang //
tha dad tha dad min ci 'dra //
de nyid don brtags ma yin gyi //
'jig rten na ni ji ltar grags //
de la de bzhin brten nas ni // (P187b)
bsgrub bya sgrub byed rab gnas pa //[5]
dam pa'i don la 'jug bya'i phyir //
mkhas pa rnams kyis sgrub pa dang //
bsgrub bya yang dag gnas (G232a) pa brtags //

zhes bya ba bshad do // [6] (N179b) yang /[7]

dpag bya dpag pa'i 'bras gnas pa //
yod pa min yang gzung ba dang //
'dzin pa rig pa ji (C171b) lta bur //
rjes su snang bzhin rab[8] bshad do //
de lta min na sna tshogs kyi //
ngo bo snang ba'i dngos gcig la //
rnam pa ji ltar bden 'gyur te //
gcig pa nyid de nyams par 'gyur //

zhes bshad do // yang 'di ni tha snyad las byung ba'i tshad ma'i[9] mtshan nyid yin no zhes kyang bshad do //

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[1] CDNP dpag: G dpags. [2] DGNP par: C pa. [3] CD //: GNP om. [4] CDGN rjes su dpag pa: P rjes dpag pa. [5] CD bsgrub bya sgrub byed rab gnas pa //: GNP sgrub dang bsgrub pa rab gnas par // mkhas pa rnams gyis brtags pa yang // dam pa'i don la 'jug phyir ro //. [6] GNP add the following sentence: gzung dang 'dzin pa rig pa dag // med kyang ji ltar snang 'di la // dpag par bya dang dpog pa dang // 'bras bu gnas par byed pa yin // de lta min na dngos gcig la // sna tshogs rnam pa snang ba yi // ngo bo ji ltar bden pa yin // gcig pa nyid de nyams par 'gyur // zhes 'byung ngo //. [7] CD /: GNP om. [8] CD rab: GNP rab 'di. [9] DGNP tshad ma'i: C mtshan ma'i.

§5. tshad (D172a) ma'i mtshan nyid 'di thams cad ni de kho na nyid la 'jug par bya ba'i ched kho na yin no // de lta ma yin na thams cad don med pa kho nar 'gyur te / 'di ltar tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos ma bslabs pa gnag rdzi'i chung ma la sogs pa yan chad lung med par yang du ba[1] la sogs pa'i rtags mthong ba'i sgo nas me la sogs pa rtogs[2] par 'gyur ba kho na'o // de'i phyir kho bo cag kyang de kho na nyid la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir te /[3] de bzhin nyid du[4] tha snyad kyi sgo nas rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa rab tu 'jug par byed pas nyes pa med pa nyid do // (G232b)

§6. gzhan yang tha snyad kyi sgo nas rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa 'jug pa la yang gang la mi rtag pa la sogs pa dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor[5] sgrub par 'dod pa de la ni gdon mi za bar tha snyad[6] kyi sgo nas dngos por gyur pa'i chos can la sogs pa dgos te / de la de lta bu'i gzhi med par bsgrub par bya ba la sogs pa 'ba' zhig gnas (P188a) par grub pa ni med do // de nyid la de lta bu'i gzhi med na bsgrub par bya ba bkag pa'i phyir gzhi ma grub pa nyid kyi nyes pa rjod par byed[7] pa yin no //

§7. de la yang chos can ji lta ba bzhin du gyur pa kho na log na[8] gdon mi za bar bsgrub par bya ba la sogs pa'i chos rang med na mi 'byung ba (N180a) bkag pa yin te / de ma grub na gtan tshigs ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa rjod par byed[9] pa yin gyi / rang dgar nye bar brtags pa'i chos can 'ga' zhig log kyang bsgrub par bya ba la sogs pa bkag pa 'ga' yang med pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa brjod pa mi rigs te / de la 'dod pa'i don 'grub pa la gags byed pa med pa'i phyir ro //

§8. gang la dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi[10] 'on kyang sgro btags pa'i chos rnam par gcad[11] pa sgrub pa tsam zhig brjod par[12] 'dod pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i[13] nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos (G233a) te / de ni de'i chos ma yin pa'i phyir ro // de la ltos nas[14] kyang de'i chos can nyid du mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // (C172a) de ma grub tu zin kyang bsgrub par bya ba med na[15] mi 'byung ba'i gtan tshigs mngon par 'dod pa'i don grub[16] (D172b) pa la gags byed pa med pa'i phyir ro //

§9. rgol ba'i mngon par 'dod pa'i don 'grub pa la gnod pa byed pa don du gnyer ba'i phyir rgol ba ni chos can 'grub pa'am / ma grub pa tshol bar byed kyi / chags[17] pas ni ma yin no // gang la chos can ma grub pa la sogs

[1] CDGP du ba: N du. [2] GNP rtogs: CD rtog. [3] CD /: GNP om. [4] CD de bzhin nyid du: GNP de bzhin du. [5] GNP ngo bor: CD ngo bo. [6] CDNP tha snyad: G thal snyad. [7] DGN rjod par byed: CP brjod par byed. [8] CDNP log na: G om. [9] CD rjod par byed: GP brjod par byed; N ill. [10] CD kyi: GNP kyi /. [11] CD rnam par gcad: GNP rnam par bcad. [12] DGNP par: C pa. [13] CD pa'i: GNP pa'i /. [14] CD ltos nas: GNP bltos nas. [15] GNP med na: CD med na de. [16] CDNP grub: G 'grub. [17] DGNP chags: C chegs.

pa glengs[1] kyang rgol ba'i mngon par 'dod pa'i don la gnod pa med pa kho na yin pa de la ni de glengs pas ci zhig bya ste / gleng ba po nyes pa ma yin pa[2] brjod pa nyid kyis phyin ci log gi nyes pa'i rdul gyis gang ba'i nang du rgyug pa 'ba' zhig tu zad de / cig shos la ni ma yin no // de nyid kyi phyir bsgrub par bya ba'i chos dang rjes su mthun pa'i chos can rtogs par bya ba'i phyir phyogs kyi mtshan nyid kyi skabs su rigs (P188b) pa shes pa rnams kyis rang gi chos can[3] zhes khyad par brjod do //

§10. 'di ltar gang zhig rang gi 'bras bu thams cad cig car 'grub[4] par mi byed pa de ni mthu thogs pa med pa dang / rtag pa dang / gcig pu'i ngo bo nyid ma yin te / dper na mo (N180b) gsham gyi bu la sogs pa lta bu'o // nam mkha' la sogs pa pha rol po mngon par 'dod pa rnams kyang sgra la sogs pa'i (G233b) 'bras bu cig car du 'grub par mi byed pas khyab par byed[5] pa mi dmigs par bshad pa la /[6] kha cig na re gtan tshigs 'di ni 'gal ba yang[7] yin te / 'di ji ltar bsgrub par bya ba sgrub par byed pa[8] de bzhin du nam mkha' la sogs pa'i chos can dngos po'i rang gi ngo bor gyur pa med pa yang sgrub par byed pas gtan tshigs 'di gzhi ma grub pa yang yin no zhes zer ro //

§11. de la yang 'dir[9] nam mkha' la sogs pa'i chos can dngos por gyur pa bsal[10] du zin kyang bsgrub par bya ba rnam par bcad[11] pa tsam du 'dod pa la ni gnod pa ci yang med la / gtan tshigs rnam par bcad pa tsam gyi ngo bo ma grub pa nyid kyang ma yin te / chos can dngos por gyur pa ma yin yang de gnyis grub pa'i phyir ro // de bas log par rtog[12] pa bsal ba'i phyir rang dang rjes su mthun pa'i chos can kho na la gnod pa byas na bsgrub par bya ba bkag pa yin gyi / chos gzhan dang ldan pa'i chos can ni ma yin no zhes ston par mdzad pa na

> bdag nyid 'dod pa dang / [13] mngon sum dang / rjes su dpag pa dang / (C172b) yid ches pa dang / grags pas ma bsal[14] ba rang gi (D173a) ngo bo kho na bstan par bya ba ni rang gi chos can no[15] (G234a)

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[1] DGNP glengs: C glen. [2] CD pa: GNP om. [3] CDGNP rang gi chos. However, rang gi chos should be emended to rang gi chos can. See fn. 210. [4] GNP 'grub: CD mngon par 'grub. [5] CD khyab par byed: GNP khyad par byed. [6] CDGN /: P om. [7] GNP yang: CD yang ma. [8] CDGNP bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed pa. Emendation to bsgrub par bya ba sgrub par byed pa. [9] CD 'dir: GNP 'dir kha cig. [10] CD bsal: GNP btsal. [11] DGNP rnam par bcad: C rnam par gcad. [12] CD rtog: GNP rtogs. [13] GNP add the following sentence: 'dir dpe gzhan las / der bdag nyid 'dod la mngon sum dang / rjes dpag lung dang grags pa yi / rang chos can la ma bsal (GN bsal: P gsal) ma // ma bsal chos can bdag nyid kyi // rang gi ngo bor bstan pa nyid dang / ces sogs 'dug pas legs par brtag par rigs so //. [14] CD bsal: GNP bstsal. [15] CDNP no: G om.

zhes bya ba 'dir phyogs kyi mtshan nyid[1] kyi skabs su slob dpon (P189a) gyis rang gi chos can smos pa mdzad do zhes 'grel pa mdzad pas bshad de /

rgol ba kun gyi bdag nyid kyis //
bsgrub byar 'dod pa'i chos gang yin //
chos de ldan la gnod yin gyi // (N181a)
chos gzhan gyi ni chos can min //
gzhan du chos can gzhan la ni //
gnod kyang 'di la ci zhig bkag /

ces rgyas par bshad nas / log par rtog[2] pa bsal ba'i yul nye bar bstan pa'i phyir smras pa /

cig car sgra sogs rgyu min phyir //
sngon med ngo bo dper gzhan gyis //
bskyed bya min ltar mkha' sogs min //[3]
zhes bya ba la sogs pa bshad la /[4]
sun 'byin par byed pas / smras pa /[5]
de bzhin mkha' sogs chos can gyi //
dngos po'i ngo bo'ang med par 'gyur //
'dod pa bsgrub par bya ba la //
gnod pa ci yang med pa nyid //[6]
gnyi ga'ang bsgrub bya nyid yin na //
chos can la ni gnod pa gang //
bsgrub par bya ba'i chos 'gog pa //
des ni de la gnod ces brjod //[7]

zhes[8] gang bshad pa yin no //

§12. gdon mi za bar 'di ltar shes par bya'o // de lta ma yin na ji ltar mkhas pa rnams rim dang cig car la sogs pas khyab pa'i don byed pa'i nus pa dang bral ba la sogs pas gzhan gyis kun brtags pa la (G234b) sogs pa'i dngos po 'gog par byed /[9] dngos po yod pa la ni ji ltar yang de yang dag

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[1] CDGNP chos nyid. However, judging from the quotations of PV IV kk. 136-137ab and kk. 141-143, which explain the term *svadharmin* in PS III's definition of the thesis, chos nyid should be emended to mtshan nyid. [2] CD rtog: GNP rtogs. [3] CDNP min //: G min / zhes bya ba la sogs min /. [4] CD /: GNP om. [5] CD smras pa /: GNP om. [6] CDGNP mkha' sogs chos can dngos med kyi // ngo bo nyid kyang de dang 'dra // (CD //: GNP om.) zhes smras pa ni / 'dod pa bsgrub par bya ba la // gnod pa ci yang med pa nyid // de bzhin mkha' sogs chos can gyi // dngos po'i ngo bo'ang med par 'gyur //. CDGNP have the problem of the duplicate translations of PV IV 142ab: tadvad vastusvabhāvo 'san dharmī vyomādir ity api /; (Tib:) de bzhin mkha' sogs chos can gyi // ngo bo'am dngos med ces brjod bzhin //. See fn. 221. [7] CD //: GNP om. [8] CD zhes: GNP ces. [9] DGNP /: C //.

par[1] dgag par bya ba[2] mi nus so // med pa la yang gal te gzhi ma grub pa nyid kyi nyes pas 'di bya ba ma yin na / 'o na ni ji ltar yang gang yang dgag par mi 'gyur ro // de'i phyir rnal 'byor spyod pa rnams kyis /[3]

de ni gcig na'ang yul min la //
phra rab rdul du du ma'ang min //
skad cig ma yin yod ma yin //
de ni rim dang rim min[4] 'gal //

zhes bya ba la sogs pas phyi rol gyi don la sogs pa ji ltar 'gog par byed / rdzas dang / yon tan dang / las dang / spyi la sogs pa mu stegs can ngan pas kun brtags pa rnams dgag pa (N181b) byed (P189b) par 'dod na yang ji ltar gzhi ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa 'jug (D173b) par mi 'gyur /

§13. 'on te gal te thal bar sgrub[5] pa kho nas 'di byed pa'i phyir mi 'jug go zhe na / de'i tshe thal bar sgrub pa tshad ma ma yin pa las ji ltar 'di dag gcig tu med pa'i (C173a) tha snyad 'grub par 'gyur te / de ni tshad ma la rag las pa'i phyir ro //

§14. ji[6] ste thal bar sgrub pa yang tshad ma kho na'o zhes bya bar 'dod na ni de'i tshe de la gzhi ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa ji[7] ste 'jug par mi 'gyur / rtog pa dang ldan pa ni rigs pa'i stobs kyis[8] 'ongs pa'i nyes pa la sogs pa rang dgas 'ga'[9] kho na la sgrub par rigs pa ma[10] yin no //

§15. 'on te phyi rol gyi don la sogs pa dgag pa sgrub par 'dod pa la blo'i mtshan nyid kyi (G235a) chos can dngos por gyur pa yod pa nyid de / de kho na la phyi rol dang gtso bo la sogs pas[11] bskyed par bya ba nyid dgag pa sgrub par byed de[12] / de'i phyir de la gzhi ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa mi 'jug pa nyid do zhes bya bar 'dod na /

§16. gal te de lta na gcig[13] dang du ma'i rang bzhin gyis dben pa nyid dang / rim dang rim ma yin pas khyab pa'i don byed pa'i nus pas stong pa nyid ces bya ba la[14] sogs pa'i chos dgag pa'i gtan tshigs rnams / gal te chos can de la de'i chos nyid rab tu ma grub pa nyid yin na ni de'i tshe ji ltar de'i sgo nas de la mngon par 'dod pa'i bsgrub par bya ba'i chos[15] 'grub par 'gyur / phyogs kyi chos ma yin yang bsgrub par bya[16] ba med na mi 'byung ba tsam kho na'i[17] gtan tshigs ni bsgrub par bya ba yang dag par 'grub par

[1] CDNP yang dag par: G yang. [2] P bya ba: CDGN bya. [3] D /: C //; GNP om. [4] CD min: GNP ni. [5] GNP sgrub: CD bsgrub. [6] CD ji: GNP ci. [7] CD ji: GNP ci. [8] CDNP kyis: G kyis kyis. [9] CD rang dgas 'ga': GNP rang 'ga'. [10] DGNP ma: C mi. [11] CDGNP par. However, par should be emended to pas. See fn. 225. [12] CD de: GNP ste. [13] CDGN gcig: P cig. [14] DGNP la: C le. [15] CDNP ba'i chos: G ba'i chos 'grub par bya ba'i chos. [16] DGNP bya: C ba. [17] CD kho na'i: GNP kho na yin yang bsgrub par bya ba med na mi 'byung ba tsam kho na'i.

nus pa ma yin te /[1] de lta na ni mig gi[2] yul nyid kyang sgra zhes bya ba'i chos can la mi rtag pa nyid ji ste sgrub par mi 'gyur /

§17. ji ste de dag de la rab tu grub pa nyid du (N182a) khas len na ni de'i tshe phyi rol dang gtso bo la sogs pa bzhin du blo nyid nus pa dang / gcig dang du ma la sogs pa dngos po la khyab par byed pa'i chos dang bral ba'i phyir ngo bo nyid (P190a) med pa nyid[3] du rab tu bsgrubs par 'gyur te / de dag ni de'i chos yin pa'i phyir ro // chos gzhan yang gzhan la sgrub pa ma yin la / nus (G235b) pa la sogs pas stong ba'i dngos po yang ci yang mi[4] 'grub po // de lta ma yin na de las phyi rol dang / gtso bo la sogs pa yang ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du 'grub par mi 'gyur ro // de yang ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rab tu sgrub[5] na (D174a) ni gzhi ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa de yang de'i so na[6] 'dug pa kho na yin la / rang gi phyogs nyams par thal ba yang ma yin no //

§18. blo la phyi rol dang gtso bo la sogs pas bskyed par bya ba (C173b) nyid dgag pa bsgrubs su zin kyang gzhan gyis kun brtags pa gtso bo la sogs pa[7] rang gi[8] ngo bo dgag pa ni mi 'grub pa kho na ste / de'i rnam pa ni gzhan yin pa'i phyir ro // de ma grub na gzhan gyis kun brtags pa'i gtso bo la sogs pa med do zhes bya ba'i yul can med pa'i tha snyad du yang ji ltar 'gyur te / chos gzhan yang dag par grub na gzhan dag la gzhan du tha snyad 'jug par rigs pa ni ma yin no //

§19. mi shes pa kha cig gis so sor brtags pas 'gog pa la sogs pa 'dus ma byas gsum po gang gi yang skyed[9] par byed pa nyid du ma gyur pa gang dag yang dag par dngos por kun brtags pa de dag dgag par bsgrub par bya ba la yang ji ltar blo chos can du 'gyur te / pha rol po dag de la des bskyed par bya ba nyid kyi chos khas mi len pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir de dgag pa ni nam yang 'grub par mi 'gyur ba nyid do //

§20. ji[10] ste thog ma med pa'i rang gi sa bon yongs su smin pa las yang dag par byung ba'i (G236a)(N182b) rnam par rtog pas yongs su bsgrubs pa / byis pa rnams kyis[11] phyi rol dang dngos po nyid du nye bar brtags pa blo la yod pa nyid chos can yin te / de'i phyir de la brten nas gtso bo la sogs pa 'gog par byed do // de ni don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang rnam par 'khrul pa'i dbang gis phyi rol lta bu dang / gtso bo la sogs (P190b) pa dang / tha mi dad pa[12] lta bu dang / nus pas stong pa la sogs pa'i chos mtha' dag dang ldan pa lta bur rtog go // de la gtso bo la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid dgag

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[1] DGNP /: C om. [2] CDGN gi: P om. [3] CDNP med pa nyid: G om. [4] CDGN mi: P ma. [5] CD rab tu sgrub: GNP sgrub. [6] D so na: CGNP son. [7] CD pa: GNP pa'i. [8] CD rang gi: GNP om. [9] CDGP skyed: N bskyed. [10] CD ji: GNP ci. [11] DGP kyis: CN kyi. [12] CDNP pa: G par.

pa sgrub pa la gtso bo la sogs pa dgag pa bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa dag gzhi gcig pa nyid kyang grub pa kho na yin te / 'di ltar de nyid byis pa rnams kyis phyi rol dang /[1] gtso bo la sogs pa nyid du nye bar bzung la[2] rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba dag kyang rab rib can gyis zla ba gnyis su mthong ba bzhin du de dang tha mi dad par sems pa kho nas tha snyad 'dogs pa'i phyir ro // (D174b) de ni blos kun brtags pa yin yang de'i rnam pa nyid kyis blo zhes nye bar 'dogs te / 'di dngos su ni blo'i ngo bo yang ma yin te[3] / de ni de dang mtshan nyid mi mthun pa'i ngo bo nyid du snang ba'i phyir ro // de'i phyir de ngo bo nyid med pa nyid[4] du rab tu bsgrubs kyang blo ngo bo nyid med pa nyid[5] du thal ba ni ma yin te[6] / de la phyi rol dang gtso bo la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid dgag[7] pa tshad mas sgrub par byed kyi / de nyid dgag pa'i phyir gtan tshigs (C174a)(G236b) sbyor ba ma yin no // gang la phyi rol gyi chos can sgra la sogs pa dngos por gyur pa yod pa de la yang[8] mi rtag pa la sogs pa'i chos rab tu sgrub pa la blo la yod pa'i chos can phyi rol gyi sgra la sogs pa dang / tha mi dad par[9] nye bar brtags pa de nyid la kun du brten par byed pa yin te / phyi rol gyi sgra la sogs pa yul dang / dus dang[10] gnas skabs tha dad par nges pa dag ni rgol ba dang /[11] phyir rgol ba'i blo la rang gi ngo bor mngon (N183a) sum du mi snang ba'i phyir ro // 'di la cha shas med pa nyid kyis bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa la sogs pa'i chos kyi bye brag rnams mi srid pa'i yang phyir ro // de'i phyir rjes su dpag par bya ba dang / rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i tha snyad 'di thams cad ni blo la yod pa'i chos can kho na la brten nas 'jug pa nyid de / rnam pa gzhan mi srid pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar 'dod na /[12]

§21. gal te (P191a) de lta yin na / 'o na don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang kun brtags pa'i chos can la brten nas dgag pa la sogs pa rab tu sgrub par byed pa la yang gzhi ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa mi 'jug na ci[13] ste nan gyis kho bo cag la klan ka tshol bar byed / ji ltar khyed don dam pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir gtso bo la sogs pa dgag par kun brtags pa'i chos can kho na la bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa'i sems pa rgyas par byed pa de bzhin du kho bo cag kyang gzugs dang[14] sgra la sogs pa grags pa dag la / (G237a) yod pa dang med pa la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du sgro btags pa dgag par[15] byis pa rnams la de dag sgyu ma dang / smig rgyu dang / rmi lam dang / gzugs brnyan dang mtshungs pa nyid du ston par byed do // de la ji ltar brtags pa'i chos can la dngos po'i ngo bo nyid du sgro btags[16] pa la sogs pa bkag tu zin kyang rgol ba dang phyir (D175a) rgol ba dag la snang ba'i

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[1] CD /: GNP om. [2] GNP la: CD ba. [3] CDGN te: P no. [4] CDNP med pa nyid: G om. [5] CDNP med pa nyid: G om. [6] CDGN te: P to. [7] CDNP dgag: G dpagg?. [8] CD yang: GNP om. [9] GNP par: CD pa. [10] CD dang: GNP dang /. [11] CD /, GNP om. [12] CD /: GNP om. [13] DGNP ci: C ji. [14] CD dang: GNP dang /. [15] CDGN par: P pa. [16] CDGP sgro btags: N sgro brtags.

phyir ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa mi 'jug pa de bzhin du gzugs la sogs pa yang gnag rdzi'i chung ma yan chad kyi skye bo la snang ba'i phyir ji ltar ma grub pa nyid du 'gyur / snang ba ni gang gis na de log na ldog par[1] 'gyur ba bden pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis khyab pa yang ma yin te[2] / brdzun pa yang snang ba'i phyir ro // de lta ma yin na skye bo thams cad de kho na nyid mthong bar 'gyur te / de kho na 'ba' zhig snang ba'i phyir ro //

§22. ji ltar (N183b) kun brtags (C174b) pa'i chos can de la yang ngo bo nyid med pa yang dag par 'grub par bya ba'i phyir nus pa dang bral ba la sogs pa'i chos nye bar 'god pa des khyab pa nyid kyis gtso bo la sogs pa la de rab tu grub[3] par byed pa de bzhin du kho bo cag yang dag pa nyid du kun brtags pa'i dngos po thams cad la de rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir yang dag pa la nus pa med pa la sogs pa smos pa yang ci ste sgrub (G237b) par mi byed

§23. gzhan yang rtog[4] pa dang ldan pa rnams kyi[5] khas len pa ni dpyad (P191b) pa'i 'og tu yin la[6] / de'i[7] bdag nyid gtan la phab na rigs pa yin no // dpyod pa'i dus na ni ma yin te / [8] de gtan la ma phab pa'i phyir dang / dpyod pa yang de gtan la dbab pa'i don yin pa'i phyir ro //[9] de'i phyir tshad mas de kho na nyid gtan la 'bebs pa'i dus na su yang grub pa'i mtha' khas len pa med pas de'i tshe gang la gzhi ma grub pa'i sgo nas chos can ma grub pa la[10] sogs pas rgol bar byed de /

§24. 'on te de kho na nyid 'di rgol ba bdag nyid kyis sngar tshad mas gtan la phab nas gzhan dag la de bsgrub par 'dod pas zhugs pa yin pas de'i phyir de grub pa'i mtha' khas len pa[11] snga na gnas pa kho na yin no zhes bya bar 'dod na de yang rigs pa ma yin te / bdag nyid rtogs par byed pa'i dus na grub pa'i mtha' khas mi len pa'i phyir ro // sngar grub pa'i mtha' khas ma blangs pa'i rgol ba bdag nyid tshad ma gang kho nas de kho na nyid rtogs par gyur pa de nyid kyis gzhan la rtogs par byed na[12] ji ltar grub pa'i mtha' khas blangs pa zhes bya / 'di bdag nyid sngar tshad mas de kho na nyid gtan la phab na gzhan dag la grub pa'i mtha' kho nas rtogs par byed pa yang ma grub la / (G238a) gzhan rtog pa dang ldan pa yang de'i tshig tsam gyis tshad ma med pa'i (D175b) don yid ches[13] par (N184a) yang mi 'gyur ro // de bas na bdag nyid gtan la 'bebs pa'i dus bzhin du gzhan la ston pa'i dus na yang 'dra ba'i phyir thams cad du tshad ma kho nas de kho na nyid gtan la phab

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[1] CD log na ldog par: GNP log par. [2] CD te: GNP ste. [3] CD rab tu grub: GNP rab tu sgrub. [4] CD rtog: GNP rtogs. [5] GNP kyi: CD kyis. [6] CD la: GNP te. [7] CD de'i: GNP dngos po'i. [8] CDGNP add de'i phyir. However, this should be deleted because of being very odd. [9] CDNP ro //: G ro // de'i phyir ro //. [10] CDNP pa la: G pa la grub pa la. [11] CDGNP khas len pa'i. Emendation to khas len pa. [12] CDNP rtogs par byed na: G rtogs par byed par gyur pa de nyid kyis gzhan la rtogs par byed na. [13] CDNP yid ches: G yis ches.

na su yang grub pa'i mtha' khas len pa med pa'i phyir ji ltar de'i sgo nas chos can ma grub pa la sogs pa rjod par byed[1] /

§25. tshad ma yang dag pa'i stobs kyis rgol ba'i mngon par 'dod pa'i bsgrub par bya ba grub kyang / grub pa'i mtha' khas blangs pas de la de gnod par byed do zhes zer ba 'di la gzhan rigs pa ci zhig yod / dngos po'i de kho na nyid bsam pa la ni grub pa'i (C175a) mtha' (P192a) las yang dag par grags pa'i chos can la su yang rten[2] par mi byed de / de lta bu'i chos can ni rgol ba dang /[3] phyir rgol ba dag la gang du yang ma grub pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar sangs rgyas pa la sogs pa sgra la sogs pa'i chos can 'byung ba las gyur pa la sogs pa ji lta bur mngon par 'dod pa de lta bur bye brag pa[4] la sogs pa ni ma yin te / de dag gis de nam mkha'i yon tan nyid la sogs pa nye bar brtags pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir chos can de lta bu ma grub na su yang gang du yang sgrub pa 'jug par mi 'gyur ro // 'on te chos can de lta bu grub na ni de'i chos kyang gnyi ga la grub pa kho na yin pas (G238b) rtsod par mi 'gyur ro //

§26. de lta bas na de kho na nyid rtogs par 'dod pa thams cad ni gzhung lugs kyis bsgrubs[5] pa'i chos can gyi bye brag spangs te / gnag rdzi yan chad la grags pa 'di nyid la brten nas bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa'i sems pa rgyas par byed do // de'i phyir grub pa'i mtha' la brten nas gzhi ma grub pa la sogs pas gleng ba ni 'brel pa med pa kho na'o // gang la tha snyad du yang chos can la sogs pa rab tu ma grub pa la sogs pa de la 'di gleng ba rigs pa kho na yin gyi / kho (N184b) bo cag la ni[6] gzugs la sogs pa tha snyad du yang rab tu ma grub pa ma yin no // C175a4,D175b6 G238b3,N184b1 P192a6

[1] CD rjod par byed: GNP brjod par byed. [2] CD rten: GNP brten. [3] CD /: GNP om. [4] CDNP pa: G om. [5] CDGN bsgrubs: P bsgrub. [6] CD ni: GNP om.

3. The Proof of the Absence of Intrinsic Nature in Reality by means of Nonperception

3.1 *Phyogs snga ma (pūrvapakṣa)*

C135a7,D135a6 G178b4,N137a3 P145a8

§1. mi dmigs pa yang de sgrub par nus (C135b) pa ma yin te /

§2. 'di ltar re zhig rang bzhin mi dmigs pa med pa'i tha snyad sgrub[1] pa gang yin pa de ni mngon sum gyis gzhan gyis dben pa'i dngos po rtogs na dam pa ma yin pa'i bstan bcos mnyan pas yid rnam par rmongs pa kha cig de la gzhan gyis dben par tha snyad 'jug par mi byed pa rnams la de'i tha snyad rab tu[2] sgrub pa'i phyir rab tu sbyor ba yin na[3] khyed la ni gang du de'i tha snyad rab tu bsgrub par bya ba chos thams (D135b) cad kyis rab tu dben pa'i dngos po mngon sum gyis rtogs pa de lta bu cung zad kyang med de / rang gi phyogs nyams par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro zhes bshad zin pa nyid do[4] //

§3. de dang 'gal (G179a) ba dmigs pa la sogs pa yang mi srid pa kho na ste / de ni shin tu lkog tu gyur ba'i phyir chos thams cad dben pa dang 'ga' yang lhan cig 'gal ba la sogs pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro // 'on te grub na ni de dang 'gal ba la sogs pa kho na dngos po nyid du grub pa'i phyir mi 'dod par 'gyur ba ma yin no //

§4. 'di ltar dngos po rnams kyi 'gal ba ni rnam pa gnyis su rnam par gzhag[5] ste / lhan cig mi gnas pa'i mtshan nyid dang / phan tshun spangs te gnas pa'i mtshan nyid do //

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[1] GNP sgrub: CD grub. [2] CD rab tu: GNP om. [3] CD na: GNP na /. [4] CD nyid do: GNP zin to.
[5] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag.

§5. de la rgyu ma tshang ba med pa gang zhig gang yod pas nges par med pa de gnyis ni 'gal ba (N137b) dang por rnam par gzhag[1] ste / dper na grang ba dang tsha ba'i reg pa dag[2] lta bu'o //

§6. gang la gang zhig yongs su gcod pa gang rnam par gcad[3] pa med na med pa de gnyis ni de la 'gal ba gnyis par rnam par gzhag[4] ste / dper na chos can gcig la cig car[5] dngos po yod pa dang med pa dag lta bu'o //

§7. 'gal ba de lta bu rnam pa gnyis ka yang chos thams cad ngo po nyid med pa nyid du smra ba la mi srid pa kho na ste / nam mkha'i[6] utpala la sogs pa la rgyu ma (P146a) tshang ba nyid kyang med la[7] gzhan rnam par gcad[8] pas yongs su gcod pa yang med de / de ni dngos po'i mtha' yin pa'i phyir ro //

§8. yod par rnam par gcad[9] pas 'di yongs su gcod par rnam par 'jog mod kyi / de yang la lar yod pa 'ga' zhig rnam par gcad pa grub[10] na /[11] grub par[12] 'gyur ba zhig na / khyed ni gang du yang gang zhig rnam par gcad par[13] 'gyur ba gang yang yod par mi 'dod do //

§9. chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa nyid nye ba yin na khyed la (G179b) rgyu ma tshang ba med pa 'ga' (C136a) yang yod par ma grub po /

§10. ji[14] ste grub na ni rgyu ma tshang ba med pa gang yin pa de nyid[15] dngos po grub par gyur pa yin no //

§11. gal te chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam par gcad[16] pas ngo bo nyid 'ga' zhig yongs su gcod par 'gyur[17] na ni de'i tshe de nyid kho bo cag gi[18] dngos po bsgrubs par yang[19] 'gyur bas

§12. de lta na[20] re zhig de dang 'gal ba dmigs pa mi srid do //

§13. de mi srid (D136a) na 'gal bas khyab pa dmigs pa la sogs pa yang mi srid pa kho na ste / de thams cad 'gal bas rab tu phye ba'i phyir 'gal ba ma grub na de dag kyang mi srid pa'i phyir ro //

§14. khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa yang khyab par bya ba dang / khyab par byed pa'i dngos po yang dag par grub na khyab par bya ba dgag pa'i phyir rab tu sbyor ba yin na / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa ma yin pa nyid la ni gang gis (N138a) kyang khyab par ma grub po // ji[21] ste

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[1] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [2] GNP dag: CD om. [3] CDP rnam par gcad: GN rnam par bcad. [4] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [5] CDNP cig car: G gcig car. [6] CDP nam mkha'i: GN nam kha'i [7] CD la: GNP la /. [8] CD rnam par gcad: GNP rnam par bcad. [9] CD rnam par gcad: GNP rnam par bcad. [10] CD grub: GNP 'grub. [11] CD /: GNP om. [12] CD grub par: GNP om. [13] CD rnam par gcad par: GNP rnam par bcad pa'i. [14] CD ji: GNP ci. [15] CDGP nyid: N ni. [16] CD rnam par gcad: GNP rnam par bcad. [17] GNP 'gyur: CD gyur. [18] CDNP gi: G gis. [19] CD yang: GNP om. [20] CD de lta na: GNP de ltar na. [21] CD ji: GNP ci.

grub na ni khyab pa gang yin pa de nyid dngos por grub par 'gyur ro //

§15. rgyu mi dmigs pa yang rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por grub na 'bras bu'i rang gi ngo bo nyid[1] dgag pa'i phyir rab tu sbyor ba yin na[2] / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa nyid la ni rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por grub pa med do // grub na ni rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa de nyid dngos por grub par 'gyur ro //

§16. chos (P146b) thams cad la yang gang zhig bkag pas 'di dag ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du 'grub par 'gyur ba'i byed rgyu gcig bu ni 'ga' yang med do //

§17. kha cig gis dbang phyug la sogs pa byed rgyu gcig bu khas blangs pa gang yin pa de bkag (G180a) kyang 'di dag ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du ni 'grub par mi 'gyur te / thams cad rang gi rgyu kho na las skye ba'i phyir ro // 'di dag gi[3] so so rang rang gi rgyu dgag par bya bar yang mi nus te / de ni grags pa'i phyir ro // C136a6,D136a5 G180a1,N138a4 P146b3

3.2 *Phyogs phyi ma* (*uttarapakṣa*)

§1. gang yang rang bzhin mi dmigs pa mi srid do zhes smras pa de la gong du lan btab pa nyid de / tshul 'di ni gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid yin na 'di yang bsgrub par mi 'dod do // 'o na ci zhe na mtshan nyid stong pa nyid yin no // C176a6,D177a2 G240b3,N185b6 P193b3

§2. gang yang 'gal ba dmigs pa la sogs pa mi srid pa kho na'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa de yang 'brel pa med pa (N186a) nyid de[4] / 'di ltar chos thams cad dben pa dang 'ga' yang lhan cig 'gal ba la sogs par ma grub mod kyi / 'on kyang sgyu (C176b) ma[5] dang nam mkha'i padmo la sogs pa dag la spyir ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang lhan cig 'gal ba la sogs pa rab tu grub pa kho na'o // de lta ma yin na khyed gzhan gyis kun brtags pa'i dbang phyug la sogs pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du sgrub par yang ji ltar 'gyur / de'i phyir spyir ngo bo nyid med pa tsam gyis tha snyad du 'gal ba la sogs pa (G241a) yang dag par grub na phyis chos thams cad la don dam par bsam par 'gal ba la sogs pa'i chos nye bar bstan pas yang dag pa pa'i ngo bo nyid

[1] CD nyid: GNP om. [2] DGNP na: C no. [3] GNP gi: CD ni. [4] DGNP de: C do. [5] DGNP sgyu ma: C sgru ma.

med par bsgrub pa'i phyir 'di la 'gal ba ci zhig yod /

§3. de dang 'gal ba la sogs pa kho na dngos po nyid du thal bar rigs pa ma yin te / don dam pa'i ngo bo nyid (P194a) med pa'i chos kyis yang dag pa'i dngos po gsal ba'i ngo bo dag ni gang du yang yang dag pa'i dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo nyid du mi gnas[1] pa'i phyir ro // 'on te gnas na ni 'di dag gi de dang 'gal ba la sogs pa nyid rab tu mi 'grub po // de'i phyir chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang lhan cig 'gal ba la sogs pa yang dag par grub na de dang 'gal ba la sogs pa kho na dngos po nyid du thal bar 'gyur ro zhes brjod par mi bya'o //

§4. 'gal ba la sogs pa tha snyad kho nar grub pa yin gyi / yang dag par ni ma yin (D177b) no // 'di ltar skye bo dag mar me la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid kyi dngos po brtan pa ma yin pa'i ngo bo nyid du yongs su gcod pa na brtan pa'i rnam pas dben pa nyid du yongs su gcod par byed de / de rnam par ma bcad na de yongs su gcod par mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // gang la gang zhig yongs su gcod pa gang rnam par gcad pa med na med pa de dag ni de la phan tshun yongs su spangs te gnas pa'i (N186b) mtshan nyid kyis 'gal bar rnam par gzhag[2] go // yod pa dang med pa dang / rim dang rim ma[3] (G241b) yin pa[4] la sogs pa 'gal ba dag la yang tshul de bzhin du blta bar bya'o // grang ba'i reg pa la sogs pa rgyu ma tshang ba med pa yin pa las me[5] la sogs pa'i dngos po nye ba[6] na yang med par mthong ba'i phyir de gnyis ni lhan cig mi gnas pa'i mtshan nyid kyi 'gal bar rnam par gzhag[7] go //

§5. 'gal ba de kho na rab tu grub kyang[8] mar me la sogs pa gcig[9] tu dngos po nyid du mi 'thad de / sgyu ma la sogs pa brdzun pa yang skye ba dang 'jig pa la sogs pa'i chos snang ba'i phyir ro // (C177a) slob dpon rnams kyis ni don dam pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir de bzhin du mar me la sogs pa dag la yang rtag pa dang mi rtag pa la sogs pa chos rnams kyi 'gal ba ji ltar snang ba bzhin du rnam par gzhag[10] go // mar me la sogs pa phyi rol gyi don gyi ngo bo'am shes pa'i ngo bo yang dag par ni ma grub (P194b) ste / gnyi ga'i ngo bo yang de dag nyid kyis bsal ba'i phyir ro // gang gis na 'di dag yang dag[11] pa pa'i dngos po'i ngo bo nyid dang lhan cig 'gal ba mngon sum du rtogs par 'gyur ba don dam pa pa'i[12] dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo ni cung zad kyang pha rol ma yin pa mthong ba rnams kyis mthong ba'i lam

[1] CDNP mi gnas: G dmigs. [2] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [3] CDNP rim ma: G rim ma ma. [4] CD pa: GNP om. [5] CDGN me: P med. [6] CD ba: GNP om. [7] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [8] CD kyang: GNP kyang /. [9] CD gcig: GNP cig. [10] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [11] CD yang dag: GNP om. [12] CD don dam pa pa'i: GNP don dam pa'i.

du mi 'jug go //

§6. lhan cig mi gnas pa'i mtshan nyid kyi 'gal ba gang yin pa de yang kun rdzob pa[1] kho na yin te / dngos po rnams ni bdag nyid kho nas 'jig gi gzhan gyis ni ma yin no // 'jig pa don gzhan zhig byed na ni 'jig pa'i rgyu rnams cung zad kyang mi byed pa'i phyir ro / don (G242a) gzhan du gyur pa ma yin na yang de'i 'jig pa'i rgyu rnams kyis mi byed de / de ni dngos po'i rgyu kho na las byung[2] ba'i phyir ro // 'on te 'jig pa ni dngos (D178a) por gyur pa ma yin pa'i phyir de nyid dang[3] gzhan nyid du rnam par brtags pa rigs pa ma yin no snyam du sems na / de'i tshe 'di shin tu yang 'jig pa'i rgyu rnams kyis (N187a) mi byed de ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir cung zad kyang mi byed pa'i me la sogs pa ji ltar yang dag par na 'gal ba yin par 'gyur / 'on kyang me 'di ni grang ba la sogs pa gong nas gong du[4] nus pa med pa'i mtshan nyid skad cig ma[5] rab dang mchog skyed par byed pa kho na la me la sogs pa 'gal ba zhes tha snyad 'dogs pa 'ba' zhig tu zad de[6] / de nyid kyi phyir slob dpon dag gis 'gal pa'i tshul zhes bshad kyis 'gal ba nyid ces ni ma yin no // de'i phyir 'gal ba 'di yang tha snyad pa'i dngos po kho na[7] la brten nas brjod kyi / yang dag pa pa ni ma yin te / me dang grang ba la sogs pa'i phyi rol gyi don gyi[8] ngo bo yang dag pa ma grub pa'i phyir la / shes pa'i rnam pa'i ngo bo yang brtags pa yin pa'i phyir ro // shes pa gcig la grang ba dang tsha bar snang ba dag srid pa'i phyir yang ji ltar 'gal te / de gnyis ni cig car so sor myong ba'i phyir ro // rnam par shes pa rigs mthun pa du ma ni cig car mi skye ba'i phyir (C177b) ro // de lta (P195a) bas na grang ba la sogs pa'i dngos po rmi lam la sogs pa bzhin du brdzun pa kho na dag cig car[9] snang bas de'i phyir 'di dag la yang dag par na 'gal ba med pa nyid do //

§7. khyab par[10] bya ba dang khyab par byed (G242b) pa'i dngos po yang shing dang shing sha pa la sogs pa'i dngos po tha snyad pa kho na la brten nas kun brtags pa'i spyi dang khyad par gyi dngos po rnam par gzhag[11] pas rnam par 'jog pa yin te / dngos su ni[12] gang khyab par byed par 'gyur ba shing nyid la sogs pa spyi dang zhes bya ba ni yang dag par cung zad kyang med do // khyad par gda' ba la sogs pa gang dag yin pa de dag kyang phyi rol gyi don gyi[13] ngo bo yang ma yin la / shes pa'i rnam pa'i ngo bo nyid

[1] CD pa: GNP om. [2] CD byung: GNP 'byung. [3] CD dang: GNP om. [4] CDNP gong nas gong du: G gong. [5] CD skad cig ma: GNP om. [6] CD de: GP do; N ill. [7] CD kho na: GNP om. [8] CD don gyi: GNP om. [9] CD cig: GNP cig /. Emendation to cig car. See fn. 286. [10] CDGN par: P pa'i. [11] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [12] CD ni: GNP na. [13] CDNP don gyi: G om.

yang dag pa par[1] yang[2] ma grub mod kyi / 'on kyang mkhas pa de kho na nyid kyi don btang snyoms su (N187b) gzhag[3] pa rnams kyis glang po che'i lta stangs lta bur byas te / rmi lam la sogs pa na seng ldeng la sogs pa'i (D178b) khyad par brdzun pa rnam pa sna tshogs nyams su myong ba lta bu'i shing la sogs pa'i dngos po'i brdzun pa kho na la kun du brten nas[4] de kho na nyid la 'jug par bya ba'i ched du don dam pa la 'jug pa dang mthun pa'i phyir khyab par bya ba dang / khyab par byed pa'i dngos po rnam par gzhag[5] pa nyid[6] 'ba' zhig tu zad do //

§8. de bzhin du rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po nyid sa bon dang myu gu la sogs pa kun rdzob pa kho na la brten nas tha snyad 'dogs par byed kyi / yang dag pa pa ni ma yin te / sa bon la sogs pa yang dag pa pa ma grub pa'i phyir dang / rmi lam la sogs pa na de lta bu brdzun pa yang snang ba'i phyir ro // sad pa na yang sgyu ma la sogs pa rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur ba bden par gyur ba ma yin pa yang dmigs pa'i phyir ro // de bas na tha snyad kyi sgo nas (G243a) rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po la sogs pas dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa nyid du khyab mod kyi / 'on kyang de las de dag don dam pa pa'i ngo bo nyid du ni mi 'grub ste / khyab par byed pa yod pa las khyab par bya ba (P195b) nges par rab tu grub[7] pa ni ma yin no // 'on kyang dngos po dag la dngos po'i ngo bo nyid la yang dag par khyab par byed pa rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po la sogs pa 'di log na sgyu ma la sogs pa bzhin du de dag gi dngos po'i ngo bo nyid yang dag par kun brtags[8] pa ldog par 'gyur ba nyid do //

§9. de bas na 'gal ba la sogs pa (C178a) rnam par gzhag[9] pa 'di thams cad de kho na nyid la 'jug par nus pa'i phyir mkhas pa rnams kyis de kho na nyid bstan pa'i phyir dang / mu stegs can gyis kun brtags pa'i tshad ma la sogs pa de kho na nyid kyi[10] rjes su mi mthun pa nyid du brjod pa'i phyir de spangs nas yang dag pa'i tshad (N188a) ma'i[11] mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos mdzad do // 'di ltar mu stegs can kha cig ni ril gyis bdag la sogs pa'i dngos po de kho na nyid brdzun pa bsgrub par 'dod cing thams cad mkhyen pa nyid dang / 'dod chags dang bral ba nyid dang / las dang 'bras bur[12] 'brel ba la sogs pa kun rdzob pa rnam par gzhag pa[13] sel bar 'dod pas tshad ma'i

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[1] CD yang dag pa par: GNP yang dag par. [2] CD yang: GNP om. [3] CD btang snyoms su gzhag: GNP btang snyoms su bzhag. [4] CDGN brten nas: P brtegs. [5] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [6] CD nyid: GNP om. [7] CD rab tu grub: GNP rab tu 'grub. [8] CDNP yang dag par kun brtags: G yang dag par kun brtag. [9] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [10] DGNP kyi: C kyis. [11] CDNP tshad ma'i: G om. [12] CDNP 'bras bur: G 'bras bu. [13] CD 'brel ba la sogs pa kun rdzob pa rnam par gzhag pa: GNP 'brel par rnam par bzhag pa.

mtshan nyid phyin ci log kho na byed de[1] /[2] (D179a) de'i phyir mkhas pa rnams kyis de bkag nas gang zag dang chos la bdag med pa'i de kho na nyid la 'jug pa dang mthun pa / las dang (G243b) 'bras bur 'brel ba la sogs pa kun rdzob pa rnam par gzhag[3] pa gnas pa'i rgyu mngon sum la sogs pa'i tshad ma'i mtshan nyid yongs su dag pa nyid mdzad do // de yang bcom ldan 'das kyis yongs su gnang ba kho na yin pas de'i phyir kho bo cag tshad ma'i mtshan nyid rnam par dag cing don dam pa'i rjes su mthun pa[4] khas len pa nyid do //

§10. de'i phyir 'gal ba la sogs pa'i tha snyad khas blangs pa tsam gyi sgo nas dngos po'i ngo bo khas blangs par[5] thal bar 'gyur ba gang yin pa de ni ma nges pa kho na yin te / de khas blangs su zin kyang dngos po'i ngo bo yang dag pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro // C178a5,D179a G243b3,N188a P195b8

[1] CD de: GNP do. [2] CD /: GNP //. [3] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [4] CDNP pa: G par. [5] CDGN par: P om.

4. The Proof of the Absence of Intrinsic Nature in Reality by means of "Neither One Nor Many" Reason

4.1 *Phyogs snga ma (pūrvapakṣa)*

§1. gang dag dngos po thams cad ni gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i phyir rang bzhin med pa'o zhes zer pa de la yang gal te thal bar sgrub[1] na ni de'i tshe gzhan dag de lta bu khas mi len pa'i phyir gtan tshigs ma grub pa yin te / gcig[2] dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i dngos po ni su yang khas mi len to // C138b6,D138b6 G183b2,N141a3 P149b4

§2. de nyid kyi phyir rang dgar sgrub[3] na yang gtan tshigs cig shos la ma grub pa yin no //

§3. de lta bu'i chos can bdag nyid la ma grub pa'i phyir gzhi ma grub pa yang yin la /

§4. mi (D139a) mthun pa'i (C139a) phyogs las ldog[4] pa la the tshom za ba'i phyir ma nges pa yang yin no //

§5. gzhan yang 'di la bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub pa dag ma yin pa'i ngo bo nyid dam / med pa'i ngo bo nyid[5] gcig tu 'gyur grang na /

§6. gal te ma yin pa'i ngo bo nyid yin na ni de'i tshe gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i dngos po'i ngo bo[6] khas blangs par gyur bas de yang[7] mi 'dod par 'gyur ba ma yin no //

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[1] CD thal bar sgrub: GNP thal ba sgrub. [2] CDGP gcig: N cig. [3] CD rang dgar sgrub: GNP rang dgar bsgrub. [4] CD ldog: G logs; NP log. [5] CD ngo bo nyid: GNP ngo bo. [6] GNP ngo bo: CD ngo bor. [7] CD de yang: GNP om.

§7. 'on te med pa'i ngo bo nyid gcig yin na ni de'i tshe rtogs par bya ba dang / rtogs par byed pa'i dngos por mi (P150a) 'gyur te / gnyi ga[1] (G184a) yang ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir dang / phan tshun 'brel ba med pa'i phyir dang tha dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro //

§8. gang zhig nye bar brjod pa thams cad dang bral ba'i mtshan nyid de ni cung zad kyang[2] go bar mi byed cing / go bar bya ba yang ma yin (N141b) te / dper na rta'i rwa lta bu yin la / ji skad bshad pa'i bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa dag kyang nye bar brjod pa thams cad dang bral ba'i mtshan nyid yin no //

§9. gang dag phan tshun ma 'brel pa de dag ni[3] go bar bya ba[4] dang go bar byed pa'i dngos po ma yin te / dper na ri 'bigs byed dang[5] gangs can dag lta bu yin la / bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa dag kyang phan tshun ma 'brel pa yin no //

§10. ci ste[6] gnyi ga yang dngos po med pa'i ngo bo nyid yin pa'i phyir de'i bdag nyid kyi mtshan nyid kyi 'brel pa yod pa kho na'o snyam du sems na / de yang rigs pa ma yin te / de'i bdag nyid ni dngos po kho na la rnam par gnas pa'i phyir ro // gang zhig gang las tha dad pa'i ngo bo nyid ma yin pa[7] de dag la ni go bar bya ba dang / go bar byed pa'i dngos po med de / dper na shing dang ljon pa dag lta bu yin la / ji skad bshad pa'i bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa dag kyang tha dad pa'i ngo bo nyid ma yin no // byas pa nyid dang mi rtag pa nyid dag gis ma nges pa nyid kyang ma yin te / de la ni ldog pas byas pa'i bye brag yod pa'i phyir ro //

§11. gal te 'di la yang ldog pas byas pa'i bye brag yod pa[8] kho na'o snyam du sems na

§12. de ni[9] rigs pa ma yin te / de lta (G184b) na ni sngon po dang ser po dag bzhin du de dag dngos po nyid du 'gyur ro //

§13. gzhan yang ji ltar gcig dang (C139b) du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral (D139b) ba'i gtan tshigs 'di nyid kyis dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du sgrub par byed pa de bzhin du chos can yang dngos po med par sgrub na ni chos can las[10] bzlog pa[11] bsgrub pa'i phyir gtan tshigs (P150b) 'gal ba yin te /

§14. de ltar na ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du sgrub pa la tshad ma ci yang
C139b2,D139b1 med do //
G184b2,N141b7
P150b1

[1] CD gnyi ga: GNP gnyi ga la. [2] CD cung zad kyang: GNP chung zad kyang. [3] CDNP de dag ni: G de dag ni ni. [4] CDNP go bar bya ba: G ga bar bya ba dang go bar bya ba. [5] CD dang: GNP dang /. [6] DGNP ci ste: C ji ste. [7] CD nyid ma yin pa: GNP om. [8] DGNP pa: C pa yang. [9] CD de ni: GNP de'i. [10] CD las: GNP la. [11] CDNP bzlog pa: G bzlog par.

4.2 *Phyogs phyi ma* (*uttarapakṣa*)

§1. gang yang smra ba gcig dang du ma dang bral ba'i mtshan nyid kyi gtan tshigs ma grub pa la sogs pa smras pa de dag thams cad kyi[1] lan kyang sngon gyi slob dpon gyis blan zin to // 'on kyang kha cig 'di la zhe sdang pa'i phyir brdzun pa (P238b) nyid du skyon brjod[2] pa de log par rtogs pa yin par brjod par bya'o // C214a6,D215b1 G298b4,N232a1 P238a7

§2. de la 'dir thal bar sgrub[3] na gtan tshigs ma grub pa yang (C214b) ma yin te / 'di ltar ji ste pha rol po dag gis dngos po rnams gcig dang du ma dang bral bar khas ma blangs su zin kyang / 'on kyang des khyab pa'i chos khas blangs pa'i phyir shugs kyis ni[4] de yang khas blangs pa kho na yin te /

§3. de la[5] re zhig gang gis dbang phyug la sogs pa rtag[6] pa dang gcig (G299a) pu'i ngo bo nyid du kun brtags pa de dag gis ni de dag 'bras bu rim gyis 'byung ba la nye bar sbyor ba nyid kyi chos su khas blangs pa'i phyir shugs kyis na gcig gi ngo bo nyid dang bral pa yang khas blangs pa nyid de / ngo bo gcig la skyed par mi byed[7] pa'i gnas skabs dang khyad par med pa nyid kyis dus snga ma bzhin du dus phyis kyang skyed par byed pa nyid du mi rung ba'i phyir ro // 'on te skyed par byed pa nyid yin na ni sngon gyi gnas skabs dang mtshan nyid mi mthun pa'i ngo bo nyid yin pa'i phyir gcig pa nyid nyams pa[8] yin no //

§4. 'di ni yang dag par na du ma nyid du yang rigs pa ma yin te / de kho na nyid du na dus mnyam pa dang cig shos dag tu rang dang gzhan gyi rgyud kyi nying mtshams sbyor ba med par sngar bsgrubs zin pa'i phyir ro //

§5. gang dag gis nam mkha' la sogs pa 'dus ma byas gsum po ngo bo nyid gcig pa 'bras bu la nye bar sbyor ba med pa nyid du khas (N232b) blangs pa de dag gis kyang de dag shes pa rim gyis 'byung ba'i shes bya'i ngo bo nyid du khas blangs pa'i phyir shugs kyis na ngo bo gcig pa dang bral pa khas blangs pa nyid de / de dag shes pa re re zhing de'i[9] shes pas shes par bya ba'i ngo bo nyid tha dad par 'gyur pa'i phyir ro // mi 'gyur na ni khyad par med pa'i phyir sngon bzhin du phyis kyang de'i shes pas shes par bya ba'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'thad do // de'i phyir 'di dag gcig gi ngo bo nyid du rigs pa ma yin no //

[1] CDNP kyi: G kyis. [2] CD skyon brjod: GNP skyon rjod. [3] CD 'dir thal bar sgrub: GNP 'di thal ba sgrub. [4] CD ni: GP na; N ill. [5] CD de la: GNP de. [6] CDP rtag: GN brtag. [7] GNP skyed par mi byed: CD skyed par byed. [8] CD pa: GNP par. [9] CDGN de'i: P om.

§6. (P239a) du (G299b) ma'i ngo bo nyid kyang ma yin no (D216a) zhes sngar bsgrubs zin pa nyid do //

§7. kha cig gis dus dang skyes bu dang[1] gtso bo dang tshangs pa la sogs pa 'gro ba sna tshogs pa rnam par gzhag[2] pa'i rgyu[3] rtag pa dang ngo bo[4] gcig par kun brtags pa gang dag yin pa de dag kyang de dag gis rim mam[5] / cig car dngos po'i tshogs bden pa[6] dang brdzun pa sna tshogs kyi ngo bo nye bar 'dzin pa nyid kyi chos su khas blangs pa'i[7] (C215a) phyir shugs kyis na gcig pa nyid dang bral ba khas blangs pa nyid de / ngo bo nyid[8] gcig pa dag ni de ltar 'gro ba sna tshogs kyi ngo bo nye bar 'dzin pa nyid du rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin no //

§8. de dag gcig pa nyid du ma grub na du ma nyid du yang rigs pa ma yin pa kho na ste / de ni de bsags pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir ro //

§9. gang dag gis gang zag ces bya ba'i dngos po rtag pa dang mi rtag pa'i ngo bo dag tu brjod par bya ba ma yin pa nyid du kun brtags par gyur pa de dag gis kyang / 'di gcig dang du ma dang bral ba nyid du dngos su khas blangs pa nyid de / gcig gi ngo bo nyid dang ldan pa yang / rtag pa nyid du brjod par bya ba ma yin pa nyid du rigs pa ma yin la / ngo bo nyid gzhan dang gzhan du nyams su myong ba[9] yang skad cig ma nyid du brjod par bya ba ma yin pa nyid du rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin no //

§10. mi rtag pa'i ngo bo (N233a) lus dang sa dang ri la sogs pa bdag nyid so sor yan lag can gyi rdzas gcig pa nyid du kun brtags[10] pa gang yin pa de yang yan lag gi rdzas su[11] yul tha dad pa du ma la khyab par byed pa nyid la sogs pa'i chos su (G300a) khas blangs pa'i phyir / gcig pa nyid dang bral bar khas blangs pa kho na ste / de yan lag re re la ngo bo nyid tha dad pa med na ni de la khyab par byed pa nyid du yang[12] 'thad pa ma yin no // cha shas med pa la bsgribs pa dang ma bsgribs pa la sogs pa'i chos 'gal ba dang ldan par yang 'thad pa ma (P239b) yin no //

§11. gang dag gis[13] lus la sogs pa rdul phran[14] bsags pa tsam[15] yin pa'i phyir rdul phra rab rnams so so re re gcig pa nyid du kun brtags pa de dag gis kyang sbyor ba dang bsags pa[16] la sogs pa'i chos su khas blangs pa'i

[1] CD dang: GNP om. [2] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [3] CDNP rgyu: G rgyud. [4] CDNP ngo bo: G po bo. [5] CD rim mam: GNP rim 'am [6] CD bden pa: GNP bden pa pa. [7] CDGN pa'i: P bya'i. [8] CD ngo bo nyid: GNP ngo bo. [9] CD nyams su myong ba: GNP ma nyams su myong ba. [10] CDGN kun brtags: P brtags. [11] CD rdzas su: GNP rdzas. [12] CDGN yang: P kun yang. [13] G gis: CDNP gi. [14] CD rdul phran: GNP rdul phra rab. [15] CD tsam: GNP om. [16] GNP bsags pa: CD bstsags pa.

phyir shugs kyis na gcig pa nyid[1] dang bral pa nyid kyang khas blangs pa kho na yin te / cha shas med pa'i ngo bo rnams la gang (D216b) gis na sbyor ba la sogs pa nyams su myong bar 'gyur ba[2] phyogs gcig ni yod pa ma yin la[3] phyogs gcig gis[4] sbyor ba med pa rnams dang bsags pa[5] med pa rnams la / yul rgyas par khebs par gnas par yang mi rung ngo // yan lag rnams ngo bo nyid gcig par rigs pa dang ldan pa yang ma yin te / de dag ni yan lag 'dus pa tsam yin pa'i phyir ro //

§12. rdul phra rab dang yan lag can gyi (C215b) rdzas 'di gnyi ga[6] yang du ma'i ngo bo nyid du yang rung ba ma yin te / de ni gcig 'dus pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir gcig pa nyid ma grub na / de yang de la ltos[7] te rnam par gzhag[8] pa yin pas mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro //

§13. de ltar rgyu dang 'bras bu'i rdzas gcig dang du ma'i ngo bo dang bral bar grub na de la brten nas nye bar brtags pa yon tan dang / las[9] dang / spyi dang / khyad par dang / (G300b) 'du ba rnams rab tu mi 'grub pa (N233b) nyid de / de dag ni de'i gzhan gyi dbang yin pa'i phyir ro //

§14. de ltar na re zhig shugs kyis shes bya thams cad gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin gyis stong pa kho nar khas blangs so zhes bstan pa yin no //

§15. shes pa yang ngo bo nyid gcig par nye bar brtags mod kyi / 'on kyang de yul ngo bor sna tshogs 'dzin pa nyid kyi chos su khas blangs pa'i phyir shugs kyis na ngo bo nyid gcig pa dang bral ba khas blangs pa kho na ste / 'di ltar shes pa ni gdon mi za bar rnam pa dang bcas par khas blangs[10] dgos so // de lta ma yin na yul gyi rnam pas ma bsgyur ba'i lus 'di yul 'dzin (P240a) par rnam par gzhag par[11] mi 'thad pa nyid do // rnam pa dang bcas pa nyid du khas len na ni 'di ngo bo nyid gcig pa dang bral ba[12] gsal[13] ba kho nar khas blangs pa nyid de / shes pa'i ngo bo sna tshogs pa[14] yin pa'i phyir ro // sna tshogs dang gcig pa nyid dag kyang 'gal ba'i phyir

§16. shes pa thams cad dngos po sna tshogs kyi yul can du khas blangs pa yin te / 'di ltar rnam par shes pa lnga'i tshogs dag ni rang gi sde pa rnams bsags[15] pa la dmigs pa kho nar 'dod do // rnam par shes pa drug pa yang

[1] CDNP nyid: G om. [2] CDNP ba: G bar. [3] CD la: GP la /; N la (/ ill.). [4] CDNP gis: G gi. [5] GNP bsags pa: CD bstsags pa. [6] CDNP gnyi ga: G gnyis. [7] CD de la ltos: GNP de las bltos. [8] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [9] DGNP las: C lus. [10] CDG khas blangs: NP khas blang. [11] CD rnam par gzhag par: GNP rnam par bzhag pa. [12] CD bral ba: GNP bral ba'i. [13] GNP gsal: CD bsal. [14] CD pa: GNP om. [15] GNP bsags: CD bstsags.

sems dang sems las byung ba la dmigs la / ri mo rkyang pa[1] la sogs pa la lta[2] ba na / rnam par shes pa[3] (D217a) rnam pa sna tshogs pa can nyams su myong ba'i phyir shes pa thams cad rnam pa sna tshogs can du rab tu grub pa kho na'o // de la rnam pa sna tshogs nyid gzhung gzugs (G301a) pa'i phyir shes pa du ma skye bar rtog pa yang legs pa ma yin te / de dag ni lus can ma yin pa nyid kyis[4] yul la bkram pa ltar gnas pa med pa'i phyir ro // de ltar mi gnas na yang rnam pa sna tshogs nyid 'thad pa ma yin no //

§17. yon tan dang las la sogs pa dang ldan pa'i rdzas la sogs pa yang shes pas cig car[5] 'dzin par khas blangs (N234a) pa'i phyir (C216a) gzhan dag gis kyang shes[6] pa yul sna tshogs can du khas blangs pa nyid do //

§18. gang dag rdzas kyi rnam grangs la sogs pa'i bye brag gis dngos po thams cad nor bu gzi lta bur rtogs par byed pa de dag gis kyang de'i yul can gyi[7] sems kyi yul nyid dngos po'i ngo bo du mar 'dod pa kho na'o //

§19. gang dag yul 'byung ba bzhi gnas pa'i bdag nyid kho na yin par[8] nye bar rtog par byed pa de dag gis kyang shes pa dngos po du ma'i yul can nyid du khas blangs pa nyid do //

§20. gang dag gis[9] yul snying stobs dang / rdul dang / mun pa'i ngo bo kho na yin par khas blangs pa de dag gis kyang[10] (P240b) shes pa'i yul nyid dngos po du ma'i ngo bo yin par khas blangs pa kho na ste / yul nyid dngos po gsum gyi bdag nyid du khas blangs pa'i phyir ro //

§21. gang dag yid kyi rnam par shes pa 'das pa la sogs pa'i yul can ni dmigs pa med pa kho nar smra ba de dag gi lugs kyis kyang ming gi rnam pa[11] dang ldan pa'i phyir rnam pa gcig pa de rigs pa ma yin pa nyid de / yi ge'i ngo bo du mar snang ba'i phyir ro // rmi lam la sogs pa'i shes pa yang sngon po la sogs pa rnam pa sna tshogs (G301b) snang ba nyid du myong ba'i phyir ngo bo nyid gcig par rigs pa ma yin pa kho na'o //

§22. 'gro ba rnam par shes pa tsam gyi[12] ngo bor smra ba gang dag gis rnam par shes pa thams cad phyi rol yang dag pa'i yul can ma yin pa'i phyir

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[1] GNP ri mo rkyang pa: CD ri mo brkyang pa. [2] CD lta: GNP blta. [3] CD rnam par shes pa: GNP shes pa. [4] GNP kyis: CD kyi. [5] CD cig car: GNP cig char. [6] CDNP kyang shes: G om. [7] CD gyi: GNP gyis. [8] CDGN par: P pa. [9] CDGNP gi. However, gi should be emended to gis. [10] CD kyang: GNP kyang /. [11] CDNP pa: G om. [12] GNP gyi: CD gyis.

rang rig pa'i[1] mthar thug pa kho nar[2] khas blangs pa de dag gis kyang thog ma med pa nas rnam par 'khrul pa'i bag chags yongs su smin pa'i dbang gis rnam par shes pa thams cad (D217b) gzugs la sogs pa rnam pa sna tshogs[3] snang bar skye bar khas blangs pa'i phyir rnam par shes pa ngo bo gcig pa ma yin par[4] khas blangs (N234b) pa yin no //

§23. de'i phyir rnam par shes pa yang lta ba gang la yang ngo bo nyid gcig par ma grub bo[5] // de ma grub na ngo bo nyid du ma[6] yang ma grub bo zhes sngar bshad pa nyid do //

§24. de nyid kyi phyir rang gi rgyud kyis bsgrub pa la yang gtan tshigs ma grub pa nyid ma yin te / ji skad bshad pa'i tshul gyis rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba gnyi ga la yang chos thams cad (C216b) gcig dang du ma dang bral ba tsam du grub pa'i phyir ro //

§25. rnam par bcad pa tsam zhig[7] yin pa la ni bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa dang rjes su mthun pa'i chos can dngos por gyur pa ma yin pa rigs pa nyid do zhes sngar bstan zin to // des na rang dang gzhan gyi[8] gzhung lugs la gnas pa rnams kyis nye bar brtags pa'i chos can la yang bsgrub pa'i chos rnam par bcad pa (P241a) tsam gyis ji skad bshad pa gnyi ga la grub pa nyid do //

§26. gang yang gtan tshigs 'di ji ltar grub / gal te mi dmigs[9] pa'i sgo nas yin na ni de yang mi dmigs pa gzhan las grub na thug[10] pa med par thal ba yin no // (G302a) mngon sum gyi sgo nas dmigs pa med pa grub pa nyid kyang ma yin te / de ni de'i yul ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes smras pa

§27. de yang bsal[11] ba nyid de / ji skad bshad pa'i tshul gyis gtan tshigs rab tu sgrub pa'i phyir ro //

§28. 'di ltar re zhig bdag la sogs pa dbang pos mi sod pa gang dag[12] yin pa de dag ni des khyab pa 'bras bu rim can la sbyor ba nyid la sogs pa'i chos khas blangs pa'i phyir gcig dang du ma dang bral ba nyid kyang rab tu bsgrubs pa kho na'o //

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[1] GNP rang rig pa'i: CD rang rig pa'i phyir. [2] GNP mthar thug pa kho nar: CD mthar thug pa'i de kho nar. [3] GNP rnam pa sna tshogs: CD log pa sna tshogs su. [4] CD ma yin par: GNP yin par. [5] DGNP grub bo: C grub ba'o. [6] CDGNP ngo bo nyid du. Judging by the context, however, ngo bo nyid du should be emended to ngo bo nyid du ma. [7] CD zhig: GNP om. [8] CDNP gyi: G gyis. [9] CDNP mi dmigs: G dmigs. [10] DGNP thug: C thugs. [11] GNP bsal: CD bstsal. [12] CD gang dag: G gang yi sod pa gang; NP gang.

§29. ji ste chos can de nyid ma grub na / gang la de dang bral ba 'di sgrub snyam du sems na

§30. de ni rigs pa ma yin te / dngos po de lta bu'i dgag pa la thams cad du chos can brtags pa kho na yin pa'i phyir te / de kho na'i chos mi dmigs pa yin no zhes sngar bstan zin to // de lta (N235a) ma yin na khyed la yang de dgag pa de la gtan tshigs don byed pa'i nus pa dang bral ba'i mtshan nyid ji ltar grub ces bya ba'i klan kar ji ste mi 'gyur / pha rol po dag (D218a) gis kun brtags pa'i chos can de la 'bras bu rim can de lta bu khas blangs ba kho na'i phyir de la khyab par byed pa'i chos grub pa de'i lugs la brten pa nyid kyis na chos can de kun brtags pa yin pa'i phyir ro //

§31. rjes su dpag pa'i sgo nas rtogs kyang thug[1] pa med par thal ba ma yin te / de ni[2] bdag nyid kyis tshad ma yin pa'i phyir ro // tha snyad kyi sgo nas bsgrub par bya bas sgrub pa la khyab pa yang grub pa nyid do zhes sngar bshad zin pa'i phyir ro //

§32. chos can gzugs la sogs pa lkog tu ma gyur (G302b) pa gang dag yin pa de dag kyang ngo bo nyid gcig pa dang bral ba mngon sum kho nar gyur pa yin (P241b) te / 'di dag rtag tu rnam (C217a) pa sna tshogs su snang ba nyid kyis bye brag med par ngo bo nyid gcig par so sor myong ba med pa'i phyir ro // ngo bo nyid gcig dang bral ba grub na ngo bo nyid du ma dang[3] bral ba yang mngon sum kho nar grub pa yin te / du ma nyid ni gcig tshogs pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir ro // tha snyad kyi sgo nas mngon sum la sogs pa'i tshad ma med pa nyid kyang ma yin no zhes sngar bstan zin to //

§33. 'on te yang don dam par med pa gang yin pa de ni kun rdzob tu yang med la / cung zad kyang myong ba yang[4] med de / dper na ri bong gi rva lta bu'o // mngon sum yang de dang 'dra'o snyam du sems na /

§34. de yang 'di ltar 'brel ba med pa'i phyir gtan tshigs 'di ma nges pa nyid do zhes pas sngar lan btab zin pa kho na'o //

§35. ji ste sgro btags pa'i bdag nyid kyi ngo bo gang yin pa de ni de nyid du rtogs par 'gyur gyi[5] / yang dag par na de med par ni ma yin (N235b) te / smig rgyu la chur shes pa lta bu'o // mngon sum thams cad kyang sgro btags pa'i bdag nyid kyi ngo bo kho na yin pas ji ltar des gcig dang du mas dben pa nyid rtogs par 'gyur[6] snyam du sems na /

§36. de ni 'dir sgyu ma mkhan gyi mngon sum dang /[7] rjes su dpag pa'i

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1 GDNP thug: C thugs. 2 GNP de ni: CD de dag ni. 3 CD dang: GNP om. 4 CDGN yang: P om. 5 CDGN gyi: P gyiu?. 6 CDNP 'gyur: G gyur. 7 CD /: GNP om.

shes pas ma nges pa nyid yin te / 'di ltar sgyu ma mkhan gyi shes pa glang po che la sogs pa'i rnam par sgro btags pa can yang yang dag par na de'i ngo bo nyid du mngon par zhen pa med do // der mngon par zhen pa med pas yang dag par na des dben pa nyid rtogs pa nges par (D218b) skye ba'i rgyu nyid kyis de'i yul can du rnam par gzhag[1] go // de dang 'dra bar rtog (G303a) pa dang ldan pa rnams kyi mngon sum 'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan yang dag par bsal[2] ba sgro btags pa'i rnam pa can gzhan yang skye ba na yang dag par de'i ngo bo nyid du mngon par zhen pa med par nges pa'i rgyu nyid kyis des dben pa'i yul can du rnam par gzhag[3] pa nyid (P242a) do //

§37. de bzhin du rjes su dpag pa'i shes pa dngos po'i spyi'i mtshan nyid kyi rnam par sgro btags pa can yang dngos po'i de kho na nyid ji lta ba bzhin rtogs pa'i ngo bo nyid yin pa'i phyir de'i yul can yin no //

§38. de'i phyir tshad ma yin pas gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid yin no //

§39. gang yang de ni de'i yul[4] ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang rigs pa ma (C217b) yin pa nyid de / dngos po rnams rta'i rva lta bur khas blangs pa ni ma yin no // 'o na ci zhe na / sgyu ma la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid lta bur yin te / de dag kyang[5] sgyu ma la sogs pa bzhin du mngon sum kho na'o // gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral bar gzung mod kyi / skye bo dam pa ma yin pa'i bstan bcos mnyan pa la sogs pa 'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis[6] sgro 'dogs pa nye bar skyed[7] pa kha cig gis gtan la mi (N236a) phebs kyi / gzhan dag gis ni gtan la phebs na ji ltar mi dmigs pa'i sgo nas gcig dang du ma dang bral ba yang dag par grub[8] / rnam pa gcig tu na sna tshogs kyi rnam pa la sogs pa'i rtags kyi sgo nas thams cad du gcig pa nyid dang bral ba grub na du ma nyid dang bral ba yang grub pa yin te / de ni de'i tshogs pa'i[9] bdag nyid yin pa'i phyir ro //

§40. gcig dang du ma nyid dag gis ni rnam pa thams (G303b) cad la khyab ste / de dag ni phan tshun spangs te gnas pa'i mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar skye bo tha snyad du bum pa la sogs pa yul la sogs pa yongs su chad pa dang 'brel pa[10] zla med par gyur pa / gcig tu tha snyad gdags su rung ba yongs su gcod pa na de las bzlog pa zla dang bcas pa la sogs pa'i ngo bo rnam par bcad nas yongs su gcod la / de bzhin du rdzas kyi rigs du ma'i[11] tshogs dngos po du mar tha snyad gdags su rung ba (P242b) yongs su gcod pa na yang de las bzlog pa zla med pa'i rnam pa rnam par

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[1] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [2] GNP bsal: CD bstsal. [3] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [4] GNP yul: CD yul can. [5] CDGP kyang: N kyang /. [6] CDGNP gyi. However, gyi should be emended to gyis. [7] CD nye bar skyed: GNP nye bar bskyed. [8] CD grub: GNP ma grub. [9] CGNP tshogs pa'i: D tshog 'di. [10] CD pa: GNP pa /. [11] CDNP du ma'i: G su ma'i.

bcad[1] nas (D219a) yongs su gcod do // gang zhig yongs su gcod pa gang rnam par bcad[2] pa med na med pa de gnyis ni phan tshun spangs te gnas pa'i mtshan nyid yin no // gang dag phan tshun spangs[3] te gnas pa'i mtshan nyid[4] yin pa de dag ni rnam pa thams cad la khyab par byed pa dag yin no // gang dag rnam pa thams cad la khyab par byed pa de dag ni phung po gzhan sel bar byed pa[5] dag yin te / dper na lus can dang lus can ma yin pa la sogs pa'i bye brag dag lta bu'o // gcig pa nyid dang du ma nyid dag[6] kyang de dang 'dra la khyab par byed pa log pas kyang khyab par bya ba ldog par nges pas de'i phyir gtan tshigs mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa la the tshom za ba ma yin te / phung po gzhan mi srid pa'i (N236b) phyir ro //

§41. des na gang la la dag na re khyab par bya ba dang khyab par byed pa'i dngos po rang la (C218a) ma grub pa'i phyir gtan tshigs ma grub pa yin no // de bzhin du chos can gang kho na la khyab par (G304a) byed pa dang / khyab par bya ba'i dngos po[7] grub pa de kho na la[8] khyab par byed pa log pas khyab par bya ba ldog pa[9] ma grub bo zhes zer ba de dag thams cad la lan btab pa kho na yin no // 'di ltar khyab par bya ba dang khyab par byed pa'i dngos po la sogs pa thams cad ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa la brten nas spyir[10] gzhag[11] go zhes sngar bstan zin to // khyab par byed pa nye na gdon mi za bar khyab par bya ba bye brag rtogs pa yang ma yin no zhes de yang sngar bstan pa nyid do // de'i phyir tha snyad kyi sgo nas gcig dang du ma'i ngo bo dag gis ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa tsam la khyab mod kyi / 'on kyang de las don dam pa pa'i[12] ngo bo nyid du nges pa ni ma yin te / bum pa la sogs pa gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin can (P243a) kun rdzob pa yang snang ba'i phyir ro //

§42. khyad par du na khyab par byed pa dang[13] khyab par bya ba'i dngos po 'grub pa ni tha snyad pa'i chos can la brten pa yin la / khyab par byed pa ldog pa ni don dam pa la brten pa'i[14] rtsod pa'i gzhir gyur pa'i chos can thams cad la spyir sgrub pa'i phyir 'di gnyis chos can gcig la brten pa nyid lta ga la yin /

§43. chos can gcig la brten pa nyid yin du chug na yang / 'on kyang ltos[15] pas tha dad pa'i phyir nyes pa med pa kho na ste / 'di ltar khyab par byed pa dang (D219b) khyab par bya ba'i dngos po grub pa ni tha snyad kyi

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[1] GN med pa'i rnam pa rnam par bcad: CD med pa'i rnam par bcad; P med pa'i rnam pa rnam par bcas. [2] CDP rnam par bcad: GN rnam par gcad. [3] CDNP spangs: G spang. [4] GNP nyid: CD nyid gang. [5] CD sel bar byed pa: GNP sel ba. [6] GNP du ma nyid dag: CD du ma dag nyid. [7] CGNP khyab par byed pa dang / khyab par bya ba'i dngos po: D khyab par bya ba'i dngos po. [8] CD grub pa de kho na la: GNP grub pa kho na la. [9] GNP ldog pa: CD la ldog par. [10] CDGNP phyir. Emendation to spyir. [11] CD gzhag: GNP bzhag. [12] CDGP don dam pa pa'i: N don dam pa'i. [13] CD dang: GNP dang /. [14] GNP brten pa'i: CD brten par. [15] CD ltos: GNP bltos.

bden pa la brten pa yin la / khyab par byed pa ldog pa ni don (G304b) dam pa'i bden pa la brten pa nyid[1] yin pas 'gal re skan /

§44. gang yang bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub pa dag ci med par dgag pa'i ngo bo zhig yin nam / 'on te ma yin pa'i ngo bo yin / phyogs dang po ltar yin na ni de (N237a) gnyis go bar bya ba dang go bar byed pa nyid du 'thad pa ma yin te / ngo bo med pa'i phyir dang / 'brel pa med pa'i phyir dang / tha dad[2] pa med pa'i phyir ro // nye bar brjod pa thams cad dang bral ba'i mtshan nyid gang yin pa de ni cung zad go bar yang mi byed la / go bar yang mi 'gyur te / dper na rta'i rva lta bu'o // ji skad bshad pa'i bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub[3] pa dag kyang nye bar brjod pa thams cad dang bral ba'i mtshan nyid yin no // gang dag phan tshun 'brel ba (C218b) med pa de dag kyang go bar bya ba dang[4] go bar byed pa'i ngo bo ma yin te / dper na ri gangs can dang 'bigs byed dag lta bu'o // bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed pa[5] dag kyang phan tshun 'brel pa med pa yin no // gang dang gang zhig tha dad pa med pa'i ngo bo dag la yang go bar bya ba dang go bar byed pa'i dṅgos po med de / dper na shing dang shing[6] ljon pa (P243b) dag lta bu'o // bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed pa dag kyang tha dad pa med pa yin no //

§45. 'on te ma yin pa'i ngo bo zhes bya ba'i phyogs yin na ni / de'i tshe gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba dngos (G305a) po'i ngo bo don byed par rung bar khas blangs par 'gyur bas mi 'dod par 'gyur ba ma yin no zhes smras pa

§46. de yang rigs pa ma yin te / rnam par rtog pa 'di ni gzhan gyis kun brtags pa dbang phyug la sogs pa dgag pa la yang thams cad du mtshungs pa nyid do // 'di ltar dbang phyug la sogs pa de ni gdon mi za bar khyab bar byed pa'i chos bkag pa kho nas dgag par bya dgos te / shin tu lkog tu gyur pa de mngon sum du dgag par mi nus pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir klan ka thams cad der yang ci ste 'byung bar mi 'gyur /

§47. gang yang /

> de ni gcig na yul min la //
> tha dad (N237b) rdul du du ma'ang min //[7]

zhes bya ba dang / de bzhin du /

> dngos rnams gang du rnam[8] dpyad na //
> de yi ngo bor yang (D220a) dag med[9] /

[1] CD nyid: GNP om. [2] GNP tha dad: CD 'thad. [3] CDNP sgrub: G bsgrub. [4] CD dang: GNP dang /. [5] CD pa: GNP pa de. [6] CD shing: GNP om. [7] CD //: GNP om. [8] CD rnam: GNP rnams. [9] CDGN med: P med la.

gang gi phyir na de dag la //
gcig dang du ma'i ngo bo med //

ces bya ba la sogs pas phyi'i[1] don la sogs pa kun brtags pa 'gog pa de la yang klan ka 'di ci ste 'byung bar mi 'gyur /

§48. gal te yang ngo bo nyid med pa la go bar byed pa nyid med na de'i tshe rta'i rva go bar byed pa ma yin pa nyid kyang ci ste nye bar dgod / khyod kyi[2] nye bar brjod pa thams cad dang bral ba'i mtshan nyid gang yin pa de ni cung zad kyang go bar mi byed ces bya ba la[3] (G305b) sogs pa'i sbyor ba de nyid la yang bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub par byed pa dgag pa'i ngo bo dag ji ltar go bar bya[4] ba dang / go bar byed pa'i dngos po yin / de lta bas na sbyor ba 'di[5] mtshon cha'i thabs bslab pa[6] nyes par byed pa bzhin du rang la gnod par byed pa nye bar bkod pa 'ba' zhig tu zad pas[7] sbyor ba la te por mkhas pa yang ma yin no //

§49. thams cad kyis[8] dngos (C219a) po (P244a) thams cad rtag tu gtan la 'bebs par thal bar[9] 'gyur ba'i phyir rtags dngos por gyur pa kho na go bar byed pa nyid du ni su yang mi 'dod de /[10] gdon mi za bar gang yang rung ba la rtags gang yang rung ba zhig[11] go bar byed par gnas pa'i phyir ro // de lta bas na rtags[12] nges pa kho na mngon sum du go bar byed pa yin te / bsgrub par bya ba'i rnam pa la nges pa skyed pa'i[13] phyir ro // rtags ni nye bar 'dogs pa'i sgo kho na nas go bar byed par gzhag[14] go zhes bya bar rig ste / des na rtags ngo bo nyid[15] med pa yin yang de'i rnam par nges pa ni 'dod pa'i bsgrub par bya ba'i rnam pa gtan la 'bebs pa skye ba'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir go bar byed pa nyid du nye bar brtags pas[16] nyes pa med do //

§50. thams cad du rtags[17] dngos por gyur pa kho na dgod pa yang (N238a) ma yin te[18] / nam mkha' la sogs pa dgag pa la rtags nyid brtags pa kho na yin no zhes sngar (G306a) bstan zin pa'i phyir ro //

§51. gang yang 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro zhes smras pa gang yin pa de la yang gal te 'brel pa dngos por gyur ba zhig gtan tshigs nyid du brjod par 'dod na ni de'i tshe gtan tshigs ma nges pa yin[19] te / dngos po la yang la lar de lta bu'i 'brel pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro // de ni gzhan dag gis gnyis la brten pa nyid dang / ngo bo nyid (D220b) phan tshun 'byar ba'i rgyu can nyid du

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[1] CDNP phyi'i: G phyi ma'i. [2] CDNP kyi: G kyis. [3] CDNP la: G la la. [4] CDNP go bar bya: G go bar bye. [5] CD 'di: GNP 'di ni. [6] CD bslab pa: G bslabs nya bar; NP bslab. [7] CD pas: GNP pas /. [8] G kyis: CDNP kyi. [9] CDNP thal bar: G om. [10] CDNP 'dod de /: G 'dod de / gdon mi par yang ma 'dod //. [11] GNP zhig: CD bzhin. [12] CDGP rtags: N rtag. [13] CDGN pa'i: P par. [14] CD gzhag: GNP bzhag. [15] CD ngo bo nyid: GNP ngo bo. [16] CDNP pas: G pa. [17] CDNP thams cad du rtags: G thams cad rtag. [18] CDN te: GP ste. [19] GNP yin: CD ma yin.

nye bar brtags pa'i phyir la / grub zin pa gnyis ni ngo bo nyid phan tshun 'byar bar 'thad pa yang ma yin te / rang gi ngo bo nyid[1] la gnas pa'i phyir ro // 'byar na ni gnyi ga gcig pu[2] nyid du 'gyur te / de ni 'gal lo // gcig pa[3] nyid yin na ni 'di gnyis la brten par mi 'gyur ro // de la[4] 'brel pa can dag las don gzhan yin na ni rang gi ngo bo nyid la gnas pa'i phyir ji ltar 'brel ba'i ngo bo nyid yin /[5] don gzhan ma yin pa nyid yin na[6] ni 'brel pa can tsam du zad (P244b) pa'i phyir 'brel pa brtags pa kho na yin par 'gyur gyi[7] dngos po ni ma yin no //

§52. 'brel pa de[8] las byung ba'i mtshan nyid du brjod pa gang yin pa de yang brtags pa kho na yin te / rgyu dang 'bras bu dag cig car[9] mi srid pa'i phyir ro // mi nye ba dag la ni 'brel pa yod pa ma yin no // gzhan yang[10] gang gi tshe (C219b) 'bras bu yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo yin pa de'i tshe de ltos[11] pa med pa nyid kyis gzhan la rag[12] ma las pa kho na yin pas gang dang yang 'brel pa med do // de yongs su ma grub pa nyid yin na yang rang gi rgyu dang 'brel pa can yin pa'i[13] dus na mi nye ba'i phyir de dang 'brel ba med do // de lta bas na rtog pa kho nas dngos po rnams sbyor bar byed de /

> rang gi rgyu las grub pa'i (N238b) phyir //
> 'bras bu rag[14] las med na yang // [15] (G306b)
> rtog[16] pa yis ni 'brel bar byed //
> 'bras min ji ltar yang ci zhig /[17]

ces kyang bshad do[18] //

§53. de'i bdag nyid kyi mtshan nyid kyi[19] 'brel pa yang yang dag pa ba ma yin te / de ni gnyis la[20] brten pa'i phyir la / de'i bdag nyid yin na yang gnyis nyid mi rung ba'i phyir ro // gnyis nyid med na yang 'brel ba can dag med pa'i phyir gang zhig gang dang 'brel ba yin /

§54. de lta bas na 'brel pa thams cad rtog pas bkod pa'i bdag nyid yin pa'i phyir dngos po med pa la 'jug na yang[21] nyams pa med pa nyid pas gtan tshigs ma grub pa nyid do //

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[1] CD ngo bo nyid: GNP ngo bo. [2] CD gcig pu: GNP gcig pa. [3] CD pa: GNP om. [4] CD de la: GNP de. [5] CD /: GNP om. [6] CDNP na: G om. [7] CD gyi: GNP gyi /. [8] CDNP de: G om. [9] CD cig car: GNP cig char. [10] CD yang: GNP om. [11] CD ltos: GNP bltos. [12] CD rag: GNP rags. [13] CD 'brel pa can yin pa'i: GNP 'brel pa'i. [14] CDNP rag: G gar. [15] CDGNP add the following two stanzas: grub pa (CDNP pa: G om.) gzhan rag ma las pa'ang // 'bras bu rang gi rgyu dag las //. However, these stanzas should be eliminated, because they are not included in the original Sanskrit of PV III k. 26. See fn. 393. [16] CD rtog: GNP rtogs. [17] CD /: GNP om. [18] CDGP do: N de. [19] CD bdag nyid kyi mtshan nyid kyi: GNP bdag nyid kyi. [20] CD la: GNP pa. [21] CDNP yang: G om.

§55. gzhan yang gal te 'brel ba med pa kho na yin na ni ji ltar tha dad pa med pa'i phyir zhes gtan tshigs gzhan smos par byed / tha dad pa med pa nyid yin na ni de'i bdag nyid kyi 'brel pa (D221a) kho na bstan par gyur to //

§56. gal te dngos po kho na la de'i bdag nyid kyi 'brel pa yin gyi[1] gzhan la ni ma yin no[2] zhe na /

§57. de ni rigs pa ma yin te / de'i bdag nyid ni tha dad pa med pa'i rnam grangs yin pa'i phyir la / de ni (P245a) ngo bo nyid med pa dag kyang bdag med pa nyid du mtshungs pas 'gal ba med pa kho na'o // de lta ma yin na tha dad pa med pa'i phyir zhes bya ba yang brjod par mi bya bar 'gyur ro //[3]

§58. de la tha dad pa med pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs 'di gal te don dam pa'i dbang du byas nas brjod na ni de'i tshe ma nges pa yin te / byas pa dang mi rtag pa lta bu don dam par tha dad pa med pa yin yang go bar bya ba dang go bar byed pa'i dngos po mthong ba'i phyir ro // 'on te tha snyad du yang 'di la tha (G307a) dad pa med do zhes bya bar 'dod na ni de ma grub ste / ldog pa'i bye brag gis nye bar (N239a) brtags pa'i tha dad pa yod (C220a) pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar sgra la sogs pa'i chos can byas pa ma yin pa la sogs pa las log pa nyid du nges pa na /[4] rtag pa la sogs pa las log par nges par 'gyur bas yang dag par tha dad pa med kyang ldog pa'i bye brag la ltos[5] nas byas pa nyid dang / mi rtag pa nyid dag tha dad par rnam par gzhag[6] par nye bar brtags te[7] go bar bya ba dang / go bar byed pa'i dngos po rnam par gzhag[8] go // de bzhin du dngos po rnams yang dag par na gzugs brnyan la sogs pa bzhin du gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin las ldog pa na don dam pa pa'i ngo bo nyid las kyang ldog par nges pas de'i phyir ldog pa'i bye brag la ltos[9] pas byas pa'i tha dad pa yod pa'i phyir go bar bya ba dang /[10] go bar byed pa'i dngos por 'gyur ro // yang ji ltar dngos po rtag pa don byed pa'i nus pa las log pa nyid kyis dngos po'i ngo bo nyid las log pa nyid du sgrub pa ltar gzhan la yang de dang 'dra bas 'gal ba med pa nyid do //

§59. gang yang gal te 'di gnyis kyi[11] tha dad pa[12] ldog pa'i bye brag gis byas pa zhig yin na de'i tshe dngos po nyid du 'gyur te / sngon po dang[13] ser po'i bdag nyid dag[14] (P245b) lta bu'o zhes smras pa

§60. de yang 'brel pa med de[15] / byas pa dang mi rtag pa nyid la sogs pas ma nges pa'i phyir ro // byas pa nyid dang mi rtag pa nyid dag (D221b)

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[1] CD gyi: GNP gyi /. [2] CDNP no: G no /. [3] CDNP 'gyur ro //: G 'gyur ro // de lta ma yin na tha dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba yang brjod par mi 'gyur ro //. [4] CD /: GNP om. [5] CD ltos: GNP bltos. [6] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [7] D te: C de; GNP te /. [8] CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag. [9] CD ltos: GNP bltos. [10] CD /: GNP om. [11] CDGNP kyis. However, kyis should be emended to kyi. [12] CD pa: GNP pa'i. [13] CD dang: GNP dang /. [14] GNP bdag nyid dag: CD bdag nyid. [15] DGNP de: C do.

gi[1] tha dad pa ldog pas byas zhes te / 'di tsam gyis de gnyis dngos por ni mi 'gyur ro // ji (G307b) ltar rtag pa'i dngos po dgag pa[2] la don byed pa'i nus pa dang bral ba dang / ngo bo nyid med pa ldog pas byas pa'i bye brag yod kyang dngos po nyid du mi 'gyur ba ltar gzhan la yang de dang 'dra bas 'di ni gyi na'o // gang yang sngon po dang ser po'i bdag nyid dag lta bu'o zhes dpe nyid[3] du smras pa de yang (N239b) don dam pa pa'i dngos po'i ngo bo nyid du ma grub pa'i phyir rigs pa ma yin pa nyid do //

§61. gang yang ma yin pa'i phyogs la nyes pa smras pa de yang rigs pa ma yin pa kho na ste / ma yin pa'i tshul du brjod ces te / 'di tsam gyis ni 'ga' yang gang du yang[4] don dam pa pa'i dngos po nyid du ma grub ste / nam mkha' la sogs pa brtags pa lus can ma yin pa la sogs pa'i tshig tu brjod kyang dngos po med pa'i phyir ro[5] // de la blo la yod pa'i chos can sngar bshad pa (C220b) gang yin pa de yang ma yin pa'i tshul gyis de skad du[6] brjod mod kyi / 'on kyang 'di yang dag pa pa'i dngos po nyid du rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin no // dngos po yod par smra ba rnams la yang gang gis na grub pa sgrub pa nyid du 'gyur ba gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i dngos po yang dag pa de ni cung zad kyang med de / de ni rtog pa'i yul yang ma yin pa'i phyir dang / gcig dang du ma dag gis kyang rang bzhin thams cad la khyab par sngar bsgrub pa'i phyir ro // don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa sgyu ma la sogs pa dang khyad par med pa de lta bu la yang dngos po zhes ming du 'dogs na ni cung zad kyang gnod pa med de / khyed nyid[7] la khas blangs pa'i phyogs nyams (P246a) pa'i sgo nas gnod pa 'ba' zhig (G308a) tu zad de / de'i phyir gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid ma yin no //

§62. 'gal ba nyid kyang ma yin te / gzugs brnyan la sogs pa mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa'i phyir ro // gzugs brnyan la sogs pa'i dngos po ni gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin don dam pa par rung ba ma yin te / de yang yang dag par na shes pa dang shes bya'i ngo bo nyid du yang dag par ma grub bo zhes sngar bstan zin to //

§63. ji ltar[8] gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i mtshan nyid (D222a) kyi gtan tshigs bdag med par bsgrub[9] pa ltar chos can dngos po med pa yang de dang 'dra bas chos can las bzlog pa sgrub[10] pa'i phyir gtan tshigs 'gal (N240a) ba yin no zhes smras pa gang yin pa

§64. de ni gcig tu tshad mas mngon par mi shes pa nyid 'ba' zhig tu zad

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[1] CDGNP gis. However, gis should be emended to gi. [2] GNP dgag pa: CD dag. [3] GNP dpe nyid: CD dpe de nyid. [4] CD 'ga' yang gang du yang: GNP 'ga' yang. [5] GNP phyir ro: CD phyir rigs pa ma yin pa nyid do. [6] CD du: GNP om. [7] GNP nyid: CD gnyis. [8] CDGNP 'di ltar. However, 'di ltar should be emended to ji ltar. [9] GNP bsgrub: CD bsgrubs. [10] GNP sgrub: CD bsgrub.

de / gal te chos can dngos po'i ngo bor bsgrub[1] par 'dod par 'gyur na ni de'i tshe de las ldog pa sgrub pa'i phyir gtan tshigs 'gal bar yang 'gyur ba zhig na / gang gi tshe de ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du sgrub par byed pa[2] de'i tshe ji ltar rgol ba'i 'dod pa grub[3] kyang gtan tshigs 'gal ba nyid du 'gyur / rang bzhin med pa nyid du sgrub pa la ni dngos po'i ngo bo chos can nyid du yang mi 'gyur te / rjes su mthun pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes sngar bstan zin to // de'i phyir bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub pas[4] ji skad bshad pa la chos can dngos por gyur pa ma yin pa kho nar 'dod pa'i phyir ji ltar[5] (G308b) gtan tshigs de las bzlog pa bsgrub pa nyid yin / dngos po'i ngo bo (C221a) nyid du sgrub pa la ni de las[6] bzlog pa sgrub par 'gyur ro // 'di'i phyir[7] ji ltar gtan tshigs 'di bdag med pa sgrub par byed pa ltar chos can dngos po med pa yang de dang 'dra'o zhes brjod pa 'di yang 'brel pa med pa yin te / bdag med pa dang dngos po med pa dag la ni gang gis na[8] chos gnyis grub par brjod pas gtan tshigs 'gal ba nyid du (P246b) brjod par 'gyur pa ldog pas kyang phan tshun tha dad pa yod pa ma yin te / de gnyis ni rnam grangs kyi ngo bo yin pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir ji ltar bdag med pa sgrub par byed pa de bzhin du bdag med pa sgrub par byed do zhes smras par 'gyur te / mngon par brjod pa la mkhas pa de lta bu[9] su zhig la yod par 'gyur /

§65. de lta bas na chos thams cad don dam par ngo bo nyid[10] med pa nyid du grub pa kho na yin no //

§66. gtan tshigs 'di ni bcom ldan 'das nyid kyis bka' stsal te /

dper na me long ngos la ni //[11]
gcig dang gzhan (N240b) nyid spangs pa'i gzugs //[12]
snang yang de na yod min ltar //
dngos la ngo bo nyid de bzhin //

zhes bshad pa gang yin pa'o //

de'i phyir rang bzhin med par bsgrub par bya ba la gtan tshigs cung zad kyang med do zhes (G309a) smras pa gang yin pa de yang lan btab (D222b)
C221a4,D222b1 pa yin no //
G309a1,N240b2
P246b4

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[1] CD bsgrub: GNP sgrub. [2] GNP sgrub par byed pa: CD grub pa la sgrub par byed pa. [3] CD 'dod pa grub: G 'dod pa 'grub; NP 'dod par 'grub. [4] CD pas: GNP par. [5] CDGNP 'di ltar. However, 'di ltar should be emended to ji ltar. [6] CD de las: GNP om. [7] CDGNP 'di'i. However, 'di'i should be emended to 'di'i phyir. [8] GNP gang gis na: CD gang gis ni. [9] GNP bu: CD bu lta. [10] CD ngo bo nyid: GNP ngo bo. [11] CDNP //: G /. [12] CDNP //: G /.

Indices

Sanskrit terms

References are to page numbers. Certain extremely frequent terms are deliberately not included.

PH

B

Tibetan terms

References are to page numbers.

Na

Pa

Pha

La

Sha

Sa

Ha

Chinese terms

References are to page numbers.

Index locorum

References are to the notes in which the quotations figure

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